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ISCR Case 16-00465.h1 — CASE

ISCR Case 16-00465.h1granted

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 16-00465.h1

grantedMar 29, 2017· Hon. Thomas M. Crean· hearing

Summary

This security clearance decision involved a 63-year-old U.S. citizen, originally from India, under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). Concerns were raised due to the applicant's family members residing in India, specifically four brothers, three sisters, a brother-in-law, and two sisters-in-law, all citizens and residents of India. Additionally, the applicant had a friend who was a citizen and resident of India. Financial interests in India included an inherited house and some interest in two bank accounts.

Disqualifying conditions under Guideline B were considered, but the applicant successfully applied mitigating conditions. He demonstrated minimal contact with his relatives in India, thereby reducing the potential for foreign influence. Furthermore, he relinquished his financial interests in the property and bank accounts located in India.

The judge ultimately granted the security clearance. The decision highlighted the applicant's long-standing loyalty to the U.S. and his professional integrity, which were found to outweigh the potential risks associated with his foreign connections. The demonstrated lack of significant contact with family in India and the relinquishment of financial interests were key factors in mitigating the foreign influence concerns.

Why the Applicant Prevailed

The applicant demonstrated minimal contact with family members in India, significantly reducing the risk of foreign influence.
He relinquished his financial interest in property in India, further mitigating concerns of foreign influence.
The applicant's long-standing loyalty to the U.S. and his professional reputation supported his case for clearance.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 7(a)raisedContact with Foreign Family Members
AG ¶ 7(b)raisedConnections to Foreign Persons
AG ¶ 7(e)raisedSubstantial Business or Financial Interest in a Foreign Country

Mitigating

AG ¶ 8(a)appliedNature of Relationships with Foreign Persons
AG ¶ 8(b)appliedNo Conflict of Interest Due to Strong U.S. Ties
AG ¶ 8(c)appliedCasual or Infrequent Contact with Foreign Citizens

Key Rule Quoted

“The mere existence of foreign relationships and contacts is not sufficient to raise the above disqualifying conditions.”

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedJun 14, 2016
Answer filedSep 17, 2016
Hearing heldFeb 8, 2017
Decision dateMar 29, 2017

Cite For

Mitigation of Foreign Influence Concerns Under Guideline B
Impact of Strong U.S. Ties on Foreign Influence Assessments
Relinquishing Foreign Financial Interests as a Mitigating Factor

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline B (Foreign Influence) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: granted

The judge found that the applicant mitigated the security concerns related to foreign influence under Guideline B. The applicant admitted to having family and financial ties in India but demonstrated strong loyalty to the United States and a commitment to resolving any potential conflicts of interest. As a result, eligibility for access to classified information was granted.

Country conditions:the decision took administrative notice of official facts about the foreign country (the Government’s country submission).

U.S. ties the decision noted: Naturalized U.S. Citizen · U.S. Spouse or Partner · U.S. Children · U.S. Home or Property · U.S. Career or Business · U.S. Financial Assets Predominant · Intent to Remain in U.S.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
1.a	Applicant has four brothers who are citizens and residents of India.	For Applicant	Sibling in Foreign Country Immediate Family	India HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Documented Severed Foreign Contact
1.b	Applicant has three sisters who are citizens and residents of India.	For Applicant	Sibling in Foreign Country Immediate Family	India HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Documented Severed Foreign Contact
1.c	Applicant has a brother-in-law who is a citizen and resident of India.	For Applicant	In Law in Foreign Country Immediate Family	India HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Documented Severed Foreign Contact
1.d	Applicant has two sisters-in-law who are citizens and residents of India.	For Applicant	In Law in Foreign Country Immediate Family	India HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Documented Severed Foreign Contact
1.e	Applicant has a friend who is a citizen and resident of India.	For Applicant	Friend in Foreign Country Friend	India HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Documented Severed Foreign Contact
1.f	Applicant has an interest in a house in India inherited from his father.	For Applicant	Foreign Real Estate Financial or Property Interest	India HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Documented Foreign Assets Divested
1.g	Applicant has some interest in two bank accounts in India.	For Applicant	Foreign Bank Account or Investment Financial or Property Interest	India HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Documented Foreign Assets Divested

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline B). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Full decision

The complete, official text — footnotes and signatures included — is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No.16-00465 ) ) ) Applicant for Security Clearance

For the Government: Tovah Minster, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Gregory F. Greiner, Esq. ______________

03/29/2017

STATEMENT OF CASE

______________

CREAN, Thomas M., Administrative Judge:

Based on a review of the case file, hearing testimony, and the exhibits, I conclude that Applicant provided adequate information to mitigate the security concerns for foreign influence under Guideline B. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

Statement of the Case

On December 12, 2014, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing (e-QIP) to renew a security clearance for his employment with a defense contractor. Applicant was interviewed by a security investigator from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in May 2015. After reviewing the results of the investigation, the Department of Defense (DOD) could not make the affirmative findings required to issue a security clearance. On June 14, 2016, DOD issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns for foreign influence under Guideline B. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective in the DOD on September 1, 2006. Applicant answered the SOR on September 17, 2014. He admitted the five allegations that concerned relatives and friends who are citizens and residents of India. He admitted two allegations concerning interest in property and bank accounts in India. Department Counsel was prepared to proceed on August 24, 2016, and the case was assigned to me on December 2, 2016. DOD issued a notice of hearing on January 18, 2017, scheduling a hearing for February 8, 2017. I convened the hearing as scheduled. The Government offered three exhibits that I marked and admitted into the record without objection as Government Exhibits (GX) 1, 2, and 3. Applicant and three witnesses testified. Applicant offered seven exhibits that I marked and admitted into the record without objection as Applicant Exhibits (AX) A through G. I received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on February 16, 2017.

Procedural Issues

Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts concerning India, and provided relevant U.S. Department of State documents. (GX 3) I will take administrative notice of facts concerning India as noted in my Findings of Fact.

FINDINGS OF FACT

After a thorough review of the pleadings, transcript, and exhibits, I make the following findings of fact. Applicant is 63 years old. Applicant was born in India, and received a bachelor’s degree from a college in India. He came to the United States in May 1979 on a student visa to continue his education. He received both a master’s degree in chemical engineering and a master’s degree in industrial engineering from a United States university in 1982.

Applicant worked for a U.S. government agency from September 1982 until April 1984. The agency had a clearance procedure for access to information but not a rigid security clearance procedure. He received a clearance from the agency. Applicant left the agency in April 1984, and worked for over 20 years until December 2004, as a systems engineer and technical staff member for a large U.S. telecommunications company. Since April 2005, he has worked for various government contractors as a senior network systems engineer on projects in support of the U.S. military. He received temporary eligibility for access to classified information in 2004, and permanent eligibility in 2006. His latest performance review shows that he is an excellent employee and engineer who is a vital support to his company’s mission in support of the U.S. military.

Applicant married his wife, who was a citizen of India at the time, in November 1983. She came to the United States after being granted resident alien as his spouse in December 1984. Applicant became a United States citizen in October 1989, and his wife became a United States citizen in 1993. They have two grown children who were born in the United States and are United States citizens. His son graduated from a U.S. university and was designated a prestigious scholar who attended and received a doctorate from a world-class university. He is completing his fourth year of medical school at a United States medical school. His daughter is completing her second year at a United States medical school. (Tr. 38-43; GX 1, e-QIP, dated December 12, 2014; GX 2, PSI, dated May 6, 2015; AX C; Degree Certificates, dated April 1981 and 1982; AX E, Performance Award, June 25, 2010)

Applicant came to the United States for the opportunity to think and work as an engineer. He knew he would have the freedom to work and design as an engineer. He knew the United States was a great place to be innovative. He had a brother who was a doctor living in the United States that sponsored him and eased his transition to the U.S. culture. He left India at age 24 and has been in the United States for 38 years. Since becoming a citizen, he has voted in every election except one. He owns property in two states valued at over $1,000,000, and a condominium with his wife and son. He believes his net value in the United States is over $2,000,000. His performance reviews show that he is a valued and excellent employee in support of the U.S. military. (Tr. 43- 44, 62-66; AX D, Deeds, various dates; AX E, Performance Review, dated December 31, 2016)

Applicant’s parents were residents of both the United States and India. His parents when alive had United States resident alien status. Applicant has eight siblings. Two brothers are citizens and residents of the United States. One is a doctor and the other an engineer. Applicant has family members in India. The SOR alleges, and Applicant admits, he has four brothers (SOR 1.a) and three sisters (SOR 1.b) who are citizens and residents of India. Two brothers in India are self-employed doctors, another is a self-employed farmer, and the fourth brother is an accountant for the India postal system, a government agency. His sisters are homemakers. There is no indication that any of his siblings are considered prominent citizens of India. The evidence indicates that they are ordinary citizens working in critical but ordinary jobs, like doctors accountants, farmers, and homemakers.

Applicant used to have periodic phone or e-mail contact with his brothers. He never had much phone or e-mail contact with his sisters. He has stopped contact with all his siblings, and has no telephone or email contact with them except for the brother employed by the postal system. He has electronic contact with him about once a quarter. He has stopped contacting his siblings so as to mitigate the risks of foreign influence caused by his siblings in India. Applicant enjoys his work and does not want to risk his eligibility or access to classified information. Applicant sees his siblings when he visits India. He visited India for a few weeks in June/July 2009, October/November 2012, and December 2014/January 2015. Only one brother and his wife have visited Applicant and his family in the United States, and that was for their daughter’s wedding in July 2015. Applicant has not had an Indian passport since the early 1980s, and is not a dual citizen with India. (Tr. 45-48, 67-68: GX 2, PSI, May 6, 2015)

Applicant admits he has a brother-in-law (SOR 1.c), two sisters-in-law (SOR 1.d), and a friend (SOR 1.e) who are citizens and residents of India. Applicant’s brother-in- law is a self-employed doctor. He used to have contact with him by phone or e-mail once a month. Applicant has no contact with him now. (Tr. 47-48) He had limited contact by phone or e-mail with his sisters–in-law, who are homemakers. He has stopped all communications with both of them. He sees them when he visits India. They have no information about Applicant’s work and do not know he is seeking a security clearance. (Tr. 48-49, 60-61)

Applicant admits he has contact with a friend from college who is an electrical engineer for an oil company and a citizen and resident of India. They used to have contact by phone or e-mail once or twice a month. However, they now have no contact. (Tr. 49-51)

Applicant admits that he has an interest in a house in India he inherited along with his brothers from his father in 1999. (SOR 1.f). The house is valued at approximately $100,000, and Applicant’s value in the house is approximately $15,000. In 2006, he signed an Indian legal document to have his name removed from the deed. In 2016, he signed an affidavit releasing any share he may still have in the property to his brother who lives on the property. (Tr. 51-53; AX A, Affidavit, dated October 18, 2016)

Applicant admits that he has some interest in two bank accounts in India (SOR 1.g). One account belongs to his wife as the primary account holder and he is the secondary account holder. For many years, her father deposited funds in the account for her use. The balance of the account is approximately $15,000. In 2012, when her father was sick, his wife had her father’s name removed from the account and made it a joint account with Applicant. In their 2014 visit to India to celebrate the passing of Applicant’s father-in-law, they did not consider closing the account. They learned later that bank accounts could not be closed unless the account holders were present in India. The second account was started by his father, who had started accounts for all of his children. Applicant would like to close both accounts to mitigate the security concerns, but he does not want to return to India. (Tr. 53-59, 62-65)

One of Applicant’s supervisors, a retired U.S. Army officer, testified that Applicant was one of his key engineers on a project to support the Army’s battlefield communications. Applicant was a critical part of the project. Applicant discovered and resolved an issue that enabled the program to work supporting worldwide military battlefield communications. The witness does not have a concern with Applicant having access to classified information. (Tr. 16-23)

The facility security officer for Applicant’s employer testified that he has known and worked closely with Applicant for approximately 10 years. He has no concerns about Applicant’s access to classified information. Applicant is trustworthy and honest. He cooperated fully with the security clearance process. He is extremely loyal to the United States. (Tr. 23-27)

Applicant’s brother testified that he came to the United States in 1967 on a student visa. He attended medical school and became a general surgeon. He is now retired. He assisted his brother in coming to the United States to continue his studies. He and his brothers, including Applicant, inherited property from their father worth approximately $100,000. Applicant’s share of the property is worth approximately $15,000. He knows that Applicant has relinquished his share of the property to another brother. The witness sponsored Applicant and his wife for their entry and citizenship in the United States. He has never had any question about Applicant’s or his family members loyalty to the United States. (Tr. 30-34)

India is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy with a population of approximately 1.2 billion people. The U.S. and India share common values including the rule of law, respect for diversity, and democratic government. The U.S. Department of State reported in 2012 that bilateral defense and counterterrorism cooperation between the U.S. and India had grown to reach unprecedented levels, In 2009, the U.S. and India launched the U.S.-India Strategic dialogue which is a bilateral forum focused on strengthening cooperation between the two countries in several area, including energy, climate change, trade, education, and counterterrorism. The U.S. supports a reformed United Nations Security Council that includes India as a permanent member. The U.S. is one of India’s largest trade and investment partners. In January 2015, President Obama and Indian Prime Minister Modi lauded the close and growing ties between the United Stead and India.

The 2008 Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage identified India, along with seven other countries, as being involved in criminal espionage of U.S. trade secrets. There were export control enforcement cases in 2008 against India or Indian businesses. There have been recent criminal cases In the U.S. concerning export enforcement, economic espionage, theft of trade secrets, and embargo-related criminal prosecutions involving both the government of India and private companies and individuals in India.

India and Pakistan have been locked in a tense rivalry since the partition of the subcontinent following independence from Great Britain in 1947. India continues to experience terrorist and insurgent activities that may affect U.S. citizens. Anti-Western terrorist groups, some on the U.S. Government’s list of foreign terrorist organizations, are active in India. India remains subject to violent terrorists attacks and continues to be one of the most persistently targeted countries by transnational and domestic terrorist groups.

According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2013 Human Rights Report, the most significant human rights problems in India were police and security forces abuses, including extra judicial killings, torture, rape, and widespread corruption at all level of government. The United States and India share a number of security perspectives, including, those on China, and the Asian balance of power, terrorism, Afghanistan, maritime issues, and weapons of mass destruction. India also has a long-standing military supply relationships with the Soviet Union, and Russia remains India’s largest supplier of military systems and spare parts. India has remained reticent to discuss its nuclear security measures or allow inspections. India has also refused to accede to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty despite U. S. policy supporting its universality. (GX 3, Request for Administrative notice and Supporting Documents)

POLICIES

When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which must be considered in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.

These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.

The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record.

Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision.

A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.

ANALYSIS

Foreign Influence

Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in the U.S. interest, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including but not limited to, such consideration as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism. (AG ¶ 6)

Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States. The United States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those of the United States. Even friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security. Friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States, especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields. The nature of a nation’s government and its relationship with the United States are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are vulnerable to government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family member is associated with or dependent upon the government or the country is known to conduct intelligence operations against the United States. In considering the nature of the government, an administrative judge must also consider any terrorist activity in the country at issue.

The SOR alleges, and Applicant admits, that his four brothers, three sisters, brother-in-law, two sisters-in-law, and a friend are citizens and residents of India. He also admits to having financial and property interests in India. Applicant’s family members who are citizens or residents of India and his property interest in India are a foreign influence security concern.

Three disqualifying conditions are relevant to the security concerns raised in the SOR under AG ¶ 7:

(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;

(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information;

(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and

(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign operated business, which could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation.

The mere existence of foreign relationships and contacts is not sufficient to raise the above disqualifying conditions. AG ¶¶ 7(a), 7(d), and 7(e) requires substantial evidence of a “heightened risk.” The “heightened risk” required to raise one of these disqualifying conditions is a relatively low standard. “Heightened risk” denotes a risk greater than the normal risk inherent in having a family member or contacts living under a foreign government. The nature of Applicant’s contacts and relationships must be examined to determine whether it creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. The Government has established that Applicant’s family in India may be under a “heightened risk” of security concern because of the potential for criminal espionage targeted at the United States, terrorist activities and threats, targeted intelligence activities, and human rights violations in India. An applicant with foreign family or friendship ties to a country that presents a heightened risk has a heavy burden of persuasion to show that neither he nor the family members are subject to influence by that country. The totality of an applicant’s family and friends ties to a foreign country as well as the tie to the country for each individual person must be considered.

Applicant raised facts to mitigate the security concerns arising from his family members in India. I have considered the following Foreign Influence Mitigating Conditions under AG ¶ 8:

(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.;

(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and (c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual or infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation.

In evaluating the potential conflict of interest because Applicant’s family members are citizens and residents of India I considered that India is a strong ally of the United States with mutual defense and strategic interests, that India is a substantial trading partner of the United States, and that India cooperates with the United States on many military matters. A friendly relationship is not determinative, but it makes it less likely that a foreign government would attempt to exploit a United States citizen through relatives or associates in that country. Even friendly countries may engage in espionage against the United States’ economic, scientific, or technical interest. I have also considered the on-going situation in India with extensive terrorist activities and human rights issues. Even though India is not a hostile country and its interests are not inimical to the United States, it is reasonable to consider that the terrorist situation and groups in India could take an action that may jeopardize their friendly position with the United States. There are indications that elements in India could seek sensitive information from their citizens who have family in the United States.

I have considered Applicant’s relationship with his siblings and family who are citizens or residents of India. Applicant has been open and candid about his foreign contacts. There is a rebuttable presumption that contacts with an immediate family member in a foreign country are not casual. Factors such as an applicant’s relatives’ obscurity or the failure of foreign authorities to contact them in the past do not provide a meaningful measure of whether an applicant’s family circumstances post a security concern. Applicant has minimal contact with his siblings in India. He had talked to his siblings a few times a year, but he has curtailed his contact with them. He only occasionally contacts one brother by phone or e-mail. He travels to India about every other year and sees his siblings when he visits India. One sibling and spouse attend Applicant’s daughter’s recent wedding. Even though the contacts with his siblings are minimal, Applicant has not rebutted the presumption that the contacts and communications with his siblings are not casual. The communications and contacts between Applicant and his family members are not considered casual or infrequent for security clearance purposes. His family members could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation. Because of the terrorist activity in India, Applicant may likely be placed in a position of having to choose between his family members and the U.S. interests. AG ¶ 8 (a) and (c) do not apply.

Applicant has strong ties to the United States. He came to the United States to complete his education and to be free to pursue with freedom his profession as an engineer. He followed two of his siblings to the United States. Applicant and his wife became U.S. citizens at the first opportunity. Their children are U.S. native born citizens and contributing to U.S. society and values. Applicant owns property and has the majority of his financial assets in the United States. He relinquished his interests in property he inherited in India and is trying to close bank accounts in India that opened by others in his or his wife’s name. He has firm ties to the United States and considers it home. He embraced the culture, history, and life style of the United States.

Applicant’s loyalty to the United States is unquestioned. He has family members who have been citizens and residents of the United States for many years. His immediate family, wife and children, are U. S. citizens and residents. Applicant has established that it is unlikely that he could be placed in a position to choose between any sense of loyalty or obligation to his family members in India and his sense of loyalty or obligation to the United States. In balancing all of the factors mentioned and considered above, I am satisfied Applicant’s loyalty to the United States is such that he can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the United States interest. There is no risk to the national interest if Applicant has access to classified information. The mitigating conditions in AG ¶¶ 8(b) apply. Applicant has met his heavy burden to show that his family members who are citizens and residents of India do not cause a security concern. I conclude that Applicant has mitigated security concerns for foreign influence.

WHOLE PERSON CONCEPT

Under the whole person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):

(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for access to sensitive information must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.

I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I considered the information about Applicant’s job performance and his contributions to work performed for the U.S. military. The whole-person concept requires consideration of all available information about Applicant, not single items in isolation, to reach a determination concerning Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.

Applicant has contact with family members and financial interests in India. However, Applicant established that he has such strong relationships and loyalties in and to the United States that he can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the United States. While access to classified information is not based on a finding of loyalty to the United States, Applicant established his deep and abiding commitment to the protection of United States interests. Applicant and his wife and children are residents of the United States and solely United States citizens. He has performed quality work as an engineer for the U.S. military. These facts leave me without questions and doubts about Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for access to classified information. For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant has met the heavy burden of mitigating potential security concerns arising from family members in India. Applicant mitigated security concerns arising from foreign influence and access to classified information is granted.

FORMAL FINDINGS

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT

Subparagraphs 1.a – 1.g: For Applicant

CONCLUSION

In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent with national security to grant Applicant eligibility for access to classified information. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

_________________ THOMAS M. CREAN Administrative Judge