Summary
A 64-year-old scientist and businessman was denied a security clearance due to significant foreign influence and personal conduct concerns. The applicant's wife and immediate family are citizens of the People's Republic of China (PRC), with his mother and siblings residing in the PRC. He also maintained extensive personal and business ties within the PRC, including undisclosed contacts with high-ranking officials, such as the son of a former PRC president and a PRC ambassador. These connections, which included seeking favorable consideration from PRC officials on at least two occasions, were deemed to make him vulnerable to coercion.
Furthermore, the applicant demonstrated a lack of candor by deliberately failing to disclose material facts on his security clearance application. He did not disclose his PRC commercial connections, his younger brother and sister's PRC citizenship, or various business dealings. These undisclosed dealings included export licenses for the Taipei and Shanghai fire departments, business discussions with a Singapore representative, an oral agreement with a casing manufacturer, an optical import business, and a textbook published in the PRC.
The applicant also failed to disclose personal relationships with individuals at the Metallic Institute and a PRC university. The judge found that these omissions, coupled with his extensive foreign ties, raised unmitigated security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline E (Personal Conduct), leading to the denial of his security clearance.
Why the Applicant Was Denied
- Applicant's wife and immediate family are PRC citizens, creating a potential for foreign influence.
- Applicant had extensive undisclosed business and personal contacts in the PRC.
- Applicant deliberately failed to disclose material facts on his security clearance application.
Conditions Referenced
- DC 1appliedAn Immediate Family Member, or a Person to Whom the Individual Has Close Ties of Affection or Obligation, Is a Citizen Of, or Resident or Present In, a Foreign Country.
- DC 2appliedSharing Living Quarters with a Person or Persons, Regardless of Their Citizenship Status, If the Potential for Adverse Foreign Influence or Duress Exists.
- DC 3appliedAssociates Who Are Connected with Any Foreign Government.
- DC 4appliedFailing to Report, Where Required, Associations with Foreign Nationals.
- DC 6appliedConduct Which May Make the Individual Vulnerable to Coercion, Exploitation, or Pressure by a Foreign Government.
- DC 2appliedThe Deliberate Omission, Concealment, or Falsification of Relevant and Material Facts From Any Personnel Security Questionnaire, or Similar Form Used to Determine Security Clearance Eligibility or Trustworthiness.
- DC 3appliedDeliberately Providing False or Misleading Information Concerning Relevant and Material Matters to an Investigator or Other Official Representative in Connection with a Personnel Security or Trustworthiness Determination.
- DC 4appliedPersonal Conduct That Increases an Individual's Vulnerability to Coercion, Exploitation or Duress, Such as Engaging in Activities Which, If Known, May Affect the Person's Personal, Professional, or Community Standing or Render the Person Susceptible to Blackmail.
Key Rule Quoted
“"[N]o one has a 'right' to a security clearance."”
Procedural Posture
- SOR issuedMar 1, 2005
- Answer filedMar 30, 2005
- Hearing heldDec 15, 2005
- Decision dateApr 28, 2006
Cite For
- Foreign Influence Concerns Due to Family Ties Under Guideline B
- Personal Conduct Issues Related to Lack of Candor Under Guideline E
- The Importance of Disclosing Foreign Contacts in Security Clearance Applications