Summary
A 55-year-old U.S. citizen and defense contractor, originally from Lebanon, was denied a security clearance due to concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), Guideline C (Foreign Preference), and Guideline E (Personal Conduct). The applicant had renounced his Lebanese citizenship and surrendered his Lebanese passport.
However, the denial stemmed from several factors. The applicant retained and used a Lebanese passport until its expiration in 2000, which indicated foreign preference. Additionally, he traveled to Syria on three occasions without disclosing these trips on his security clearance application, raising concerns about personal conduct. The presence of his immediate family members in Lebanon also created potential for foreign influence and exploitation.
The judge determined that the applicant did not adequately mitigate the risks associated with foreign influence and personal conduct, leading to the denial of his security clearance.
Why the Applicant Was Denied
- The applicant retained and used a Lebanese passport until it expired in 2000, indicating foreign preference.
- The applicant traveled to Syria on three occasions without disclosing these trips on his security clearance application.
- The applicant's immediate family members reside in Lebanon, creating potential for foreign influence and exploitation.
Conditions Referenced
- E2.A3.1.2.1raisedThe Exercise of Dual Citizenship.
- E2.A3.1.2.2raisedPossession And/or Use of a Foreign Passport.
- E2.A2.1.2.1raisedAn Immediate Family Member, or a Person to Whom the Individual Has Close Ties of Affection or Obligation, Is a Citizen Of, or Resident or Present In, a Foreign Country.
- E2.A2.1.2.8raisedA Substantial Financial Interest in a Country, or in Any Foreign-owned or Operated Business That Could Make the Individual Vulnerable to Foreign Influence.
- E2.A5.1.2.2raisedThe Deliberate Omission, Concealment, or Falsification of Relevant and Material Facts From Any Personnel Security Questionnaire, or Similar Form Used to Determine Security Clearance Eligibility or Trustworthiness.
- E2.A5.1.2.3raisedDeliberately Providing False or Misleading Information Concerning Relevant and Material Matters to an Investigator or Other Official Representative in Connection with a Personnel Security or Trustworthiness Determination.
- E2.A5.1.2.4raisedPersonal Conduct That Increases an Individual's Vulnerability to Coercion, Exploitation or Duress, Such as Engaging in Activities Which, If Known, May Affect the Person's Personal, Professional, or Community Standing or Render the Person Susceptible to Blackmail.
- E2.A3.1.3.1rejectedDual Citizenship Is Based Solely on Parents' Citizenship or Birth in a Foreign Country.
- E2.A3.1.3.4rejectedIndividual Has Expressed a Willingness to Renounce Dual Citizenship.
- E2.A2.1.3.1rejectedA Determination That the Immediate Family Members, (spouse, Father, Mother, Sons, Daughters, Brothers, Sisters), Cohabitant, or Associate(s) in Question Are Not Agents of a Foreign Power or in a Position to Be Exploited by a Foreign Power in a Way That Could Force the Individual to Choose Between Loyalty to the Person(s) Involved and the United States.
- E2.A2.1.3.5rejectedForeign Financial Interests Are Minimal and Not Sufficient to Affect the Individual's Security Responsibilities.
Key Rule Quoted
“"[N]o one has a 'right' to a security clearance."”
Procedural Posture
- SOR issuedMar 11, 2005
- Answer filedMar 30, 2005
- Hearing heldFeb 22, 2006
- Decision dateJul 7, 2006
Cite For
- Foreign Preference Concerns Under Guideline C
- Foreign Influence Concerns Under Guideline B
- Personal Conduct Issues Related to Non-disclosure of Foreign Travel