Summary
Applicant, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Syria, has close family ties to relatives in Syria and Lebanon, which raised security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). Despite being deemed trustworthy at work, the risk of foreign influence was not mitigated. The applicant's foreign preference concerns were alleviated by the destruction of a Syrian identification card, and a reasonable explanation for omissions in his security clearance questionnaire led to a favorable finding under Guideline E (Personal Conduct). Ultimately, clearance was denied due to unresolved foreign influence concerns.
Under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), Guideline C (Foreign Preference), and Guideline E (Personal Conduct), the Statement of Reasons alleged the following: Applicant's father, sister, and step-mother are citizens of and currently residing in the Syrian Arab Republic (1.a). Applicant's step-father and two step-brothers are citizens of and currently residing in Lebanon (1.b). Applicant sends $600.00 every three months to his father in the Syrian Arab Republic (1.c). Applicant maintains contact with four friends, two of whom are in Saudi Arabia, one in the Syrian Arab Republic, and one in the United Arab Emirates (1.d). Applicant traveled to the Syrian Arab Republic in June 1997, June 1999, and August 2001 (1.e). Applicant was employed as either a programmer or an assistant professor at the University of Damascus from August 1987 to August 1989 (1.f). Applicant traveled to the Republic of Lebanon in June 1999 and August 2001 (1.g). Applicant plans to return to the Republic of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic every year to visit family (1.h). Applicant received a Syrian identification card that was necessary for visits to Syria (2.a). Applicant executed a security clearance questionnaire on February 17, 2001. In response to question 16 requiring information about foreign countries visited (other than those identified in models 4, 5, and 6) in the last seven years on other than official U.S. Government orders, Applicant answered "yes" and listed Germany and Austria in 2000, Bermuda in 1999, and Egypt in 1995. Applicant failed to list his trips to the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon (3.a).
The judge denied the clearance. The government raised disqualifying conditions B1, C1, E2. The judge applied mitigating conditions B3, C1, E3. The decision turned on the following: The applicant's close family ties to foreign nationals in Syria and Lebanon posed a persistent risk of foreign influence that was not mitigated; The applicant failed to demonstrate that his family members are not in a position to be exploited by a foreign power; The applicant's intention to visit family in Syria and Lebanon increased his vulnerability to coercion.
Why the Applicant Was Denied
- The applicant's close family ties to foreign nationals in Syria and Lebanon posed a persistent risk of foreign influence that was not mitigated.
- The applicant failed to demonstrate that his family members are not in a position to be exploited by a foreign power.
- The applicant's intention to visit family in Syria and Lebanon increased his vulnerability to coercion.
Conditions Referenced
- B1raisedForeign Influence
- C1raisedForeign Preference
- E2raisedPersonal Conduct
- B3rejectedForeign InfluenceThe applicant's contacts with distant cousins and friends were deemed casual and infrequent.
- C1appliedForeign PreferenceThe applicant's destruction of the Syrian identification card mitigated the foreign preference concern.
- E3appliedPersonal ConductThe applicant provided a reasonable explanation for the omission of travel information.
Key Rule Quoted
“Security concerns are activated when an individual's immediate family, including cohabitants, and other persons to whom he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens of the U.S. or may be subject to duress.”
Procedural Posture
- SOR issuedJan 8, 2004
- Answer filedMar 29, 2004
- Hearing held—Case decided on written record without a hearing.
- Decision dateJan 31, 2005
Cite For
- Evaluation of Foreign Influence Risks Due to Family Ties Under Guideline B
- Mitigation of Foreign Preference Concerns Through the Destruction of Foreign Identification Documents
- Reasonable Explanations for Omissions in Security Clearance Questionnaires Under Guideline E