Summary
A 48-year-old principal systems engineer and U.S. citizen was denied a security clearance under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) due to extensive family ties in China, an authoritarian country. The applicant's parents and sister are Chinese citizens and residents, with whom he maintains regular contact. His parents are retired university professors receiving pensions, and his sister works for a U.S.-headquartered company. The applicant and his wife, also born in China and a naturalized U.S. citizen, own two apartments in China valued at approximately $175,000, purchased for his parents' use.
The applicant's wife became a U.S. citizen in 2000, losing her Chinese citizenship, and her immediate family, including her U.S. citizen mother, resides in the U.S. In 2008, the applicant, his wife, and children visited China, where he attended a school reunion with former classmates, with whom he has had no contact since. Despite strong recommendations from coworkers attesting to his good character, integrity, and adherence to rules, the judge found these factors insufficient to mitigate the foreign influence concerns.
The denial was based on the applicant's significant family connections in China, which were deemed exploitable and presented a heightened risk of foreign exploitation. The judge concluded that the applicant did not provide sufficient evidence to alleviate the security concerns associated with these relationships.
Why the Applicant Was Denied
- The applicant has significant family ties to China, creating a heightened risk of foreign exploitation.
- The applicant did not present sufficient evidence to mitigate the security concerns related to foreign influence.
- The applicant's relationships with family members in China were deemed exploitable in a foreign influence context.
Conditions Referenced
- B2appliedContact with a Foreign Family Member, Business, or Professional Associate, Friend, or Other Person Who Is a Citizen of or a Resident in a Foreign Country If That Contact Creates a Heightened Risk of Foreign Exploitation, Inducement, Manipulation, Pressure, or Coercion.
- B3appliedA Substantial Business, Financial, or Property Interest in a Foreign Country, or in Any Foreign-owned or Foreign-operated Business, Which Could Subject the Individual to Heightened Risk of Foreign Influence or Exploitation.
- B1rejectedThe Nature of the Relationships with Foreign Persons, the Country in Which These Persons Are Located, or the Positions or Activities of Those Persons in That Country Are Such That It Is Unlikely the Individual Will Be Placed in a Position of Having to Choose Between the Interests of a Foreign Individual, Group, Organization, or Government and the Interests of the U.S.
- B3appliedContact or Communication with Foreign Citizens Is so Casual and Infrequent That There Is Little Likelihood That It Could Create a Risk for Foreign Influence or Exploitation.
- B6appliedThe Value or Routine Nature of the Foreign Business, Financial, or Property Interests Is Such That They Are Unlikely to Result in a Conflict and Could Not Be Used Effectively to Influence, Manipulate, or Pressure the Individual.
Key Rule Quoted
“the clearly consistent standard indicates that security clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”
Procedural Posture
- SOR issuedFeb 10, 2009
- Answer filedMar 8, 2009
- Hearing heldJun 15, 2009
- Decision dateSep 8, 2009
Cite For
- Foreign Influence Concerns Under Guideline B
- Heightened Risk of Foreign Exploitation Due to Family Ties
- Insufficient Evidence to Mitigate Foreign Influence Risks