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ISCR Case 16-01652.h1 — CASE

ISCR Case 16-01652.h1granted

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 16-01652.h1

grantedJan 24, 2017· Hon. Mark W. Harvey· hearing

Summary

This case concerns a 34-year-old U.S. citizen and linguist, originally from Afghanistan, who was granted a security clearance despite concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The Statement of Reasons highlighted the applicant's extensive family ties in Afghanistan, including his mother, father, step-mother, brothers, sisters, mother-in-law, and father-in-law, all of whom are citizens and residents of Afghanistan. Additionally, the applicant's father was identified as a retired field grade officer in the Afghan military, and the applicant provides financial support to his relatives living in Afghanistan.

Disqualifying conditions under Guideline B were raised, specifically regarding immediate family members who are foreign citizens, close and continuing contact with foreign citizens, and financial ties to foreign citizens. However, the judge applied several mitigating conditions.

The security clearance was granted due to the applicant's honorable service as a U.S. linguist for over eight years in a dangerous environment, where he made substantial contributions to U.S. national security. The judge determined that these factors, along with the applicant's character, mitigated the foreign influence security concerns.

Why the Applicant Prevailed

The applicant served honorably as a U.S. linguist in a dangerous environment for over eight years.
He provided substantial contributions to U.S. national security.
The judge found that foreign influence security concerns were mitigated by the applicant's character and service record.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 7(a)raisedContact with Foreign Family Members
AG ¶ 7(b)raisedConnections to Foreign Persons
AG ¶ 7(d)raisedSharing Living Quarters with Foreign Citizens

Mitigating

AG ¶ 8(a)appliedThe Nature of the Applicant's Service
AG ¶ 8(b)appliedThe Applicant's Family Ties Are Not Disqualifying
AG ¶ 8(c)appliedThe Applicant's Financial Support Is Directed to Family in the U.S.

Key Rule Quoted

“The mere possession of close family ties with one or more family members living in Afghanistan, is not, as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B.”

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedJun 30, 2016
Answer filedAug 2, 2016Applicant waived his right to a hearing.
Hearing held—No hearing was held.
Decision dateJan 24, 2017

Cite For

Mitigation of Foreign Influence Concerns Under Guideline B
The Impact of Honorable Military Service on Security Clearance Decisions
The Non-disqualifying Nature of Family Ties in Foreign Countries Under Guideline B

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline B (Foreign Influence) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: granted

The judge found that the applicant's foreign influence concerns were mitigated, leading to a decision to grant eligibility for access to classified information. The applicant admitted to having family ties in Afghanistan but provided sufficient mitigating information to alleviate security concerns.

Country conditions:the decision took administrative notice of official facts about the foreign country (the Government’s country submission).

U.S. ties the decision noted: Naturalized U.S. Citizen · U.S. Spouse or Partner · U.S. Children · U.S. Home or Property · U.S. Career or Business

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
1.a	Applicant has the following relatives who are citizens and residents of Afghanistan: mother; father; step-mother; brothers; sisters; mother-in-law; and father-in-law.	For Applicant	Parent in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Afghanistan HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (d) counterintelligence information indicating unacceptable risk	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Claimed Deep U.S. Ties Claimed Foreign Assets Divested
1.b	Applicant’s father is a retired field grade officer who served in the Afghan military.	For Applicant	Parent in Foreign Country Immediate Family	Afghanistan HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (d) counterintelligence information indicating unacceptable risk	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Claimed Deep U.S. Ties Claimed Foreign Assets Divested
1.c	Applicant provides financial support to his relatives living in Afghanistan.	For Applicant	Financial Support to Foreign Relative Immediate Family	Afghanistan HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (d) counterintelligence information indicating unacceptable risk	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Claimed Deep U.S. Ties Claimed Foreign Assets Divested
1.d–1.f	3 sub-charges — specific text not stated in this decision (for the applicant). (low confidence)	For Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	—		—	—	—
1.g	Applicant provides financial support to his relatives living in Afghanistan.	For Applicant	Financial Support to Foreign Relative Immediate Family	Afghanistan HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (d) counterintelligence information indicating unacceptable risk	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Claimed Deep U.S. Ties Claimed Foreign Assets Divested

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline B). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Full decision

The complete, official text — footnotes and signatures included — is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 16-01652 ) ) Applicant for Security Clearance

For Government: Nicole A. Smith, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se

01/24/2017 __________

STATEMENT OF CASE

__________

HARVEY, Mark, Administrative Judge:

Applicant served honorably as a U.S. linguist in a dangerous environment for more than eight years, and he has made substantial contributions to the national security of the United States. His parents, spouse, and children emigrated from Afghanistan to the United States. Foreign influence security concerns are mitigated, and eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

Statement of the Case

On April 22, 2015, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for National Security Positions (SF 86) or security clearance application (SCA). (Item 3) On June 30, 2016, the Department of Defense (DOD) Consolidated Adjudications Facility (CAF) issued an SOR to Applicant, pursuant to Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry, dated February 20, 1960, as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Directive), dated January 2, 1992, as amended; and the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information (AG), which became effective on September 1, 2006.

The SOR alleged security concerns under Guideline B (foreign influence). The SOR recommended referral to an administrative judge to determine whether Applicant’s clearance should be granted, continued, denied, or revoked. (Item 1) On August 2, 2016, Applicant responded to the SOR allegation and waived his right to a hearing. (Item 2) On September 14, 2016, Department Counsel completed the file of relevant material (FORM). On October 19, 2016, Applicant was provided a copy of the FORM. Applicant did not submit a response to the FORM. On December 3, 2016, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals referred this case for decision. On January 11, 2016, the case was assigned to me.

PROCEDURAL RULINGS

Department Counsel offered six exhibits for administrative notice concerning foreign influence security concerns raised by Applicant’s connections to Afghanistan. (Item 5; I-VI) Administrative or official notice is the appropriate type of notice used for administrative proceedings. See ISCR Case No. 05-11292 at 4 n.1 (App. Bd. Apr. 12, 2007); ISCR Case No. 02-24875 at 2 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2006) (citing ISCR Case No. 02-18668 at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 10, 2004) and McLeod v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 802 F.2d 89, 93 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986)). Usually administrative notice at ISCR proceedings is accorded to facts that are either well known or from government reports. See Stein, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, Section 25.01 (Bender & Co. 2006) (listing fifteen types of facts for administrative notice). Applicant did not object to me taking administrative notice of the proffered documents, and Department Counsel’s request is granted.

Findings of Fact1

Applicant admitted the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.c, 1.e, 1.f, and 1.g, and he provided explanations and mitigating information. (Item 2) His admissions are incorporated herein as findings of fact. After a complete and thorough review of the evidence of record, I make the following findings of fact.

SOR ¶¶ 1.a through 1.fallege he has the following relatives who are citizens and residents of Afghanistan: mother; father; step-mother; brothers; sisters; mother-in-law; and father-in-law. (Item 1) SOR ¶ 1.balso alleges Applicant’s father is a retired field grade officer who served in the Afghan military. (Item 1) SOR ¶ 1.galleges Applicant provides financial support to his relatives living in Afghanistan. (Item 1)

Applicant is a 34-year-old linguist, who is employed by a government contractor in Afghanistan. (Items 2-4) He was born in Afghanistan, and he graduated from high school in Afghanistan. (Items 3, 4) In 2008, he received a bachelor’s degree in Afghanistan. (Item 3) In 2009, he emigrated from Afghanistan to the United States, and in 2014, he was naturalized as a U.S. citizen. (Items 3, 4)

In 2005, Applicant married. (Items 3, 4) His spouse and two oldest children were born in Afghanistan. (Items 3, 4) His five children were born in 2006, 2008, 2011, 2014, and 2015. (Item 3) In 2010, his spouse and two oldest children emigrated from Afghanistan to the United States. (Item 4) Applicant lives with his spouse when he is not deployed to Afghanistan, and she is a citizen of Afghanistan. (Item 4) The record does not indicate whether she is a permanent resident or a citizen of the United States. The SOR does not allege a security concern arising from her Afghan citizenship or the status of her U.S. citizenship. His three youngest children were born in the United States. (Items 3, 4) Applicant’s spouse and five children live in the United States with Applicant’s step brother and parents. (Items 2, 4)

Applicant’s father was born in 1945, and his mother was born in 1966. (Item 2) They were born in Afghanistan. (Item 2) When Applicant’s parents lived in Afghanistan, he sent them money. (Item 2) He does not send money directly to anyone in Afghanistan. (Item 2) He provides financial support to his step brother, who lives in Applicant’s residence in the United States. (Item 2) The record does not indicate whether or not Applicant’s step brother provides financial support to Applicant’s siblings living in Afghanistan. In 2016, Applicant’s parents emigrated from Afghanistan to the United States, and they have U.S. permanent residence status. (Item 2) Applicant’s father served as a field-grade officer in the Afghan Army; however, he does not receive a military pension from Afghanistan. (Items 2, 4)

Applicant has five brothers and five sisters who are citizens and residents of Afghanistan. (Item 2) He contacts some of his brothers and sisters living in Afghanistan on a weekly basis and sometimes more often. (Item 2) Applicant has a step brother who is a U.S. permanent resident, and his step brother lives in Applicant’s residence in the United States and cares for Applicant’s family while Applicant is deployed to Afghanistan. (Item 2) Applicant communicates with his mother-in-law and father-in-law on a monthly basis. (Item 2) Applicant has one brother living in the United States. (Item 2)

Applicant served as a linguist, translator, linguist consultant, or cultural advisor from September 2004 to May 2009, March 2010 to November 2010, December 2011 to June 2013, and April 2015 to present for U.S. government contractors mostly for the U.S. Army at a forward operating base (FOB) in Afghanistan. (Item 4; FORM at 2) From November 2009 to March 2010, and from February 2011 to May 2011, Applicant worked as a role player or cultural advisor at a military installation in the United States. (Item 4) The Air Force (AF) has advised security officials that Applicant recently successfully completed a counterintelligence polygraph examination. (Item 2)

Character Evidence

Applicant provided character references from four AF master sergeants (MSgt), an AF major (MAJ), three AF technical sergeants (TSgt) and an AF lieutenant colonel. (Item 2) These AF officers and noncommissioned officers served closely with Applicant for extended periods under combat conditions and dangerous circumstances in 2016. They described his service in Afghanistan as professional, diligent, honest, and reliable. (Item 2) He is enthusiastic, willingly undergoes hardship, and is exceptionally valuable for mission accomplishment in a combat environment. (Item 2) The lieutenant colonel is his squadron commander, and he described Applicant as clearly “the best of twenty interpreters that enable our mission.” Applicant provided two certificates from his employer in 2016 lauding his excellent duty performance in Afghanistan. There is no evidence that Applicant has engaged in criminal activity, abused alcohol or illegal drugs, or committed any security violations.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a country in Southwestern Asia that is approximately the size of Texas (249,935 square miles). Pakistan borders it on the east and the south. Iran borders it on the west and Russia to the north. It is a rugged and mountainous country which has been fought over by powerful nations for centuries. In 2009, the population was about 28 million people with about 3,000,000 Afghans living outside Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is presently an Islamic Republic with a democratically elected president. Afghanistan has had a turbulent political history, including an invasion by the Soviet Union in 1979. After an accord was reached in 1989, and the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, fighting continued among the various ethnic, clan, and religious militias. By the end of 1998, the Taliban rose to power and controlled 90% of the country, imposing aggressive and repressive policies.

In October 2001, U.S. forces and coalition partners led military operations in the country, forcing the Taliban out of power by November 2001. The new democratic government took power in 2004 after a popular election. Despite that election, terrorists, the Taliban, and their affiliates continue to seek power and employ intimidation within the country. Safety and security are key issues because these terrorist organizations and the Taliban target United States and Afghan interests, installations, and personnel by suicide operations, bombings, assassinations, car-jacking, assaults, and hostage taking. The risk of terrorist activities remains extremely high. The country’s human-rights record remains poor, corruption is widespread, and violence is rampant. According to recent reports from the U.S. Department of State, insurgents continue to plan attacks and kidnappings of Americans and other Western nationals. Travel warnings are ongoing. No section of Afghanistan is safe or immune from violence.

The United States’ extraordinary commitment to Afghanistan is balanced against the inherent dangers of the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan to its citizens and residents and Afghan Government problems developing and complying with the rule of law. In July 2016, President Obama announced that he would keep 8,400 U.S. service members in Afghanistan through January 2017, in an effort to aid Afghanistan in the suppression of the Taliban and other terrorist entities. A top national security goal of the United States is to establish relationships, cooperation, training, and support of the Afghanistan Government and military in the ongoing war against terrorism.

POLICIES

The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion of the Executive Branch in regulating access to information pertaining to national security emphasizing, “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended.

Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable.

The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. See also Executive Order 12968 (Aug. 2, 1995), § 3.1. Thus, nothing in this Decision should be construed to suggest that I have based this decision, in whole or in part, on any express or implied determination about applicant’s allegiance, loyalty, or patriotism. It is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance.

Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996).

Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). The burden of disproving a mitigating condition never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b).

ANALYSIS

Foreign Influence

AG ¶ 6 explains the security concern about “foreign contacts and interests” stating:

[I]fthe individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, [he or she] may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.

AG ¶ 7 has three conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying in this case:

(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;

(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; and

(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.

Applicant has frequent contact2 with his siblings, mother-in-law, and father-in-law, who are citizens and residents of Afghanistan. His frequent contacts are a manifestation of his care and concern for his relatives living in Afghanistan.

There are widely documented safety issues for residents of Afghanistan because of terrorists and insurgents. Applicant has voluntarily shared in those dangers on behalf of the DOD for more than eight years, and he is willing to do so in the future. Numerous Afghan linguists, supporting U.S. forces, have family living in Afghanistan. Thousands of U.S. and coalition armed forces and civilian contractors serving in Afghanistan are

“frequent contact” under AG ¶¶ 7 and 8. ISCR Case No. 14-05986 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Oct. 14, 2016). See targets of terrorists or the Taliban, along with Afghan civilians who support the Afghan Government and cooperate with coalition forces.

The mere possession of close family ties with one or more family members living in Afghanistan, is not, as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B. However, if an applicant has a close relationship with even one relative, living in a foreign country, this factor alone is sufficient to create the potential for foreign influence and could potentially result in the compromise of classified information. See Generally ISCR Case No. 03-02382 at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 15, 2006); ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001).

Applicant lives with his spouse when he is not deployed to Afghanistan, and she is a citizen of Afghanistan. The record does not indicate whether she is a permanent resident or a citizen of the United States. The SOR does not allege she is not a citizen of the United States. The record lacks evidence of his spouse’s relationships with her family who are residents and citizens of Afghanistan. There is a rebuttable presumption that a person has ties of affection for, or obligation to, their immediate family members. See generally ISCR Case No. 01-03120, 2002 DOHA LEXIS 94 at *8 (App. Bd. Feb. 20, 2002). Applicant has ties of affection and obligation to his spouse, and her parents are citizens and residents of Afghanistan. “[A]s a matter of common sense and human experience, there is [also] a rebuttable presumption that a person has ties of affection for, or obligation to, the immediate family members of the person’s spouse.” ISCR Case No. 07-17673 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 2, 2009) (citing ISCR Case No. 01-03120 at 4 (App. Bd. Feb. 20, 2002)). This concept is the basis of AG ¶ 7(d).

The nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and its human-rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are vulnerable to government coercion or inducement. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, the government ignores the rule of law including widely accepted civil liberties, a family member is associated with or dependent upon the government, the government is engaged is counterinsurgency, terrorists cause a substantial amount of death or property damage, or the country is known to conduct intelligence collection operations against the United States. The relationship of Afghanistan with the United States, places a significant, but not insurmountable burden of persuasion on Applicant to demonstrate that his relationships with his family members living in Afghanistan do not pose a security risk. Applicant should not be placed into a position where he might be forced to choose between loyalty to the United States and a desire to assist a family member living in Afghanistan.

Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States. “The United States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those of the United States.” ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). Furthermore, friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security. Finally, we know friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States, especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields. See ISCR Case No. 00-0317, 2002 DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002).

While there is no evidence that intelligence operatives or terrorists from Afghanistan seek or have sought classified or economic information from or through Applicant or his family, nevertheless, it is not possible to rule out such a possibility in the future. International terrorist groups are known to conduct intelligence activities as effectively as capable state intelligence services, and Afghanistan has an enormous problem with terrorism. Applicant’s relationships with relatives living in Afghanistan create a potential conflict of interest because terrorists or the Taliban could place pressure on his family living in Afghanistan in an effort to cause Applicant to compromise classified information. When Applicant is not deployed to Afghanistan, he lives with his spouse, who is an Afghan citizen. These relationships create “a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion” under AG ¶ 7(d). Department Counsel produced substantial evidence of Applicant’s contacts with family in Afghanistan and has raised the issue of potential foreign pressure or attempted exploitation. AG ¶¶ 7(a), 7(b), and 7(d) apply, and further inquiry is necessary about potential application of any mitigating conditions.

AG ¶ 8 lists six conditions that could mitigate foreign influence security concerns including:

(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.;

(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;

(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation;

(d) the foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government business or are approved by the cognizant security authority;

(e) the individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons, groups, or organizations from a foreign country; and (f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.

AG ¶ 8(b) applies. Applicant has frequent contact with his siblings, mother-in-law, and father-in-law, who are citizens and residents of Afghanistan. A key factor in the AG ¶ 8(b) analysis is Applicant’s “deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S.” Applicant immigrated to the United States in 2009, and he became a U.S. citizen in 2014. One of his brothers and his step brother live in the United States. His spouse and five children live in the United States, and three of his children were born in the United States and are U.S. citizens.

Applicant’s years of support to the DOD in Afghanistan as a linguist and cultural advisor, including the dangers that service entailed, weigh heavily towards mitigating security concerns. Applicant is currently serving in Afghanistan providing critical assistance to U.S. Armed Forces in a dangerous combat environment. He has offered to continue to risk his life to support the United States’ goals in Afghanistan. He has shown his patriotism, loyalty, and fidelity to the United States during his more than eight years of support to DOD while serving in Afghanistan.

Applicant’s relationship with the United States must be weighed against the potential conflict of interest created by his relationships with relatives who are citizens and residents of Afghanistan. Applicant’s father, a former field-grade Afghan officer who is now 76 years old, and his mother are U.S. permanent residents living in Applicant’s U.S. residence, and their Afghan citizenship and former residency are no longer of a security concern. Nevertheless, Applicant’s relatives currently living in Afghanistan, like every other resident of Afghanistan, are at risk from terrorists and the Taliban.

It is important to be mindful of the United States’ huge investment of manpower and money in Afghanistan, and Applicant has supported U.S. goals and objectives in Afghanistan. Applicant and his relatives living in Afghanistan are potential targets of terrorists and the Taliban, and Applicant’s potential access to classified information could theoretically add risk to his relatives living in Afghanistan from lawless elements in Afghanistan.

In sum, Applicant’s connections to his relatives living in Afghanistan are less significant than his connections to the United States. His employment in support of the U.S. Government, performance of linguist duties in a combat zone, and U.S. citizenship are important factors weighing towards mitigation of security concerns. His connections to the United States taken together are sufficient to fully overcome the foreign influence security concerns under Guideline B. Foreign influence concerns under Guideline B are mitigated. Even if security concerns are not mitigated under Guideline B, they are mitigated under the whole-person concept, infra.

WHOLE PERSON CONCEPT

Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):

(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I have incorporated my comments under Guideline B in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(a) were addressed under that guideline, but some warrant additional comment.

Applicant has frequent contact with his siblings, mother-in-law, and father-in-law, who are citizens and residents of Afghanistan. His frequent contacts are a manifestation of his care and concern for his relatives living in Afghanistan. Those relationships raise important foreign influence security concerns, and they must be balanced against his connections to the United States. His closest relatives all live in the United States. His parents, spouse, five children, step brother, and brother all reside in the United States.

Applicant immigrated to the United States in 2009, and he became a U.S. citizen as soon as eligible in 2014. One brother, one step brother, and his parents have emigrated from Afghanistan to the United States. Three of his children were born in the United States, and they are U.S. citizens. When he became a U.S. citizen, he took an oath of allegiance to the United States. There is no evidence that Applicant has engaged in criminal activity, abused alcohol or illegal drugs, or committed any security violations.

Applicant served as a linguist, translator, linguist consultant, or cultural advisor for more than eight years from September 2004 to present in Afghanistan. He worked for U.S. government contractors primarily for the U.S. Army at an FOB in Afghanistan. Applicant provided character references from nine AF officers and noncommissioned officers who served closely with Applicant for extended periods under combat conditions and dangerous circumstances in 2016. They described his service in Afghanistan as professional, diligent, honest, and reliable. His squadron commander described Applicant as clearly “the best of twenty interpreters that enable our mission.” He served in a U.S. designated combat zone, and he made contributions to the U.S. military at personal risk. He is willing to continue to serve in Afghanistan in support of U.S. Armed Forces as a linguist, risking his life as part of his duties on behalf of the U.S. combat forces in Afghanistan. He is fully aware of the risks to himself. All these circumstances increase the probability that Applicant will recognize, resist, and report any attempts by a foreign power, terrorist group, or insurgent group to coerce or exploit him. See ISCR Case No. 07-00034 at 2 (App. Bd. Feb. 5, 2008). His past honorable service as a linguist in Afghanistan, desire for continued employment as a translator or cultural advisor, and oath of allegiance to the United States document his loyalty, trustworthiness, and reliability, and they weigh heavily towards approval of his security clearance.

A Guideline B decision concerning Afghanistan must take into consideration the geopolitical situation and dangers there.3 Afghanistan is a dangerous place because of violence from the Taliban and terrorists. The Taliban and terrorists continue to threaten the Afghan Government, the interests of the United States, U.S. Armed Forces, and those who cooperate and assist the United States. The Afghan Government does not fully comply with the rule of law or protect civil liberties in many instances. The United States and Afghan Governments are allies in the war on terrorism.

I have carefully applied the law, as set forth in Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), Exec. Or. 10865, the Directive, and the AGs, to the facts and circumstances in the context of the whole person. I conclude foreign influence concerns are mitigated, and eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

FORMAL FINDINGS

Formal findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT

Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.g: For Applicant

CONCLUSION

In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

____________________________ Mark Harvey Administrative Judge

FOOTNOTES

1 The facts in this decision do not specifically describe employment, names of witnesses, names of other groups, or locations in order to protect Applicant and his family’s privacy. The cited sources contain more specific information. 2The Appeal Board has concluded that contact every two months or more frequently constitutes also ISCR Case No. 04-09541 at 2-3 (App. Bd. Sep. 26, 2006) (finding contacts with applicant’s siblings once every four or five months not casual and infrequent). 3 See ISCR Case No. 04-02630 at 3 (App. Bd. May 23, 2007) (remanding because of insufficient discussion of geopolitical situation and suggesting expansion of whole-person discussion).