ISCR Case No. 26-00093

___________________________________ ______________ ______________ DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

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In the matter of: )

) ISCR Case No. 26-00093

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) Applicant for Security Clearance ) ___________________________________ ) Appearances For Government: Brittany White, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se 09/15/2026 Decision ROSS, Wilford H., Administrative Judge: Applicant did not mitigate the security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA) on April 3, 2024. On April 10, 2026, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) sent her a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under Guideline B. Applicant answered the SOR on April 15, 2026, and requested a decision on the written record in lieu of a hearing. Department Counsel submitted the Government’s written case on June 16, 2026. A complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM) was sent to Applicant, who was given an opportunity to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the Government’s evidence. She received the FORM on July 10, 2026, and did not respond. The case was assigned to me on September 2, 2026. 1

The Government’s FORM consists of the SOR (Government Exhibit (GE) 1); Applicant’s answer to the SOR (GE 2); the documents in support of the allegations in the SOR (GE 3-4); and the later submitted requests for administrative notice (AN) regarding Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. GE 3 and 4 are admitted into evidence, without objection. The Government supplemented the FORM on September 9, 2026, and provided Applicant and me with the three administrative notice documents it refers to in the FORM. Applicant acknowledged receipt, did not object, and elected to not supplement the information contained within Government’s administrative notice requests. Accordingly, I have taken administrative notice of the facts about the country conditions in Sudan (AN I), Saudi Arabia (AN II), and Egypt (AN III), as well as their relationship with the United States as reported by official U.S. Government sources. Findings of Fact The SOR alleges foreign influence concerns under Guideline B stemming from Applicant’s close and continuing personal and familial relationships with citizens and residents of foreign nations with interests that are inconsistent with that of the United States. Specifically, Applicant’s mother, father, brother and two sisters are citizens of Sudan and residents of Saudi Arabia (SOR ¶ 1.a); four of her brothers and six of her sisters-in-law are citizens and residents of Sudan (SOR ¶ 1.b); her sister and two brothers-in-law are citizens of Sudan and residents of Egypt (SOR ¶ 1.c); and she has multiple cousins and friends who are citizens of Sudan (SOR ¶¶ 1.d-1.e). Furthermore, Applicant provides approximately $2,000 in monthly financial support to her relatives who are citizens of Sudan (SOR ¶ 1.f) and has used an unknown intermediary in the past to send money to her relatives in Sudan (SOR ¶ 1.g). Applicant admits the allegations. Applicant is 44 years old, never married, and has no children. She immigrated to the United States from Sudan in June 2014 and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in June 2020. (GE 3 at 6) Her U.S. passport was issued in August 2020 and contains a visa for Sudan issued in May 2022. (GE 3 at 6; GE 4 at 7) She traveled to Sudan in May 2022 to visit family and friends and was in country for less than 10 days. (GE 3 at 45) Prior to this trip, she visited family and friends in Sudan for an extended period of time from August 2020 to November 2020; in August 2018 for approximately 30 days; from June 2017 to August 2017 for more than 30 days; and from May 2016 to June 2016 for more than 30 days. (GE 3 at 46-50) She also visited friends and family in Egypt for less than 20 days in January 2023. (GE 3 at 43) Applicant maintains daily contact with her father, mother, and sisters who reside in Saudi Arabia. She reported monthly contact with her brothers who live in Sudan; noting during her interview that due to the war in Sudan, her brothers move frequently, and she is only able to maintain weekly contact with one of them. (GE 3 at 25-33) She provides financial support to most of her family members abroad and has been doing so since around 2015. She steadily provides anywhere from $1,000 to $2,000 a month to family members in Sudan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, which they use to cover basic living expenses, to include food. She usually uses a recognized money transfer service to send 2

money to her family, but when it was no longer available in Sudan, she used an unverified and unknown intermediary to send money to her family members in Sudan. She increased the amount she sent when her mother was sick and needed surgery in Egypt. She also intended to send additional monies to her brothers in Sudan to help with their relocation expenses. (GE 3; GE 4) In response to Government interrogatories, she explained, “About the matter of Sudan, I really don’t have no relation with the country itself, the reason it matter to me because my family were there and now with what’s going on over there my family moved to different country, so America is the place I care about.” (GE 4 at 3). Her loyalty is to her family, not Sudan. She has no plans to ever return to Sudan to live, and believes the benefits afforded to Sudanese citizens in Sudan is limited because “there is a dictator in power.” (GE 4 at 11) However, she does maintain a valid Sudanese passport (issued: May 2022; expires: May 2032) and has used it in the past to travel to and from Sudan to avoid the need for a travel visa. (GE 3 at 7) She does not think she will renew it. (GE 4 at 11) Policies This case is adjudicated under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by the DOD on June 8, 2017. “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to “control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy” to have access to such information. Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 2. Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 3

extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance. Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 15-01253 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 20, 2016). Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02- 31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).

An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01- 20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. Analysis Guideline B, Foreign Influence The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 6: Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual maybe manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. 4

The evidence in the FORM, as discussed in further detail below, establishes the following disqualifying conditions under this guideline: AG ¶ 7(a): contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and AG ¶ 7(b): connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information or technology. In terms of assessing the security risks raised by a particular country, administrative judges must rely upon authoritative, official determinations from the Executive Branch on matters such as a country’s relationship with the U.S. or the history and nature of a foreign government. ISCR Case No. 00-0484 at 11 (App. Bd. Feb. 1, 2002). The Government’s Request for Administrative Notice regarding Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt lay out the following: Sudan As of May 15, 2026, the U.S. Department of State advised US citizens to not travel to Sudan due to risk of unrest, crime, kidnapping, terrorism, landmines, and health threats. The U.S. Embassy in Khartoum suspended its operations in April 2023 due to the outbreak of armed conflict in Sudan, and in June 2026, released a statement warning of the significant increase in the risk of violence against civilians and further escalation of conflict in the region, with alarming indications that mass atrocities could be imminent, further worsening Sudan’s already catastrophic humanitarian crisis. Significant human rights issues in Sudan include credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary killings; disappearances; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious abuses in a conflict; unlawful recruitment or use of children in armed conflict; trafficking in persons, including forced labor; and significant presence of any of the worst forms of child labor. The government did not take credible action to identify and punish officials who committed human rights abuses. (AN I) Saudi Arabia There have been significant human rights issues in Saudi Arabia throughout the years that persist, to include credible reports of arbitrary or unlawful killings; disappearances; torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest and detention; transnational repression 5

against individuals in another country; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists and censorship; restrictions of religious freedom; and prohibiting independent trade unions or significant or systemic restrictions on workers’ freedom of association. Moreover, the government did not take credible steps or action to identify and punish officials who committed human rights abuses in a verifiable way. In the past few years, the US Dept of State has either advised US citizens to not travel to certain areas in or reconsider travel to Saudi Arabia due to safety risks and concerns, to include terrorist violence and attacks. (AN II) Egypt The U.S. Department of State advises US citizens to exercise increased caution while traveling to Egypt due to terrorism, crime, and health; with some areas in the country being marked as “Do not travel” zones. There is risk of terrorist violence, including terrorist attacks and other activity in Northern and Middle Sinai Peninsula. As of August 2025, Egypt’s human rights situation remained concerning. The government took steps to address human rights concerns during the year, but in most cases, authorities did not comprehensively investigate or prosecute allegations of human rights abuses, including most incidents of violence by security forces. Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest and detention; instances of transnational repression against individuals in another country; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists and censorship; significant restrictions on workers’ freedom of association; and significant presence of some of the worst forms of child labor. The government’s lack of investigations and prosecutions into allegations of human rights abuses contributed to an environment of impunity. (AN III) Applicant has made it very clear, through her words and her actions, that her loyalty is to her family, all of whom live abroad in countries whose government itself either operates in a manner that creates a risk to U.S. interests or is weak and t herefore allows terrorists or individuals with interests adverse to the U.S. to operate within its borders with impunity. Accordingly, AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(b) are established for Applicant’s deep and longstanding bounds of affection and loyalty to her many Sudanese family members and friends who reside in Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. During her subject interview, Applicant asserts that she would never return to Sudan to live because, amongst other things, there is a dictator in power in Sudan. “As a matter of common sense, it is fair to say that the risk of exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion is greater when the foreign country involved has an authoritarian government.” ISCR Case No. 18- 02802 at 3. (App. Bd. Nov. 6, 2019). 6

There is a rational connection between an applicant's family ties in a country whose interests are adverse to the United States, even if the family has no connection to the foreign government, and the risk that the applicant might fail to protect and safeguard classified information. See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 22-00364 at 3 (App. Bd. June 22, 2023); ISCR Case No. 01-26893 at 7 (App. Bd. Oct. 16, 2002). Unfortunately for Applicant, her closest and dearest family members all reside in foreign countries with quite a significant known history of interests that are adverse to the United States. Close and continuing ties with family members who are citizens of a foreign country with demonstrated hostility towards the United States, its citizens and interests create a heightened risk. Application of Guideline B is not a comment on an applicant’s patriotism, but merely an acknowledgment that people may act in unpredictable ways when faced with choices that could be important to a loved-one, such as a family member. ISCR Case No. 08-10025 at 4 (App. Bd. Nov 3, 2009). Here, Applicant’s relationship with her family members creates a potential conflict of interest and makes her vulnerable to foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. The following mitigating conditions are potentially applicable: AG ¶ 8(a): the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States; AG ¶ 8(b): there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and AG ¶ 8(c): contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation. None of these mitigating conditions are established. There is a rebuttable presumption that an applicant has ties of affection for, or obligation to, immediate family members. See ISCR Case No. 22-01556 at 5-6 (App. Bd. Jan. 7, 2026) Applicant has failed to rebut the presumption. Aside from stating, “America is the place I care about,” Applicant has not presented evidence of deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties to or in the United States, where she can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of U.S. interests. In fact, her continued regular contact with foreign family members, to include her financial support and frequent visits, demonstrates the deep standing sense of loyalty and obligation she feels towards her father, mother, brothers, sisters, and extended family and friends. There is no evidence that her contact or 7

communication with her foreign citizen family members and friends is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation. Whole-Person Concept Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. In applying the whole- person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. I have incorporated my comments under Guideline B in my whole-person analysis and applied the adjudicative factors in AG ¶ 2(d). Because Applicant requested a determination on the record without a hearing, I had no opportunity to evaluate her credibility and sincerity based on demeanor. See ISCR Case No. 01-12350 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Jul. 23, 2003). After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guideline B and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns raised under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). Formal Findings I make the following formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive: Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraphs 1.a-1.g: Against Applicant 8

Conclusion I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the national security interests of the United States to grant Applicant eligibility for access to classified information. Clearance is denied. Wilford H. Ross Administrative Judge 9