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ISCR Case 02-15806.h1 — CASE

ISCR Case 02-15806.h1granted

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 02-15806.h1

grantedSep 28, 2005· Hon. Richard A. Cefola· hearing

Summary

This case concerns a 44-year-old defense contractor whose security clearance was granted despite past issues under Guideline E (Personal Conduct) and Guideline M (Use of Information Technology). The Statement of Reasons detailed several incidents of unauthorized access and misuse of classified information technology systems, occurring approximately ten years prior to the decision.

Specifically, the Applicant was alleged to have deleted a co-worker's private computer files from a classified system in 1990 or 1991, and in 1994, viewed a co-worker's personal files and accessed his supervisor's personnel evaluations, all without authorization. Additionally, in 1993 or 1994, he accidentally deleted shared files from a classified system, and in 1994, disclosed his classified job site location to his spouse.

The Administrative Judge granted the clearance, citing several mitigating factors. The Applicant had disclosed the past misconduct to his employer, which mitigated concerns about potential coercion. Furthermore, the incidents were not recent, having occurred over ten years ago. The Applicant also demonstrated a long-standing positive reputation among colleagues and supervisors, reinforcing his trustworthiness.

Why the Applicant Prevailed

The Applicant disclosed past misconduct to his employer, mitigating vulnerability to coercion.
The misconduct occurred over ten years ago, indicating it is not recent.
The Applicant has a strong reputation among colleagues and supervisors, demonstrating trustworthiness.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

1.a.raisedUnauthorized Entry Into an Information Technology System
1.b.raisedDestruction of Information Residing on an Information Technology System
2.a.raisedConcealment of Misconduct From Employer
2.b.raisedPattern of Rule Violations

Mitigating

1.a.appliedMisuse Was Not Recent
5.appliedPositive Steps Taken to Reduce Vulnerability to Coercion
6.appliedEvidence of Trustworthiness From Colleagues

Key Rule Quoted

“The Government must be able to place a high degree of confidence in a security clearance holder to abide by all security rules and regulations at all times and in all places.”

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedApr 25, 2005
Answer filedMay 27, 2005
Hearing heldAug 30, 2005
Decision dateSep 28, 2005

Cite For

Mitigation of Past Misconduct Under Guideline M Due to Time Elapsed
Disclosure of Past Misconduct as a Mitigating Factor Under Guideline E
Importance of Character References in Security Clearance Decisions

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline E (Personal Conduct) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: granted

The Applicant misused his employer's information technology systems on four separate occasions more than ten years ago, which constituted a pattern of rule violations. However, he has disclosed this misuse to his employer, mitigating concerns about vulnerability to coercion. The judge found that the Applicant's past conduct was not recent and that he has demonstrated trustworthiness, leading to the granting of his security clearance.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Conduct	Concealed Issue	Response	Disqualifying (¶16)	Mitigating applied (¶17)	Mitigation
1.a	In about 1990 or 1991, the Applicant deleted a co-worker's private computer files, from a classified system and without authorization.	For Applicant	Rules Violation at Workplace	—	Admitted	(b) deliberately providing false information to an investigator or official (c) credible adverse information across areas supporting a whole-person concern	(a) prompt, good-faith correction before being confronted	—
1.b	In about 1994, the Applicant viewed a co-worker's personal computer files containing personal information, from a classified system and without authorization.	For Applicant	Rules Violation at Workplace	—	Admitted	(b) deliberately providing false information to an investigator or official (c) credible adverse information across areas supporting a whole-person concern	(a) prompt, good-faith correction before being confronted	—
1.c	In about 1994, the Applicant accessed his supervisor's personal computer files containing personnel evaluations, from a classified system and without authorization.	For Applicant	Rules Violation at Workplace	—	Admitted	(b) deliberately providing false information to an investigator or official (c) credible adverse information across areas supporting a whole-person concern	(a) prompt, good-faith correction before being confronted	—
1.d	In about 1993 or 1994, the Applicant accidentally deleted shared files from a classified computer system.	For Applicant	Rules Violation at Workplace	—	Admitted	(b) deliberately providing false information to an investigator or official (c) credible adverse information across areas supporting a whole-person concern	(a) prompt, good-faith correction before being confronted	—
1.e	In about 1994, the Applicant disclosed to his spouse the location of his job site, where the Applicant worked on a classified test program.	For Applicant	Violation of Written Commitment	—	Admitted	(b) deliberately providing false information to an investigator or official (c) credible adverse information across areas supporting a whole-person concern	(a) prompt, good-faith correction before being confronted	—
1.f–2.a	2 sub-charges — specific text not stated in this decision (for the applicant). (low confidence)	For Applicant		—		—	—	—

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline E). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline M (Use of Information Technology) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: granted

The Applicant misused his employer's information technology systems on four separate occasions over ten years ago, which constituted a pattern of rule violations. However, he has disclosed this misuse to his employer, demonstrating that he is not vulnerable to coercion or exploitation. The judge found sufficient mitigation based on the Applicant's long history of positive conduct and the support from colleagues, leading to a granted security clearance.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Type	Response	Disqualifying (¶40)	Mitigating applied (¶41)	Mitigation
1.a	In about 1990 or 1991, the Applicant deleted a co-worker's private computer files, from a classified system and without authorization.	For Applicant	Unauthorized Modification or Destruction	Admitted	(a) unauthorized entry into any information technology system (b) unauthorized modification, destruction, or manipulation of, or denial of access to, an IT system or any data in such a system	(a) so much time has elapsed since the behavior, or it happened under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on …	—
1.b	In about 1994, the Applicant viewed a co-worker's personal computer files containing personal information, from a classified system and without authorization.	For Applicant	Unauthorized System Access	Admitted	(a) unauthorized entry into any information technology system (b) unauthorized modification, destruction, or manipulation of, or denial of access to, an IT system or any data in such a system	(a) so much time has elapsed since the behavior, or it happened under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on …	—
1.c	In about 1994, the Applicant accessed his supervisor's personal computer files containing personnel evaluations, from a classified system and without authorization.	For Applicant	Unauthorized System Access	Admitted	(a) unauthorized entry into any information technology system (b) unauthorized modification, destruction, or manipulation of, or denial of access to, an IT system or any data in such a system	(a) so much time has elapsed since the behavior, or it happened under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on …	—
1.d	In about 1993 or 1994, the Applicant accidentally deleted shared files from a classified computer system.	For Applicant	Unauthorized Modification or Destruction	Admitted	(a) unauthorized entry into any information technology system (b) unauthorized modification, destruction, or manipulation of, or denial of access to, an IT system or any data in such a system	(a) so much time has elapsed since the behavior, or it happened under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on …	—
1.e	In about 1994, the Applicant disclosed to his spouse the location of his job site, where the Applicant worked on a classified test program.	For Applicant	Unspecified IT Misuse	Admitted	(a) unauthorized entry into any information technology system (b) unauthorized modification, destruction, or manipulation of, or denial of access to, an IT system or any data in such a system	(a) so much time has elapsed since the behavior, or it happened under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on …	—
1.f–2.a	2 sub-charges — specific text not stated in this decision (for the applicant).	For Applicant			—	—	—

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline M). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Full decision

The complete, official text — footnotes and signatures included — is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

DATE: September 28, 2005

In Re:

-------------------

SSN: -----------

Applicant for Security Clearance

CR Case No. 02-15806

DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

RICHARD A. CEFOLA

SYNOPSIS

The Applicant misused his present employer's information technology systems on four separate occasions more than ten years ago. This misuse also constitutes a pattern of rule violations. He has recently disclosed this misuse to his employer; and as such, is not vulnerable to coercion, exploitation or duress. The isuse of Information Technology Systems is also not recent. Those who know and work with the Applicant think most highly of him. Mitigation is shown. Clearance is granted.

STATEMENT OF CASE

On April 25, 2005, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA), pursuant to Executive Order 10865 and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Directive), dated January 2, 1992, issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to the Applicant, which detailed the reasons why DOHA could not make the preliminary affirmative finding under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for the Applicant and recommended referral to an Administrative Judge to determine whether a clearance should be denied or revoked.

Applicant filed an Answer to the SOR on May 27, 2005.

The case was received by the undersigned on July 19, 2005. A notice of hearing was issued on August 3, 2005, and the case was heard on August 30, 2005. The Government submitted documentary evidence. Testimony was taken from the Applicant, who also submitted documentary evidence, and called two witnesses to testify on his behalf. The transcript (TR) was received on September 14, 2005. The issues raised here are whether the Applicant's admitted Misuse of Information Technology Systems and related Personal Conduct militate against the granting of a security clearance. [The Applicant admits the underlying basis of all of the allegations, but denies subparagraphs 1.a.~1.d., in that his employer now knows of his past transgressions.]

FINDINGS OF FACT

The following Findings of Fact are based on Applicant's Answer to the SOR, the documents and the live testimony. The Applicant is 44 years of age, and is employed by a defense contractor who seeks a security clearance on behalf of the Applicant. After a complete and thorough review of the evidence in the record, and upon due consideration of the same, I make the following additional findings of fact.

Guideline M - Misuse of Information Technology Systems & Guideline E - Personal Conduct

1.a. and 2.a. In about 1990 or 1991, the Applicant deleted a co-worker's private computer files, from a classified system and without authorization (TR at page 54 line 23 to page 57 line 12, and at page 65 line 15 to page 68 line 6). This co- worker had belittled the Applicant, and the deletion of the private files was the Applicant's way of "getting even" with the co-worker (Id). The Applicant's then and present employer is aware of this incident (Applicant's Exhibit (AppX) A at page 1).

1.b. and 2.a. In about 1994, the Applicant viewed a co-worker's personal computer files containing personal information, from a classified system and without authorization (TR at page 59 lines 8–22, and at page 68 line 7 to page 71 line 8). He "attempted" to compare his co-worker's "accomplishments and goals" with his own, in preparation for his evaluation (Id). The Applicant's then and present employer is also aware of this incident (AppX A at page 1).

1.c. and 2.a. In about 1994, the Applicant accessed his supervisor's personal computer files containing personnel evaluations, from a classified system and without authorization (TR at page 59 line 23 to page 60 line 7, and at page 71 line 9 to page 72 line 21). He again attempted to compare himself with his co-workers (Id). The Applicant's then and present employer is aware of this incident (AppX A at pages 1–2).

1.d. and 2.a. In about 1993 or 1994, the Applicant accidentally deleted shared files from a classified computer system (TR at page 60 line 8 to page 61 line 17, and at page 72 line 22 to page 74 line 19). The Applicant's then and present employer is aware of this incident (AppX A at pages 1–2).

1.e. and 1.f. In about 1994, the Applicant disclosed to his spouse the location of his job site, where the Applicant worked on a classified test program (TR at page 62 at line 18 to page 63 line 15, at page 75 line 10 to page 76 line 9, and at page 79 line 25 to page 82 line 9). While out boating with his spouse, the Applicant pointed out the barge on which he worked (Id). The Applicant's spouse has little recollection of the incident, but the Applicant was subsequently removed from the special access program (Ibid, and TR at page 49 lines 1–16).

Mitigation

Those who know and work with the Applicant think most highly of him (TR at page 21 line 15 to page 42 line 12, at page 43 line 22 to page 50 line 17, and AppXs B and C). His former supervisor is also recommending that the Applicant succeed her as a supervisor (TR at page 32 lines 6–15).

POLICIES

Enclosure 2 and Section E.2.2. of the 1992 Directive set forth both policy factors, and conditions that could raise or mitigate a security concern. Furthermore, as set forth in the Directive, each clearance decision must be a fair and impartial common sense determination based upon consideration of all the relevant and material information and the pertinent criteria and adjudication policy in enclosure 2, including as appropriate:

a. Nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct, and surrounding circumstances.

b. Frequency and recency of the conduct.

c. Age and maturity of the applicant.

d. Motivation of the applicant, and the extent to which the conduct was negligent, willful, voluntary, or undertaken with knowledge of the consequence involved. e. Absence or presence of rehabilitation.

f. Probability that circumstances or conduct will continue or recur in the future."

The Administrative Judge, however, can only draw those inferences or conclusions that have a reasonable and logical basis in the evidence of record. The Judge cannot draw inferences or conclusions based on evidence that is speculative or conjectural in nature.

The Government must make out a case under Guideline E (Personal Conduct), and Guideline M (Misuse of Information Technology Systems); which establishes doubt about a person's judgment, reliability and trustworthiness. While a rational connection, or nexus, must be shown between an applicant's adverse conduct and his ability to effectively safeguard classified information, with respect to sufficiency of proof of a rational connection, objective or direct evidence is not required.

Then, the Applicant must remove that doubt with substantial evidence in refutation, explanation, mitigation or extenuation, which demonstrates that the past adverse conduct is unlikely to be repeated, and that the Applicant presently qualifies for a security clearance.

The Government must be able to place a high degree of confidence in a security clearance holder to abide by all security rules and regulations at all times and in all places. If an applicant has demonstrated a lack of respect for rules, there then exists the possibility that an applicant may demonstrate the same attitude towards security rules and regulations.

CONCLUSION

The Applicant admittedly misused his employer's classified computer system on four separate occasions from about 1990 to 1994. The first and second disqualifying conditions under Misuse of Information Technology Systems are therefore applicable as there was "unauthorized entry into . . . [an] information technology system," and on one occasion "destruction . . . [of] information residing on an information technology system." This was more than ten years ago, however, thus bringing his misconduct within the purview of the first mitigating condition, as the "misuse was not recent." Further evidence of the Applicant's trustworthiness is the testimony of his former supervisor, and the five letters of recommendation from those who know and work with the Applicant. Guideline is therefore found for the Applicant.

As to the Applicant's admitted related Personal Conduct, the fourth and fifth disqualifying conditions are applicable as the above misuse was concealed from his employer, which "render the person susceptible to blackmail," and there is a "pattern of . . . rule violations." This is countered by the fifth mitigating condition, however, as the Applicant, by disclosing his past transgressions, "has taken positive steps to significantly reduce or eliminate vulnerability to coercion, exploitation or duress." The past pattern of rule violations is countered by his decade of exemplary work and conduct as attested to by those who know and work with the Applicant. Guideline E is also found for the Applicant.

FORMAL FINDINGS

Formal Findings required by paragraph 25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive are:

Paragraph 1: FOR THE APPLICANT

a. For the Applicant.

b. For the Applicant.

c. For the Applicant.

d. For the Applicant.

e. For the Applicant.

f. For the Applicant. Paragraph 2: FOR THE APPLICANT

a. For the Applicant.

Factual support and reasons for the foregoing are set forth in FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS, supra.

DECISION

In light of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for the Applicant.

Richard A. Cefola

Administrative Judge

FOOTNOTES

02-15806.h1 FOR GOVERNMENT Jeff Nagel, Esquire, Department Counsel FOR APPLICANT B. Daniel Lynch, Esquire, Applicant's Counsel file:///usr.osd.mil/...omputer/Desktop/DOHA%20transfer/DOHA-Kane/dodogc/doha/industrial/Archived%20-%20HTML/02-15806.h1.html[6/24/2021 10:58:22 AM] 02-15806.h1