ISCR Case No. 25-01218

______________ ______________ DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 25-01218 ) ) Applicant for Security Clearance ) Appearances For Government: John B. Renehan, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se 09/22/2026 Decision LOKEY ANDERSON Darlene D., Administrative Judge: Statement of the Case On September 12, 2024, Applicant submitted a security clearance application (e- QIP) (Government Exhibit 1.) On April 24, 2026, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR), detailing security concerns under Guideline B, Foreign Influence. The action was taken under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DoD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position (AG), effective within the DoD after June 8, 2017. Applicant answered the SOR on May 20, 2026, and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. The case was assigned to me on July 20, 2026. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals issued a notice of hearing on July 21, 2026, and the hearing was convened as scheduled on August 26, 2026. The Government offered two exhibits, referred to as Government Exhibits 1 and 2, which were admitted without objection. The Applicant offered two exhibits, referred to as Applicant’s Exhibits A and B,

which were also admitted without objection. He also testified on his own behalf. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on September 8, 2026. Procedural Rulings The Government requested I take administrative notice of certain facts relating to the Islamic Republic of Iran set forth in the Government’s brief dated July 6, 2026. Without objection, I have taken administrative notice of the facts included in the brief and in the U.S. Government reports referenced therein. (Tr. p. 5.) The facts are summarized in the written request and will not be repeated verbatim in this decision. Of particular note is the fact that Iran is recognized as a primary geopolitical and intelligence threat to the United States; and the most active and persistent practitioner of economic espionage. Iran is an authoritarian, theocratic government, a state sponsor of terrorism, and a country with deepening ties to Russia and China, as recognized by the U.S. government in the context of our current armed hostilities between Iran and the U.S. In assessing the heightened risk created as a result of Applicant holding a security clearance, the Applicant’s ties to this hostile country establish security concerns under Guideline B. (HE-1, with nineteen attachments.) Findings of Fact Applicant is 50 years old. He is divorced and has no children. He has a PhD in Power Electronics. He currently holds the position of Senior Principal Electrical Engineer with a defense contractor. He first obtained a security clearance in 2021. He is seeking to retain this security clearance in connection with his employment. Guideline B – Foreign Influence

The Government alleged that Applicant is ineligible for a clearance because of his foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited, to business, financial, and property interests; which are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S. interests, or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is known to target U.S citizens to obtain classified information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. Applicant was born and raised in Iran and is from an Iranian family. He has been a citizen of Iran since birth. He grew up in Iran and went to schools there. In 2000, he obtained his Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees from a University in Iran. In 2005, he came to the United States as a graduate student on a student visa to work towards a PhD. Since then, he has lived in the U.S. After completing his doctorate, he found a job with an employer who applied for an H1-B work Visa for him. He then obtained a green card, and after five years he became a lawful permanent resident. In 2017, he became a 2

naturalized citizen of the U.S. He is now a dual citizen of Iran and the U.S. He holds both a U.S. and an Iranian passport. He has held an Iranian passport since 2002. He stated that his purpose of holding an Iranian passport is to be able to travel internationally to Iran. (Government Exhibit 2, p.17.) Applicant explained that he was married from 2016 to 2017, to an Iranian citizen he met while visiting Iran. They grew apart and divorced. (Tr. p. 23.) Applicant is very close with his immediate family, nearly all of whom reside in Iran. Applicant’s immediate family includes his mother and father, and two sisters who are all citizens and residents of Iran. He also has two brothers, one of his brothers is a dual citizen of Iran and Canada, and resides in Iran. The other brother is a dual citizen of Iran and Canada, and resides in Canada. Applicant also has a brother-in-law who is a citizen and resident of Iran. He has a sister-in-law who is a dual citizen of Iran and Canada, and she resides in Iran. (Applicant’s Response to the SOR.) Applicant stated that if things change in Iran, he will return to Iran because his family are there and they are close. Applicant stated that his intention is to stay in the United States unless the government changes in Iran. Since he has lived in the U.S., he has normally visited Iran at least once a year. However, given the current situation in Iran, he has not been back to Iran for the past two years, and his family in Iran are no longer able to visit him in the United States. A week before the hearing, Applicant traveled to Canada, in order to visit his parents who traveled to Canada from Iran, and were staying at his brother’s house. In order to protect his family in Iran, he has deliberately maintained a low public profile, and has not disclosed his employment to his family in Iran. (Applicant’s Exhibit B.) Applicant explained that his parents live in Karaj, Iran, a city near Tehran. (Tr. p. 24.) The family moved there when Applicant was eleven years old. Applicant’s father started a private postal service business on Kish Island. His father was also a swimming instructor for lifeguards employed by the Department of Sports in Iran, which is run by the Government. His father also served in the Iranian military before the Islamic revolution. (Tr. p. 27.) His father is now retired. His mother has always been a housewife. Applicant maintains close communications with his parents either through texting and/or video communication on a weekly basis. (Tr. p. 29.) He did not tell his parents the truth about where he works in the U.S. He told his parents that he works for a different company than where he actually works because he does not want them to know that he works for the U.S. military. If someone else in Iran overheard the truth, the word could spread, and it could create a problem. His parents do not know that he holds a security clearance, or that he works for an employer who has contracts with the U.S. military. (Tr. p. 30.) One of Applicant’s sisters, who used to live in the U.S., went back to Iran to care for their parents. She has been prevented from returning to the U.S. (with the current VISA restrictions now in place), and is now living in Canada. She is waiting for the fall to 3

start a post-doc employment position. Applicant maintains very close contact with her, at least once a week by phone or WhatsApp. Applicant has told her the truth about where he works and what he does. He trusts her to keep it a secret. (Tr. p. 31.) Applicant’s other sister resides in Tehran, Iran, and is now married. Applicant maintains contact with her about once a month. She has no knowledge about Applicant’s job or his security clearance. She is a professor at the University of Tehran, and is paid by the Iranian Government. Applicant explained that if anyone asks him where he works, he tells them that he works for a different company than he actually does to avoid any problems. With respect to his brothers, Applicant explained that he has not told his older brother the truth about where he works, or about his security clearance. Applicant’s older brother, resides in Tabriz, Iran, and at one time served in the Iranian military due to compulsory service obligations. Applicant has contact with this brother about once every couple of months. Applicant explained that because the internet is slow, he does not regularly answer his WhatsApp calls. (Tr. p. 33.) Applicant’s younger brother, who resides in Canada, is a Chemist, and works for a private company. This brother does know where the Applicant actually works, and the nature of his work. This brother has visited the Applicant in the past, and he and the Applicant have a very close relationship, and have frequent conversations. (Tr. p. 35.) Applicant’s brother-in-law studied physics and was in school with Applicant’s sister. Applicant does not know what kind of work he does. (Tr. p. 38.) Applicant’s sister-in-law is a housewife. Applicant’s brother is a Professor at the University of Tabriz, Iran. His salary comes from the Government of Iran. There are other Iranian family members and a friend listed on a chart in response to the Government Interrogatories that Applicant was required to fill out. Applicant acknowledged that he has a cousin that is an Iranian citizen who now lives in Turkey. Applicant has not told him where he works or that he holds a security clearance. (Government Exhibit 2, and Tr. p. 43.) Two years ago, when Applicant last traveled to Iran to visit his family, after filling out the security paperwork required by the company, Applicant was questioned by his company security office. Applicant told them that he would be traveling to Iran using his Iranian passport. The company was concerned about why he would need to go to Iran. Applicant told the company security office that he would keep a low profile. He would not tell anyone about his work, and he did not post his travel on LinkedIn or on any other social media platform. Applicant stated that he has continued to try to keep a low profile. Applicant stated that he was told by his security office that if anyone in Iran found out that he worked for a defense contractor, and his family was put under pressure from the Iranian Government because of it, Applicant should tell the truth. (Tr. p. 45.) 4

Applicant submitted copies of photographs of him at anti-Islamic Republic rallies he has attended in the past several months. He stated that these activities reflect his long-standing opposition to the Iranian regime and his support for democratic values. He stated that he loves the U.S., and he intends to stay here given the situation in Iran. He appreciates the opportunities this country provides to those who are willing to contribute. He strongly believes that the U.S. remains the world’s leader and defender of freedom and democracy. (Applicant’s Exhibit B.) Policies When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in conjunction with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(a), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the “applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” A person who applies for access to classified information seeks to enter into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. 5

Section 7 of (EO) 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information). Analysis Guideline B - Foreign Influence The security concern relating to the guideline for Foreign Influence is set out in AG ¶ 6: Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 7. Four are potentially applicable in this case: (a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; (b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information or technology; (e) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulations, pressure, or coercion; and (f) substantial business, financial, or property interests in a foreign country, or in any foreign owned or foreign-operated business that could subject the individual to a heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation or personal conflict of interest. 6

Nearly all of Applicant’s immediate family are citizens and residents of Iran or dual citizens of Iran and Canada. Applicant has a strong bond of affection to his family in Iran. He maintains a close and continuing relationships and has continuous contact with his Iranian family members. These particular foreign connections create a heightened security risk to the national security of the United States. The evidence is sufficient to raise the above disqualifying conditions. AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 including: (a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States; (b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and l oyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; (c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation; (d) the foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government business or are approved by the agency head or designee; (e) the individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons, groups, or organizations from a foreign country; and (f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual. Applicants have a very heavy burden of persuasion to show that connections in a hostile country do not pose a threat to the national security of the United States. ISCR Case No. 19-01689 at 3 (App. Bd. June 8, 2020); ISCR Case No. 17-04208 at 5 (App. Bd. Aug 7, 2019). This very heavy burden standard is not based on the conditions in the country itself, but whether that country has interests or policies that are adverse to U.S. interests, or that it has taken actions that threaten U.S. national security. ISCR Case No. 19-01689 at 3 (App. Bd. June 8, 2020.) Any country whose policies consistently threaten U.S. national security may be viewed as hostile to the U.S. interests for purposes of 7

national security adjudications. ISCR Case No. 19-00831 at 4 (App. Bd. July 29, 2020); ISCR Case No. 17-04208 at 5 (App. Bd. Aug 7, 2019). The country of Iran clearly meets the standard of being hostile to the U.S. interests. The Iranian government operates in a manner that creates risk to the U.S. As to Iran’s authoritarian form of government, it is a matter of common sense that the risk to an Applicant’s contacts of exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion is greater when the country involved has an authoritarian government. ISCR Case NO. 18-02802 at 3 (App. Bd. November 6, 2019.) Applicant is 50 years old and has been an Iranian citizen since birth. Nearly all of his foreign family members, including his parents, two brothers, two sisters, a sister-in- law, and a brother-in-law are all Iranian citizens, and residents of Iran, and/or residents of Canada. Applicant has made no mention of any family or friends in the United States. Applicant has a strong bond of affection and maintains a close relationship and continuous contact with his foreign family in Iran which raises serious security concerns. His contact and communication with these foreign family members is regular and consistent, ranging from weekly to monthly. Applicant is not able to tell his parents and most of his family members where he works, or that he possesses a security clearance, for fear that the information could spread and result in a problem for his family in Iran. He has told two of his family members, who live in Canada, because he trusts them to keep the information secret. The close nature of his relationships with his Iranian family; and the context of our current armed hostilities with the country of Iran, is likely to result in a situation that could create divided allegiance, and pos

e a serious threat or negatively influence Applicant’s decision making, impacting the interests and security of the United States. Under the particular circumstances here, the risk-benefit analysis is applicable, and these contacts do pose a serious security risk to the U.S. Government. It is possible that the Iranian government could use his family members against him through manipulation and coercion and influence the Applicant to act in a way that is inconsistent with the U.S. interests. Under the circumstances, his foreign contacts present a risk. None of the mitigating conditions set forth above are applicable. Whole-Person Concept Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 8

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments under Guideline B, in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(d) were addressed under those guidelines, but some warrant additional comment. Iran is considered to be a hostile country to the United States. The relationship between the United States and Iran has been and continues to be tumultuous, marked by ongoing tensions over nuclear programs and regional influence. Applicant’s entire family is inextricably linked to a foreign nation of significant concern to the United States. His numerous foreign family members are Iranian citizens and reside in Iran; he maintains frequent contact with his family in Iran; and he maintains a foreign passport in order to travel to Iran. Under the particular facts of this case, Applicant’s ties with Iran pose a clear and significant risk to the U.S. government. Under the circumstances, Applicant’s Foreign Influence security concerns have not been mitigated. Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions and doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. I conclude Applicant has not mitigated the Foreign Influence security concerns. Formal Findings Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraphs 1.a. through 1.g. Against Applicant Conclusion In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant national security eligibility and a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Darlene Lokey Anderson Administrative Judge 9