ISCR Case No. 25-00983

FOR GOVERNMENT Andrea M. Corrales, Esq., Deputy Chief Department Counsel

Samir Nakhleh, Esq. The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance. On August 13, 2025, DoD issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis of that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations), Guideline B (Foreign Influence), and Guideline L (Outside Activities) of the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) in Appendix A of Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (effective June 8, 2017) and DoD Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive). In his answer to the SOR (Answer), Applicant requested a decision on the written record in lieu of a hearing. On January 26, 2026, the Government submitted its written case, which included a withdrawal of the Guideline B and Guideline L allegations. The Government sent Applicant a complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM) and provided him with an opportunity to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the Government’s evidence. In response, Applicant submitted Applicant Exhibits A through G. On June 24, 2026, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Administrative Judge Charles C. Hale denied Applicant national security eligibility. Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.

Background Applicant is in his early 40s and divorced, with no children. A naturalized citizen, Applicant worked for a family-owned company in Kuwait from July 2023 through the date of his security clearance application (SCA), which he submitted in November 2024. Applicant stated on his SCA that he also worked as a consultant for a real estate company in the United States from 2018 through the date of his SCA. The SOR alleged six delinquent consumer debts. In his Answer, Applicant acknowledged the alleged debts and stated that he had taken corrective action, including repayment agreements and payments under those agreements. The Judge found favorably for Applicant on two debts and unfavorably on four that totaled approximately $22,500. For each of those four debts, the Judge acknowledged that Applicant had made some payments and that all balances had been reduced. In analyzing the relevant mitigating conditions, however, the Judge found none fully applicable. Citing to the fact that Applicant began to address the debts only after the security clearance process was underway, the Judge found that Applicant did not act responsibly under AG ¶¶ 20(a) or 20(b) and that he did not act in good faith, as required by AG ¶ 20(d).1 The Judge also highlighted that Applicant did not explain why he had difficulty making payments while living in Kuwait, which Applicant claimed as the cause of his delinquencies, and that he did not submit evidence of a consistent track record of payments. Discussion On appeal, Applicant asserts that the Judge erred in relying so heavily on the timing of Applicant’s remedial efforts, arguing that the Judge placed “disproportionate emphasis on when Applicant began making payments rather than on the objective evidence demonstrating that meaningful rehabilitation had occurred.” Appeal Brief at 4. Applicant highlights that he “entered repayment agreements, complied with those agreements over an extended period, reduced multiple outstanding balances, and continued making payments through the close of the record.” Id. Applicant specifically takes issue with the Judge’s conclusion that his record of payments did not constitute a good-faith effort under AG ¶ 20(d). Contrary to Applicant’s arguments, the Judge’s emphasis on the timing of Applicant’s remedial efforts is firmly grounded in the precedent to which he cites. The Appeal Board has consistently held that a judge may consider the timing of an applicant’s efforts in determining whether those efforts were made in good faith. Indeed, even when an alleged debt is fully resolved, a judge may consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the debt, including “the manner in which it was incurred, the circumstances under which it became delinquent, and the manner in which [the applicant] addressed the delinquency.” ISCR Case No. 03-04704 at 4 (App. Bd. Sep. 21, 2005). In this case, the Judge highlighted both that Applicant never explained why he was 1 AG ¶ 20(a): the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; AG ¶ 20(b): the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person’s control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, a death, divorce or separation, clear victimization by predatory lending practices, or identity theft), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances; AG ¶ 20(d): the individual initiated and is adhering to a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts. 2

unable to pay his bills from his overseas location and that he began to address the bulk of his debts only after beginning the security clearance process. These were appropriate factors for the Judge to consider in determining whether Applicant acted responsibly and in good faith, and his adverse conclusions are reasonably supported by the record. On these issues, as well as his challenge to the Judge’s analysis under the Whole-Person Concept, Applicant is fundamentally arguing for a different weighing of the evidence. None of his arguments, however, are enough to rebut the presumption that the Judge considered all the record evidence, and nothing in his brief persuades the Board that the Judge weighed the record evidence improperly. Applicant’s ability to argue for a more favorable weighing of the record evidence is not sufficient to demonstrate that the Judge weighed the evidence in a manner that was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. See ISCR Case No. 96-0376 at 2-3 (App. Bd. Mar. 6, 1997) (citing Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 523 (1981)). Conclusion Applicant has not established that the Judge’s conclusions were arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. Rather, the Judge examined and weighed the disqualifying and mitigating evidence and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision. The record is sufficient to support that the Judge’s findings and conclusions are sustainable. “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’” Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” AG ¶ 2(b). 3

Order The decision in ISCR Case No. 25-00983 is AFFIRMED. Signed: Moira Modzelewski Moira Modzelewski Administrative Judge Chair, Appeal Board Signed: Allison Marie Allison Marie Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board Signed: Eric H. Borgstrom Eric H. Borgstrom Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board 4