ISCR Case No. 24-01569

______________ ______________ DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS "'L 09i~ .t!J~ "' ;:. "tr "" In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 24-01569 ) Applicant for Security Clearance ) Appearances For Government: Tovah Minster, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se 01/13/2026

FOREMAN, LeRoy F., Administrative Judge: This case involves security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations). Clearance is denied. Statement of the Case Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA) on July 1, 2023. On March 5, 2025, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) sent him a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under Guideline F. The DCSA acted under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated in Security Executive Agent Directive 4, National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (December 10, 2016), which became effective on June 8, 2017.

Applicant answered the SOR on April 18, 2025, and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was ready to proceed on May 1, 2025. The case was assigned to me on August 19, 2025. On September 8, 2025, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) notified Applicant that the hearing was scheduled to be conducted on October 30, 2025. The hearing was cancelled on October 29, 2025, when all administrative judges were furloughed from October 1 to November 12, 2025, during a federal government shutdown due to a lapse in federal funding. On November 18, 2025, Applicant was notified that his hearing was rescheduled for December 19, 2025. I convened the hearing as rescheduled. Government Exhibits 1 through 4 were admitted in evidence without objection. Applicant testified but did not present the testimony of any other witnesses or submit any documentary evidence. The record closed upon adjournment of the hearing. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) of the hearing on January 9, 2026.

In Applicant’s answer to the SOR, he admitted all the allegations in the SOR. His admissions are incorporated in my findings of fact. Applicant is a 54-year-old adjunct researcher for a Department of Defense agency. He was hired in April 2023. (Tr. 16) He is an at-will employee and is paid an hourly rate while working on specific projects. (Tr. 16) He married in November 2010 and divorced in August 2014. He has no children. Applicant received a bachelor’s degree and was commissioned as an Air Force officer in 1990. He served on active duty from June 1990 to June 2004 and in the Air Force Reserve from June 2004 to August 2014. He attained the rank of captain while on active duty and was promoted to major in the Air Force Reserve. He left military service after 17 years and received an honorable discharge, but he receives no military retired pay. He received a master’s degree in December 2021. He received a security clearance in June 1996 and again in June 2008. When Applicant submitted his SCA in July 2023, he disclosed that he had failed to file his federal and state income tax returns for tax years 2018 through 2022 and pay the taxes that were due. He explained that he did not file his tax returns because he could not afford to pay the taxes due. He attributed his lack of funds to medical expenses incurred in 2020 and 2021 and spending $20,000 to prevent the failure of a business that he had started. (GX 1) The business went bankrupt in 2020. (Tr. 19). Applicant owes about $28,000 in federal taxes and $7,000 in state taxes. When he was interviewed by a security investigator in August 2023, he told the investigator that he had not filed his past due federal returns because he feared that the IRS would seize his home to satisfy his tax debt. (GX 2 at 6) At the hearing, he testified that filing a tax return would trigger an audit, and he does not earn eno

ugh money on a regular basis to set up a payment agreement. (Tr. 23) He lives in his home with his 80-year-old mother and 78- year-old aunt, and they would be left homeless if the property was seized. (Tr. 12) He believes that his property is worth about $320,000, and his equity in the property is about

$200,000. (Tr. 32) At the hearing, he estimated that he owes about $50,000 in federal taxes and $20,000 in state taxes, plus any penalties that are assessed. (Tr. 20) As of the date of the hearing, Applicant had not contacted federal or state tax authorities to determine how much he owes or consulted with a tax professional for help in filing his returns. (Tr. 24-25) He testified that he intends to contact tax authorities in 2026, because he is now financially able to set up a payment plan and avoid seizure of his property. (Tr. 24-26)

“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to “control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 2. Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance. Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan at 531. Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion in light of all the contrary evidence in the same record.” See ISCR Case No. 17-04166 at 3 (App. Bd. Mar. 21, 2019). It is “less than the weight of the

evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [a Judge’s] finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. ISCR Case No. 15-01253 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 20, 2016). Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02- 31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01- 20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan at 531.

Guideline F, Financial Considerations The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 18: Failure to live within one's means, satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. . . . This concern is broader than the possibility that a person might knowingly compromise classified information to raise money. It encompasses concerns about a person’s self-control, judgment, and other qualities essential to protecting classified information. A person who is financially irresponsible may also be irresponsible, unconcerned, or negligent in handling and safeguarding classified information. See ISCR Case No. 11-05365 at 3 (App. Bd. May 1, 2012). A clearance adjudication is not directed at collecting debts. Neither is it directed toward inducing an applicant to file tax returns. Rather, it is a proceeding aimed at evaluating an applicant’s judgment and reliability. See ISCR Case No. 07-08049 at 5 (App. Bd. Jul. 22, 2008). Failure to file tax returns suggests that an applicant has a problem with complying with well-established governmental rules and systems. Voluntary compliance with such rules and systems is essential for protecting classified information. ISCR Case No. 01- 05340 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 20, 2002).

Applicant’s admissions and the evidence submitted at the hearing establish the following disqualifying conditions under this guideline: AG ¶ 19(a): inability to satisfy debts; AG ¶ 19(b): unwillingness to satisfy debts regardless of the ability to do so; AG ¶ 19(c): a history of not meeting financial obligations; and AG ¶ 19(f): failure to f ile or fraudulently filing annual Federal, state, or local income tax returns or failure to pay annual Federal, state, or local income tax as required. The following mitigating conditions are relevant: AG ¶ 20(a): the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; AG ¶ 20(b): the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, a death, divorce or separation, clear victimization by predatory lending practices, or identity theft), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances; and AG ¶ 20(g): the individual has made arrangements with the appropriate tax authority to file or pay the amount owed and is in compliance with those arrangements. None of these mitigating conditions are established. Applicant’s tax delinquencies are recent, numerous, and did not occur under circumstances making recurrence unlikely. While the failure of Applicant’s business may have been largely beyond his control, his response to the business failure was not responsible. He submitted no evidence of arrangements to resolve his federal and state tax problems.

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. An administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s security eligibility by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all the relevant circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the

individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. I have incorporated my comments under Guideline F in my whole-person analysis and applied the adjudicative factors in AG ¶ 2(d). Applicant was articulate and sincere at the hearing. However, I have serious concerns about his lack of good judgment, and I am not convinced that he will follow through on his promise to start resolving his tax problems in the near future. After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guideline F and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns raised by his repeated failures to discharge his federal and state tax obligations.

I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR: Paragraph 1, Guideline F (Financial Considerations): AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraphs 1.a-1.j: Against Applicant

I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the national security interests of the United States to continue Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. Clearance is denied. LeRoy F. Foreman Administrative Judge