PSH-23-0060

*The original of this document contains information which is subject to withholding from disclosure
under 5 U.S. C. § 552. Such material has been deleted from this copy and replaced with XXXXXX’s.
United States Department of Energy
Office of Hearings and Appeals
In the Matter of: Personnel Security Hearing )
)
Filing Date: February 15, 2023 ) Case No.: PSH-23-0060
)
__________________________________________)
Issued: July 25, 2023
___________________________
Administrative Judge Decision
___________________________
Noorassa A. Rahimzadeh, Administrative Judge:
This Decision concerns the eligibility of XXXXXXXXXX to hold an access authorization under
the United States Department of Energy’s (DOE) regulations, set forth at 10 C.F.R. Part 710,
“Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Matter and Special Nuclear
Material.”1 As discussed below, after carefully considering the record before me in light of the
relevant regulations and the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility
for Access to Classified Information or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position (June 8, 2017)
(Adjudicative Guidelines), I conclude that the Individual’s access authorization should not be
restored.
I. Background
The Individual is currently employed with a DOE contractor in a position that requires her to hold
an access authorization. While employed with a second-line subcontractor to a DOE contractor in
2015, the Individual’s former spouse called the DOE’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to
report derogatory information pertaining to the Individual. Ex. 3 at 1. Accordingly, the OIG began
an investigation into the allegations made by the Individual’s former spouse. Ex. 4.
As part of the periodic reinvestigation of her eligibility for access authorization the Individual
signed and submitted a Questionnaire for National Security Positions (QNSP) in December 2018.
Ex. 5. In the QNSP, she provided information pertaining to her residential address, indicating that
from November 2007 through July 2014, she lived in her former marital home in State 1, and from
August 2014 to April 2015, she lived at a second location in State 1.2 Ex. 5 at 24–25. She indicated
1 The regulations define access authorization as “an administrative determination that an individual is eligible for access
to classified matter or is eligible for access to, or control over, special nuclear material.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.5(a). This
Decision will refer to such authorization as access authorization or security clearance.
2 The Individual submitted an email and screenshots of a tenant list from her former landlord indicating that she rented
a home at the second address in State 1 from July 2014 to May 2015. Ex. F at 7–13, 15–19; See Transcript of Hearing,
Case No. PSH-23-0060 at 83–84 (hereinafter cited as “Tr.”).
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that from April 2015 to July 2015, she resided at two different locations in State 2.3 Id. at 24. From
July 2015 through the date of the QNSP, the Individual indicated that she had lived at three separate
residences in State 3.4 Id. at 22–24.
OIG completed and issued a report of their findings on September 6, 2022. Ex. 4. As stated in the
report, the OIG “investigation focused on violations of . . . 18 U.S.C. § 287 . . . and 18 U.S.C.
§ 641,”5 and concluded that the Individual had “signed, certified, and submitted multiple expense
vouchers for travel and approximately seven months of per diem as a subcontractor while claiming
permanent and duplicate expenses in [State 1].” Ex. 4 at 3. OIG also concluded that the Individual
“submitted permanent change of station documentation requesting relocation expenses from [State
1 to State 3].” Id. As a result of the aforementioned expenses claimed, the Individual was ultimately
paid approximately $48,787.96 to which she was not entitled. Id.
Due to unresolved security concerns, the LSO began the present administrative review proceeding
by issuing a letter (Notification Letter) to the Individual in which it notified her that it possessed
reliable information that created substantial doubt regarding her continued eligibility for access
authorization in connection with her employment, and accordingly, her access authorization had
been suspended pending a resolution. In a Summary of Security Concerns (SSC) attached to the
letter, the LSO explained that the derogatory information raised security concerns under
Guidelines E (Personal Conduct), F (Financial Considerations), and J (Criminal Conduct) of the
Adjudicative Guidelines. Ex. 1. The Notification Letter informed the Individual that she was
entitled to a hearing before an Administrative Judge to resolve the substantial doubt regarding her
eligibility to hold a security clearance. See 10 C.F.R. § 710.21. The Individual requested a hearing,
and the LSO forwarded the Individual’s request to the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA).
The Director of OHA appointed me as Administrative Judge in this matter. At the hearing I
convened pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 710.25(d), (e), and (g), the Individual testified on her own behalf
and submitted seven exhibits, marked as Exhibits A through G.6 The DOE Counsel submitted five
exhibits marked as Exhibits 1 through 5.
II. Notification Letter
As indicated above, the Notification Letter informed the Individual that information in the
possession of the DOE created substantial doubt concerning her eligibility for a security clearance.
Guideline E
3 She testified that she “temporarily resided in a hotel [in State 2] for three months.” Tr. at 47.
4 The Individual stated that first occupied a hotel room for approximately one month upon her arrival in State 3. Tr. at
47–48. She then occupied a rental condominium through April 2016. Tr. at 48.
5 The aforementioned codes pertain to “False, Fictitious or Fraudulent Claim” and “Public Money, Property,
Records[,]” respectively. Ex. 4 at 4.
6 Counsel for the Individual submitted a brief and Exhibits A through F. The brief was marked Exhibit A and the
subsequent exhibits were renumbered B through G.
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Under Guideline E, “[c]onduct involving questionable judgement, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s
reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information.” Adjudicative
Guidelines at ¶ 15. Among those conditions set forth in the Adjudicative Guidelines that could
raise a disqualifying concern is
[c]redible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is not sufficient for
an adverse determination under any other single guideline, but which, when considered as
a whole, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness,
unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other
characteristics indicating that the individual may not properly safeguard classified or
sensitive information.
Id. at ¶ 16(c).
Under Guideline E, the LSO alleged that OIG report determined that, from July 2015 to February
2016, the Individual “signed, certified, and submitted false multiple expense vouchers for travel”
and “per diem as a subcontractor . . . while claiming permanent residence and duplicate expenses
from [State 1 to State 3].” Ex. 1 at 1. The LSO also alleged that the OIG report indicated that the
Individual admitted in March 2016 “that she falsely claimed permanent residence at her former
marital home . . . in [State 1], while on temporary duty travel (TDY), in order to receive duplicate
expenses and qualify for per diem she was not entitled to.” Id. The LSO’s invocation of Guideline
E is justified.
Guideline F
Guideline F provides that “[a]ffluence that cannot be explained by known sources of income is
also a security concern insofar as it may also result from criminal activity[.]” Adjudicative
Guidelines at ¶ 18. Among those conditions set forth in the Adjudicative Guidelines that could
raise a disqualifying security concern is “[u]nexplained affluence . . . that are inconsistent with
known legal sources of income[.]” Id. at ¶ 19(g).
Regarding Guideline F, the LSO realleged all of the above allegations, and also indicated that the
OIG report stated that the Individual “fraudulently received a total of $48,787.96” by the contractor
after “submitting multiple false vouchers for payment.” Ex. 1 at 2. The LSO’s invocation of
Guideline F is justified.
Guideline J
Guideline J states that “[c]riminal activity creates doubt about a person’s judgment, reliability, and
trustworthiness” and that, “[b]y its very nature, it calls into question a person’s ability or
willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations.” Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 30.
Conditions that could raise a security concern under Guideline J include “[e]vidence . . . of criminal
conduct, regardless of whether the individual was formally charged, prosecuted, or convicted[.]”
Id. at ¶ 31(b).
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Regarding the Guideline J concerns, the LSO realleged all of the aforementioned allegations made
under Guidelines E and F. Id. at 2. The LSO’s invocation of Guideline J is justified.
III. Regulatory Standards
A DOE administrative review proceeding under Part 710 requires me, as the Administrative Judge,
to issue a decision that reflects my comprehensive, common-sense judgment, made after
consideration of all the relevant evidence, favorable and unfavorable, as to whether the granting
or continuation of a person’s access authorization will not endanger the common defense and
security and is clearly consistent with the national interest. 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(a). The regulatory
standard implies that there is a presumption against granting or restoring a security clearance. See
Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988) (“clearly consistent with the national
interest” standard for granting security clearances indicates “that security determinations should
err, if they must, on the side of denials”); Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1990)
(strong presumption against the issuance of a security clearance).
The individual must come forward at the hearing with evidence to convince the DOE that granting
or restoring access authorization “will not endanger the common defense and security and will be
clearly consistent with the national interest.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.27(d). The individual is afforded a
full opportunity to present evidence supporting his eligibility for an access authorization. The Part
710 regulations are drafted so as to permit the introduction of a very broad range of evidence at
personnel security hearings. Even appropriate hearsay evidence may be admitted. Id. § 710.26(h).
Hence, an individual is afforded the utmost latitude in the presentation of evidence to mitigate the
security concerns at issue.
IV. Findings of Fact and Hearing Testimony
In July 2015, the Individual began employment with a second-line subcontractor in State 3. Ex. 4
at 4; Ex. G at 26. The OIG report states that at the time the Individual was employed with the
second-line subcontractor, she had indicated to the second-line subcontractor that her permanent
residence was the former marital home in State 1.7 Ex. 4 at 4; Ex. G at 1. Based on the residential
address provided, the Individual met “the eligibility requirements for non-local [TDY]
employees.” Ex. 4 at 4. Per the OIG report, the second-line subcontractor certified the Individual’s
residential information to the DOE contractor through the first-line subcontractor. Id. The OIG
report also states that the Individual would submit “signed expense vouchers and timesheets” to
the DOE contractor by email, who would then email those same items to points of contact with the
first-line and second-line subcontractors.8 Id. at 5. The first-line subcontractor would then be
7 In her April 2015 application for employment with this employer, the Individual listed the second address in State 1
as her residential address. Ex. G at 12, 17.
8
The Individual submitted copies of the expense vouchers she signed and provided to her employer. Ex. E at 1–33.
The forms indicate that when the employee signs his or her name, that person “[c]ertif[ies] this [document] to be a
true statement of expenses incurred on authorized company business[]” and that “[r]eceipts are attached as required.”
Id. These documents do not list the Individual’s residential address. Id. Further, there were no receipts attached to any
of the expense vouchers. Tr. at 29. However, the Individual also submitted airplane tickets and a travel itinerary
indicating that she traveled from State 3 to State 1 in February 2016. Ex. E at 40–49, 51–56. The Individual also
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responsible for “submit[ting] invoices for [the Individual’s] labor and per diem to [the DOE
contractor] for payment.” Id.
In December 2015, the Individual’s former spouse contacted the OIG Hotline to disclose his belief
that the Individual was claiming their former marital home in State 1 as her residence “to qualify
for travel expenses and per diem.”9 Id. at 4; Tr. at 54–55. The OIG report indicated that after the
Individual’s former spouse provided the Individual’s paystubs, which listed the former marital
home address, the Individual’s former spouse asserted that the Individual had left the former
marital home in State 1 in July 201410 and that he was awarded the home following their divorce
pursuant to an April 2015 court order. Ex. 4 at 4; Tr. at 19–20, 44, 55–56. The OIG report indicates
that following the receipt of this information, the second-line subcontractor “requested
documentation from [the Individual]”11 and following an examination of said documents, the
second-line subcontractor “determined [that the Individual] was not eligible to receive per diem
and notified her” in December 2015 “that she would no longer be reimbursed for those expenses.”12
Ex. 4 at 5. Per the OIG report, the Individual then provided her mother’s residence in State 4 as
her mailing address, and she did not notify the first-line subcontractor of the second-line
subcontractor’s determination that she did not qualify for the aforementioned expenses. Id. The
Individual “continued to submit expense vouchers until she resigned from her [position with the
second-line subcontractor] in February 2016[.]” Id. The Individual received approximately
$17,826.34. Id.
The Individual resigned from her position with the second-line subcontractor and took
employment with the DOE contractor in February 2016. Id. at 4; Ex. G at 6–7, 9–10. The OIG
report indicates that at this time, the Individual “signed relocation paperwork with [the DOE
contractor] that listed her permanent residential address as” the second address in State 1,
“allowing her to receive relocation expenses.” Ex. 4 at 4, 6. However, the Individual directed the
provided copies of the timesheets she submitted to the second-line contractor, dated July 2015 through February 2016.
Id.; Ex. D.
9 Regarding this fact, the Individual testified that her former spouse was controlling and abusive, and that he had told
her he was going to “bring [her] down and destroy [her.]” Tr. at 55, 86–89.
10 Per the QNSP and testimony, from August 2014 to April 2015, the Individual occupied a rental property in State 1.
Ex. 5 at 24–25; Tr. at 20, 46. She terminated that lease early to pursue employment in State 2. Tr. at 46.
11 In her testimony, the Individual denied that the second-line subcontractor made any such request. Tr. at 66.
12 The Individual confirmed in her testimony that she had been notified that she was ineligible for per diem, but that
she continued to be asked for said documents. Tr. at 67–69. The OIG report also states that the DOE contractor
“notified [the first-line subcontractor] via email in January 2016 [that] there were concerns regarding [the Individual’s
eligibility] for travel and per diem payments.” Ex. 4 at 5. The DOE contractor informed both subcontractors that the
Individual “could continue to receive reimbursement for her expenses until a final determination could be made
regarding her TDY status.” Id. However, “no final determination was made by [the DOE contractor].” Id. A copy of
January 2016 email submitted into the record by the Individual indicates that “there [were] concerns regarding
[whether the Individual was] eligible for Travel/Per Diem” reimbursement. Ex. E at 37, 54. A January 2015 email
indicates that the Individual could continue seeking reimbursement for her per diem costs “pending the final
determination[,]” and a February 2016 email states that the first-line subcontractor had “not yet paid [the Individual]
on any past (backlogged) per diem that was withheld.” Id. at 35–36, 52–53. The OIG report indicates that she reached
out to the second-line subcontractor and offered to rent an apartment in State 1 to continue receiving these benefits,
but the Individual testified that she could not remember making such an offer. Tr. at 70–80; Ex. 4 at 4.
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moving company to report to a different address, one that belonged to a storage facility. Id. at 6.
The OIG report indicates that the moving expenses cost approximately $30,961.62, which were
satisfied by the DOE contractor. Id. When asked about whether she had listed the second address
in State 1 in her relocation paperwork, the Individual testified that she could not recall, but
conceded only she could have been the source of that information and that she had kept some of
her belongings in a storage unit. Tr. at 63–64, 75–76. She denied knowing the address of the
storage facility, and stated that during the period at issue, her “life was all over the place, and [she]
was doing what [she] could each day to make decisions [that she] needed to live[.]” Id. at 64, 75–
76. She also conceded that she was living in State 3 at the time she submitted the relocation
paperwork and received the benefit. Id. at 64–65. She testified that she could not recall why she
gave the address of a storage facility. Id. at 76.
The OIG report indicates that when the Individual was confronted by the OIG investigator, she
admitted that she had left the former marital home in 2014, that she had left State 1 in 2015 to
pursue employment in State 2, and that she had been notified by the second-line subcontractor in
December 2015 that she was not eligible for per diem payments. Ex. 4 at 7. The OIG report made
several recommendations, including a referral of “the matter to [the LSO] for further evaluation of
[the Individual’s] clearance status.” Id.
In her testimony, the Individual indicated that during the time in question, she felt that her mother’s
address in State 4 was really her permanent residence, as she had proceeded to her mother’s home
following her departure from State 1, and further, this home was left to her and her mother
following her father’s passing.13 Tr. at 20–21, 27, 51–52, 61, 97–99. She also felt her mother’s
home was her permanent residence because she had experienced temporary living arrangements
after leaving State 1 to seek employment in States 2 and 3, and although she lived in a different
location, she had personal belongings in State 4. Id. at 20–23, 27, 46–47, 51–52, 61, 77–78, 89. In
later testimony, the Individual admitted that she had not resided in her mother’s home in State 4 at
any time after July 2014, and that she was not responsible for any of the bills in the household, but
that she would send money to her mother. Id. at 52, 72–73, 92. In her testimony, she stated that
had her employer “followed her instructions” and used her mother’s address, her paystubs would
not have been sent to her former marital home. Id. at 56–57. However, she also conceded that the
second-line subcontractor “could only have gotten” her former marital home address from her. Id.
at 58–59. She explained that when she was first hired, she “did not know how or what” she needed
to complete on her employment forms and recalled that although she had provided her mother’s
address to the person assisting her with the forms, that person also inspected her driver’s license,
which listed her former marital home as her address. Id. at 59–61, 66–67, 90.
13
The Individual did not list her mother’s address as a residence in her QNSP, because, as she testified, she was not
physically located in that home at the time. Ex. 5; Tr. at 99–101. She did, however, consider her mother’s home a
“permanent” address. Tr. at 99–101. In support of this assertion, the Individual submitted two envelopes into the
record from August 2015, indicating that the second-line contractor listed her address as the former marital home in
State 1, but that the United States Postal Service forwarded the mail to her mother’s address in State 4. Ex. G at 22.
The 2016 wage and tax statement submitted by the Individual into the record indicates that she listed her mother’s
residence in State 4 as her address. Id. at 2. However, a January 2016 offer of employment letter from the DOE
contractor lists the Individual’s address as an address in State 1. Id. at 6, 9. The Individual also submitted paperwork
indicating that she had rented a home in State 3 from July 2015 to April 2016, and she listed her mother’s residence
in State 4 as her billing address on said paperwork. Ex. F at 21–44. The Individual did not do any “contracting for the
[DOE] in [State 4].” Tr. at 27.
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The Individual testified at the hearing that she disagreed with the allegations in the SSC because,
although her former spouse remained in the former marital home pursuant to their settlement
agreement, he did not comply with the terms of the settlement in that he did not “immediately put
the home in his name[,]” resulting in him being held “in contempt of court[,]” and she further
stated that “he did not want to make several of the [mortgage] payments on [the] home.” Id. at 23–
24, 45–46, 49–50. The Individual stated that her name was still on the deed and mortgage, and she
remained responsible should her former spouse fail to satisfy his ongoing mortgage obligations,
even though she admitted that she never made a mortgage payment or paid a bill after she left the
home. Id. at 26, 50–51. She indicated that she felt the OIG investigator had already formulated
conclusions prior to the interview, and as a result, was “rough with the way she would ask [the
Individual] questions” and simply failed to listen to her. Id. at 24–26. She testified that she does
not remember telling the OIG investigator that she was still responsible for the mortgage of her
former marital home. Id. at 77.
The Individual testified that at the time she sought employment in State 2, she had never been
employed as a contractor, and as a result, she “had no clue what [she] was doing.” Id. at 28, 40.
Accordingly, she “had to rely and depend on others to direct [her] and lead [her] in the way that
policy and procedure should be.” Id. at 28, 96. She also denied being given a written copy or told
of the procedures or policies for claiming reimbursement for expenses and stated that she still
experiences confusion regarding the matter. Id. at 28, 35, 53, 55, 70–71, 91–92. She only found
herself responsible for completing the requisite forms and returning them to the appropriate person.
Id. at 28, 35–36. When asked whether she sought some explanation of protocol and policy for
filing such vouchers during the period in question, she testified that she “did not ask because it
was not in question[]” and that she “[did not] know to question it.” Id. at 96. The Individual stated
that she “thought [she] was doing everything right by how [she] was being led[]” by others. Id. at
96–97.
Regarding her financial history, she stated that there was debt in the marriage, and she took her
share of it upon divorce. Id. at 34. Further, although she stated that she never felt “overwhelmed
with . . . debt,” she did suffer a period of unemployment for three to four months but did have
money in savings that she used to cover expenses and received unemployment benefits. Id. at 34–
35, 39. She further indicated that her living expenses were “normal” and that she has never needed
to commit fraud, specifically denying any intent to defraud the government. Id. at 37–39. The
Individual also denied any restitution requests or further communication from prosecutors or
special agents. Id. at 37.
V. Analysis
It is ultimately the Individual’s burden to mitigate the concerns stated in the SSC, and I am
unconvinced that her behavior was unintentional, despite any assertions to the contrary. The
information before me indicates, among other things, that at various points in time, the Individual
listed her address on various documents in a manner inconsistent with what she reported in her
2018 QNSP. Based on her testimony, she understood what constituted a residential address in the
context of the QNSP, but in the context of receiving per diem funds, the concept of a residential
address seemed to be less clear to her. Id. at 99–101. Additionally, some of the evidence the
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Individual submitted seems inconsistent with her testimony. For example, the Individual testified
that she considered her mother’s address in State 4 to be her permanent residence throughout the
period at issue. However, she also submitted copies of plane tickets and a travel itinerary indicating
she was flying from State 3 to State 1 in February 2016, ostensibly to illustrate that she was a
resident of State 1. While the Individual stated that the conclusions in the OIG report were incorrect
because her former spouse failed to assume full responsibility of the home pursuant to their
agreement, and thus extending her responsibility regarding the home, this logic fails to take into
consideration that the purpose of receiving such funds is to cover the extra costs associated with
employment when one’s residence is located elsewhere. She did not incur such costs because she
was not traveling to and from or maintaining the former marital home at the time, as she was living
in State 3.
The Individual’s testimony is rife with statements indicating that she considered her mother’s
address to be her residential address during the period in question. This information does nothing
to mitigate the stated concerns before me. The only relevant portion of this testimony pertains to
whether this address was provided to the second-line employer at the start of her employment, as
she claims. Specifically, she seemingly provided this testimony to evade any responsibility as it
pertains to the question of why the second-line subcontractor had her former marital home as her
residential address. She testified that although she had provided her mother’s address to the person
who was assisting her with the employment documents, she also let him inspect her driver’s
license, which she claims bore the address of her former marital home. Id. at 59–61. Although she
testified that she “[could not] allude that [the former marital home] was the address that he put
down[,]” she was doing just that and placing the fault with a person who was not made available
for examination. I remain unconvinced by this version of events, especially when in an April 2015
application for permanent employment with the DOE contractor, she provided the second address
in State 1 as her residential address and her mother’s address is conspicuously missing from the
2018 QNSP. Ex. G at 11–15. The aforementioned facts, taken with the fact that the Individual was
notified by the second-line subcontractor that she was not eligible for such reimbursement in
December 2015, but continued claiming reimbursement until February 2016 regardless, strongly
indicates the Individual’s behavior was intentional. Lastly and importantly, the OIG report
indicates that once confronted by the investigator, the Individual “eventually admitted [that] she
did not have duplicate expenses in [State 1] even though she received reimbursement for living
costs and per diem.” Ex. 4 at 7
Further, regarding the matter of moving expenses, the Individual did not present any testimony or
evidence to refute the fact that she had been living in State 3 for approximately seven months at
the time she requested relocation funds, provided a former address in State 1 in her relocation
paperwork, and proceeded to give an entirely different address to the moving company. She stated
that she simply could not remember the address she provided to the second-line contractor and to
the moving company. While I understand that her life was in tumult at the time, I cannot make a
determination that the concern has been successfully mitigated because she could not remember.
The fact remains that the Individual was the only source of information to the second-line
contractor and the moving company, and no other person could have provided those addresses. I
have no compelling reason to deviate from the conclusion that she intentionally provided a
residential address in State 1 to receive relocation expenses, and that she instructed the moving
company to retrieve the items she had kept in a storage unit.
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I remain incredulous that the Individual signed forms to receive funds for alleged expenses without
first seeking any information regarding the correct manner in which to complete such a form, so
that she may ensure that the information she provided was accurate. The Individual indicated that
she relied on others employed with the second-line subcontractor to make decisions regarding
whether she was appropriately seeking these funds. At best, this was an act of willful ignorance,
especially because she was certifying that the information she was submitting was accurate. Ex. E
at 67–81. Finally, while I can understand that the information that led to the OIG investigation
could have come from a source hostile to the Individual, this does not negate the fact that OIG
conducted an investigation and what resulted was a report indicating that the Individual had
actively engaged in the alleged behavior.
a. Guideline E
The Adjudicative Guidelines provide that conditions that could mitigate security concerns under
Guideline E include:
(a) The individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission,
concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts;
(b) The refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was caused or
significantly contributed to by advice of legal counsel or of a person with
professional responsibilities for advising or instructing the individual specifically
concerning security processes. Upon being made aware of the requirement to
cooperate or provide the information, the individual cooperated fully and truthfully;
(c) The offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so
infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to
recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good
judgment;
(d) The individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change
the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances,
or factors that contributed to untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate
behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur;
(e) The individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to
exploitation, manipulation, or duress;
(f) The information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable reliability;
and,
(g) Association with persons involved in criminal activities was unwitting, has ceased,
or occurs under circumstances that do not cast doubt upon the individual's
reliability, trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness to comply with rules and
regulations
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Id. at ¶ 17.
The allegations contained in the SSC pertain to conclusions reached following an investigation
and do not pertain to any information that was omitted, concealed, or falsified during the clearance
process. At any rate, I do not have any information before me indicating that the Individual
disclosed any omitted, falsified, or concealed information prior to being confronted with it or that
the alleged behavior was the result of receiving advice from an attorney or similar professional.
Accordingly, the mitigating factors at (a) and (b) are not applicable in this case.
When considering the Individual improperly benefitted in an amount over $48,000, I cannot
conclude that the behavior was minor. Further, as the Individual repeatedly filed false information
in forms over the span of approximately seven months during the course of her regular
employment, I cannot conclude that that the behavior was infrequent or occurred under unique
circumstances. These events took place less than ten years ago, which is not so far removed in the
past considering the fact that the Individual refuses to accept responsibility for her actions means
that her judgement and reliability remain impaired, and accordingly, the lack of any personal
development strongly suggests that this sort of behavior may recur. Accordingly, the Individual
has not satisfied the mitigating condition at (c).
The record is bereft of any indication that the Individual has acknowledged her behavior and
sought counseling or taken any steps to alleviate the factors that resulted in her inappropriate
behavior. Accordingly, the mitigating factor at (d) is not applicable.
The mitigating factor at (e) is not relevant in this matter, as the LSO did not allege that the
Individual engaged in conduct that made her susceptible to manipulation, exploitation, or duress.
I also cannot conclude that the information that resulted in the security concerns came from an
unsubstantiated source or one of questionable reliability, as the concerns were the result of an OIG
investigation, and accordingly, the mitigating factor at (f) does not apply. Lastly, as there is no
allegation before me that indicates the Individual was associated with persons involved in criminal
activities, the mitigating factor at (g) is not applicable.
b. Guideline F
The Adjudicative Guidelines provide that conditions that could mitigate security concerns under
Guideline F include:
a) The behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such
circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's current
reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
b) The conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person’s
control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, a
death, divorce or separation, clear victimization by predatory lending practices, or identity
theft), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances;
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c) The individual has received or is receiving financial counseling for the problem from a
legitimate and credible source, such as a non-profit credit counseling service, and there are
clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control;
d) The individual initiated and is adhering to a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or
otherwise resolve debts;
e) The individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy of the past-due debt which
is the cause of the problem and provides documented proof to substantiate the basis of the
dispute or provides evidence of actions to resolve the issue;
f) The affluence resulted from a legal source of income; and
g) The individual has made arrangements with the appropriate tax authority to file or pay the
amount owed and is in compliance with those arrangements.
Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 20.
On balance, for the following reasons and the reasons stated above, the evidence strongly indicates
that the Individual knowingly received per diem costs and moving expenses to which she was not
entitled, and that she received these funds through misrepresentations made to her employer to
gain a financial benefit.
As previously stated, I cannot conclude that this behavior was infrequent and occurred under
unique circumstances. Further, as stated above, considering the Individual persists in denying any
wrongdoing after receiving the ill-gotten financial windfall leads me to the conclusion that her the
lack of judgment and untrustworthiness persists to this day. Accordingly, regardless of when the
Individual discontinued employment with the second-line subcontractor, the behavior was not so
long ago. The Individual has not mitigated the stated concerns pursuant to mitigating factor (a).
Although the Individual testified to the financial difficulties she experienced, she did not put forth
any evidence indicating that they were beyond her control or that she acted responsibly despite
them. The Individual also denied receiving any financial counseling. The factors at (b) and (c) do
not apply to this case.
In terms of whether the income came from a legal source, on balance, the evidence indicates that
the $48,787.96 the Individual received was very likely obtained in the manner indicated in the OIG
report, in that the Individual inappropriately claimed permanent residence and duplicate expenses
in State 1 and inappropriately requested relocation expenses. Accordingly, I cannot conclude that
the Individual mitigated the stated concerns pursuant to mitigating factor (f).
As the LSO did not allege that the Individual had any past due debt or tax obligation, the mitigating
factors at (d), (e), and (g) are not applicable.
c. Guideline J
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The Adjudicative Guidelines provide that conditions that could mitigate security concerns under
Guideline J include:
(a) So much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior happened, or it happened under
such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the
individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b) The individual was pressured or coerced into committing the act and those pressures are
no longer present in the person’s life;
(c) No reliable evidence to support that the individual committed the offense; and
(d) There is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including, but not limited to, the passage of
time without recurrence of criminal activity, restitution, compliance with the terms of
parole or probation, job training or higher education, good employment record, or
constructive community involvement.
Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 32.
To begin, there is no need to have any evidence of arrests, charges, or prosecutions for concerns
to be raised under Guideline J. I have before me an OIG report that concluded that the Individual
fraudulently collected approximately $48,000 in funds to which she was not entitled. The report
also contained an admission from the Individual. Although the Individual submitted ample
evidence, the main thrust of the entirety of the evidence she presented was that her behavior was
unintentional, and therefore, not criminal and dishonest. But for all the reasons stated previously,
the evidence strongly indicates that the Individual knew she was not entitled to the money, but
continued to claim the funds even after she was told she was not entitled to the money.
As stated above, the Individual benefitted in an amount exceeding $48,000 through her behavior
and she repeatedly filed for reimbursement over the course of seven months during the time she
was employed with the second-line contractor. The alleged actions, for which the Individual has
not taken any responsibility or paid any restitution, took place less than ten years ago. Again, as
indicated above, because the Individual continues to deny responsibility and because the behavior
took place in the context of her routine employment, I cannot conclude that the criminal behavior
occurred so long ago or happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or
does not cast doubt on the Individual’s trustworthiness, reliability, or good judgment pursuant to
mitigating factor (a). As I have no information before me suggesting that the Individual was
coerced or pressured into claiming these funds, the mitigating factor at (b) is not applicable in this
case.
While the Individual denied that her conduct was intentional and she frequently stated that she
could not remember the facts and circumstances surrounding many details regarding the matter, I
cannot conclude that there is no reliable evidence to support the determination that the Individual
committed the stated offenses. As an initial matter, the Individual admitted in her testimony that
her employer had the wrong residential address for the term of her employment, and it is
undisputed that she repeatedly filed the necessary documents to receive reimbursement for the
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alleged expenses. Importantly, the OIG conducted an investigation and issued a report indicating
that the Individual had “signed, certified, and submitted multiple expense vouchers for travel and
approximately seven months of per diem as a subcontractor while claiming permanent residence
and duplicate expenses in [State 1].” Ex. 4 at 3. The OIG also concluded that the Individual
“request[ed] relocation expenses from [State 1] to [State 3,]” resulting in the Individual “being
paid [approximately] $48,787.96.” Id. I find it highly implausible that the Individual took these
actions without knowledge that they were unauthorized, and if she did her recklessness in claiming
tens of thousands of dollars without basic knowledge of the requirements for claiming these sums
cast substantial doubt on her judgment and reliability. Therefore, I cannot conclude that the
Individual mitigated the stated concerns pursuant to the mitigating factor at (c).
I also cannot conclude that the mitigating factor at (d) is applicable in this case. Successful
rehabilitation requires a person to take ownership of his or her conduct. Again, the Individual
consistently blamed her actions on other individuals. There is no evidence before me that indicates
the Individual has paid restitution, that she has committed herself to community involvement, or
that she has endeavored upon any higher education. Further, I do not have any evidence of good
work performance.
VI. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, I conclude that the LSO properly invoked Guidelines E, F, and J
of the Adjudicative Guidelines. After considering all the evidence, both favorable and unfavorable,
in a comprehensive, common-sense manner, including weighing all the testimony and other
evidence presented at the hearing, I find that the Individual has not brought forth sufficient
evidence to resolve the security concerns set forth in the Notification Letter. Accordingly, the
Individual has not demonstrated that restoring her security clearance would not endanger the
common defense and security and would be clearly consistent with the national interest. Therefore,
I find that the Individual’s access authorization should not be restored. This Decision may be
appealed in accordance with the procedures set forth at 10 C.F.R. § 710.28.
Noorassa A. Rahimzadeh
Administrative Judge
Office of Hearings and Appeals