Skip to main content

← Department of Energy hearings

Department of Energy · Office of Hearings and Appeals

PSH-15-0021

A personnel-security hearing decision under 10 CFR Part 710. The individual is not named in the decision. Descriptive of the published record, never a prediction.

ResultNot favorable (“should not be restored”)
Administrative JudgeSteven L. Fine
Decision issued2015-07-17
Filed2015-03-27
Concerns (guidelines)Psychological conditions (I), Personal conduct (E), Sexual behavior (D), Information technology (M)
Concerns (older criteria)10 CFR 710.8 criteria H, L
RepresentationNot stated
Read the full decision
*The original of this document contains information which is subject to withholding from
disclosure under 5 U.S. C. § 552. Such material has been deleted from this copy and
replaced with XXXXXX’s.
United States Department of Energy
Office of Hearings and Appeals
In the Matter of: Personnel Security Hearing )
)
Filing Date: March 27, 2015 )
_________________________________________ ) Case No.: PSH-15-0021
Issued: July 17, 2015
_______________
Administrative Judge Decision
_______________
Steven L. Fine, Administrative Judge:
This Decision concerns the eligibility of XXX X. XXX (hereinafter referred to as “the
Individual”) for access authorization under the Department of Energy’s (DOE) regulations set
forth at 10 C.F.R. Part 710, Subpart A, entitled, “Criteria and Procedures for Determining
Eligibility for Access to Classified Matter or Special Nuclear Material.”1 For the reasons set
forth below, I conclude that the Individual’s security clearance should not be restored at this
time.2
I. BACKGROUND
On August 26, 2014, the Local Security Office (LSO) received an incident report concerning the
Individual. In order to address those concerns, the LSO conducted a Personnel Security
Interview (PSI) of the Individual on September 23, 2014, and sponsored a forensic psychological
examination of the Individual which occurred on December 5, 2014. Because the PSI and
forensic psychological examination did not resolve these concerns, the LSO began the present
administrative review proceeding by issuing a Notification Letter to the Individual informing
him that he was entitled to a hearing before an Administrative Judge in order to resolve the
substantial doubt regarding his eligibility for a security clearance. See 10 C.F.R. § 710.21. The
1
An access authorization is an administrative determination that an individual is eligible for access to classified
matter or special nuclear material. 10 C.F.R. § 710.5. Such authorization will also be referred to in this Decision as
a security clearance.
2 Decisions issued by the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) are available on the OHA website located at
http://www.doe.gov/OHA.
2
Individual requested a hearing and the LSO forwarded the Individual’s request to the OHA. The
Director of OHA appointed me as the Administrative Judge in this matter on March 27, 2015.
At the hearing I convened pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 710.25(e) and (g), I took testimony from the
Individual, his spouse, his treating psychologist (the Treating Psychologist), an investigator (the
Investigator), a human resources specialist (the Employee Relations Specialist), a psychologist
serving as an expert witness on behalf of the Individual (the Individual’s Expert), two of the
Individual’s supervisors, and a DOE consultant psychologist (the DOE Psychologist). See
Transcript of Hearing, Case No. PSH-15-0021 (hereinafter cited as “Tr.”). The LSO submitted
seven exhibits, marked as Exhibits 1 through 7, while the Individual submitted three exhibits,
which are marked as Exhibits A through C.
II. THE NOTIFICATION LETTER AND THE DOE’S SECURITY CONCERNS
As indicated above, the Notification Letter informed the Individual that information in the
possession of the DOE created a substantial doubt concerning his eligibility for a security
clearance. That information pertains to paragraphs (h), and (l) of the criteria for eligibility for
access to classified matter or special nuclear material set forth at 10 C.F.R. § 710.8.
Criterion H refers to information indicating that the Individual has: “An illness or mental
condition of a nature which, in the opinion of a psychiatrist or licensed clinical psychologist,
causes or may cause, a significant defect in judgment or reliability.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.8(h).
Specifically, the Notification Letter alleges that the Individual has been diagnosed by a
psychologist with “a strong desire to view pornography [that] has led to behaviors over several
years that reflect defects in his judgment or reliability.” Summary of Security Concerns at ¶ I.
These circumstances adequately justify the DOE’s invocation of Criterion H, and raise
significant security concerns. The Revised Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility
for Access to Classified Information, issued on December 29, 2005, by the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, The White House (Adjudicative Guidelines) state that an
opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional that an individual has a condition that may
impair judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness, raises a security concern under Adjudicative
Guideline I at ¶ ¶ 27 and 28(b).
Criterion L refers to information indicating that the Individual has: “Engaged in any unusual
conduct or is subject to any circumstances which tend to show that the individual is not honest,
reliable, or trustworthy; or which furnishes reason to believe that the individual may be subject to
pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress which may cause the individual to act contrary to the
best interests of the national security.” Specifically, the Notification Letter, alleges that the
Individual failed a polygraph administered to him on August 7, 2014, “because he lied and was
trying to cover up misuse of a computer system by viewing pornographic material during work
hours,” and “deliberately perform[ed] searches with the intent to see sexually explicit adult
content images during daily breaks or when bored at work . . .” Summary of Security Concerns
at ¶ II.A and II.B. It is well settled that “Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of
candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information.”
Adjudicative Guideline E at ¶ 15. A pattern of compulsive, self-destructive, or high-risk sexual
3
behavior that the person is unable to stop can also raise a security concern about an individual
and may be disqualifying. Adjudicative Guideline D at ¶ 13(b). Similarly, “noncompliance with
rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations pertaining to information technology systems may
raise security concerns about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness, calling into question
the willingness or ability to properly protect sensitive systems, networks, and information.”
Adjudicative Guideline M at ¶ 39. Finally, unauthorized use of a government or other
information technology system could raise a security concern about an individual and may be
disqualifying. Adjudicative Guideline M at ¶ 40(e).
III. REGULATORY STANDARDS
The Administrative Judge's role in this proceeding is to evaluate the evidence presented by the
agency and the Individual, and to render a decision based on that evidence. See 10 C.F.R.
§ 710.27(a). The regulations state that “[t]he decision as to access authorization is a
comprehensive, common sense judgment, made after consideration of all the relevant
information, favorable and unfavorable, as to whether the granting of access authorization would
not endanger the common defense and security and would be clearly consistent with the national
interest.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(a). In rendering this opinion, I have considered the following
factors: the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; the circumstances surrounding the
conduct, including knowledgeable participation; the frequency and recency of the conduct; the
Individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct; the voluntariness of the Individual's
participation; the absence or presence of rehabilitation or reformation and other pertinent
behavioral changes; the motivation for the conduct, the potential for pressure, coercion,
exploitation, or duress; the likelihood of continuation or recurrence; and other relevant and
material factors. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 710.7(c), 710.27(a). The discussion below reflects my
application of these factors to the testimony and exhibits presented by both sides in this case.
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT
On August 7, 2014, the Individual was the subject of a random polygraph examination, which he
apparently “failed.”3 The polygraph examination had produced information indicating that the
Individual had misused government property, viewed pornography on government property
during working hours, and circumvented his employer’s computer security. The Individual
reported this failure of his polygraph examination to his employer’s Security Inquiries Team
(SIT) on August 8, 2014. Exhibit 6 at 3.
A. The SIT Investigation
SIT investigators conducted an investigation into whether the Individual had misused
government property, viewed pornography on government property during working hours, or
3 During his PSI, the Individual stated that: “to the best of my knowledge on the polygraph, the question that I failed
and I don't know because they don't really tell you the results, was have you ever done damage to a U.S. secured or
done damage to a U.S. security system with the intent of damaging national security or something like that.”
Exhibit 7 at 20.
4
circumvented his employer’s computer security.4 Exhibit 6 at 3. SIT investigators interviewed
the Individual on August 8, 2014. Exhibit 6 at 3. After conducting their investigation, the SIT
investigators issued a report (the Investigation Report) on August 22, 2014. The SIT
investigators concluded that the Individual is an “employee who failed a DOE mandated
polygraph and subsequently admitted to viewing sexually explicit information during work hours
while using government resources. He was able to accomplish this activity by modifying his
computer security settings and then browsing in a manner which left no trace of the sites he
visited.” Exhibit 6 at 3-4. The SIT Investigators further concluded that the Individual had not
circumvented his employer’s firewall. Exhibit 6 at 4. The SIT provided a copy of the
Investigation Report to the Individual’s employer’s Human Resources Department.5 Exhibit 6 at
4.
On August 24, 2014, the Individual’s employer provided a copy of the Investigation Report to
the LSO. Exhibit 6 at 1.
B. The September 23, 2014, PSI
On September 23, 2014, the LSO conducted a PSI of the Individual. During this PSI, the
Individual repeatedly stated that he is “addicted to pornography” and admitted viewing
pornography on an almost daily basis at his home. Exhibit 7 at 19, 31, 58, 61-63. 80. At one
point he stated that he was addicted to pornography in his “private life,” and then he stated:
“However, addicted to pornography in my private life, does not mean that I've done that behavior
with my work computer, which I have not.” Exhibit 7 at 19. The Individual stated that he was
unable to stop viewing pornography and described it as “more of a compulsion than a desire.”
Exhibit 7 at 65. The Individual stated: “I don’t feel good about myself when I view
pornography. I do it anyway. I don’t feel I can stop.” Exhibit 7 at 65-66. The Individual
admitted that he masturbates while using pornography; however, he claimed that he had never
masturbated at work. Exhibit 7 at 75, 81. He views pornography on his home computer, which
is located in his minor son’s bedroom. Exhibit 7 at 63. He reported that he used pornography as
“an escape.” Exhibit 7 at 84.
4 One of the SIT Investigators (the Investigator) who had been part of the team that conducted the SIT’s
investigation and prepared the SIT Report, testified at the hearing, at the request of the Individual. The Investigator
testified that SIT had conducted its investigation after the Individual had admitted misusing a government computer.
Tr. at 64. He further testified that the SIT also investigated whether the Individual had viewed sexually explicit
material on his government computer and whether he had bypassed his employer’s computer security. Tr. at 64.
The SIT’s investigation revealed that the Individual had viewed sexually explicit materials on his government
computer. Tr. at 65. However, the SIT’s investigation did not find that the Individual had bypassed his employer’s
computer security. Tr. at 65. The SIT’s findings that the Individual had viewed sexually explicit materials on his
government computer were based upon the Individual’s own admissions. Tr. at 69, 71.
5 The Employee Relations Specialist testified at the hearing at the request of the Individual. She testified that she
had received a copy of the SIT Report. Her responsibility was to consider SIT’s findings and then determine what,
if any, corrective or disciplinary action was warranted. Tr. at 80-81. She reviewed the SIT Report, gathered some
additional information, spoke to the Individual personally, and decided that the Individual’s conduct warranted a
written counseling, which is fairly low on his employer’s scale of disciplinary action. Tr. at 81. She believed that
the Individual viewed partial nudity, not pornography at work. Tr. at 84. The Individual further informed her that if
he observed any nudity, he would immediately close his web browser. Tr. at 84-85.
5
The Individual also admitted that since 1993, he had intentionally viewed sexually explicit
images dozens of times on his government computer while at work.6 Exhibit 7 at 13-14, 16, 40,
42. When asked why he searched for sexually explicit images at work, he stated: “Mm, stupidity
and poor judgment, um, but just because I was bored at that moment and needed a break.”
Exhibit 7 at 14. He further stated: “My intent was a couple of different things. N - n -- none of
them honorable. My intent was to relieve the boredom. My intent was to see what came up.
And my intent was to see what would get past [his employer’s] filters.” Exhibit 7 at 39. The
Individual admitted that he knew that he was violating his employer’s policy by searching for
sexually explicit web images and that it was wrong to do so. Exhibit 7 at 15-16. The Individual
expressed remorse for his actions by stating “I am ashamed and humiliated by my behavior
which was the misuse by doing the inappropriate web searches or trying to view sexually explicit
material with my computer and as a result of the shame on that, I failed on the polygraph.”
Exhibit 7 at 20. He said his viewing of sexually explicit images at work “was stupid and I
realize[d] that if I got caught, bad things would happen.” Exhibit 7 at 28. The Individual stated
that he no longer views sexually explicit material on his government computer. Exhibit 7 at 13.
He noted that it had been six weeks since the last time he viewed sexually explicit materials on
his work computer. Exhibit 7 at 82.
The Individual admitted that he had failed the August 7, 2014, polygraph because he “lied” and
“was trying to cover up misuse of a computer system.” Exhibit 7 at 8-9. The Individual then
stated that he is an anxious person who over-interpreted the questions posed to him during the
polygraph examination, although he subsequently admitted that he “certainly intended to use,
misuse a government system,” when searching for sexually explicit images. Exhibit 7 at 9, 20.
The Individual subsequently denied circumventing his employer’s firewall and attempted to
explain his admissions that he had circumvented his employer’s cybersecurity measures.7
Exhibit 7 at 22-23. He admitted that he had used a web proxy to visit a pornography site on one
occasion, but claimed that visit was “almost work-related.” Exhibit 7 at 26-28. He then
described that visit as “poor judgment.” Exhibit 7 at 26. He then repeatedly stated: “the web
6 The Individual claimed he would put a word into a popular web search engine and instruct it to search for images.
He often used a woman’s first name. Exhibit 7 at 13. He claimed that he never knowingly “surfed porn sites.”
Exhibit 7 at 15. The Individual explained that he would turn off the safe search feature in the web search engine he
was using, in order to allow adult and sexually explicit images to be included in the results in his image searches.
Exhibit 7 at 24, 54-55.
7
To this end he stated:
So in my statement or in my polygraph I made the statement that I circumvented [his employer’s]
filters trying to view sexually explicit things. Um, I used a lot of words that I didn't know the
meaning to or that had legal meanings. One of those is circumvent --I did not circumvent by the
legal definition. All I was trying to do is what would see what would come through [his
employer’s] proxy by doing a Google or Bing search which is all that I ever did. I never used a
proxy server or Tor router or any of those things, I never actually tried to bypass. I went straight
down the middle of what [his employer’s] controls were designed to do. So, I did not take any
action at all to try and, you know, cover up or hide what I was doing. I just pulled up a web
browser and did web searches.
Exhibit 7 at 22-23.
6
proxy stuff was absolutely work related.” Exhibit 7 at 26, 27. The Individual stated that: “I
really am not a security risk. I have misused federal equipment.” Exhibit 7 at 38.
The Individual reported that he has received counseling and medication for anxiety and stress,
and further reported that he also exercises to reduce his stress. Exhibit 7 at 90- 93, 102-103.
C. The DOE Psychologist’s Evaluation
At the request of the LSO, the DOE Psychologist evaluated the Individual on December 5, 2014.
Exhibit 4 at 1. In addition to conducting a 70-minute forensic psychiatric interview of the
Individual, the DOE Psychologist reviewed portions of the Individual’s personnel security file.
Exhibit 4 at 1-2. After completing his evaluation of the Individual, the DOE Psychologist issued
a report (the DOE Psychologist’s Report) on December 5, 2014. While recognizing that the
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-Fifth Edition, (DSM-5)
does not recognize the compulsive viewing of pornography as a mental illness, the DOE
Psychologist opined that the Individual’s “addiction” to pornography is a “mental condition.”8
Exhibit 7 at 8. The DOE Psychologist opined that: “The concern is that [the Individual’s] strong
urge to view porn (which he correctly terms as an addiction and something that he is unable to
stop) has motivated him to use poor judgment and to behave in ways that make him unreliable.”
Exhibit 7 at 8. The DOE Psychologist further opined that the Individual’s pornography
addiction’s effect on his judgment and reliability has manifested itself in the Individual’s
masturbation in his son’s room (while his son was not present), and his viewing of sexually
explicit materials at his work computer.9 Exhibit 4 at 8. The DOE Psychologist further
concluded that the Individual was not rehabilitated or reformed for his mental condition, since
the Individual continued to admit that he could not stop using pornography.10 Exhibit 4 at 6-9.
8 The DOE Psychologist also diagnosed the Individual with “Unspecified Anxiety Disorder.” Exhibit 4 at 5. The
DOE Psychologist, however, felt that this disorder was unlikely to cause significant defects in the Individual’s
judgment and reliability. Exhibit 4 at 5.
9 Specifically, the DOE Psychologist’s Report states, in pertinent part:
Viewing porn on his 13-year old son's computer, in his son's room (while his son, 11-year old
daughter and his wife are at home), . . . and masturbating to the images and videos reflect
significant defects in his judgment that have been present over a several year span. His viewing of
sexually explicit imagery on his work computer over a several year span is another indication of
repeated poor judgment. His doing so while being aware that it was against the security policy
indicates a defect in his being reliable. His successful manipulation of his work computer
indicates his wish to obscure his behavior, just as his "hiding" his viewing of porn from his family
(as a result of his being caught his wife now knows). His effort to obscure his involvement in
porn is also a matter of his being unreliable.
Exhibit 4 at 8.
10 During his DOE Psychological Examination, the Individual reported that it had been four and a half months since
he had last viewed sexually explicit materials at work. Exhibit 4 at 4.
7
D. The Hearing
At the hearing, the Individual testified that, as a result of his therapy, he realized that he had
made false admissions during the polygraph examination, SIT interview and his PSI. Tr. at 102.
These allegedly false admissions occurred, according to the Individual’s testimony, because “in
times of stress, it – my judgment becomes clouded.” Tr.at 102, 114. The Individual testified that
he had a panic attack while he was undergoing the polygraph examination. Tr. at 87. The
Individual testified that “because of the atmosphere and intimidation, I failed the polygraph.”11
Tr. at 88. The Individual testified that during the polygraph examination, he told the interviewer
that he: had conducted web searches “with the intent of viewing sexually explicit material,”
downloaded pornography, and bypassed his employer’s computer security. Tr. at 89. The
Individual testified that he further informed the interviewer that he had been addicted to
pornography for 30 years. Tr. at 89-90. The Individual also testified that he made a number of
false admissions when he was interviewed by the SIT investigators. Tr. at 92-93, 101. The
Individual attributed his allegedly false admissions to “my own mind, spinning out of control,
overthinking the questions from the polygraph, I admitted to everything.” Tr. at 93. The
Individual testified that he had a panic attack during his September 23, 2014, PSI, which, he
asserts, caused him to make the same statements he made during the polygraph examination and
the interview with the SIT investigators. Tr. at 97.
The Individual testified that as a result of the investigations that resulted from his admissions,
compounded by other stressors, he began to experience high stress levels. He began having
difficulty sleeping and lost his appetite. Since he was not handling his stress well, he consulted
with his physician, who prescribed medication for the Individual’s symptoms. Tr. at 94. After
the Individual was informed that his clearance was suspended, the Individual’s anxiety became
overwhelming, and he decided to begin weekly therapy with the Treating Psychologist. Tr. at
99-100. The Individual testified that his therapy was helping him “quite a lot.” Tr. at 103. The
Individual testified that he now understands his anxiety much better, and has learned some
coping strategies to help him manage his anxiety appropriately. Tr. at 103. The Individual
testified that he has given-up pornography and has not used it since December 2, 2014,
approximately six months prior to his hearing. Tr. at 103-104, 124. The Individual testified that
as a result of his medication and the passage of time, he is feeling much less anxious. Tr. at 108,
111. He now believes that he has his anxiety under control. Tr. at 110. The Individual testified
that before his therapy, he did not believe he could control his use of pornography, but as a result
of his therapy he now believes he has control over his pornography use. Tr. at 113, 124. Instead
of using pornography, the Individual now plays musical instruments, video games, or cards, or
reads, writes, shops, exercises, or spends time with his family. Tr. at 120, 124, 129-130. The
Individual denied masturbating at work. Tr. at 106, 109.
V. ANALYSIS
At the hearing, the Individual’s attorney essentially argued that the Individual (1) had not in fact,
circumvented his employee’s computer security, (2) has a mental illness, specifically
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), which (a) caused the Individual to make false admissions
11 The Individual testified that the question he failed on was “Have you ever done damage to a US government
information system?” Tr. at 88.
8
during the polygraph examination, SIT investigation, PSI and DOE Psychologist’s Examination;
and (b) led the Individual to use pornography as a coping mechanism, which in turn led him to
misuse his government computer by viewing sexually explicit materials.
A. Circumvention of the Individual’s Employer’s Computer Security.
Despite his admission during the polygraph examination that he had circumvented his
employer’s firewall in order to view sexually explicit material, and his admission during his PSI
that he had on at least one occasion, employed a proxy server to see if he could circumvent his
employer’s firewall, the Individual denies that he has circumvented his employer’s computer
security. The Individual has tried to walk back his admissions by claiming that his admissions
were in fact misstatements that, in turn, were attributable to his mental state at the time that they
were made (which he asserts resulted from the his GAD), and his misunderstanding of the term
“circumvent.”
The Individual presented the testimony of the Investigator who testified that the SIT’s
investigation did not find that the Individual had bypassed his employer’s computer security. Tr.
at 65. However, I find that the record indicates that the Individual circumvented12 his
employer’s computer security software that was intended to prevent the viewing of sexually
materials on government computers. The Individual was able to view sexually explicit images
by using various search engines such as Google and Bing. While these search engines are
typically set by default to use safe-mode, a filter which prevents adult oriented materials for
being included in search results, these search engines usually allow the user to disable the safe-
mode filter with a few mouse-clicks on the search engine’s web site. Moreover, these search
engine web sites allow a user to search for images located on webpages throughout the Internet.
The Individual admits that, while he was at work, he would disable the safe-mode filter on the
search engines he was using, and in addition, turn off the feature on his web browser that would
track his actions on the Internet, so that no record would be made of his web searches. Exhibit 7
at 24, 54-55. He would then type in a search term, in his case often women’s names, hoping that
the resulting images that would appear on his computer scene (but that would not be downloaded
to his computer) would be sexually explicit in nature. By doing so, he was able to view sexually
explicit material that would otherwise be blocked by his employer’s firewall or other computer
security filters, without creating a record of his activities.
The Individual correctly asserts that he did not violate any of his employer’s rules by using safe-
mode or turning his browser’s history tracking function off. However, his employer, and the
DOE, prohibited the viewing of sexually explicit materials on his government computer; and
over the years, employed a number of strategies to prevent the viewing of sexually explicit
materials on government computers, including, but not limited to, setting its firewalls to prevent
users from accessing sexually explicit materials and the adoption of policies forbidding the
viewing of sexually explicit materials. The Individual has therefore clearly used the safe-mode
and history disabling options to circumvent his employer’s computer security precautions
12 Webster’s Online Dictionary provides the following definition of circumvent: “to avoid being stopped by
(something, such as a law or rule) : to get around (something) in a clever and sometimes dishonest way.”
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/circumvent.
9
deployed to enforce his employer’s and DOE’s prohibition against viewing sexually explicit
materials.
The Individual’s intentional circumvention of his employer’s computer security raises significant
doubts about his trustworthiness, reliability, and judgment, under Criterion L. I find that the
Individual has not mitigated or resolved these doubts. Simply put, I cannot find that an
individual who fails to acknowledge the lapses in judgment, reliability and trustworthiness,
clearly evidenced by his circumvention of his employer’s computer security precautions, has
mitigated those lapses. Moreover, by failing to fully acknowledge his prior lapses in judgment,
reliability and trustworthiness, the Individual has continued to exhibit the defects in judgment,
reliability and trustworthiness into the present.
B. Intentional Provision of False Information
During his September 23, 2014, PSI, the Individual admitted that he had lied during his
polygraph examination in order to “cover up misuse of a [government] computer system.”
Exhibit 7 at 9. The Individual has attempted to mitigate this admission by claiming that his
anxiety caused him to misspeak, and subsequently claim that he did not in fact lie during the
polygraph examination. I find these assertions to be without credibility, and that the Individual’s
subsequent dissembling suggests that his lack of judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness
continues into the present.
Accordingly, I find that the Individual has not resolved the security concerns raised under
Criterion L.
C. Misuse of a Government Computer
The Individual admits that that he misused his government computer by viewing sexually
explicit materials. Tr. at 132-133. The Individual contends that the lapses in judgment,
reliability, and trustworthiness exhibited by his repeated misuse of a government computer were
caused by a mental illness, GAD, which is now under control. While, as I discuss at length
below, I find that the Individual has shown that he suffers from GAD, and that his GAD is
unlikely to cause a significant defect in the Individual’s judgement or reliability going forward,
those facts alone, do not sufficiently mitigate the doubts raised by the Individual’s misuse of a
government computer.
While there was certainly an interrelationship between the Individual’s anxiety, his use of
pornography, and his misuse of a government computer system, the Individual has not shown
that the defects in judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness that he has exhibited, and which
continue into the present, were caused by his GAD. All three of the psychologists who testified
before me in this matter, testified that the Individual’s GAD did not likely cause a significant
defect in judgment, or reliability.13 Tr. at 22 (DOE Psychologist), 179 (Individual’s Expert), and
13 Moreover, by the end of the hearing, there appeared to be a consensus among the three psychologists that the
Individual had been using pornography as a coping mechanism for his anxiety, that he has learned to use other, more
effective and appropriate, coping mechanisms, and that he would likely continue to use these other, more effective
and appropriate strategies going forward.
10
195 (Treating Psychologist). (Although, the Treating Psychologist testified that the Individual’s
anxiety may have caused him to “overthink” and therefore make false admissions. Tr. at 187).
Moreover, the Individual’s minimizing of his conduct, which continued into the hearing,
indicates that his judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness issues have not been fully resolved,
despite his successful mental health treatment.
Accordingly, I find that the Individual has not resolved the security concerns raised by his
misuse of a government computer system under Criterion L.
D. Mental Health Concerns
At the hearing, the three psychologists reached a consensus that the Individual has an anxiety
disorder, most likely GAD. Tr. at 199. Each of the three psychologists that testified at the
hearing also agreed that anxiety disorders, like that of the Individual’s, usually do not cause
significant defects in judgment or reliability. Tr. at 22, 179, 195. While they differed somewhat
about the particulars, the three psychologists agreed that the Individual’s use of pornography was
causing problems for him and needed to be treated. Each of the three psychologists testified at
the hearing that the Individual had received the appropriate and effective psychological
treatment. Tr. at 161-176, 184-195, 203. Finally, each of the psychologists agreed that the
Individual’s prognosis was highly favorable and that his psychological issues were unlikely to
cause him to return to viewing sexually explicit materials on his work computer. Tr. at 170, 179-
180, 190-195, 202-203.
Accordingly, I find that the security concerns raised under Criterion H have been resolved.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, I conclude that the LSO properly invoked Criteria H and L.
After considering all the evidence, both favorable and unfavorable, in a common sense manner, I
find that Individual has sufficiently mitigated the Criterion H security concerns. However, the
security concerns raised under Criterion L remain unresolved. Accordingly, the Individual has
not demonstrated that restoring his security clearance would not endanger the common defense
and would be clearly consistent with the national interest. Therefore, the Individual's security
clearance should not be restored at this time. The Individual may seek review of this Decision
by an Appeal Panel under the procedures set forth at 10 C.F.R. § 710.28.
Steven L. Fine
Administrative Judge
Office of Hearings and Appeals
Date: July 17, 2015

This is the Department of Energy’s own published decision, kept separate from the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals record used elsewhere on this site. General information from a public decision, not legal advice about any particular case.