ISCR Case No. 26-00066

______________ ______________ DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS ___________________________________

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In the matter of: )

) ISCR Case No. 26-00066

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) Applicant for Security Clearance ) ___________________________________ ) Appearances For Government: Aubrey M. De Angelis, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se 09/25/2026 Decision ROSS, Wilford H., Administrative Judge: Applicant did not mitigate the security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA) on July 21, 2025. On April 17, 2026, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) sent her a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under Guideline B. Applicant answered the SOR on May 4, 2026, and requested a decision on the written record in lieu of a hearing. Department Counsel submitted the Government’s written case on July 9, 2026. A complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM) was sent to Applicant, who was given an opportunity to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the Government’s evidence. She received the FORM on July 20, 2026, and did not respond. The case was assigned to me on September 2, 2026. 1

The Government’s FORM consists of the SOR (Government Exhibit (GE) 1); the SOR transmittal letter and receipt (GE 2); Applicant’s answer to the SOR (GE 3); the documents in support of the allegations in the SOR (GE 4-5); a request for administrative notice regarding a Western European country (hereafter referred to as Country One) that is a member state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (AN I); and an unmarked document purported to contain information on Country One’s foreign intelligence service, as published by Country One (which I have marked as GE 6). GE 4 through 6 are admitted into evidence, without objection. I have taken administrative notice of the U.S. Department of State’s travel advisory regarding Country One. Findings of Fact The SOR alleges foreign influence concerns under Guideline B stemming from Applicant’s familial relationship with four citizens and residents of Country One (SOR ¶ 1.a). It further alleges that one of these family members works as a foreign intelligence officer with Country One’s intelligence service (SOR ¶ 1.b). (GE 1) Applicant admits the allegations. (GE 3) Applicant is a 54-year-old United States citizen by birth. She received her bachelor’s and master’s degrees from two different universities located in the U.S., in 1993 and 1994, respectively. While in college, she attended a certificate program for about a year abroad, from 1991 to 1992. She has no history of military service. She married in 1998 and has two adult stepchildren. She has been employed with her current sponsor since August 2021. Prior to this, she was employed by another federal defense contractor since 2004. (GE 4) The four family members who are citizens and residents of Country One include Applicant’s sixth-cousin, his wife, and their two children. Applicant’s cousin does not work for and is not affiliated with Country One’s government. He spent one year performing compulsory military service for Country One in approximately 1985. (GE 4-5) Applicant stated in her SCA that her sixth-cousin’s wife worked for Country One’s federal criminal police agency and provided the organization’s exact name as written in the foreign language. (GE 4 at 25-26) In her interrogatory response, however, she handwrote, “Foreign Intelligence Officer with [Country One] government.” (GE 5 at 9) During her adopted subject interview, she described the position as a “foreign intelligence officer,” and stated that it was equivalent to a federal law enforcement position with the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) in the U.S. (GE 5 at 4). The Country One government organization name that was alleged in SOR ¶ 1.b. and is the name of the organization described in GE 6 is different than the name Applicant provided in her SCA.1 (GE 1; GE 4 at 26; GE 6) The SOR allegation specifically names Country One’s intelligence service, not its federal criminal police agency. Nowhere in her SCA, subject interview, or interrogatory response does Applicant use the name of Country One’s intelligence service, as it was alleged in the SOR. That said, she admitted the allegation as written. (GE 3) 1 This should not be construed as an intentional or knowing mischaracterization of the agency name. It is unclear how the conflicting information developed. 2

Applicant’s cousin was last in the U.S. for a visit in January 2026; his wife was in the U.S. and last visited Applicant in August 2024. Applicant maintains regular communication with both. This consists of weekly written communication via letters, emails, and What’s App messages, as well as monthly calls and in-person visits every two to three years. Both are aware that Applicant is under consideration for a national security position because she contacted them for their address when completing her SCA. Applicant’s communication with their young adult children (high school and college students) is less frequent and consists of occasional visits and text messages. (GE 5 at 4, 7-9) In her Answer, Applicant explains, “While I do have extended family in [Country One] and we are in touch, it is a distant cousin relationship and not one that would ever influence my loyalty to the United States.” (GE 3 at 3) Applicant learned of her cousin’s wife’s affiliation with the foreign government after the September 11, 2001 attacks, because her cousin’s family was unable to join hers on a trip. However, Applicant has no further knowledge about her cousin’s wife’s role or focus areas and only knows that she reduced her hours to part-time about a year ago, after she faced various health issues. (GE 3) Applicant’s mother, father, husband, and two stepchildren are all United States- born citizens. (GE 4 at 18-20) She owns the home she has lived in since 2015 and has been employed by federal government contractors in the defense industry since at least 2004. (GE 4 at 7, 11-12) Many of Applicant’s family members have served, or are actively serving, in the U.S. military, she has served the U.S. government and the defense industrial base ecosystem for many years, and hopes to have a greater positive impact in support of U.S. troops. She is committed to upholding U.S. laws and states that her relationship with her foreign extended family would never influence her loyalty to the United States. (GE 3) Policies This case is adjudicated under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by the DOD on June 8, 2017. “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to “control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy” to have access to such information. Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 2. Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules 3

of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance. Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 15-01253 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 20, 2016). Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02- 31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01- 20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. Analysis Guideline B, Foreign Influence The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 6: 4

Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. The following disqualifying conditions are potentially applicable under this guideline: AG ¶ 7(a): contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and AG ¶ 7(b): connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information or technology. In terms of assessing the security risks raised by a particular country, administrative judges must rely upon authoritative, official determinations from the Executive Branch on matters such as a country’s relationship with the U.S. or the history and nature of a foreign government. ISCR Case No. 00-0484 at 11 (App. Bd. Feb. 1, 2002). The Government’s Request for Administrative Notice, however, only provides a U.S. State Department travel advisory. It does not detail concerns that rise from country conditions, that the foreign country’s interests are inconsistent with U.S. interests, that the foreign country is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information, or that the foreign country is associated with a risk of terrorism. The remainder of the document is simply Department Counsel’s argument that the heightened risk concern in the instant case is based upon Applicant’s familial ties to the country, which includes a family member who works as a foreign intelligence officer for the Country One government. (AN I) The evidence presented in support of disqualification as it relates to the allegation in SOR ¶ 1.a is insufficient. The evidence does not support a finding that Applicant’s relationship with her foreign non-immediate family members is such that the contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. Nor is there sufficient evidence to find that Applicant’s connections to her foreign family members could create a conflict of interest between her obligation to protect 5

classified or sensitive information or technology and her desire to help her foreign family members by providing that information or technology. However, Applicant’s relationship with her sixth-cousin’s wife who is affiliated and employed with a Country One government agency, regardless of whether it is the federal intelligence service or the federal criminal police agency, in and of itself, is sufficient to create a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion as contemplated by AG ¶ 7(a) (SOR ¶ 1.b). An applicant’s ties to persons of high rank in a foreign government or military are of concern because it is foreseeable that through such an association the applicant could come to the attention of those interested in acquiring U.S.-protected information. See ISCR Case No. 17-01979 (App. Bd. July 31, 2019) Even if Applicant’s sixth-cousin’s wife has reduced her hours, her affiliation with a Country One government agency and Applicant’s close and continuing familial contact is sufficient to raise a prima facie security concern and therefore shifts the burden to Applicant to present evidence of rebuttal, extenuation, or mitigation. See ISCR Case No. 19-02096 at 6 (App. Bd. Feb. 29, 2024). The following mitigating conditions are potentially applicable: AG ¶ 8(a): the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States; AG ¶ 8(b): there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and AG ¶ 8(c): contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation. AG ¶ 8(c) does not apply, because the evidence supports that the contact is longstanding and the communication is regular. Although there is some evidence to suggest that AG ¶¶ 8(a) and 8(b) may apply, Applicant failed to meet her burden. Applicant elected to have her matter decided on the written record without a hearing and did not respond to Government’s FORM. As such, the evidence in mitigation is limited. The record lacks testimony or substantial character evidence sufficient to establish that Applicant has deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, beyond what she provided in her SCA and Answer. Which is, all of her immediate family members are native-born U.S. citizens; she owns a house in the U.S.; 6

is a long-time employee of a defense contractor; many of her family members have served, or are actively serving, in the U.S. military; and that her relationship with her foreign extended family would never influence her loyalty to the United States. Applicant’s sense of loyalty or obligation to her sixth-cousin’s family is likely minimal when compared to her deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in and to the United States. But, without additional evidence, there is no way to be certain in that conclusion. Applicant’s foreign family member’s affiliation with a foreign government, despite it being a NATO ally, creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation and it is Applicant’s burden to mitigate that concern. Conflicting information remains about which foreign agency Applicant’s cousin’s wife actually works for, and what exactly Applicant does to prevent or reduce the likelihood of foreign exploitation. With the record evidence as it stands, I cannot conclude that it is unlikely that Applicant will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of her foreign family member and the interests of the United States. Whole-Person Concept Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. In applying the whole- person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. I have incorporated my comments under Guideline B in my whole-person analysis and applied the adjudicative factors in AG ¶ 2(d). Because Applicant requested a determination on the record without a hearing, I had no opportunity to evaluate her credibility and sincerity based on demeanor. See ISCR Case No. 01-12350 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Jul. 23, 2003). She also did not respond to the FORM or provide character evidence, further limiting my ability to evaluate her security worthiness. After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guideline B and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant did not mitigate the security concerns raised under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). This decision should not be construed as a comment on Applicant’s loyalty to the United States or her patriotism, but merely an acknowledgment that the record is void of 7

sufficient evidence in mitigation. The determination of an individual’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance is not a once in a lifetime occurrence, but is based on applying the factors, both disqualifying and mitigating, to the evidence presented. Under the current circumstances and set of facts, Applicant did not present sufficient evidence to overcome her burden of persuasion; however, she may very well do so in the future. Formal Findings I make the following formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive: Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT For Applicant Subparagraph 1.a: Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant Conclusion I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the national security interests of the United States to grant Applicant eligibility for access to classified information. Clearance is denied. Wilford H. Ross Administrative Judge 8