ISCR Case 11-00980.h1

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 11-00980.h1

grantedJun 12, 2012· Hon. Francisco Mendez· hearing

Summary

A U.S. Government employee with over 30 years of experience was granted a security clearance despite concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The applicant, a South Korean immigrant, had disclosed foreign familial connections in South Korea since his first clearance application three decades prior. He also maintained contact with South Korean government officials through U.S. civic organizations, fully disclosing these interactions, which ceased when officials returned to South Korea.

Further concerns involved two Russian scientists. The applicant befriended one scientist (RS1) at a conference, with whom he recently re-established email contact for an upcoming conference. RS1 holds a contract with the U.S. military, and the applicant consistently reported this contact. The applicant met the second scientist (RS2) in 2005, researching RS2's background and discovering family ties to the Russian government. The applicant declined to co-author a book with RS2 due to the topic's sensitivity to his U.S. Government work, but later received U.S. Government approval to collaborate with RS2 on a U.S. military project, reporting all details.

The judge granted the clearance, citing the applicant's 30-year incident-free clearance history and consistent disclosure of foreign contacts. The applicant demonstrated a strong commitment to protecting classified information, including declining offers that could pose conflicts of interest, thereby mitigating foreign influence concerns.

Why the Applicant Prevailed

The applicant has held a security clearance for over 30 years without incident.
He has consistently disclosed his foreign contacts and connections to the U.S. Government.
The applicant demonstrated a strong commitment to safeguarding classified information, declining offers that could create conflicts of interest.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 7(a)raisedContact with Foreign Family Members
AG ¶ 7(b)raisedConnections to Foreign Persons

Mitigating

AG ¶ 8(a)appliedNature of Relationships with Foreign Persons
AG ¶ 8(b)appliedMinimal Conflict of Interest Due to Loyalty to the U.S.

Key Rule Quoted

“Security clearance decisions are not an exact science, but rather predictive judgments about a person’s security suitability in light of that person’s past conduct and present circumstances.”
— ISCR Case No. 01-25941 at 5 (App. Bd. May 7, 2004)

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedJul 20, 2011
Answer filedJul 29, 2011
Hearing heldNov 18, 2011
Decision dateJun 12, 2012

Cite For

Mitigation of Foreign Influence Concerns Under Guideline B
Importance of Long-term U.S. Residency and Loyalty in Security Clearance Cases
Consideration of the Whole-person Concept in Adjudicating Security Clearances

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
1.a	Applicant disclosed his foreign familial connections to South Korea starting 30 years ago with his first security clearance application.	For Applicant	In Law in Foreign Country Immediate Family	South Korea HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Credited Deep U.S. Ties Credited Voluntary Disclosure Before Confrontation
1.b	specific text not stated in this decision	For Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	—	Unknown	—	—	—
1.c	Applicant has been actively engaged with U.S. civic organizations for over two decades. He has met a number of South Korean government officials through his service with these U.S. civic organizations. He does not have a personal friendship with any of these South Korean officials, and his contact with them ceases altogether when they return to South Korea. Applicant has fully disclosed these contacts to the U.S. Government.	For Applicant	Friend in Foreign Country Friend	South Korea HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Credited Deep U.S. Ties Credited Voluntary Disclosure Before Confrontation
1.d–1.g	4 sub-charges — specific text not stated in this decision (for the applicant). (low confidence)	For Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	—		—	—	—
1.h	Applicant met one of the Russian scientists (RS1) in about (redacted) at a scientific conference and they became friends due to their common interest in physics. RS1 has a contract through the U.S. military. Applicant last met with RS1 in approximately (redacted) – at another scientific conference. They recently started e-mail communication again in anticipation of participating at another international scientific conference. Applicant reported his contact with RS1 during his previous and current background investigations, including on his SCA.	For Applicant	Friend in Foreign Country Friend GOVT-AFFILIATED	Russia HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Credited Deep U.S. Ties Credited Voluntary Disclosure Before Confrontation
1.i	Applicant met the other Russian scientist (RS2) in 2005. Applicant researched the background of RS2 and discovered that RS2’s family worked for the Russian government. Applicant declined to co-author a book with RS2, because the topic was in his specialized field that he has been working in for the U.S. Government for over 30 years. The U.S. Government recently approved RS2 to conduct research with Applicant on a U.S. military project. Applicant and RS2 have had numerous conversations regarding this U.S. military project. Applicant reported his contact with RS2, including his suspicion that RS2’s family worked for the Russian government, on his current SCA and discussed it in detail over the course of several background interviews.	For Applicant	Friend in Foreign Country Friend GOVT-AFFILIATED	Russia HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.	Credited Deep U.S. Ties Credited Voluntary Disclosure Before Confrontation

Allegation

Finding

Relationship

Country

Response

Disqualifying (¶7)

Mitigating applied (¶8)

Mitigation

1.a

Applicant disclosed his foreign familial connections to South Korea starting 30 years ago with his first security clearance application.

For Applicant

In Law in Foreign Country

Immediate Family

South Korea

HEIGHTENED RISK

Admitted

(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation

(b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest

(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely

(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.

Credited

Deep U.S. Ties

Credited

Voluntary Disclosure Before Confrontation

1.b

specific text not stated in this decision

For Applicant

Unspecified Foreign Relationship

Other

—

Unknown

—

1.c

Applicant has been actively engaged with U.S. civic organizations for over two decades. He has met a number of South Korean government officials through his service with these U.S. civic organizations. He does not have a personal friendship with any of these South Korean officials, and his contact with them ceases altogether when they return to South Korea. Applicant has fully disclosed these contacts to the U.S. Government.

For Applicant

Friend in Foreign Country

Friend

South Korea

HEIGHTENED RISK

Admitted

(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation

(b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest

(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely

(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.

Credited

Deep U.S. Ties

Credited

Voluntary Disclosure Before Confrontation

1.d–1.g

4 sub-charges — specific text not stated in this decision (for the applicant). (low confidence)

For Applicant

Unspecified Foreign Relationship

Other

—

1.h

Applicant met one of the Russian scientists (RS1) in about (redacted) at a scientific conference and they became friends due to their common interest in physics. RS1 has a contract through the U.S. military. Applicant last met with RS1 in approximately (redacted) – at another scientific conference. They recently started e-mail communication again in anticipation of participating at another international scientific conference. Applicant reported his contact with RS1 during his previous and current background investigations, including on his SCA.

For Applicant

Friend in Foreign Country

Friend

GOVT-AFFILIATED

Russia

HEIGHTENED RISK

Admitted

(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation

(b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest

(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely

(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.

Credited

Deep U.S. Ties

Credited

Voluntary Disclosure Before Confrontation

1.i

Applicant met the other Russian scientist (RS2) in 2005. Applicant researched the background of RS2 and discovered that RS2’s family worked for the Russian government. Applicant declined to co-author a book with RS2, because the topic was in his specialized field that he has been working in for the U.S. Government for over 30 years. The U.S. Government recently approved RS2 to conduct research with Applicant on a U.S. military project. Applicant and RS2 have had numerous conversations regarding this U.S. military project. Applicant reported his contact with RS2, including his suspicion that RS2’s family worked for the Russian government, on his current SCA and discussed it in detail over the course of several background interviews.

For Applicant

Friend in Foreign Country

Friend

GOVT-AFFILIATED

Russia

HEIGHTENED RISK

Admitted

(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation

(b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest

(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely

(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S.

Credited

Deep U.S. Ties

Credited

Voluntary Disclosure Before Confrontation

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Case Profile

Summary

Why the Applicant Prevailed

Conditions Referenced

Key Rule Quoted

Procedural Posture

Cite For

Full decision

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

STATEMENT OF CASE

FINDINGS OF FACT

POLICIES

ANALYSIS

WHOLE PERSON CONCEPT

FORMAL FINDINGS

CONCLUSION

FOOTNOTES