PSH-21-0074

*The original of this document contains information which is subject to withholding from disclosure
under 5 U.S. C. § 552. Such material has been deleted from this copy and replaced with XXXXXX’s.
United States Department of Energy
Office of Hearings and Appeals
In the Matter of: Personnel Security Hearing )
)
Filing Date: June 10, 2021 ) Case No.: PSH-21-0074
)
__________________________________________)
Issued: August 24, 2021
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Administrative Judge Decision
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Phillip Harmonick, Administrative Judge:
This Decision concerns the eligibility of XXXXXXXXXXX (the Individual) to hold an access
authorization under the United States Department of Energy’s (DOE) regulations, set forth at 10
C.F.R. Part 710, “Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Matter and
Special Nuclear Material.”1 As discussed below, after carefully considering the record before me
in light of the relevant regulations and the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines for
Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive
Position (June 8, 2017) (Adjudicative Guidelines), I conclude that the Individual’s access
authorization should not be restored.
I. BACKGROUND
The Individual is a software engineer employed by a DOE contractor. Exhibit (Ex.) 6 at 22; Ex. C
at 1. On January 10, 2020, an Office of Personnel Management (OPM) investigator interviewed
the Individual as part of a routine investigation of his continued eligibility for access authorization.
Ex. 6 at 48. The OPM investigator’s interview summary indicates that the Individual suspected
that a secretary (the “Secretary”) and two other women, all of whom he believed to be of Chinese
descent, “were trying to hijack” a counterintelligence-related software project (the “Project”) on
which he had worked in 2011 and that “there could be more people . . . involved in trying to steal
information . . . to give to China.” Id. at 49–50. The OPM investigator indicated that the Individual
believed that his and his children’s lives would be in jeopardy if his coworkers of Chinese descent
learned that he had reported this information. Id. According to the OPM investigator, the
Individual’s demeanor changed when he began discussing his suspicions, and he looked around
the room and expressed that it might be “bugged.” Id. at 54. In November 2020, the Individual
arranged to meet with a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent concerning his suspicions.
Ex. 7 at 22.
1 The regulations define access authorization as “an administrative determination that an individual is eligible for access
to classified matter or is eligible for access to, or control over, special nuclear material.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.5(a). This
Decision will refer to such authorization as access authorization or security clearance.
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On March 1, 2021, the Individual met with a DOE-contracted psychologist (DOE Psychologist)
for a clinical evaluation. Ex. 3 at 1. The DOE Psychologist conducted a clinical interview and
administered the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-3 (MMPI) and a Rorschach test to
the Individual. Id. at 1, 4. During the clinical interview, the Individual identified three coworkers
of Chinese descent who he suspected of acting on behalf of the Chinese government: the former
head of the Project (the “Project Head”), a coworker involved in overseeing software (the
“Software Leader”), and the Secretary. Id. at 2–3. The Individual disclosed the bases for his
suspicions, including his beliefs that: the Project Head had prevented him from volunteering
contributions to the Project to undermine its success and was meeting with a “handler” while on
work-related travel; the Software Leader wanted him to hide a “special security camera” from
another employee and drew a cartoon expressing sadness about transferring to another DOE site
because she was forced to transfer by foreign operatives; and the Secretary demonstrated an
inappropriate interest in his work by inquiring as to how the Project was proceeding. Id. at 2–3.
The Individual said that he disclosed his concerns to a supervisor in 2011, but he was not taken
seriously, and he did not disclose his concerns again because he believed “that the Chinese would
‘kill my family and me.’” Id. Following the clinical interview, the DOE Psychologist issued a
psychological assessment (Report) in which he concluded that the Individual met the diagnostic
criteria for Delusional Disorder, Persecutory Type, Continuous, under the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – Fifth Edition (DSM-5).2 Id. at 6.
The LSO issued the Individual a letter in which it notified him that it possessed reliable information
that created substantial doubt regarding his eligibility to hold a security clearance. Ex. 2 at 1–2. In
a Summarization of Security Concerns (SSC) attached to the letter, the LSO explained that the
derogatory information raised security concerns under Guideline I (Psychological Conditions) of
the Adjudicative Guidelines. Id. at 3–4.
The Individual exercised his right to request an administrative review hearing pursuant to
10 C.F.R. Part 710. Ex. 1. The Director of the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) appointed
me as the Administrative Judge in this matter, and I subsequently conducted an administrative
hearing. The LSO submitted twelve exhibits (Ex. 1–12) into the record.3 The Individual submitted
nine exhibits (Ex. A–I). The Individual testified himself and presented the testimony of a
2 The DOE Psychologist found that the Individual met all five of the diagnostic criteria for Delusional Disorder. Ex.
3 at 6. He determined that the first diagnostic criterion was satisfied by the Individual’s longstanding suspicions that
his coworkers were acting on behalf of the Chinese government to thwart his work and obtain sensitive information.
Id. The second criterion was met because the Individual did not meet diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia. Id. The
third criterion was met because, other than his delusional beliefs regarding his coworkers of Chinese descent, the
Individual’s functioning was not markedly impaired, and his behavior was not obviously bizarre. Id. The fourth and
fifth diagnostic criteria were met because the Individual’s behavior was not attributable to manic or depressive
episodes, substance abuse, or another medical or psychological condition. Id.
3 During the hearing, testimony from the DOE Psychologist revealed that he prepared notes while administering the
Rorschach test which were not in evidence. Hearing Transcript at 223–30. The LSO submitted the DOE Psychologist’s
notes and scoring of the Rorschach test as Ex. 10 during the hearing. The Individual’s Counsel was offered the option
of recalling the DOE Psychologist for additional cross-examination approximately ten days after the hearing to provide
him with adequate opportunity to consult an expert regarding the scoring of the Rorschach test in preparation for cross
examination. Id. at 322–23, 328. The Individual’s Counsel declined this offer. Id. at 329–30.
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psychiatrist who conducted an evaluation of the Individual (Individual’s Psychiatrist), and the
DOE presented the testimony of the DOE Psychologist. Hearing Transcript (Tr.) at 3.
II. THE NOTIFICATION LETTER AND THE ASSOCIATED SECURITY CONCERNS
The LSO cited Guideline I (Psychological Conditions) of the Adjudicative Guidelines as the basis
for its determination that the Individual was ineligible for access authorization. Ex. 2 at 3. “Certain
emotional, mental, and personality conditions can impair judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness.
A formal diagnosis of a disorder is not required for there to be a concern under this guideline.”
Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 27. The SSC cited the following allegations as raising security
concerns under Guideline I: the DOE Psychologist diagnosed the Individual with Delusional
Disorder, Persecutory Type, Continuous, under the DSM-5; and the Individual made
unsubstantiated allegations to an OPM investigator, FBI agent, and the DOE Psychologist that
three coworkers were attempting to compromise a project he worked on and that he feared for his
life. Ex. 2 at 3. The LSO’s allegations that the Individual engaged in paranoid or bizarre behavior
that casts doubt on his judgment, stability, reliability, or trustworthiness, and the DOE
Psychologist’s determination that the Individual met the diagnostic criteria for a psychological
condition that may impair his judgment, stability, reliability, or trustworthiness, justify the LSO’s
invocation of Guideline I. Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 28(a)–(b).
III. REGULATORY STANDARDS
A DOE administrative review proceeding under Part 710 requires me, as the Administrative Judge,
to issue a Decision that reflects my comprehensive, common-sense judgment, made after
consideration of all of the relevant evidence, favorable and unfavorable, as to whether the granting
or continuation of a person’s access authorization will not endanger the common defense and
security and is clearly consistent with the national interest. 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(a). The regulatory
standard implies that there is a presumption against granting or restoring a security clearance. See
Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988) (“clearly consistent with the national interest”
standard for granting security clearances indicates “that security determinations should err, if they
must, on the side of denials”); Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991) (strong presumption against the issuance of a security clearance).
The individual must come forward at the hearing with evidence to convince the DOE that granting
or restoring access authorization “will not endanger the common defense and security and will be
clearly consistent with the national interest.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.27(d). The individual is afforded a
full opportunity to present evidence supporting his eligibility for an access authorization. The Part
710 regulations are drafted so as to permit the introduction of a very broad range of evidence at
personnel security hearings. Even appropriate hearsay evidence may be admitted. 10 C.F.R.
§ 710.26(h). Hence, an individual is afforded the utmost latitude in the presentation of evidence
to mitigate the security concerns at issue.
IV. HEARING TESTIMONY
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The Individual’s Psychiatrist testified that the Individual retained him for an evaluation in
connection with this proceeding, and he reviewed documents provided to him by the Individual
and conducted a clinical interview. Tr. at 22–23; see also Ex. C at 1 (reflecting that the Individual’s
Psychiatrist conducted the clinical interview of the Individual on July 16, 2021). The Individual’s
Psychiatrist characterized the Individual as a “quirky fellow” with a suspicious nature and poor
inter-personal skills. Tr. at 26–27.
During the clinical interview, the Individual told the Individual’s Psychiatrist that he had
documented “issues and inconsistencies” related to his colleagues of Chinese descent that “arose
over the course of 10 [or] 11 years,” and that he felt that “they certainly may be” Chinese
operatives, but did not “feel that [the things he documented] rose to the level of actually being
something that could be pursued perhaps.” Id. at 27, 104. The Individual’s Psychiatrist indicated
that, during the clinical interview, the Individual did not display active fear of being harmed by
“the Chinese,” and the Individual’s fear seemed to have lessened since his clinical interview with
the DOE Psychologist. Id. at 70–71. However, the Individual’s Psychiatrist indicated that the
Individual “didn’t go too far into” his fear and that “the more we talked about it, the more it seemed
like it was an unpleasant event. And he tended to get more anxious, frankly.” Id. at 69–70.
The Individual’s Psychiatrist diagnosed the Individual with Adjustment Disorder with
disturbances of emotion and conduct and noted that the Individual might meet the diagnostic
criteria for Autism Spectrum Disorder, Mild. Id. at 66; Ex. C at 5–6. He opined that the Individual’s
judgment and reliability were not impaired and that, given time to resolve the stress of attempting
to disclose his suspicions, he had a positive prognosis for avoiding aberrant behavior in the future.
Tr. at 31–32; Ex. C at 8. The Individual’s Psychiatrist gave the Individual a positive prognosis for
the resolution of his paranoia and fear of retaliation within six months based on the Individual’s
clinical presentation and the information that he was provided. Tr. at 74–75, 99–100.
The Individual’s Psychiatrist testified that he generally agreed with the DOE Psychologist’s
interpretation of the MMPI, but that the inferences he drew from MMPI scales within the normal
range were inappropriate. Id. at 32–34. The Individual’s Psychiatrist also expressed skepticism as
to the value of the Rorschach test as a diagnostic tool and asserted that it is susceptible to
projections on the part of the interpreting practitioner. Id. at 42–43.
The Individual’s Psychiatrist testified that he was “quite shocked” that the DOE Psychologist had
diagnosed the Individual with Delusional Disorder in light of the “extraordinarily low” prevalence
of the condition in the general population, which he estimated at 0.02%, and he felt that a higher
burden of proof than “check[ing] the boxes when it comes to the DSM-5” was warranted before
making such a rare diagnosis. Id. at 23–24. The Individual’s Psychiatrist also disagreed that the
Individual’s beliefs regarding his colleagues of Chinese descent were fixed and false, and,
therefore, he did not find them delusional. Id. at 102–04. He felt that, in light of news media
coverage establishing that Chinese espionage is a real phenomenon, the DOE Psychologist could
not definitively determine that the Individual’s beliefs were false. Id. at 27–28, 51. He also
indicated that he did not believe that the Individual’s beliefs were fixed and unshakeable, as
required for a diagnosis of Delusional Disorder, because the Individual showed insight into the
possibility that he might be wrong and “if he really felt that this was . . . espionage, I believe he
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would have come forward sooner.” Id. at 94–95. The Individual’s Psychiatrist noted that his
opinion would have been different had the Individual displayed the same beliefs about Chinese
espionage but did not work in a position related to national security, and the DOE Psychologist
should have taken into account the Individual’s professional background in making his diagnosis.
Id. at 53–55.
The Individual’s Psychiatrist noted that the DSM-5 specifically required a diagnosing professional
to consider the patient’s culture and religious beliefs when making a diagnosis, which he believed
that the DOE Psychologist failed to do, and he provided, as an example, that a belief in witchcraft
would not be delusional for members of certain traditional cultures who believe in its existence as
a tenet of their culture. Id. at 28, 48–49. The Individual’s Psychiatrist expressed the opinion that it
is not unusual for persons of the Individual’s background, including his cybersecurity profession,
extreme patriotism, and conservative cultural beliefs, to display some level of paranoia and fear
regarding subjects like Chinese espionage. Id. at 28–29, 50. The Individual’s Psychiatrist also
observed that the Individual’s religious beliefs and personality caused him to experience extreme
guilt for not disclosing what he perceived to be legitimate fears regarding Chinese espionage and
that these cultural factors pushed him to disclose his suspicions. Id. at 95–97.
The Individual testified that he grew up in a small, rural community where he was heavily
influenced by his church and family which cultivated in him a strong feeling of patriotism. Id. at
113–14. The Individual noted that he had worked in defense-related software development after
graduating from college, and he had devoted significant care to his work and protecting classified
information. Id. at 116–19.
The Individual denied that he ever concluded that he was working with Chinese spies in his
employment with the DOE contractor. Id. at 119. The Individual testified that he developed
suspicions that the Project Head wanted the Project to fail after she directed him not to provide
additional technical support to customers. Id. at 119–21. The Individual testified that he feared that
he would be removed from the Project or lose his job if he reported his concerns to his manager or
site security. Id. at 122. The Individual also recounted other behavior he previously disclosed
concerning the Project Head, such as the two occasions on which he believed that she had lied to
him and her habit of travelling early when returning home from other DOE sites, and reiterated
that he found the “accumulation” of behaviors suspicious. Id. at 160–65.
The Individual indicated that he suspected the Software Leader after she asked him to store a
camera in his office. Id. at 165–66. The Individual testified that he subsequently learned that the
camera contained “several thousand pictures of critical infrastructure.” Id. at 136–37. The
Individual clarified his account of the cartoon drawn by the Software Leader, noting that the
Software Leader had included a message indicating that she “had” to leave for another location,
and he believed that the Chinese military used threats of things like relocation to control “agents”
which could have been the case for the Software Leader. Id. at 166–68. The Individual expressed
the opinion that the incident concerning the camera and the circumstances of the Software Leader’s
transfer to another site, including her drawing a cartoon expressing sadness about transferring,
raised sufficient concerns to report her behavior to the FBI. Id. at 169. Regarding the Secretary,
the Individual indicated that his suspicions were related to one occasion on which she asked him
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questions about the Project and that the inquiry on that occasion was sufficient to justify reporting
her behavior to the FBI. Id. at 170–71.
The Individual reported that he voiced his concerns regarding his colleagues of Chinese descent
to a counterintelligence officer in 2011. Id. at 147–48. When questioned regarding the
inconsistency of this information with his statement to the OPM investigator that he had disclosed
his suspicions to a supervisor, the Individual testified that he had disclosed his suspicions to the
supervisor, who replaced the Project Head, as well as the counterintelligence officer. Id. at 148–
49. The Individual reported that he lost confidence in the counterintelligence capabilities of the
persons to whom he made his disclosures when they dismissed his concerns and decided not to
raise his concerns again until his children were adults out of fear of losing his job. Id. at 154–55.
The Individual reported that he disclosed his suspicions to the OPM investigator because he
thought that he was required to do so to comply with DOE reporting requirements. Id. at 127–28,
144–45; Ex. F. The Individual claimed that the OPM investigator omitted relevant information
from the summary of the interview. Tr. at 123. The Individual represented that he told the OPM
investigator that he believed that he might be subject to retaliation if his allegations led to the
investigation and imprisonment of the employees who he suspected, not that Chinese agents were
actively seeking to kill him at that time. Id. at 124. The Individual also asserted that the OPM
investigator had suggested that he might pursue the witness protection program, which he endorsed
as a hypothetical possibility, after he said that he might change his address if his allegations led to
the investigation and imprisonment of the employees he suspected. Id. at 125. The Individual
indicated that he had considered that the room at the DOE site in which the interview was
conducted might have been “bugged,” but that he “had no idea” whether it was or was not. Id. at
125–26.
The Individual represented that he disclosed “suspicious activities” he had observed to the FBI,
including efforts to “thwart” the Project, but not that he had uncovered Chinese spies. Id. at 126.
According to the Individual, he became motivated to disclose his suspicions after a discussion
about world events with a friend and decided that “[b]efore I retire or before I die, I want to do
what I feel I’m supposed to do.” Id. at 187–88; see also Ex. A (confirming that the Individual
spoke with a friend about his suspicions in February 2021). The Individual testified that he
expressed fears of retaliation, but not fears for his life, to an FBI agent. Tr. at 128, 157.
The Individual did not recall telling the DOE Psychologist that he feared for his life, but he said
he did relay his prior statements to the OPM investigator that he feared retaliation if his allegations
led to the investigation of the employees he suspected. Id. at 130–31. Regarding the Rorschach
test, the Individual noted that a response the DOE Psychologist cited in his Report as unusual was
informed by his understanding of the human anatomy and his best efforts to interpret a green spot
present on the image. Id. at 131–33. The Individual stated that his job is very detail oriented, and
that he had applied his practice of looking for non-obvious information in interpreting the
Rorschach inkblots. Id. at 134.
The Individual indicated that he did not seek treatment after receiving the DOE Psychologist’s
diagnosis, and, instead, he reflected on how he could improve his communication skills and
rethought whether he should have reported his suspicions in the first place. Id. at 174. The
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Individual represented that he did not report a fear for his life at the time of his evaluation by the
Individual’s Psychiatrist. Id. The Individual indicated that he would pursue treatment “if it had a
bearing on [his] clearance.” Id. at 177.
The Individual indicated that his perception of the events he deemed suspicious had changed
somewhat since his interview with the OPM investigator, and that the Project Head might have
had valid reasons for preventing him from volunteering contributions on the Project and not
disclosed them to him because of her personality. Id. at 179. The Individual indicated that the
person from whom he believed that the Software Leader wanted him to hide the camera had told
him that the Software Leader might have been “going to get some pictures off of it to prepare a
presentation that she was on the hook to prepare . . . .” Id. However, the Individual believes that
his colleagues of Chinese descent “were doing things that if they were agents, an agent might do”
but that he “didn’t have enough details to conclude that they were agents.” Id. at 183.
The DOE Psychologist testified that the Individual’s presentation in the clinical interview was
“very charged up” and that he volunteered a great deal of information concerning his suspicions,
whereas in the hearing the Individual presented much less certainty in his convictions. Id. at 193.
The DOE Psychologist expressed that, in the clinical interview, the Individual relayed current fears
for his life related to the Project Head potentially learning of his disclosures. Id. at 194, 199. In the
opinion of the DOE Psychologist, the Individual’s testimony at the hearing demonstrated that he
had learned how to manage his presentation but not that he had resolved his delusional beliefs. Id.
at 278–79. The DOE Psychologist acknowledged that Delusional Disorder is rare, but that the
Individual’s consistent beliefs over eleven years regarding Chinese agents operating at the DOE
site represented a delusion. Id. at 204–05. The DOE Psychologist opined that the Individual’s
responses to the Rorschach test exemplified how Delusional Disorder caused him to make
inaccurate inferences based on negative ideas which impair his reasoning. Id. at 205–06.
The DOE Psychologist disagreed with the Individual’s Psychiatrist’s opinion because of the long
duration of the Individual’s delusional beliefs, which was inconsistent with the Individual’s
Psychiatrist’s opinion that the Individual displayed an emotional response to a stressful event. Id.
at 206, 214–15. He also disagreed with the Individual’s Psychiatrist’s opinion that the Individual’s
beliefs were rooted in culture rather than delusion based on his experience working with subjects
from culturally conservative backgrounds of a similar nature. Id. at 215–16. The DOE Psychologist
testified that the Rorschach test was a valid, recognized tool in the field of clinical psychology
used to collect information regarding cognitive functions, but it was not a diagnostic tool in and of
itself. Id. at 218–19. The DOE Psychologist also testified that reliance on MMPI scores alone was
insufficient to draw diagnostic conclusions, and he reviewed subjects’ specific responses to learn
how they approached the MMPI and clinical interview. Id. at 219–21. He indicated that he assigned
minor weight to the results of the Rorschach test in making his diagnosis, and he did not rely on
the results of the MMPI. Id. at 218–19, 273, 308, 320.
The DOE Psychologist testified that he considered other potential diagnoses for the Individual, but
he decided upon Delusional Disorder because the Individual was not schizophrenic, he did not
display signs of a narcissistic character disorder, and his delusions were limited to his paranoia
about Chinese espionage. Id. at 247–48. The DOE Psychologist observed that the Individual
displayed a fixed delusion that Chinese intelligence was operating an intelligence scheme over a
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period of eleven years. Id. at 250. Although the DOE Psychologist could not absolutely conclude
that the Individual’s suspicions were false, he found the Individual’s “lack of readiness to find
other explanations” for the things he found suspicious to be indicative of a fixed false belief that
he had discovered espionage by his colleagues. Id. at 251, 261.
V. FINDINGS OF FACT
During a January 10, 2020, interview, the Individual volunteered to an OPM investigator that the
Secretary and two other colleagues of Chinese descent were trying to disrupt the Project and gain
information to give to China.4 Ex. 6 at 49–50. The Individual declined to divulge details of his
suspicions to the OPM investigator because they were not meeting in a classified space and the
room might have been “bugged.” Id. at 50, 53; Tr. at 125–26. The Individual reported disclosing
his suspicions to a supervisor in the past, but the supervisor dismissed his allegations and he was
too frightened to disclose his suspicions in a prior OPM investigation concerning his eligibility for
a security clearance. Ex. 6 at 50. The Individual told the OPM investigator that he feared for his
life, that the lives of his family might be in jeopardy due to his allegations, and that he might need
to be placed in the witness protection program. Id.; Tr. at 123–25. The Individual also disclosed
his suspicions to an FBI agent. Ex. 7 at 22; Tr. at 126–27. The FBI agent who met with the
Individual communicated to the LSO that the Individual was “long on accusations but woefully
short on substance that could be followed up on.” Id. at 24 (reflecting a summary of a phone call
between an employee of the LSO and the FBI agent who met with the Individual).
The DOE Psychologist reviewed the Individual’s personnel security file, conducted a 3.5-hour
clinical interview, and administered the MMPI and Rorschach tests. Ex. 3 at 1. All scales on the
MMPI were within the normal range. Id. at 4; Tr. at 219. The DOE Psychologist did not rely on
the MMPI in diagnosing the Individual. Tr. at 273. The DOE Psychologist determined that the
Individual’s responses to the Rorschach test reflected inaccurate inferences based on negative
ideas which impaired his reasoning. Id. at 205–06. For example, the Individual described one
inkblot as “kidneys which don’t look like kidneys, but they might if they were a different color,
but they are not shaped like kidneys . . . or anything, but they look like kidneys because they are
wrapped around the spinal cord . . . this thing in the middle . . . they are green so maybe they have
cancer or something.” Ex. 3 at 5. The Individual’s responses to the Rorschach test contributed “a
little” to the DOE Psychologist’s diagnosis. Tr. at 320.
During the clinical interview, the Individual disclosed behaviors by three colleagues of Chinese
descent which he found suspicious. The Individual reported that the Project Head: (1) Prevented
him from volunteering his time to resolve issues related to the Project at DOE sites; (2) directed
him not to pursue a change to the Project of which he conceived to make it more efficient; (3)
falsely denied discussing a change to the Project with another employee; (4) characterized another
employee as an “enemy” despite having dined with that employee’s mother; (5) dined with an
employee working on counterintelligence related matters at another DOE site without inviting the
Individual, possibly to elicit counterintelligence-related information from that employee; and (6)
travelled early when returning from other DOE sites, which the Individual believed might have
4 Although the Individual disputes portions of the OPM investigator’s summary of the interview, I assign greater
evidentiary weight to the OPM investigator’s contemporaneous summary of the conversation than the Individual’s
recollection of details of an interview that occurred approximately eighteen months prior to the Hearing.
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been to facilitate meeting her “handler.” Ex. 3 at 2–3. The Individual disclosed that the Software
Leader: (1) asked him to store a camera in his office, which he believed was “very much against
the rules” and for the purpose of hiding the camera from another employee; and (2) drew a cartoon
depicting her sadness about transferring to another DOE site which the Individual believed might
indicate that she was forced to do so by foreign operatives. Id. at 3. The Individual disclosed that
the Secretary: (1) asked the Individual how the Project was going on one occasion when she passed
him in the hall, which he deemed an inappropriate interest; (2) married an employee in the
counterintelligence group, which he perceived as a conduit for her to access sensitive information;
and (3) was a friend of the Project Head. Id. The Individual said that he attempted to disclose this
information to a supervisor in 2011, but he was not taken seriously, and did not attempt to disclose
the information again until his interview with the OPM investigator because he feared for his life
if the Project Head learned that he was “exposing our network . . . .” Id. 5 at 3–4.
In his Report, the DOE Psychologist determined that the Individual met the diagnostic criteria for
Delusional Disorder, Persecutory Type, Continuous, under the DSM-5. Ex. 3 at 6. The DOE
Psychologist identified the Individual’s delusion as “the belief that Chinese [] employees have
been conspiring to either thwart his work or convey information to the Chinese government for at
least 10 years . . . .” Id. The DOE Psychologist concluded that the Individual’s Delusional Disorder
impaired his judgment and reliability, and that the Individual had a poor prognosis for resolving
his delusions. Id.
The Individual’s Psychiatrist conducted a two-hour interview of the Individual on July 16, 2021.
Ex. C at 1. Following the interview, the Individual’s Psychiatrist issued an evaluation in which he
concluded that the Individual met the diagnostic criteria for Adjustment Disorder with disturbances
of emotion and conduct under the DSM-5 and noted that the Individual might meet the diagnostic
criteria for Autism Spectrum Disorder, Mild. Id. at 5–6. The Individual’s Psychiatrist provided a
positive prognosis for resolution of the Individual’s emotional and behavioral symptoms following
disclosure of his suspicions within six months. Id. at 6.
The Individual’s Psychiatrist disagreed with the DOE Psychologist’s diagnosis of Delusional
Disorder based on the mathematical improbability of the Individual having a condition with a
prevalence of 0.02% in the general population and his opinion that the Individual’s suspicions of
his colleagues of Chinese descent were not delusions “through the lens of his personality and
cultural norms . . . .” 6 Id. In the opinion of the Individual’s Psychiatrist, the Individual’s “hyper
5 The Individual denied that he expressed a current fear for his life to the DOE Psychologist. Tr. at 130. The Individual
asserted during the Hearing that the DOE Psychologist’s Report mischaracterized his statements in several ways, but
he did not provide specific, material examples of mischaracterizations except with respect to his fear for his life and
his response to the Rorschach inkblot which he described as looking like a kidney. Id. at 130, 150–52. I assign greater
weight to the DOE Psychologist’s contemporaneous summary of the interview in the Report than I do to the
Individual’s self-serving testimony at the hearing.
6 In his evaluation, the Individual’s Psychiatrist stated that the DOE Psychologist’s evaluation “was well performed”
and that he disagreed with the DOE Psychologist’s diagnosis based on the differing weight he assigned to cultural
considerations and the low prevalence of Delusional Disorder in the general population. Ex. C at 5–6. Following the
hearing, the Individual’s Psychiatrist offered a rebuttal opinion in which he asserted that the DOE Psychologist’s
evaluation was deficient because he failed to include certain modifiers to the diagnosis of Delusional Disorder and did
not sufficiently exclude other potential diagnoses through, among other things, developing the Individual’s family and
substance abuse history and ordering laboratory tests. Ex. G at 2. The DOE Psychologist’s Report appears to include
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patriotism” and religious beliefs caused him to have “an overwhelming need for conformity,
difficulty with ambivalence, and difficulty with shame and guilt” which, when combined with his
personality and potential Autism Spectrum Disorder, explained his behavior. Id. at 2, 6.
The Individual has not pursued treatment for any psychological condition since receiving the DOE
Psychologist’s Report. Tr. at 174. As of the date of the Hearing, the Individual believed that his
colleagues of Chinese descent “were doing things that were suspicious. I believe they were doing
things that if they were agents, an agent might do. But . . . I didn’t have enough details to conclude
that they were agents.” Id. at 183. The Individual’s beliefs are based on events he reported
observing in 2010 and 2011, and the Individual has not interacted with any of the colleagues about
whom he harbors suspicions for approximately ten years. Ex. H at 2.
VI. ANALYSIS
The LSO’s allegations in the SSC raise two distinct security concerns under Guideline I. One
concern is based on the DOE Psychologist’s diagnosis of the Individual with Delusional Disorder.
See Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 28(b) (indicating that the opinion of a duly qualified mental health
professional may raise security concerns). This security concern is dependent upon the expertise
of a mental health professional providing a valid opinion. The other concern is based on the
Individual’s statements to the OPM investigator, the FBI, and the DOE Psychologist concerning
his suspicions of his colleagues of Chinese descent. See id. at ¶ 28(a) (indicating that behavior that
casts doubt on an individual’s judgment, stability, reliability, or trustworthiness, including
paranoid behavior, may raise security concerns). This security concern addresses whether an
individual’s behavior raises security concerns in of itself, and may be assessed from the perspective
of a layperson without a formal diagnosis. Critically, “[a] formal diagnosis of a disorder is not
required for there to be a concern under [Guideline I].” Id. at ¶ 27. Thus, in order to resolve the
security concerns asserted by the LSO, the Individual must address both the DOE Psychologist’s
diagnosis and the concern that his behavior reflects paranoia that could compromise his judgment,
stability, reliability, or trustworthiness independently of the DOE Psychologist’s diagnosis.
The Individual sought to establish that his suspicions of his colleagues of Chinese descent were
plausible, that he took appropriate steps to disclose his concerns consistent with what he
understood to be his obligations as a security clearance holder, and that the DOE Psychologist
misdiagnosed him with Delusional Disorder. An individual can mitigate security concerns under
Guideline I if:
(a) the identified condition is readily controllable with treatment, and the individual has
demonstrated ongoing and consistent compliance with the treatment plan;
(b) the individual has voluntarily entered a counseling or treatment program for a condition
that is amenable to treatment, and the individual is currently receiving counseling or
treatment with a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified mental health professional;
one of the modifiers to the diagnosis – “Continuous” – that the Individual’s Psychiatrist believed was missing, and the
Individual’s Psychiatrist did not explain why his opinion as to the appropriateness of the DOE Psychologist’s
evaluation methods changed so significantly from when he issued his evaluation. Thus, I have assigned only moderate
weight to the concerns expressed in the rebuttal opinion of the Individual’s Psychiatrist as to the diagnostic methods
employed by the DOE Psychologist.
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(c) [a] recent opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional employed by, or
acceptable to and approved by, the U.S. Government [indicates] that an individual’s
previous condition is under control or in remission, and has a low probability of
recurrence or exacerbation;
(d) the past psychological/psychiatric condition was temporary, the situation has been
resolved, and the individual no longer shows indications of emotional instability; or,
(e) there is no indication of a current problem.
Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 29(a)–(e).
The first two mitigating conditions under Guideline I are inapplicable in this case because the
Individual provided no evidence that he pursued treatment for any psychological condition. Thus,
he cannot show that he is “currently receiving counseling or treatment” or that he has demonstrated
“ongoing and consistent compliance with the treatment plan.” Id. at ¶ 29(a)–(b). Therefore, this
Decision will focus on the remaining three mitigating conditions under Guideline I.
The Individual attempted to show that his suspicions that his coworkers of Chinese descent were
acting on behalf of the Chinese government did not present a current problem and that he did not
show signs of emotional instability because his suspicions were plausible, his statements were not
properly represented in the exhibits submitted by the LSO, and he demonstrated insight into the
possibility that his suspicions might not be true. I do not agree. The Individual provided no
evidence, other than his own testimony and prior statements, that any of the behaviors by his
colleagues that he found suspicious ever occurred.7 In the absence of any corroborating evidence
of the Individual’s claims, I share the opinion of the FBI agent who spoke with the Individual that
he is “long on accusations but woefully short on substance . . . .” Ex. 7 at 24. Moreover, the
Individual’s belief that innocuous behaviors by his colleagues (such as the Project Head choosing
early flight times when travelling or dining with the mother of a colleague about whom she spoke
negatively) provided plausible evidence that they were conducting espionage on behalf of the
Chinese government suggests that the Individual’s reasoning is so impaired, whether by paranoia
or other defects, that his possessing a security clearance poses a significant risk to national security.
I do not credit the Individual’s claims that his disclosures of potential espionage were misquoted
or misunderstood by the OPM investigator and DOE Psychologist. Supra pp. 9–10, nn. 4–5.8
Moreover, I am unconvinced that the Individual has developed significant insight into the
extraordinary nature of his suspicions. When asked how his perceptions of the events he found
7 Several of the Individual’s claims involved persons other than the colleagues the Individual suspected of acting on
behalf of the Chinese government. For example, the Individual alleged that the Software Leader hid a camera
containing photos of “critical infrastructure” from another employee. Supra p. 6. The Individual did not submit any
information from the employee from whom the camera was allegedly hidden corroborating that the incident even
occurred, much less that the camera contained photos of “critical infrastructure” or that the Software Leader asking
the Individual to store the camera in his office would have furthered the purposes of espionage.
8 Even if I credited the Individual’s account of these conversations, the resulting differences would have little impact
on my analysis. For example, the Individual’s claim that he told the OPM investigator that he would fear for his life
if his claims led to the investigation and imprisonment of his colleagues for espionage, and not that he feared for his
life at the time of the interview, is a distinction without a difference. In either case, the Individual expressed an
irrational fear based on his unjustified suspicions.
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suspicious had changed since his interview with the OPM investigator, the Individual observed
that “maybe” the Project Head directed him not to volunteer his time on the Project for reasons
unrelated to espionage and that it was “plausible” that the Software Leader had obtained a camera
from another colleague to collect pictures for a presentation rather than espionage. Tr. at 179. The
Individual’s statements equating the possibilities that his colleagues were engaging in routine
office behaviors and espionage, and belief as of the date of the hearing that he “didn’t have enough
details to conclude that they were agents,” indicate that he is continuing to experience paranoid or
other deficient thinking that calls into question his judgment and reliability. As the Individual
continues to harbor longstanding irrational suspicions that his colleagues are conducting espionage
or other actions on behalf of the Chinese government based on paranoid or other defective thinking,
I find that he has not resolved the security concerns related to his disclosure of his suspicions
concerning his colleagues to the OPM investigator, FBI, and DOE Psychologist. ¶ 29(d)–(e).
Turning to the security concerns raised by the DOE Psychologist’s diagnosis of the Individual with
Delusional Disorder, the Individual sought to show that the DOE Psychologist’s diagnosis was
incorrect and the product of inappropriate inferences and diagnostic tools. The Individual’s
Psychiatrist testified convincingly that the DOE Psychologist’s inferences from the MMPI test
results, which drew conclusions about the Individual’s psychological condition from scales within
the normal range solely because they were elevated more than the Individual’s other scales, were
of minimal validity.9
However, the Individual’s Psychiatrist’s willingness to credit the Individual’s suspicions as
plausible based on news coverage that the Chinese government engages in espionage was
unconvincing. Moreover, his opinion that the Individual’s conservative cultural practices and
patriotism would make him more suspicious than a typical person were not sufficiently developed
to satisfactorily explain the Individual’s conduct. The DOE Psychologist opined that the
Individual’s religious beliefs and cultural conservatism were not unusual among clearance holders
and did not explain his suspicions of his Chinese colleagues. The Individual’s Psychiatrist did not
refer to any research or medical literature establishing that it is a cultural characteristic of
conservative, devout, patriotic persons to believe that their colleagues of Chinese descent are
agents of the Chinese government. In the absence of such supporting evidence, I do not accept that
the Individual’s culture explains his paranoid beliefs as might be the case for the example cited by
the Individual’s Psychiatrist in which beliefs in witchcraft would not be delusional for members
of some traditional cultures.
9 The Individual submitted a self-prepared list of citations to several articles calling into question the reliability and
validity of the Rorschach test. Ex. I. The Individual also offered the opinion of the Individual’s Psychiatrist that the
Rorschach test “is useful for evaluation of thought disorders which can be used in evaluating for schizophrenia,
however [it is] not considered diagnostic.” Ex. G at 3. The DOE Psychologist testified that the Rorschach test is
generally accepted in the psychological community, but for a small group of dissenters, and DOE submitted a
document prepared by one of the DOE Psychologist’s subordinates to that effect. Tr. at 217–19; Ex. 12. Some courts
have found expert opinions based on the Rorschach test to meet the Daubert standard for admissibility under the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See U.S. v. Ganadonegro, 805 F.Supp.2d 1188, 1202–03 (D. New Mex. 2011) (accepting
an expert’s use of the MMPI and Rorschach tests as reliable methodology). I find that the DOE Psychologist’s opinion
and the evidence that the Rorschach test is generally accepted as a clinical tool in the psychological community
outweighs the limited evidence offered by the Individual challenging the validity of the Rorschach test.
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I found the DOE Psychologist’s characterization of the Individual’s suspicions as delusions with
a poor prognosis for resolution more compelling than the Individual’s Psychiatrist’s interpretation
of the suspicions as plausible interpretations of reality influenced by the Individual’s culture and
patriotism. I also found the Individual’s Psychiatrist’s opinion that it was uncertain whether the
Individual had harbored his suspicions continuously since 2011, and therefore that his suspicions
might not be sufficiently fixed to form a delusion, improbable in light of the Individual’s testimony
and prior statements that he restrained himself from coming forward with his suspicions out of fear
of retaliation or professional consequences. In the face of competing expert opinions, neither of
which is so convincing as to render the other implausible, I must resolve any doubts in favor of
national security. 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(a). Thus, I find that the Individual has not resolved the security
concerns related to the DOE Psychologist’s diagnosis of Delusional Disorder. Adjudicative
Guidelines at ¶ 29(c)–(d).
While the Individual has raised questions about the DOE Psychologist’s diagnosis, merely casting
doubt on the accuracy of the diagnosis falls far short of meeting his heavy burden to show that
restoring his security clearance would “not endanger the common defense and security and is
clearly consistent with the national interest.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(a). The Individual’s suspicions
that his colleagues were engaged in espionage or other activities at the direction of the Chinese
government are uncorroborated and so unlikely to be true that they reflect paranoia or other
defective thinking that compromises his judgment, stability, and reliability. The DOE
Psychologist’s opinion that the Individual suffers from Delusional Disorder, which compromises
his judgment, stability, and reliability, while contested by the Individual’s Psychiatrist, presents
additional concerns. The Individual continues to harbor suspicions of espionage, but he has not
demonstrated that his beliefs are based on evidence that would render them reasonable or shown
significant insight into the tenuous support for his extraordinary claims. Thus, I find that the
Individual has not resolved the security concerns asserted by the LSO under Guideline I.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the above analysis, I found that there was sufficient derogatory information in the possession of
DOE to raise security concerns under Guideline I of the Adjudicative Guidelines. After
considering all of the relevant information, favorable and unfavorable, in a comprehensive,
common-sense manner, including weighing all the testimony and other evidence presented at the
hearing, I find that the Individual has not brought forth sufficient evidence to resolve the security
concerns set forth in the Summary of Security Concerns. Accordingly, I have determined that the
Individual’s access authorization should not be restored. Either party may seek review of this
Decision by an Appeal Panel pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 710.28.
Phillip Harmonick
Administrative Judge
Office of Hearings and Appeals