ISCR Case 18-02984

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 18-02984

grantedMar 31, 2020· Hon. Wilford H. Ross· hearing

Summary

This case concerns a 38-year-old native-born American citizen and global intelligence analyst whose security clearance was challenged under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The Statement of Reasons cited his wife's family in Taiwan, including her mother, father, and brother, who are all citizens and residents there. Additionally, his wife worked for a Taiwanese government organization in the U.S. from 2009 until approximately 2013, when she became an American citizen.

During investigations, the applicant stated his wife suspected a former colleague at the Taiwanese organization, Mr. A, might have been a Taiwanese intelligence agent. The applicant met Mr. A twice socially, but they have had no contact since 2013. The record contained no further evidence to support the claim that Mr. A was an intelligence agent.

Despite these concerns, the administrative judge GRANTED the security clearance. The decision highlighted the applicant's minimal contact with his wife's family in Taiwan and the couple's candid discussions with investigators about their Taiwanese connections. Furthermore, the judge noted that the applicant's wife is a naturalized American citizen, which mitigated potential foreign influence concerns.

Why the Applicant Prevailed

The applicant has minimal contact with his wife's family in Taiwan.
The applicant and his wife openly discussed their connections to Taiwan with investigators.
The applicant's wife is a naturalized American citizen, reducing potential foreign influence.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 7(a)raisedContact with Foreign Family Members
AG ¶ 7(b)raisedConnections to Foreign Persons Creating Potential Conflict of Interest
AG ¶ 7(e)raisedShared Living Quarters with Foreign Contacts
AG ¶ 7(g)raisedUnauthorized Association with a Suspected Foreign Intelligence Agent

Mitigating

AG ¶ 8(a)appliedNature of Relationships with Foreign Persons Unlikely to Create Conflict
AG ¶ 8(b)appliedMinimal Conflict of Interest Due to Strong U.S. Ties
AG ¶ 8(c)appliedCasual and Infrequent Contact with Foreign Citizens
AG ¶ 8(e)appliedPrompt Compliance with Reporting Requirements Regarding Foreign Contacts

Key Rule Quoted

“The mere possession of close family ties with a person in a foreign country is not, as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B.”

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedMar 6, 2019
Answer filedMar 29, 2019Applicant requested decision on written record.
Hearing held—Decision made based on written record.
Decision dateMar 31, 2020

Cite For

Mitigation of Foreign Influence Concerns Under Guideline B
Minimal Contact with Foreign Relatives as a Mitigating Factor
Importance of Open Communication with Investigators Regarding Foreign Connections

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
1.a	Applicant’s mother-in-law, father-in-law, and brother-in-law are citizens and residents of Taiwan.	For Applicant	In Law in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Taiwan HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk (e) promptly complied with reporting requirements	Claimed Other
1.b	Applicant’s wife worked for a Taiwanese government organization in the United States from 2009 until about the time she became an American citizen in 2013.	For Applicant	Spouse Dual or Foreign Citizen Immediate Family GOVT-AFFILIATED	Taiwan HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk (e) promptly complied with reporting requirements	Claimed Other
1.c	During both investigations Applicant stated his wife believed another employee of the Taiwanese organization where she worked was a possible Taiwanese intelligence agent (Mr. A).	For Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other GOVT-AFFILIATED	Taiwan HEIGHTENED RISK	Denied	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk (e) promptly complied with reporting requirements	Claimed Other
1.d	Applicant met Mr. A twice in casual social situations.	For Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other GOVT-AFFILIATED	Taiwan HEIGHTENED RISK	Denied	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk (e) promptly complied with reporting requirements	Claimed Other
1.e	They have had no contact with Mr. A since Applicant’s wife left that employment in 2013.	For Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other GOVT-AFFILIATED	Taiwan HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk (e) promptly complied with reporting requirements	Claimed Other
1.f	This is the only evidence in the available record to support the alleged fact that Mr. A was a Taiwanese intelligence agent.	For Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other GOVT-AFFILIATED	Taiwan HEIGHTENED RISK	Denied	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk (e) promptly complied with reporting requirements	Claimed Other
1.g	He denied allegation 1.g.	For Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	—	Denied	—	—	—

Allegation

Finding

Relationship

Country

Response

Disqualifying (¶7)

Mitigating applied (¶8)

Mitigation

1.a

Applicant’s mother-in-law, father-in-law, and brother-in-law are citizens and residents of Taiwan.

For Applicant

In Law in Foreign Country

Immediate Family

Taiwan

HEIGHTENED RISK

Admitted

(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation

(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely

(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.

(c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk

(e) promptly complied with reporting requirements

Claimed

Other

1.b

Applicant’s wife worked for a Taiwanese government organization in the United States from 2009 until about the time she became an American citizen in 2013.

For Applicant

Spouse Dual or Foreign Citizen

Immediate Family

GOVT-AFFILIATED

Taiwan

HEIGHTENED RISK

Admitted

(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation

(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely

(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.

(c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk

(e) promptly complied with reporting requirements

Claimed

Other

1.c

During both investigations Applicant stated his wife believed another employee of the Taiwanese organization where she worked was a possible Taiwanese intelligence agent (Mr. A).

For Applicant

Unspecified Foreign Relationship

Other

GOVT-AFFILIATED

Taiwan

HEIGHTENED RISK

Denied

(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation

(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely

(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.

(c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk

(e) promptly complied with reporting requirements

Claimed

Other

1.d

Applicant met Mr. A twice in casual social situations.

For Applicant

Unspecified Foreign Relationship

Other

GOVT-AFFILIATED

Taiwan

HEIGHTENED RISK

Denied

(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation

(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely

(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.

(c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk

(e) promptly complied with reporting requirements

Claimed

Other

1.e

They have had no contact with Mr. A since Applicant’s wife left that employment in 2013.

For Applicant

Unspecified Foreign Relationship

Other

GOVT-AFFILIATED

Taiwan

HEIGHTENED RISK

Admitted

(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation

(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely

(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.

(c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk

(e) promptly complied with reporting requirements

Claimed

Other

1.f

This is the only evidence in the available record to support the alleged fact that Mr. A was a Taiwanese intelligence agent.

For Applicant

Unspecified Foreign Relationship

Other

GOVT-AFFILIATED

Taiwan

HEIGHTENED RISK

Denied

(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation

(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely

(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.

(c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk

(e) promptly complied with reporting requirements

Claimed

Other

1.g

He denied allegation 1.g.

For Applicant

Unspecified Foreign Relationship

Other

—

Denied

—

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Case Profile

Summary

Why the Applicant Prevailed

Conditions Referenced

Key Rule Quoted

Procedural Posture

Cite For

Full decision

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

STATEMENT OF CASE

PROCEDURAL RULINGS

FINDINGS OF FACT

POLICIES

ANALYSIS

WHOLE PERSON CONCEPT

FORMAL FINDINGS

CONCLUSION