ISCR Case 15-02889.h1

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 15-02889.h1

deniedFeb 13, 2017· Hon. Richard A. Cefola· hearing

Summary

A 40-year-old defense contractor employee was denied a security clearance due to concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline C (Foreign Preference), primarily stemming from his dual Israeli citizenship and connections to Israel. While the applicant renounced his Israeli citizenship, the decision highlighted several disqualifying conditions.

Specifically, the applicant had obtained Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return program and, during a nearly two-year residency in Israel, worked as an engineering manager for a start-up that performed R&D for the Israeli Ministry of Defense. He also obtained an Israeli travel document, which has since been cancelled and surrendered. The applicant maintained relationships with approximately 14 Israeli friends, six of whom were work friends, and seven Israeli relatives, all but one of whom are also U.S. citizens. One relative is the Chief Archivist at the Israel State Archives.

The denial was based on the applicant's actions while holding dual citizenship, including voting in Israeli elections and accepting approximately $16,000 in Immigration Absorption Benefits from Israel. These actions, combined with his ongoing relationships with Israeli citizens and his prior employment with a company working for the Israeli Ministry of Defense, were deemed to raise significant security risks, leading to the denial of his security clearance.

Why the Applicant Was Denied

Applicant voted in Israeli elections while holding U.S. citizenship.
Applicant accepted Immigration Absorption Benefits from Israel worth about $16,000.
Applicant maintained relationships with Israeli relatives and friends, including a relative who is a Chief Archivist at the Israel State Archives.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 10(a)raisedExercise of Foreign Citizenship Rights
AG ¶ 10(3)raisedAccepting Benefits From a Foreign Country
AG ¶ 7(a)raisedContact with Foreign Nationals
AG ¶ 7(b)raisedConnections to Foreign Persons

Mitigating

AG ¶ 11(b)rejectedWillingness to Renounce Dual CitizenshipAlthough the applicant renounced his Israeli citizenship, this was not mitigating due to his prior actions.

Key Rule Quoted

“Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.”

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedDec 8, 2015
Answer filedDec 31, 2015
Hearing heldJun 16, 2016
Decision dateFeb 13, 2017

Cite For

Disqualifying Conditions Related to Foreign Preference Under Guideline C
Disqualifying Conditions Related to Foreign Influence Under Guideline B
Impact of Dual Citizenship on Security Clearance Eligibility

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
2.a	During Applicant’s nearly two-year residency in Israel, he worked for “a start-up company, doing R&D (Research and Development).” He was “the engineering manager,” and his employer did work for “the Israeli Ministry of Defense.”	Against Applicant	Foreign Employment or Pension Business or Professional Associate GOVT-AFFILIATED	Israel	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	—	—
2.b	Applicant has about 14 friends, as delineated by his very comprehensive list found at his Exhibit K, who are citizens and residents of Israel. His contact with these foreign nationals ranges from “a few times per year,” to “very rare.” Six of these individuals he describes as being a “work friend.”	Against Applicant	Friend in Foreign Country Friend	Israel	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	—	—
2.c	Applicant has about seven relatives, as delineated by another very comprehensive list found at his Exhibit L, who are citizens and residents of Israel. All but one of these relatives are also U.S. citizens. His contact with these relatives ranges from “a few times per year,” to “rare.” One of his dual-national relatives is the “Chief Archivist at the Israel State Archives.”	Against Applicant	Extended Family in Foreign Country Extended Family	Israel	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	—	—

Allegation

Finding

Relationship

Country

Response

Disqualifying (¶7)

Mitigating applied (¶8)

Mitigation

2.a

During Applicant’s nearly two-year residency in Israel, he worked for “a start-up company, doing R&D (Research and Development).” He was “the engineering manager,” and his employer did work for “the Israeli Ministry of Defense.”

Against Applicant

Foreign Employment or Pension

Business or Professional Associate

GOVT-AFFILIATED

Israel

Admitted

(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation

—

2.b

Applicant has about 14 friends, as delineated by his very comprehensive list found at his Exhibit K, who are citizens and residents of Israel. His contact with these foreign nationals ranges from “a few times per year,” to “very rare.” Six of these individuals he describes as being a “work friend.”

Against Applicant

Friend in Foreign Country

Friend

Israel

Admitted

(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation

—

2.c

Applicant has about seven relatives, as delineated by another very comprehensive list found at his Exhibit L, who are citizens and residents of Israel. All but one of these relatives are also U.S. citizens. His contact with these relatives ranges from “a few times per year,” to “rare.” One of his dual-national relatives is the “Chief Archivist at the Israel State Archives.”

Against Applicant

Extended Family in Foreign Country

Extended Family

Israel

Admitted

(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation

—

¶	Allegation	Finding	Type	Response	Disqualifying (¶10)	Mitigating applied (¶11)	Mitigation
1.a	Applicant sought and was granted Israeli citizenship under Israel’s Law of Return program, 'Aliyah.'	Against Applicant	Foreign Citizenship Acquisition or Application	Admitted	(a) applying for and/or acquiring citizenship in any other country	—	—
1.b	While living in Israel, Applicant obtained an Israeli travel document (not a passport as alleged), which has been cancelled and surrendered to the Israeli Consulate.	Against Applicant	Foreign Passport Possession or Use	Admitted	(a) applying for and/or acquiring citizenship in any other country	—	—

Allegation

Finding

Type

Response

Disqualifying (¶10)

Mitigating applied (¶11)

Mitigation

1.a

Applicant sought and was granted Israeli citizenship under Israel’s Law of Return program, 'Aliyah.'

Against Applicant

Foreign Citizenship Acquisition or Application

Admitted

(a) applying for and/or acquiring citizenship in any other country

—

1.b

While living in Israel, Applicant obtained an Israeli travel document (not a passport as alleged), which has been cancelled and surrendered to the Israeli Consulate.

Against Applicant

Foreign Passport Possession or Use

Admitted

(a) applying for and/or acquiring citizenship in any other country

—

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Case Profile

Summary

Why the Applicant Was Denied

Conditions Referenced

Key Rule Quoted

Procedural Posture

Cite For

Full decision

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

STATEMENT OF CASE

PROCEDURAL RULINGS

FINDINGS OF FACT

POLICIES

ANALYSIS

WHOLE PERSON CONCEPT

FORMAL FINDINGS

CONCLUSION