Summary
A 33-year-old U.S. citizen and defense contractor sought to retain his security clearance, which was challenged under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline E (Personal Conduct). Concerns arose from his contacts with foreign nationals, including a Russian exchange student and associates, and his travel to Russia. Specifically, it was alleged that he had a friend who was a foreign national and had met individuals associated with a foreign intelligence agent, and that he had not reported all foreign contacts as required.
However, the judge determined that the applicant's foreign contacts did not pose a heightened risk of foreign exploitation or coercion. The applicant demonstrated reliability by promptly reporting his interactions with the Russian agent to his facility security officer upon learning of the agent's arrest.
Ultimately, the applicant's security clearance was GRANTED. This decision was based on the absence of disqualifying factors, the applicant's established trustworthiness, and the fact that the government failed to establish a case for disqualification under Guideline B concerning his Russian friends. The applicant also has no foreign relatives or business interests that could create a risk of foreign influence.
Why the Applicant Prevailed
- The applicant reported his contacts with the Russian agent to his facility security officer promptly after learning of the agent's arrest.
- The applicant has no foreign relatives or business interests that could create a risk of foreign influence.
- The government failed to establish a case for disqualification under Guideline B regarding the applicant's Russian friends.
Conditions Referenced
- AG ¶ 6raisedForeign Influence
- AG ¶ 7 (a)rejectedForeign InfluenceThe applicant's contacts did not create a heightened risk of foreign exploitation.
- AG ¶ 7 (b)rejectedForeign InfluenceThe applicant has no business or financial interests in a foreign country.
- AG ¶ 7 (c)rejectedForeign InfluenceThe applicant's relationships do not create a potential conflict of interest.
- AG ¶ 7 (d)rejectedForeign InfluenceThe applicant did not fail to report required associations.
- AG ¶ 7 (e)rejectedForeign InfluenceThe applicant's contacts with the Russian agent were not significant enough to warrant concern.
- AG ¶ 7 (f)rejectedForeign InfluenceThe applicant's contacts did not indicate vulnerability to coercion.
- AG ¶ 7 (g)rejectedForeign InfluenceNo evidence of attempts to elicit protected information from the applicant.
- AG ¶ 7 (h)rejectedForeign InfluenceThe applicant's conduct did not increase vulnerability to exploitation.
- AG ¶ 8 (a)appliedForeign InfluenceThe applicant's prompt reporting of contacts demonstrated reliability.
- AG ¶ 8 (b)appliedForeign InfluenceThe applicant has no foreign relatives or business interests.
- AG ¶ 8 (c)appliedForeign InfluenceThe applicant's contacts with Russian nationals were limited and did not pose a risk.
- AG ¶ 8 (d)appliedForeign InfluenceThe applicant's relationships do not create a potential conflict of interest.
- AG ¶ 8 (e)appliedForeign InfluenceThe applicant's work references support his trustworthiness.
- AG ¶ 8 (f)appliedForeign InfluenceThe applicant's conduct did not indicate a desire to provide sensitive information.
Key Rule Quoted
“The Government must prove, by substantial evidence, controverted facts alleged in the SOR.”
Procedural Posture
- SOR issuedOct 26, 2012
- Answer filed—
- Hearing heldJan 29, 2013
- Decision dateApr 2, 2013
Cite For
- Evaluation of Foreign Influence Under Guideline B
- Importance of Prompt Reporting of Foreign Contacts
- Criteria for Assessing Trustworthiness in Security Clearance Cases