ISCR Case 06-21773.h1

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 06-21773.h1

deniedJul 20, 2007· Hon. Jacqueline T. Williams· hearing

Summary

A 46-year-old computer network administrator for a defense contractor was denied a security clearance due to concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline E (Personal Conduct). The applicant's marriage to a Russian citizen, whose niece and friends reside in Russia, raised foreign influence concerns.

Additionally, during a 1996 visit to Russia, the applicant was detained and interrogated by Russian police and the Federal Security Service after taking photographs of a bridge. During this detention, he was asked if he would be willing to work for Russia and agreed, though he stated he would not do anything illegal.

The judge found that the applicant deliberately falsified material facts on his security clearance application by omitting his agreement to work for the Russian police. This omission was noted on two separate SF 86 forms, where he disclosed contact with the Russian government but failed to mention the agreement to work for them. The applicant's agreement to work for the Russian police, coupled with his deliberate omission of this fact, indicated a lack of trustworthiness and a potential conflict of interest, leading to the denial of his clearance.

Why the Applicant Was Denied

Applicant agreed to work for the Russian police, creating a potential conflict of interest.
Applicant deliberately omitted material facts from his security clearance application, indicating a lack of trustworthiness.
The applicant's connections to Russia through his wife and her family posed a heightened risk of foreign influence.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

B.7(a)appliedContact with a Foreign Family Member, Business or Professional Associate, Friend, or Other Person Who Is a Citizen of or Resident in a Foreign Country If That Contact Creates a Heightened Risk of Foreign Exploitation, Inducement, Manipulation, Pressure, or Coercion
B.7(d)appliedSharing Living Quarters with a Person or Persons, Regardless of Citizenship Status, If That Relationship Creates a Heightened Risk of Foreign Inducement, Manipulation, Pressure, or Coercion
E.16(a)appliedDeliberate Omission, Concealment, or Falsification of Relevant Facts From Any Personnel Security Questionnaire, Personal History Statement, or Similar Form Used to Conduct Investigations, Determine Employment Qualifications, Award Benefits or Status, Determine Security Clearance Eligibility or Trustworthiness, or Award Fiduciary Responsibilities
E.16(e)appliedPersonal Conduct, or Concealment of Information About One’s Conduct, That Creates a Vulnerability to Exploitation, Manipulation, or Duress

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedFeb 6, 2007
Answer filedMar 1, 2007
Hearing heldMay 15, 2007
Decision dateJul 20, 2007

Cite For

Deliberate Omission of Material Facts on Security Clearance Applications
Heightened Risk of Foreign Influence Due to Familial Ties
Impact of Personal Conduct on Security Clearance Eligibility

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
1.a	You are married to a Russian citizen.	Against Applicant	Spouse Dual or Foreign Citizen Immediate Family	Russia HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(d) counterintelligence information indicating unacceptable risk (a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (g) unauthorized association with a foreign intelligence entity (h) foreign nationals acting to increase the individual’s vulnerability (i) conduct abroad making the individual vulnerable to coercion	—	—
1.b	Your wife has a niece and friends who are citizens and residents of Russia.	Against Applicant	Extended Family in Foreign Country Extended Family	Russia HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(d) counterintelligence information indicating unacceptable risk (a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (g) unauthorized association with a foreign intelligence entity (h) foreign nationals acting to increase the individual’s vulnerability (i) conduct abroad making the individual vulnerable to coercion	—	—
1.c	You were taken into custody by the Russian police during a visit to Russia in approximately August 1996 after taking pictures of a bridge in Rostov-On-Don. You were interrogated by the Russian Federal Security Service and asked if you would be willing to work for Russia. You agreed but stated you would not do anything that was illegal.	Against Applicant	Foreign Government Contact Other GOVT-AFFILIATED	Russia HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(d) counterintelligence information indicating unacceptable risk (a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (g) unauthorized association with a foreign intelligence entity (h) foreign nationals acting to increase the individual’s vulnerability (i) conduct abroad making the individual vulnerable to coercion	—	—
1.d	You deliberately falsified material facts on your security clearance application by omitting that you agreed to work for the Russian police.	Against Applicant	Failure to Disclose Foreign Association Other	Russia HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(d) counterintelligence information indicating unacceptable risk (a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (g) unauthorized association with a foreign intelligence entity (h) foreign nationals acting to increase the individual’s vulnerability (i) conduct abroad making the individual vulnerable to coercion	—	—

Allegation

Finding

Relationship

Country

Response

Disqualifying (¶7)

Mitigating applied (¶8)

Mitigation

1.a

You are married to a Russian citizen.

Against Applicant

Spouse Dual or Foreign Citizen

Immediate Family

Russia

HEIGHTENED RISK

Admitted

(d) counterintelligence information indicating unacceptable risk

(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation

(g) unauthorized association with a foreign intelligence entity

(h) foreign nationals acting to increase the individual’s vulnerability

(i) conduct abroad making the individual vulnerable to coercion

—

1.b

Your wife has a niece and friends who are citizens and residents of Russia.

Against Applicant

Extended Family in Foreign Country

Extended Family

Russia

HEIGHTENED RISK

Admitted

(d) counterintelligence information indicating unacceptable risk

(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation

(g) unauthorized association with a foreign intelligence entity

(h) foreign nationals acting to increase the individual’s vulnerability

(i) conduct abroad making the individual vulnerable to coercion

—

1.c

You were taken into custody by the Russian police during a visit to Russia in approximately August 1996 after taking pictures of a bridge in Rostov-On-Don. You were interrogated by the Russian Federal Security Service and asked if you would be willing to work for Russia. You agreed but stated you would not do anything that was illegal.

Against Applicant

Foreign Government Contact

Other

GOVT-AFFILIATED

Russia

HEIGHTENED RISK

Admitted

(d) counterintelligence information indicating unacceptable risk

(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation

(g) unauthorized association with a foreign intelligence entity

(h) foreign nationals acting to increase the individual’s vulnerability

(i) conduct abroad making the individual vulnerable to coercion

—

1.d

You deliberately falsified material facts on your security clearance application by omitting that you agreed to work for the Russian police.

Against Applicant

Failure to Disclose Foreign Association

Other

Russia

HEIGHTENED RISK

Admitted

(d) counterintelligence information indicating unacceptable risk

(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation

(g) unauthorized association with a foreign intelligence entity

(h) foreign nationals acting to increase the individual’s vulnerability

(i) conduct abroad making the individual vulnerable to coercion

—

¶	Allegation	Finding	Conduct	Concealed Issue	Response	Disqualifying (¶16)	Mitigating applied (¶17)	Mitigation
2.a	You deliberately omitted material facts on your security clearance application by failing to disclose that you agreed to work for the Russian police.	Against Applicant	Falsification Security FormFOUND DELIBERATE	Other	Denied	(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification on a security form (e) personal conduct or concealment creating vulnerability to exploitation	—	—
2.b	You falsified material facts on an SF 86, Security Clearance Application, executed by you on January 7, 2004, in response to Question 14 "Your Foreign Activities – Contact with Foreign Government," which asks: "have you ever had any contact with a foreign government, its establishments (embassies or consulates), or its representatives, whether inside or outside the U.S., other than on official U.S. Government business?" You answered "YES" and disclosed in the remarks section that between July 1, 1996 and September 1, 1996 you had contact with the Russian Federation, Russia, in the following manner: "Travel visa to Russia for June 96 until October 1996: Stayed with my future wife, [name], an [sic] her mother, [name]. While visiting, I was detained and questioned by the local militsia [sic]/Police and the Federal Security Service because of some photographs, which I had of a railroad bridge." You deliberately omitted, in an attempt to mislead, the material facts that you were asked by the Russian Federal Security Service if you would be willing to work for them and that you agreed to do so.	Against Applicant	Falsification Security FormFOUND DELIBERATE	Other	Denied	(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification on a security form (e) personal conduct or concealment creating vulnerability to exploitation	—	—
2.c	You falsified material facts on an SF 86, Security Clearance Application, executed by you on January 7, 2004, in response to Question 14 "Your Foreign Activities – Contact with Foreign Government which asks: "have you ever had any contact with a foreign government, its establishments (embassies or consulates), or its representatives, whether inside or outside the U.S., other than on official U.S. Government business?" You answered "YES" and disclosed in the remarks section that between July 25, 1996 and September 1, 1996 you had contact with the Russian Federal Security Service, Russia, in the following manner "Detained by FSB for taking pictures of a railroad bridge." You deliberately omitted, in an attempt to mislead, the material facts that you were asked by the Russian Federal Security Service if you would be willing to work for them and that you agreed to do so.	Against Applicant	Falsification Security FormFOUND DELIBERATE	Other	Denied	(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification on a security form (e) personal conduct or concealment creating vulnerability to exploitation	—	—

Allegation

Finding

Conduct

Concealed Issue

Response

Disqualifying (¶16)

Mitigating applied (¶17)

Mitigation

2.a

You deliberately omitted material facts on your security clearance application by failing to disclose that you agreed to work for the Russian police.

Against Applicant

Falsification Security FormFOUND DELIBERATE

Other

Denied

(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification on a security form

(e) personal conduct or concealment creating vulnerability to exploitation

—

2.b

You falsified material facts on an SF 86, Security Clearance Application, executed by you on January 7, 2004, in response to Question 14 "Your Foreign Activities – Contact with Foreign Government," which asks: "have you ever had any contact with a foreign government, its establishments (embassies or consulates), or its representatives, whether inside or outside the U.S., other than on official U.S. Government business?" You answered "YES" and disclosed in the remarks section that between July 1, 1996 and September 1, 1996 you had contact with the Russian Federation, Russia, in the following manner: "Travel visa to Russia for June 96 until October 1996: Stayed with my future wife, [name], an [sic] her mother, [name]. While visiting, I was detained and questioned by the local militsia [sic]/Police and the Federal Security Service because of some photographs, which I had of a railroad bridge." You deliberately omitted, in an attempt to mislead, the material facts that you were asked by the Russian Federal Security Service if you would be willing to work for them and that you agreed to do so.

Against Applicant

Falsification Security FormFOUND DELIBERATE

Other

Denied

(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification on a security form

(e) personal conduct or concealment creating vulnerability to exploitation

—

2.c

You falsified material facts on an SF 86, Security Clearance Application, executed by you on January 7, 2004, in response to Question 14 "Your Foreign Activities – Contact with Foreign Government which asks: "have you ever had any contact with a foreign government, its establishments (embassies or consulates), or its representatives, whether inside or outside the U.S., other than on official U.S. Government business?" You answered "YES" and disclosed in the remarks section that between July 25, 1996 and September 1, 1996 you had contact with the Russian Federal Security Service, Russia, in the following manner "Detained by FSB for taking pictures of a railroad bridge." You deliberately omitted, in an attempt to mislead, the material facts that you were asked by the Russian Federal Security Service if you would be willing to work for them and that you agreed to do so.

Against Applicant

Falsification Security FormFOUND DELIBERATE

Other

Denied

(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification on a security form

(e) personal conduct or concealment creating vulnerability to exploitation

—

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Case Profile

Summary

Why the Applicant Was Denied

Conditions Referenced

Procedural Posture

Cite For

Full decision

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

SYNOPSIS

STATEMENT OF CASE

FINDINGS OF FACT

POLICIES

CONCLUSION

FORMAL FINDINGS

DECISION

FOOTNOTES

APPEARANCES