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ISCR Case 18-02584 — CASE

ISCR Case 18-02584denied

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 18-02584

deniedSep 30, 2019· Hon. Richard A. Cefola· hearing

Summary

A 37-year-old defense contractor was denied a security clearance due to concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), Guideline D (Sexual Behavior), and Guideline E (Personal Conduct). The administrative judge determined that the applicant's actions created vulnerabilities to exploitation and coercion.

Specifically, the applicant admitted to providing over $41,000 in financial support to 19 foreign-national women he met through a pornographic social website. He also electronically transmitted sexually explicit photos of himself to two of these women. In 2016, he traveled to Colombia to meet three of the foreign-national women, engaged in sexual relations with two, and maintained a continuing romantic relationship with one.

These actions raised concerns that his connections to foreign nationals created a potential conflict of interest and made him vulnerable to foreign pressure or coercion. His pattern of high-risk sexual behavior with foreign nationals also questioned his judgment and reliability, ultimately leading to the denial of his security clearance.

Why the Applicant Was Denied

The applicant admitted to providing over $41,000 in financial support to 19 foreign-national women, raising concerns of foreign influence.
The applicant engaged in questionable sexual conduct with foreign nationals, creating vulnerabilities to coercion and exploitation.
The applicant's continuing questionable conduct demonstrated a lack of judgment and reliability.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 7(a)raisedForeign Influence - Contact with Foreign Nationals
AG ¶ 7(b)raisedForeign Influence - Potential Conflict of Interest
AG ¶ 7(i)raisedForeign Influence - Vulnerability to Exploitation
AG ¶ 13(b)raisedSexual Behavior - Pattern of High-risk Behavior
AG ¶ 13(c)raisedSexual Behavior - Vulnerability to Coercion
AG ¶ 13(d)raisedSexual Behavior - Lack of Discretion
AG ¶ 16(e)raisedPersonal Conduct - Vulnerability to Exploitation

Key Rule Quoted

“A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence.”

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedApr 16, 2019
Answer filedMay 3, 2019
Hearing heldAug 13, 2019
Decision dateSep 30, 2019

Cite For

Vulnerability to Exploitation Due to Financial Support of Foreign Nationals Under Guideline B
Questionable Sexual Conduct Raising Security Concerns Under Guideline D
Lack of Discretion in Personal Conduct Leading to Security Risks Under Guideline E

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline B (Foreign Influence) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: HearingDecided: denied

The judge found that the applicant's connections to foreign-national women created a potential conflict of interest and made him vulnerable to pressure or coercion by foreign interests. The applicant admitted to providing significant financial support to these individuals and engaging in questionable conduct, which the judge ruled raised disqualifying conditions under Guideline B. Consequently, the application for a security clearance was denied.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
2.a	Applicant's connections to foreign-national women create a potential conflict of interest and make him vulnerable to pressure or coercion by foreign interests.	Against Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	—	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	—	—

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline B). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline D (Sexual Behavior) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: HearingDecided: denied

The judge found that the Applicant's pattern of high-risk sexual behavior with foreign nationals raised significant concerns regarding his judgment and reliability. The evidence indicated that this behavior created vulnerabilities to exploitation and coercion, leading to a ruling against the Applicant.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Type	Response	Disqualifying (¶13)	Mitigating applied (¶14)	Mitigation
3.a	Applicant's pattern of high-risk sexual behavior with foreign nationals raises questions about his judgment and reliability.	Against Applicant	Compulsive Sexual Behavior	Admitted	(a) sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the individual has been prosecuted	—	—

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline D). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline E (Personal Conduct) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: HearingDecided: denied

The judge found against the applicant on all allegations under Guideline E, citing significant financial support and questionable sexual conduct with foreign-national women. This conduct raised concerns about vulnerability to exploitation and a lack of discretion, leading to a denial of the security clearance.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Conduct	Concealed Issue	Response	Disqualifying (¶16)	Mitigating applied (¶17)	Mitigation
1.a	Applicant has provided in excess of $41,000 in financial support to 19 foreign-national women that he met through a pornographic social web site.	Against Applicant	Questionable Judgment General	—	Admitted	—	—	—
1.b	Applicant has electronically transmitted sexually explicit photos of himself to two of the foreign-national women.	Against Applicant	Questionable Judgment General	—	Admitted	—	—	—
1.c	In 2016, Applicant traveled to Columbia to meet three of the foreign-national women, had sexual relations with two of these Colombians, and a continuing romantic relationship with one of these foreign nationals.	Against Applicant	Questionable Judgment General	—	Admitted	—	—	—

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline E). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Full decision

The complete, official text — footnotes and signatures included — is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

In the matter of: )

)

ISCR Case No. 18-02584

)

) Applicant for Security Clearance )

For Government: Tara Kaorian, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se

September 30, 2019 ______________

STATEMENT OF CASE

______________

CEFOLA, Richard A., Administrative Judge:

Statement of the Case

On April 16, 2019, in accordance with DoD Directive 5220.6, as amended (Directive), the Department of Defense issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging facts that raise security concerns under Guidelines E, B, and D. The SOR further informed Applicant that, based on information available to the government, DoD adjudicators could not make the preliminary affirmative finding it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant’s security clearance.

Applicant answered the SOR on May 3, 2019, and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. (Answer.) The case was assigned to me on July 2, 2019. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a notice of hearing on July 9, 2019, scheduling the hearing for August 13, 2019. The hearing was convened as scheduled. The Government offered Exhibits (GXs) 1 through 4, which were admitted without objection. Applicant testified on his own behalf, but offered no Exhibits. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (TR) on August 22, 2019.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Applicant admitted all the allegations in SOR. After a thorough and careful review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, I make the following findings of fact.

Applicant is a 37-year-old employee of a defense contractor. (GX 1 at pages 5 and 12.) He has been employed with the defense contractor since about February of 2016. (GX 1 at page 12.)

Guideline E - Personal Conduct, Guideline B - Foreign Influence & Guideline D - Sexual Behavior

1.a., and 2.a. From about September of 2014 and continuing, Applicant has provided in excess of $41,000 in financial support to 19 foreign-national women that he met through a pornographic social web site. (TR at page 15 line 10 to page 23 line 3, at page 28 line 10 to page 31 line 19.) Three of these women are from Romania, three from Mexico, 13 from Colombia, and two are from Peru. (Id.) Applicant does not know if any of these women are foreign intelligence assets. (TR at page 32 line 3 to page 33 line 10.)

1.b., 2.a., and 3.a. Applicant has electronically transmitted sexually explicit photos of himself to two of the foreign-national women, noted above. (TR at page 14 lines 6–15, and at page 34 lines 3–13.) They know that Applicant is an American. (TR at page 27 line 8 to page 28 line 9.)

1.c., 2.a., and 3.a. In 2016, Applicant traveled to Columbia to meet three of the foreign-national women, noted above. (TR at page 14 lines 16–23, and at page 23 line 4 to page 27 line 7.) He had sexual relations with two of these Colombians, and a continuing romantic relationship with one these foreign nationals. (Id.)

POLICIES

When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.

These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in conjunction with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(a), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.

The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.

Directive ¶ E3.1.14, requires the Government to present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an “applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”

A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.

Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).

ANALYSIS

Guideline E - Personal Conduct

The security concern relating to the guideline for Personal Conduct is set out in AG ¶ 15:

Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure to cooperate or provide truthful and candid answers during national security investigative or adjudicative processes.

The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 16. One is potentially applicable in this case:

(e) personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's conduct, that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress by a

foreign intelligence entity or other individual or group. Such conduct includes:

(1) engaging in activities which, if known, could affect the person's personal, professional, or community standing.

Applicant has provided significant monies, and engaged in questionable sexual conduct, with foreign nationals. As a result, he is vulnerable to exploitation, manipulation, and duress. The evidence is sufficient to raise this disqualifying condition.

AG ¶ 17 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 17 including:

(c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;

(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that contributed to untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur; and

(e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress.

Applicant remains vulnerable to coercion. Despite receiving an SOR noting the Government’s concerns, the questionable conduct continues. This demonstrates questionable judgment. None of the above mitigating conditions apply. Personal Conduct is found against Applicant.

Guideline B - Foreign Influence

The security concern relating to the guideline for Foreign Influence is set out in AG ¶ 6:

Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations

such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism.

The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 7. Three are potentially applicable in this case:

(a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;

(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information or technology; and

(i) conduct, especially while traveling or residing outside the U.S., that may make the individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign person, group, government, or country.

Applicant has continuing, questionable conduct vis-à-vis foreign-national women. The evidence is sufficient to raise these disqualifying conditions.

AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 including:

(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States;

(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and

(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation

None of these apply. Applicant is clearly influenced by foreign nationals. Foreign Influence is found against Applicant.

Guideline D - Sexual Behavior

The security concern relating to the guideline for Sexual Behavior is set out in AG ¶ 12:

Sexual behavior that involves a criminal offense; reflects a lack of judgment or discretion; or may subject the individual to undue influence of coercion, exploitation, or duress. These issues, together or individually, may raise questions about an individual's judgment, reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Sexual behavior includes conduct occurring in person or via audio, visual, electronic, or written transmission. No adverse inference concerning the standards in this Guideline may be raised solely on the basis of the sexual orientation of the individual.

The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 13. Three are potentially applicable in this case:

(b) a pattern of compulsive, self-destructive, or high-risk sexual behavior that the individual is unable to stop;

(d) sexual behavior of a public nature or that reflects lack of discretion or judgment.

Applicant continues his high-risk sexual relationships with foreign nationals. This represents a pattern of high-risk sexual behavior that reflects a lack of discretion or judgment. It also creates a vulnerability to coercion, as discussed above under Guideline E. The evidence is sufficient to raise these disqualifying conditions.

AG ¶ 14 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 14 including:

(a) the behavior occurred prior to or during adolescence and there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;

(b) the sexual behavior happened so long ago, so infrequently, or under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or judgment;

(d) the sexual behavior is strictly private, consensual, and discreet.

None of the above mitigating conditions apply. There is nothing discreet about Applicant’s continuing questionable conduct. This makes him susceptible to coercion, exploitation, or duress. Sexual Behavior is found against Applicant.

WHOLE PERSON CONCEPT

Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):

(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall common-sense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.

I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments under Guidelines E, B, and D in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(d) were addressed under those guidelines, but some warrant additional comment.

Applicant remains vulnerable to coercion. Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions or doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant failed to mitigate the personal conduct, sexual behavior, and foreign influence security concerns.

FORMAL FINDINGS

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1, Guideline E:

AGAINST APPLICANT

Subparagraphs 1.a.~1.c:

Against Applicant

Paragraph 2, Guideline B:

AGAINST APPLICANT

Subparagraph 2.a:

Against Applicant

AGAINST APPLICANT

Subparagraph 3.a: Paragraph 3, Guideline D:

Against Applicant

CONCLUSION

In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.

________________________ Richard A. Cefola Administrative Judge