ISCR Case 03-21688.h1

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 03-21688.h1

deniedNov 30, 2006· Hon. Christopher Graham· hearing

Summary

A 47-year-old senior scientist and chief technologist for a defense contractor was denied a security clearance due to concerns under Guideline E (Personal Conduct), Guideline K (Handling Protected Information), and Guideline M (Use of Information Technology). The applicant admitted to downloading government software for personal use and committing two security violations in 2003. These violations involved incorporating sensitive information into reports on an unclassified computer, which were then sent via unclassified email, resulting in a compromise of classified information. His employer issued a letter of reprimand on January 19, 2004, for these actions, which violated company policy and sections of the NISPOM.

While concerns under Guideline K were successfully mitigated, the applicant's dishonesty regarding personal conduct remained a significant issue. He failed to disclose correspondence with women from an Eastern Bloc country to his wife for nine years, demonstrating a pattern of concealment.

Furthermore, the applicant filed false reports with the Office of Special Investigations (OSI). These actions, combined with his lack of candor about his foreign correspondence, led to the denial of his security clearance due to a demonstrated lack of trustworthiness, poor judgment, and unreliability under Guideline E.

Why the Applicant Was Denied

The applicant's dishonesty and lack of trustworthiness raised significant security concerns under Guideline E.
He failed to disclose his correspondence with foreign women to his wife for nine years, indicating a pattern of concealment.
The applicant's actions, including filing false reports with the OSI, demonstrated poor judgment and unreliability.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

E2.A5.1.2.1appliedReliable Unfavorable Information Provided by Associates, Employers, Coworkers, Neighbors, and Other Acquaintances
E2.A5.1.2.4appliedPersonal Conduct or Concealment of Information That Increases an Individual's Vulnerability to Coercion, Exploitation or Duress
E2.A5.1.2.5appliedA Pattern of Dishonesty or Rule Violations, Including Violation of Any Written or Recorded Agreement Made Between the Individual and the Agency

Mitigating

E2.A5.1.3.2rejectedThe Falsification Was an Isolated Incident, Was Not Recent, and the Individual Has Subsequently Provided Correct Information VoluntarilyThe applicant's false reports were not isolated and were made under duress.
E2.A5.1.3.3rejectedThe Individual Made Prompt, Good-faith Efforts to Correct the Falsification Before Being Confronted with the FactsThe applicant only disclosed the truth after receiving the SOR.

Key Rule Quoted

“"No one has a 'right' to a security clearance."”
— Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988)

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedOct 27, 2005
Answer filedNov 11, 2005
Hearing heldSep 21, 2006
Decision dateNov 30, 2006

Cite For

Denial of Security Clearance Due to Personal Conduct Issues Under Guideline E
Mitigation of Security Violations Under Guideline K
Failure to Establish a Case Under Guideline M for Misuse of Information Technology Systems

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Conduct	Concealed Issue	Response	Disqualifying (¶16)	Mitigating applied (¶17)	Mitigation
3.a–3.d	4 sub-charges — specific text not stated in this decision (against the applicant).	Against Applicant		—		—	—	—

Allegation

Finding

Conduct

Concealed Issue

Response

Disqualifying (¶16)

Mitigating applied (¶17)

Mitigation

3.a–3.d

4 sub-charges — specific text not stated in this decision (against the applicant).

Against Applicant

—

¶	Allegation	Finding	Type	Response	Disqualifying (¶34)	Mitigating applied (¶35)	Mitigation
2.a	In 2003, Applicant committed two security violations for incorporating sensitive information into reports he created on an unclassified computer. These reports contained very subtle violations and were not caught by his employer's program manager or security officer, who reviewed the reports before sending on to the customer. The customer caught the error. He submitted these reports via unclassified e-mail to other recipients whereby a compromise of classified information occurred. His conduct was in violation of his company's security policies and paragraphs 5 - 100, 5 - 403, and 5 - 500, of DOD 5220-22-M., National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), January 1995. On January 19, 2004, his employer gave him a letter of reprimand.	For Applicant	Unauthorized Disclosure	Admitted	(a) deliberate or negligent disclosure of protected information to unauthorized persons (personal/business contacts, media, persons at seminars/meetings/c…	(a) so much time has elapsed, or it has happened so infrequently or under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt… (b) responded favorably to counseling or remedial security training and now demonstrates a positive attitude toward the discharge of security responsibili… (c) the security violations were due to improper or inadequate training or unclear instructions	Credited Inadvertent Credited Isolated Credited Inadequate Training

Allegation

Finding

Type

Response

Disqualifying (¶34)

Mitigating applied (¶35)

Mitigation

2.a

In 2003, Applicant committed two security violations for incorporating sensitive information into reports he created on an unclassified computer. These reports contained very subtle violations and were not caught by his employer's program manager or security officer, who reviewed the reports before sending on to the customer. The customer caught the error. He submitted these reports via unclassified e-mail to other recipients whereby a compromise of classified information occurred. His conduct was in violation of his company's security policies and paragraphs 5 - 100, 5 - 403, and 5 - 500, of DOD 5220-22-M., National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), January 1995. On January 19, 2004, his employer gave him a letter of reprimand.

For Applicant

Unauthorized Disclosure

Admitted

(a) deliberate or negligent disclosure of protected information to unauthorized persons (personal/business contacts, media, persons at seminars/meetings/c…

(a) so much time has elapsed, or it has happened so infrequently or under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt…

(b) responded favorably to counseling or remedial security training and now demonstrates a positive attitude toward the discharge of security responsibili…

(c) the security violations were due to improper or inadequate training or unclear instructions

Credited

Inadvertent

Credited

Isolated

Credited

Inadequate Training

¶	Allegation	Finding	Type	Response	Disqualifying (¶40)	Mitigating applied (¶41)	Mitigation
1.a–1.e	5 sub-charges — specific text not stated in this decision (for the applicant).	For Applicant			—	—	—

Allegation

Finding

Type

Response

Disqualifying (¶40)

Mitigating applied (¶41)

Mitigation

1.a–1.e

5 sub-charges — specific text not stated in this decision (for the applicant).

For Applicant

—

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Case Profile

Summary

Why the Applicant Was Denied

Conditions Referenced

Key Rule Quoted

Procedural Posture

Cite For

Full decision

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

STATEMENT OF CASE

FINDINGS OF FACT

POLICIES

CONCLUSION

WHOLE PERSON ANALYSIS

FORMAL FINDINGS

DECISION

FOOTNOTES