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ISCR Case 16-03768.h1 — CASE

ISCR Case 16-03768.h1granted

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 16-03768.h1

grantedOct 2, 2017· Hon. Darlene Lokey Anderson· hearing

Summary

Darlene D. Anderson, a 37-year-old Logistics Technician and U.S. Army veteran, was granted a security clearance despite initial concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline F (Financial Considerations). The Statement of Reasons cited her family members residing in South Korea, including her spouse, and the potential for conflict of interest due to these connections. Additionally, she had failed to file federal income tax returns from 2011 to 2015.

The judge determined that Ms. Anderson's deep and longstanding loyalty to the United States, coupled with her pledge to maintain minimal contact with her foreign family members, mitigated the foreign influence concerns. Her children's young age and lack of awareness regarding her profession were also noted.

Regarding the financial concerns, Ms. Anderson resolved the issue by filing all overdue tax returns, demonstrating that she no longer had any tax indebtedness. These mitigating factors led to the decision to grant her security clearance.

Why the Applicant Prevailed

Applicant demonstrated a deep and longstanding loyalty to the United States.
Minimal and casual contact with foreign family members mitigated foreign influence concerns.
Applicant filed all overdue tax returns and has no tax indebtedness.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 7(a)raisedContact with Foreign Family Members
AG ¶ 19(f)raisedFailure to File Income Tax Returns

Mitigating

AG ¶ 8(a)appliedNature of Relationships with Foreign Persons
AG ¶ 8(b)appliedMinimal Conflict of Interest Due to Loyalty to the U.S.
AG ¶ 8(c)appliedCasual and Infrequent Contact with Foreign Citizens
AG ¶ 20(a)appliedBehavior Occurred Long Ago and Unlikely to Recur
AG ¶ 20(g)appliedArrangements Made with Tax Authorities

Key Rule Quoted

“The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration.”

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedJan 18, 2017
Answer filedFeb 16, 2017
Hearing heldJun 21, 2017via video-teleconference
Decision dateOct 2, 2017

Cite For

Mitigation of Foreign Influence Concerns Due to Minimal Contact with Family Abroad
Resolution of Financial Issues Through Timely Tax Filings
Demonstrated Loyalty to the United States as a Mitigating Factor

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline B (Foreign Influence) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: granted

The judge found that the applicant's foreign contacts and interests, primarily her family in South Korea, raised security concerns under Guideline B. However, the applicant's deep loyalty to the United States and the minimal nature of her foreign contacts were sufficient to mitigate these concerns, leading to a decision in favor of the applicant.

Country conditions:the decision took administrative notice of official facts about the foreign country (the Government’s country submission).

U.S. ties the decision noted: Naturalized U.S. Citizen · U.S. Spouse or Partner · U.S. Children · U.S. Home or Property · U.S. Career or Business · Intent to Remain in U.S.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
1.a	Applicant's family members are citizens and residents of South Korea.	For Applicant	Parent in Foreign Country Immediate Family	South Korea HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk	Credited Deep U.S. Ties
1.b	Applicant has some contact with them, and the connections with them could potentially create a conflict of interest.	For Applicant	Parent in Foreign Country Immediate Family	South Korea HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk	Credited Deep U.S. Ties
1.c	Applicant resides with her spouse who is also a South Korean national.	For Applicant	Spouse Dual or Foreign Citizen Immediate Family	South Korea HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk	Credited Deep U.S. Ties
1.d	The evidence is sufficient to raise these disqualifying conditions.	For Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	—	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk	Credited Deep U.S. Ties
1.e	Applicant has a deep and longstanding loyalty to the U.S.	For Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	—	Admitted	—	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk	Credited Deep U.S. Ties
1.f	Applicant's children are small and do not know what she does for a living.	For Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	—	Admitted	—	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk	Credited Deep U.S. Ties
1.g	Applicant has pledged to continue to have minimal contact with her foreign contacts.	For Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	—	Admitted	—	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk	Credited Deep U.S. Ties
1.h	Applicant has a deep and longstanding loyalty for the United States.	For Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	—	Admitted	—	(a) relationships such that a conflict between foreign and U.S. interests is unlikely (b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (c) contact so casual and infrequent there is little likelihood of risk	Credited Deep U.S. Ties

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline B). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline F · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: granted

The judge found that the applicant had financial concerns primarily related to failing to file federal income tax returns for several years. However, the applicant demonstrated that she has since filed the necessary returns and established compliance with tax authorities, leading to a favorable decision on all allegations under Guideline F.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Type	Response	Disqualifying (¶19)	Mitigating applied (¶20)	Mitigation
1.a–2.a	9 sub-charges — specific text not stated in this decision (for the applicant).	For Applicant			—	—	—

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline F). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Full decision

The complete, official text — footnotes and signatures included — is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 16-03768 ) ) Applicant for Security Clearance )

For Government: Tara Karoian, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Ryan C. Nerney, Attorney At Law, The Edmunds Firm

October 2, 2017 ______________

STATEMENT OF CASE

______________

LOKEY ANDERSON Darlene D., Administrative Judge:

Statement of the Case

On January 18, 2017, in accordance with DoD Directive 5220.6, as amended (Directive), the Department of Defense issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging facts that raise security concerns under Guidelines B and F.1 The SOR further informed Applicant that, based on information available to the government, DoD adjudicators could not make the preliminary affirmative finding it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant’s security clearance.

Applicant answered the SOR on February 16, 2017, and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. (Answer.) The case was assigned to me on May 1, 2017. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a notice of hearing on May 30, 2017, scheduling the hearing for June 21, 2017. The hearing was convened

1 I considered the previous Adjudicative Guidelines, effective September 1, 2006, as well as the new by video-teleconference as scheduled. The Government offered Exhibits (GXs) 1 through 3, which were admitted without objection. Applicant testified on her own behalf, and presented twelve documents, which I marked Applicant’s Exhibits (AppXs) A through L. The record was left open until June 28, 2017, for receipt of additional documentation. Applicant submitted one Post-Hearing Exhibit, consisting of three pages, marked and admitted without objection as Applicant’s Post-Hearing Exhibit M. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (TR) on July 6, 2017.

PROCEDURAL RULINGS

At the hearing, both the Government and the Applicant requested I take administrative notice of certain facts relating to the country of South Korea. Department Counsel provided an 8 page summary of the facts, supported by five Government documents pertaining to South Korea, identified as Government Exhibit 3. The documents provide elaboration and context for the summary. Applicant had no objection. (Tr. p. 14.) The Applicant provided a six page summary of the facts, supported by six documents from the U.S. Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency pertaining to South Korea, identified as Applicant’s Exhibit L. The Government had no objection. I took administrative notice of the facts included in the U.S. Government reports and the information provided by the Applicant. They are limited to matters of general knowledge, not subject to reasonable dispute. They are set out in the

FINDINGS OF FACT

Findings of Fact.

Applicant admitted each of the allegations in the SOR. After a thorough and careful review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, I make the following findings of fact.

Applicant is 37 years old and married with two children. She has a high school diploma, military training, and some college. She holds the position of Logistics Technician with a defense contractor. She has been employed with his current employer since 2009. She has held a security clearance since July 2005 without incident.

Applicant was born in South Korea to a Korean family. At the age of 13, she moved to the United States with her family. (Tr. p. 64.) Applicant attended junior high and high school in the United States. In 1998, Applicant joined the United States Army where she served honorably until her commitment was completed in July 2002. Her entire service in the Army was completed in South Korea. During her military service she received a number of awards and commendations including the Army Commendation Medal, the Army Good Conduct Medal, the National Defense Service Medal, the Army Service Ribbon, the Overseas Service Medal (2 awards), and others. Following her discharge from the Army, Applicant moved back to the United States. Shortly thereafter, she was offered a civilian job at a U.S. military base in South Korea. She accepted the job and returned to South Korea where she has been working for defense contractors since then.

Applicant’s family are citizens and residents of South Korea. In 2010, Applicant married a man from South Korea. They met two years earlier, and dated for about a year before they were married. He works freelancing with his brother’s recycling scrap- wire business. They have two children who were both born in South Korea. Applicant has discussed with him the idea of applying for U.S. citizenship, but he is afraid of life changes. Applicant’s husband provides no financial support to the family household. (Tr. p. 80.) Applicant explained that he borrowed $50,000 from her to give his brother to buy a bulk of scrap-wires for the business, and she was supposed to be reimbursed. She has not been reimbursed. (Tr. p. 74.) She is not happy about this situation.

Applicant’s daughter is six years old, her son is two years old. They are residents of South Korea and dual citizens of South Korea and the United States. Applicant states that she raises them with American values.

Applicant’s mother is a citizen and resident of South Korea. She is 62 years old and delivers milk to residences in the country side where she lives. She does not live near the Applicant, who resides in South Korea. Applicant may contact her by telephone twice a month for casual conversation and may see her on holidays. Their contact is minimal and limited. Applicant’s mother has no association what so ever with the Government of South Korea. Applicant’s father passed away.

Applicant’s father-in-law and mother-in-law are citizens and residents of South Korea. Applicant states that she may communicate with them once a year, and may see them on holidays or special occasions. Her father-in-law is a retired Chinese Doctor of Acupuncture, her mother-in-law, is and has always been, a housewife.

Applicant has two brothers-in-law, with whom she has no communication. They only know that Applicant works on a military base. She also has two sisters-in-law, who are both housewives. Applicant may see them on holidays or special occasions.

In 2010, Applicant purchased a house in South Korea. She applied for a mortgage loan for approximately $97,000 and bought the house. Applicant explained it was a house that she had been renting since 2005 with a 3 years key-money- lease of approximately $70,000. In 2008, she signed another 3 years key-money-lease for approximately $90,000. At that point, Applicant only had to pay $20,000 to the landlord. (Applicant’s Exhibit B.) The house is worth $168,500. Applicant’s name is the only name on title. (Applicant’s Exhibit A.) She states that she is willing to sell the house if it jeopardizes her security clearance. Applicant also has a Korean bank account that she maintains that has less than $1,000. She also has an American bank account that has $10,000. Applicant states that she plans to retire in the United States. She also plans on her children attending college in the United States. Applicant states that there is no situation where she would ever choose South Korea over the interests of the United States. She has a deep and longstanding loyalty for the United States for giving her the opportunity to work and support her family.

Applicant failed to file her Federal income tax returns for tax years 2011 through 2015. Applicant stated that she really had no good excuse for failing to handle her income tax returns on time. This was around the time she was getting married and having a child. Her tax status had changed and she did not know where to go for help. She states that she took the tax exemption status for granted. At some point, she tried to file the tax returns through a tax center on base, but all of them were rejected for lack of signature, from herself and the tax center. Applicant eventually consulted with the Internal Revenue Service, and H and R Block, who prepared her Federal income returns for tax years 2011 through 2015, which were filed on February 13, 2017. (Applicant’s Exhibit J and Tr. pp. 61-62.)

A certification of income for Applicant’s husband for year 2013, indicates that year he earned $51,600; for year 2014, he earned $19,200; and for year 2015, he earned $27,600. (Applicant’s Exhibit D.)

Performance Evaluations of the Applicant for the periods from 2013, through 2016, reflect competent, excellent, and exceptional ratings that improved over time. (Applicant’s Exhibit E.)

Letters of recommendation submitted by colleagues, coworkers, and friends of the Applicant collectively indicate that Applicant is a true professional. She consistently provides exemplary quality service, as evidenced by her strong work ethic, with a constant effort towards accurate and honest reporting. She has demonstrated outstanding performance during all of the Government audits in the last eight years. She is said to be one of the most competent employees on the job, and is described as an individual who goes above and beyond the normal scope of work to achieve perfection. She is considered to be a loyal and trustworthy American, who is dedicated and committed to her team, her company, and her customer. (Applicant’s Exhibits G and M.)

Applicant provided a Statement of Intent never to obtain a foreign passport again. She also pledged to continue to have minimal contact with her foreign contacts, and to keep conversations casual and infrequent. She also states that should there be any violation of such she agrees to an automatic revocation of her security clearance. (Applicant’s Exhibit H.)

Applicant also provided a Statement of Intent never to fail to pay her Federal or State Income tax debts again. Should there be any violation, she agrees to automatic revocation of her security clearance. (Applicant’s Exhibit I.)

I have taken administrative notice concerning the country of South Korea. South Korea, officially the Republic of Korea is a self-governing state located in the southern part of the peninsula of Korea. The United States and South Korea share a long history of friendship and cooperation based on shared values and interests. The two countries work together to combat regional and global threats and to strengthen their economies. South Korea is now the United States’ sixth-largest trading partner with a trillion-dollar economy. The longstanding relationship between the U.S. and South Korea has brought positive rewards to the U.S. economy including more job opportunities for American.

South Korea is one of the seven countries most actively engaged in foreign economic collection and industrial espionage against the United States. Although South Korea is considered an ally, they have been the unauthorized recipient of technology controlled under U.S. export control laws, including material that could be used in missile delivery/reentry systems, encryption software, optics and prism data and infrared detectors and camera engines. Industrial espionage remains a high profile concern relating to South Korea and South Korean companies. In July 2014, a South Korean chemical company agreed to pay a criminal penalty of over 2 million dollars to resolve an investigation into the company’s attempted theft of a U.S. company’s trade secrets regarding a meta-aramid fiber used in protective fabrics, electrical insulation, and lightweight structural support for aircraft. Sources have also reported that South Korea may have attempted to compromise protected technology of U.S. F-15 fighters that it purchased.

POLICIES

When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.

These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in conjunction with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(a), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.

The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for use will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record.

Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the “applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”

A person who applies for access to classified information seeks to enter into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.

Section 7 of Executive Order (EO) 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).

ANALYSIS

Guideline B, Foreign Influence

The security concern relating to the guideline for Foreign Influence is set out in AG ¶ 6:

Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism.

The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 7. Three are potentially applicable in this case:

(a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; (e) shared living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.

(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information or technology; and

Applicant’s family members are citizens and residents of South Korea. Applicant has some contact with them, and the connections with them could potentially create a conflict of interest. Applicant resides with her spouse who is also a South Korean national and he works with his brother’s business that could, under some circumstances, subject Applicant to a heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation or personal conflict of interest. The evidence is sufficient to raise these disqualifying conditions.

AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 including:

(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States;

(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and

(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation;

The nature of the relationships with her family do not pose a security risk. There is no conflict of interest. No one in her family is associated with the South Korean government, nor do they show any interest in the Applicant or her work. Any contact Applicant has with her extended family is minimal and casual. Her children are small and do not know what she does for a living. Her relationship with her husband seems troubled, but is not a risk to the U.S. Applicant has a deep and long-standing relationship and loyalty to the U.S. Based upon this history, she will always resolve any situation in favor of the U.S. Full mitigation under AG ¶ 8(a), 8(b), and 8(c), has been established.

Guideline F, Financial Considerations

The security concern relating to the guideline for Financial Considerations is set out in AG ¶ 18:

Failure to live within one's means, satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Financial distress can also be caused or exacerbated by, and thus can be a possible indicator of, other issues of personnel security concern such as excessive gambling, mental health conditions, substance misuse, or alcohol abuse or dependence. An individual who is financially overextended is at greater risk of having to engage in illegal or otherwise questionable acts to generate funds. Affluence that cannot be explained by known sources of income is also a security concern insofar as it may result from criminal activity, including espionage.

The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 19. One is potentially applicable in this case:

(f) failure to file or fraudulently filing annual Federal, state, or local income tax returns or failure to pay annual Federal, state or local income tax as required.

Applicant has a history of failing to file her Federal income tax returns for tax years 2011 through 2015. Even though she is exempt from paying taxes, she knew that she had to file annual Federal income tax returns. The evidence is sufficient to raise these disqualifying conditions.

AG ¶ 20 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 20 including:

(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and

(g) the individual has made arrangements with the appropriate tax authorities to file or pay the amount owed and is in compliance with those arrangements. Applicant has no good excuse for failing to file her Federal income tax returns in a timely manner. She now understands that she must file her Federal returns each year on time irrespective of whether she owes taxes or not. She has demonstrated that she has filed these returns for tax years 2011 through 2014, and has no tax indebtedness. Full mitigation under AG ¶ 20(a) and 20(g) has been established.

WHOLE PERSON CONCEPT

Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):

(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.

I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments under Guidelines B and F in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(d) were addressed under those guidelines, but some warrant additional comment.

As a veteran of the armed forces and a civilian employee for the defense department, Applicant has displayed loyalty and commitment and provides valuable service to the U.S. Applicant has no history of misconduct or security violations. Her South Korean connections do not pose a risk to the U.S. government. Applicant obviously has the level of judgment required to access classified information as evidenced by her longstanding commitment to our country.

Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant mitigated both the Foreign Influence and Financial Considerations security concerns.

FORMAL FINDINGS

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1, Guideline F: FOR APPLICANT

Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant Subparagraph 1.e: For Applicant Subparagraph 1.f: For Applicant Subparagraph 1.g: For Applicant Subparagraph 1.h: For Applicant

Paragraph 2, Guideline F: FOR APPLICANT

Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant

CONCLUSION

In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant national security eligibility and a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

Darlene Lokey Anderson Administrative Judge

FOOTNOTES

Adjudicative Guidelines, effective June 8, 2017. My decision would be the same if the case was considered under the previous Adjudicative Guidelines, effective September 1, 2006.