ISCR Case 15-01709.h1

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 15-01709.h1

deniedJul 21, 2016· Hon. Arthur E. Marshall, Jr.· hearing

Summary

A 44-year-old naturalized U.S. citizen and electrical engineer, originally from China, was denied a security clearance due to concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline C (Foreign Preference). The Statement of Reasons cited several allegations, including that her contact with and connections to family members who are citizens and residents of China created a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. Additionally, sharing living quarters with in-laws who are Chinese citizens was noted as a similar risk.

Regarding foreign preference, the applicant received a new, valid Chinese passport in April 2009, which expired in April 2019. She became a naturalized U.S. citizen in the summer of 2013 and did not use her Chinese passport after that time. When she submitted her security clearance application in 2014, she relinquished the foreign passport to her company’s general counsel, who then destroyed it.

Despite her professional background and U.S. family ties, the judge determined that her close relationships with family in China, particularly her parents, posed a potential risk for foreign influence and coercion. The applicant failed to demonstrate that these relationships did not present a security risk, leading to the denial of her security clearance.

Why the Applicant Was Denied

The applicant's close family ties in China create a potential conflict of interest and risk of foreign influence.
The applicant failed to demonstrate that her relationships with family members living in China do not pose a security risk.
The applicant's regular contact with her parents in China raises concerns about potential coercion.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 7(a)raisedContact with Foreign Family Members
AG ¶ 7(b)raisedConnections to Foreign Persons
AG ¶ 7(d)raisedSharing Living Quarters with Foreign Persons

Mitigating

AG ¶ 8(b)appliedMinimal Conflict of InterestThe applicant's strong ties to the U.S. were considered, but did not fully mitigate the concerns.

Key Rule Quoted

“Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.”
— Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 2(b)

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedSep 5, 2015
Answer filedSep 22, 2015
Hearing heldFeb 25, 2016Originally scheduled for 01/26/2016, postponed due to inclement weather.
Decision dateJul 21, 2016

Cite For

Potential Conflict of Interest Due to Foreign Family Ties Under Guideline B
Impact of Foreign Influence on Security Clearance Decisions
Burden of Proof on Applicant to Mitigate Security Concerns

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
1.a	Contact with family members who are citizens and residents of China creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.	Against Applicant	Parent in Foreign Country Immediate Family	China HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	—	—
1.b	Connections to family members in China create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information and the desire to help foreign relatives.	Against Applicant	Parent in Foreign Country Immediate Family	China HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	—	—
1.c	Sharing living quarters with in-laws who are citizens of China creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.	Against Applicant	In Law in Foreign Country Immediate Family	China HEIGHTENED RISK	Denied	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (d) counterintelligence information indicating unacceptable risk	—	—

Allegation

Finding

Relationship

Country

Response

Disqualifying (¶7)

Mitigating applied (¶8)

Mitigation

1.a

Contact with family members who are citizens and residents of China creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.

Against Applicant

Parent in Foreign Country

Immediate Family

China

HEIGHTENED RISK

Admitted

(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation

(b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest

—

1.b

Connections to family members in China create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information and the desire to help foreign relatives.

Against Applicant

Parent in Foreign Country

Immediate Family

China

HEIGHTENED RISK

Admitted

(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation

(b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest

—

1.c

Sharing living quarters with in-laws who are citizens of China creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.

Against Applicant

In Law in Foreign Country

Immediate Family

China

HEIGHTENED RISK

Denied

(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation

(b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest

(d) counterintelligence information indicating unacceptable risk

—

¶	Allegation	Finding	Type	Response	Disqualifying (¶10)	Mitigating applied (¶11)	Mitigation
2.a(1)	Applicant received a new, valid passport from China in April 2009. It had an expiration date in April 2019. She became a naturalized United States citizen in the summer of 2013. Since becoming a United States citizen, Applicant has not used her Chinese passport. While submitting her application for a security clearance in 2014, she relinquished her foreign passport to her company’s general counsel, who destroyed it.	For Applicant	Failure to Renounce or Surrender Foreign Status	Admitted	—	(b) dual citizenship is based solely on parental citizenship or birth in a foreign country, and there is no evidence of foreign preference	Credited Other
2.a(2)	specific text not stated in this decision	Withdrawn	Unspecified Foreign Preference	Unknown	—	—	—

Allegation

Finding

Type

Response

Disqualifying (¶10)

Mitigating applied (¶11)

Mitigation

2.a(1)

Applicant received a new, valid passport from China in April 2009. It had an expiration date in April 2019. She became a naturalized United States citizen in the summer of 2013. Since becoming a United States citizen, Applicant has not used her Chinese passport. While submitting her application for a security clearance in 2014, she relinquished her foreign passport to her company’s general counsel, who destroyed it.

For Applicant

Failure to Renounce or Surrender Foreign Status

Admitted

—

(b) dual citizenship is based solely on parental citizenship or birth in a foreign country, and there is no evidence of foreign preference

Credited

Other

2.a(2)

specific text not stated in this decision

Withdrawn

Unspecified Foreign Preference

Unknown

—

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Case Profile

Summary

Why the Applicant Was Denied

Conditions Referenced

Key Rule Quoted

Procedural Posture

Cite For

Full decision

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

STATEMENT OF CASE

FINDINGS OF FACT

POLICIES

ANALYSIS

WHOLE PERSON CONCEPT

FORMAL FINDINGS

CONCLUSION

FOOTNOTES