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ISCR Case 09-01595.a1 — CASE

ISCR Case 09-01595.a1denied

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 09-01595.a1

Nov 6, 2009· Hon. Jean E. Smallin· appeal

Summary

A former military member, who had continuously held a security clearance since 1984, was denied a security clearance due to concerns under Guideline E (Personal Conduct) and Guideline F (Financial Considerations). The applicant had five delinquent debts, totaling approximately $12,800. Additionally, she provided an incorrect answer on her security clearance application concerning her debts.

The judge determined that the applicant did not meet her burden of persuasion for mitigation regarding these issues. Specifically, disqualifying conditions under Adjudicative Guidelines Paragraphs 15 and 20 were raised.

Ultimately, the appeal board affirmed the denial of the applicant's security clearance, concluding that the presented mitigating factors were insufficient to overcome the established security concerns.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 20raisedFinancial Considerations
AG ¶ 15raisedPersonal Conduct

Key Rule Quoted

“The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’”
— Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988)

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedMar 19, 2009
Answer filed—Applicant requested a decision on the written record.
Hearing heldAug 28, 2009Decision made by Administrative Judge Paul J. Mason.
Decision dateNov 6, 2009Appeal affirmed by the board.

Cite For

Disqualifying Conditions Under Guideline E and F Due to Financial Issues and Personal Conduct
Burden of Persuasion for Mitigation Not Met
Affirmation of Adverse Decisions Based on the Egan Standard

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

Appeal at a glance· Full written decision

Affirmed

The appeal involved a denial of a security clearance based on financial considerations and personal conduct. The applicant contended that the Judge's decision was arbitrary and capricious. The Board affirmed the Judge's decision, finding no error in the ruling.

Appealed bythe applicant

Applicant representationPro se (self-represented)

Judge belowPaul J. Mason — denied the clearance

Decided onthe written record

Guidelines belowGuideline FGuideline E

What the Board reviewed

Decision arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law — raised by the applicantRejected
The applicant argued that the Judge's adverse security clearance decision was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.

Why the Board ruled this way

The Board found no harmful error in the Judge's decision, affirming that the adverse decision was sustainable based on the record and the Egan standard.

Standard of review applied

Harmful-error gatekeeperSubstantial-evidence reviewArbitrary-and-capricious reviewProcedural complianceNo de-novo re-decisionNo new evidence on appealDeference to the judge’s credibility calls

Appeal Board panel

Jean E. Smallin
William S. Fields
James E. Moody

Descriptive structured reading of this decided, public Appeal Board decision — what the case says, not a prediction or advice.

Full decision

The complete, official text — footnotes and signatures included — is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

APPEAL

SYNOPSIS

KEYWORD: Guideline F; Guideline E DIGEST: Viewed in light of the record as a whole and the Egan standard, the Judge’s adverse decision is sustainable. Adverse decision affirmed. CASENO: 09-01595.a1 DATE: 11/06/2009 DATE: November 6, 2009 In Re: ---- Applicant for Security Clearance ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 09-01595

APPEAL BOARD DECISION

APPEARANCES

FOR GOVERNMENT James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel FOR APPLICANT Pro Se The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance. On March 19, 2009, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis for that decision–security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) and Guideline E (Personal Conduct) of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as The Board cannot consider the information Applicant provided in her appeal brief concerning the origin of her debts and her plans to pay them off in the future, since it constitutes new evidence. See Directive ¶ E3.1.29. amended) (Directive). Applicant requested a decision on the written record. On August 28, 2009, after considering the record, Administrative Judge Paul J. Mason denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance. Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30. Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse security clearance decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. Finding no error, we affirm. The Judge found that Applicant had served in the U.S. military from 1983 until 2005 and had held a security clearance since 1984. She has five delinquent debts, totaling approximately $12,800. They became delinquent between 2002 and 2005. Additionally, Applicant answered “no” to the question on the security clearance application (SCA) inquiring whether she had debts more than 180 days delinquent. This answer was not correct. The Judge concluded that these facts establish disqualifying conditions under the Directive. In analyzing Applicant’s case for mitigation, he concluded that her military experience and history of holding a security clearance militated against an innocent mistake in providing the false answer to the SCA. Regarding the debts, the Judge stated that Applicant’s having failed to respond to the file of relevant material resulted in numerous unanswered questions about her finances–questions about the reasons for her delinquent debts, her plans to pay them off, etc. As a consequence, the Judge concluded that Applicant had not met her burden of persuasion as to mitigation. Viewed in light of the record as a whole and of the Egan standard, the Judge’s adverse decision is sustainable. See Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988) (“The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’”).

ORDER

The Judge’s adverse security clearance decision is AFFIRMED.

Signed: Jean E. Smallin Jean E. Smallin Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board Signed: William S. Fields William S. Fields Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board Signed: James E. Moody James E. Moody Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board