Summary
The applicant, a 70-year-old linguist and U.S. citizen originally from Iraq, faced security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline E (Personal Conduct) due to her past relationships with individuals in Iraq and Jordan, as well as allegations of falsification and previous criminal conduct. The judge found that while the applicant mitigated some foreign influence concerns, she did not sufficiently address the personal conduct issues, leading to a denial of her security clearance.
Under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline E (Personal Conduct), the Statement of Reasons alleged the following: Applicant admitted that she developed a friendly relationship with an Iraqi officer, who worked closely with the U.S. Forces, while she served as a linguist and translator in Iraq. She said the last time she had contact with that officer was in June 2011 (1.a). Applicant denied that she hosted or attended parties with Iraqi soldiers while serving as a linguist. She said that soldiers never lived in her quarters. She acknowledged that on occasion she served as a translator at events, attended by Iraqi and U.S. officials, including the officer noted above. Her sister, who served as a linguist in Iraq at the same time, and another linguist stated they never witnessed Applicant engaging in those activities. The Army reported that she improperly engaged in hosting and attending parties (1.b). Applicant testified that she no longer maintains contact with an individual, who was born in Iraq and resides in Jordan, as alleged. Her last contact with him was in 2010. She said she worked with him (1.c). Applicant admitted that she associated and worked with three Iraqi resident citizens of Iraq while there. She spoke to one of them a year ago and the other in about 2010. Another individual with whom she associated while in Iraq became a U.S. citizen (1.d). Applicant admitted that she worked on a television program while working as a linguist in Iraq; however, she denied that she worked with Iraqi nationals or that the program was sponsored by the Iraqi government. She testified that she did translation work for an American, who was producing an Iraqi television show. She said she had authorization to help with the project (1.e). In September 1990, while employed as a translator and legal assistant for an immigration law firm, Applicant was arrested and charged with bribery of a public official, a felony. She was caught passing money to an immigration agent on behalf of clients who were about to be deported. She pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 18 months of incarceration and three years of supervised probation. She served in a detention center from December 1991 to May 1992, and then went into a halfway house for two months. She was released from probation in March 1995. (GE 4, GE 10.) She realized she made a serious mistake in committing this crime and learned an important lesson. (Tr. 33-34, 62.) (2.a). In 1997, Applicant pleaded guilty to theft by deception, a misdemeanor. She was sentenced to a year of probation, and ordered to pay $7,000 in restitution. Applicant explained that her daughter’s friend, who worked at a retail store, stole her credit card, used it to charge a large amount of items, and then voided the charges and collected a refund from the retailer. Applicant said she assumed the blame for the young woman and legal responsibility for the debt because she felt sorry for her and did not want her to go to jail. The young girl was arrested, but was not convicted as a result of Applicant’s actions. Applicant testified that she was unaware of the theft of her credit card at the time the girl used it. (Tr. 37, 44-47; Answer.) The young girl submitted a November 2016 affidavit stating that Applicant was not aware of the theft of her charge card. (AE J.) According to an investigative report from May 2015, the girl told the police that Applicant knew about the transactions. (GE 4.) (2.b). From April 2005 until September 2009, Applicant was deployed to Iraq with the U.S Army, where she worked as a contract linguist. In early September 2009, subsequent to an U.S. Army intelligence investigation, Applicant was terminated and released from her employment. The Army based its decision on the following violations: unofficial communications with members of the Iraqi military, including generals; and receiving unauthorized gifts from members of the Iraqi military, including a vehicle. (GE 7.) An Incident History report prepared on September 9, 2009, by Applicant’s personnel office, cited the above allegations and other infractions. (GE 8.) Applicant acknowledged that she was terminated from her position in September 2009, but denied the truth of the underlying reasons. She said the allegations were based on false accusations from other linguists and personality problems she had with them. (Tr. 39; Answer.) She referred to an August 3, 2009 email from her site manager, who told her not to return to work until he told her to do so. He stated she was not in trouble. (AE K.) A letter she later received from her personnel manager stated that she was terminated effective September 17, 2009, at will. It accused her of being a security risk. (Tr. 40.) After she returned home from Iraq, Applicant requested a copy of the incident and adverse information reports that were filed in September 2009. She received them in March 2010. (Tr. 65-66.) The Army’s adverse information report referenced incidents involving Applicant’s travel to another country with a large amount of money; negative information about her husband; improper use of her cell phone; and numerous and inappropriate interactions with local businessmen and soldiers. (GE 7.) An Incident History report, dated January 22, 2010, referenced her inappropriate hosting of parties for local soldiers, receipt of a vehicle as an unauthorized gift from an Iraqi officer, and information that she had been denied employment by a federal investigative agency. (GE 8.) (2.c). Applicant denied that she operated a vehicle on base in violation of Command policies, as documented by the Army. She said she was authorized to use a car because she was an authorized escort on base. She said she used the particular car referenced in this allegation because it had air conditioning. She drove it seven to ten days and a security officer was with her. (Tr. 41; Answer; AE G, AE L.) Applicant submitted a letter from the Iraqi officer referenced in SOR ¶ 2.c above. He stated that the automobile was not a gift to her, but was a loaner car he authorized her to use for a few days. He said the allegations made against Applicant about this issue were false. (AE B.) According to the Army’s report, Applicant told the investigator that the officer had given the car to her as a gift. According to Command rules, interpreters were not allowed to operate vehicles on base. (GE 7.) (2.d). On May 6, 2015, Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA). In Section 13A: Employment Activities, Applicant disclosed that she had worked for a federal contractor from April 2005 to September 2009. She stated the reason she left was: “Employment at Will, Investigation closed without adverse action. Termination and/or lapse of employer’s contract. Contract. [sic] Reduction of US Forces in Iraq.” (GE 1.) She answered “no” to questions inquiring whether, within the past seven years, she had been fired; quit a job after being told she would be fired; left a job by mutual agreement following charges or allegations of misconduct; or left a job by mutual agreement following notice of unsatisfactory performance. (GE 1.) Applicant denied that she falsified the above answer. She testified that when she left her position in September 2009, she was not told the reasons she was being removed. (Tr. 65.) She said she consulted an attorney, who advised her to use the above language in the 2015 SCA. She testified that she felt she should have mentioned the September 2009 incident report, which is why she wrote “incident report” on her copy of the 2015 SCA in the employment section referencing the job. She made the note to remind herself to mention it to the investigator when she was interviewed. Subsequently, she was unable to discuss the termination with the investigator during her May 2015 interview because it went too fast. (Tr. 45-46; 65-69; GE 1, AE M.) She acknowledged that she did not give the adverse information to the investigator after the interview. (Tr. 71.) She admitted that she made a mistake by not disclosing the termination and reasons in the SCA (2.e). Applicant denied that she falsified information during an Army interview in May 2015 about the 1997 theft. She testified that she did not tell the investigator that she voluntarily gave the young girl her credit card to use. (Tr. 74.) She submitted the affidavit from the girl attesting to that fact, although the girl also said that when she first meet with the police she stated that Applicant knew of the credit card transaction. (AE J.) According to the summary report of that interview, Applicant acknowledged that she was aware of the misuse of her credit card. (GE 4.) (2.f). Applicant denied that the five allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.a through 1.e raised personal conduct security concerns (2.g).
The judge denied the clearance. The government raised disqualifying conditions AG ¶ 7(a), AG ¶ 7(b). The judge applied mitigating conditions AG ¶ 8(a), AG ¶ 8(b). The decision turned on the following: The applicant had a history of criminal conduct, including bribery and theft, which raised significant concerns about her reliability and trustworthiness; The applicant's previous employment issues, including termination for alleged misconduct related to her interactions with foreign nationals, were not adequately mitigated.
Why the Applicant Was Denied
- The applicant had a history of criminal conduct, including bribery and theft, which raised significant concerns about her reliability and trustworthiness.
- The applicant's previous employment issues, including termination for alleged misconduct related to her interactions with foreign nationals, were not adequately mitigated.
Conditions Referenced
- AG ¶ 7(a)raisedContact with Foreign NationalsThe applicant's relationships with individuals in Iraq and Jordan created a heightened risk of foreign exploitation.
- AG ¶ 7(b)raisedPotential Conflict of InterestThe applicant's connections to foreign individuals posed a potential conflict of interest regarding her obligation to protect sensitive information.
- AG ¶ 8(a)rejectedNature of RelationshipsThe judge found that the nature of the applicant's relationships did not mitigate the security concerns.
- AG ¶ 8(b)rejectedNo Conflict of InterestThe applicant's sense of loyalty to foreign individuals was deemed significant enough to raise concerns.
Key Rule Quoted
“The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration.”
Procedural Posture
- SOR issuedJun 21, 2016
- Answer filedJul 14, 2016
- Hearing heldJan 11, 2017
- Decision dateJun 15, 2017
Cite For
- Denial of Security Clearance Due to Personal Conduct Issues
- Impact of Foreign Influence on Security Clearance Eligibility
- Significance of Criminal History in Security Clearance Determinations