ISCR Case No. 24-02063

FOR GOVERNMENT Andrea M. Corrales, Esq., Deputy Chief Department Counsel FOR APPLICANT Carl Anthony Marrone, Esq. The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance. On March 27, 2025, DoD issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis of that decision – security concerns raised under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) of the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) in Appendix A of Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (effective June 8, 2017) and DoD Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive). On January 29, 2026, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Administrative Judge Richard A. Cefola granted Applicant national security eligibility. The Government appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30. On April 16, 2026, the Appeal Board determined that the Judge erred through his incomplete analyses of the Guideline B mitigating conditions and Whole-Person Concept, and we remanded the case for correction of those errors. On May 26, 2026, the Judge again granted Applicant’s request for national security eligibility, and the Government appealed that decision. Now on its second appeal, the Government argues that the Judge’s latest favorable decision is again arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law for the same reasons articulated in its initial appeal

and which we found meritorious and remanded for correction. The Government’s arguments once again have merit. Discussion Under the Directive, the Board is authorized to review the determinations of Administrative Judges. Directive ¶ E3.1.32. The Board’s rulings are the law of the case and binding on the judge to whom the case is remanded. DISCR OSD Case No. 87-2107, 1992 WL 388439 at *2 (App. Bd. Sep. 29, 1992). A judge has no authority or discretion to ignore, disregard, or try to evade the rulings of this Board, regardless of how much the judge may personally disagree with those rulings. Id. Moreover, the right to due process is not limited to receiving it at the hearing level but also includes the parties’ right to receive due process at the appeal level, including the right not to be deprived of the benefit of legal rulings won on appeal once a case has been remanded. In our Remand Order, we noted that the “entirety of the Judge’s mitigation analysis” consisted of three sentences, that his analysis under the Whole-Person Concept was similarly brief, and that both were incomplete and insufficient to be sustainable. Remand Order at 3-4. After identifying the Judge’s errors more specifically, including his unsupported assumptions about Applicant’s sister’s future relocation intentions and failure to explain which facts satisfied the mitigating conditions he identified as potentially applicable, we provided the Judge with enumerated and detailed instructions to cure those errors. The Government argues that “despite explicit instructions by the Appeal Board on how he could rectify his Initial Decision’s harmful errors, the Judge made all the same errors he did before” and, in another scant analysis, he failed to properly analyze: (1) Applicant’s close and continuing relationship with his sister and her husband who both served in the [Israel Defense Forces (IDF)], and (2) the heightened risk of foreign exploitation or coercion posed by (a) his sister and her husband’s ongoing residency in Israel and (b) his sister’s service in the IDF intelligence unit. Appeal Brief at 17. We agree. For example, despite our discussion about what is contemplated as mitigative “casual contact” under Guideline B, the presumptions about contact with immediate family members under Appeal Board precedent, and how the facts of this case do not obviously lend support to a finding of “casual” here, the Judge simply restated verbatim his prior analysis that “Applicant’s contacts with his sister and her husband are casual, dealing with family matters, and do not focus on Applicant’s work.” Remand Decision at 7. This analysis was insufficient before and remains so now. Similarly, despite that we expressly identified that “the couple’s potential future relocation is not relevant for purposes of mitigation,”1 the Judge relied heavily on his prior unsupported finding about those unrealized relocation expectations and altogether failed to cure his earlier error and reasonably explain why those contacts are not an unmitigated conflict of interest. 1 Remand Order at 4. 2

Pursuant to the Directive, the Judge was required to “make a new clearance decision in the case after correcting the error(s) identified by the Appeal Board.” Directive ¶ E3.1.35. Instead of correcting the identified errors through a new, independent decision on remand, the Judge simply reiterated his prior unsupported factual findings and insufficient analysis. This was in error. Conclusion The Government has met its burden of demonstrating errors that warrant remand. In light of those errors, no useful purpose would be served by remanding the case to the same Administrative Judge. Accordingly, the Board remands the case with the recommendation that it be reassigned to another judge for a new hearing and decision in accordance with Directive ¶ E3.1.35. Order The decision in ISCR Case No. 24-02063 is REMANDED. Signed: Moira Modzelewski Moira Modzelewski Administrative Judge Chair, Appeal Board Signed: Allison Marie Allison Marie Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board Signed: Eric H. Borgstrom Eric H. Borgstrom Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board 3