Summary
A 53-year-old principal engineer for a defense contractor was granted a security clearance despite concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The Statement of Reasons noted the applicant's regular contact, through visits and calls, with her mother, brother, two sisters, sister-in-law, and brothers-in-law, all citizens and residents of Taiwan. Additionally, she maintained contact with an aunt and uncle, Taiwanese citizens residing in Japan. Her family was unaware of her security clearance.
The applicant became a U.S. citizen in 1990, holds a U.S. passport, owns a home in the U.S., and has a retirement account with her employer. She has been employed as a principal engineer for a defense contractor since 1995 and has held a security clearance since 1996.
The clearance was granted because the judge determined that the applicant's family members in Taiwan were not in positions susceptible to exploitation for espionage. Furthermore, Taiwan's status as a U.S. ally with a defense agreement and improved human rights conditions mitigated the risk of foreign influence. The applicant's deep and longstanding ties in the U.S. were also considered, indicating loyalty to U.S. interests.
Why the Applicant Prevailed
- The applicant's family members in Taiwan are not in positions to be exploited for espionage.
- Taiwan is a U.S. ally with a defense agreement and improved human rights conditions, reducing the risk of foreign influence.
- The applicant has established deep and longstanding ties in the U.S., indicating loyalty to U.S. interests.
Conditions Referenced
- AG ¶ 7(a)raisedContact with a Foreign Family Member, Business or Professional Associate, Friend, or Other Person Who Is a Citizen of or Resident in a Foreign Country If That Contact Creates a Heightened Risk of Foreign Exploitation, Inducement, Manipulation, Pressure, or Coercion
- AG ¶ 7(b)raisedConnections to a Foreign Person, Group, Government, or Country That Create a Potential Conflict of Interest Between the Individual’s Obligation to Protect Sensitive Information or Technology and the Individual’s Desire to Help a Foreign Person, Group, or Country by Providing That Information
- AG ¶ 8(a)appliedThe Nature of the Relationships with Foreign Persons, the Country in Which These Persons Are Located, or the Positions or Activities of Those Persons in That Country Are Such That It Is Unlikely the Individual Will Be Placed in a Position of Having to Choose Between the Interests of a Foreign Individual, Group, Organization, or Government and the Interest of the U.S.
- AG ¶ 8(b)appliedThere Is No Conflict of Interest, Either Because the Individual’s Sense of Loyalty or Obligation to the Foreign Person, Group, Government, or Country Is so Minimal, or the Individual Has Such Deep and Longstanding Relationships and Loyalties in the U.S., That the Individual Can Be Expected to Resolve Any Conflict of Interest in Favor of the U.S. Interest
- AG ¶ 8(c)appliedContact or Communication with Foreign Citizens Is so Casual or Infrequent That There Is Little Likelihood That It Could Create a Risk for Foreign Influence or Exploitation
Key Rule Quoted
“The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration.”
Procedural Posture
- SOR issuedOct 28, 2007
- Answer filedNov 18, 2007Applicant admitted all allegations with explanation.
- Hearing heldApr 8, 2008
- Decision dateMay 19, 2008
Cite For
- Mitigating Conditions for Foreign Influence Under Guideline B
- Consideration of Family Ties in Security Clearance Decisions
- Impact of U.S.-Taiwan Relations on Security Clearance Evaluations