PSH-25-0011

*The original of this document contains information which is subject to withholding from disclosure
under 5 U.S. C. § 552. Such material has been deleted from this copy and replaced with XXXXXX’s.
United States Department of Energy
Office of Hearings and Appeals
In the Matter of: Personnel Security Hearing )
)
Filing Date: October 16, 2024 ) Case No.: PSH-25-0011
)
______________________________________)
Issued: December 26, 2024
__________________________
Administrative Judge Decision
__________________________
Katie Quintana, Administrative Judge:
This Decision concerns the eligibility of XXXXXXXXXXXXX (hereinafter referred to as “the
Individual”) to hold an access authorization under the United States Department of Energy’s
(DOE) regulations, as set forth at 10 C.F.R. Part 710, “Procedures for Determining Eligibility for
Access to Classified Matter and Special Nuclear Material.”1 As discussed below, after carefully
considering the record before me in light of the relevant regulations and the National Security
Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or
Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position (June 8, 2017) (Adjudicative Guidelines), I conclude that
the Individual’s access authorization should not be granted.
I. Background and Findings of Fact
The Individual is seeking employment with a DOE contractor in a position that requires him to
hold a security clearance. In December 2021, the Individual completed a Questionnaire for
National Security Positions (QNSP). Exhibit (Ex.) 4. In the QNSP, the Individual disclosed that
his mother was a citizen of a DOE-sensitive country (Country A). Id. at 50.2 The Individual did
1 The regulations define access authorization as “an administrative determination that an individual is eligible for
access to classified matter or is eligible for access to, or control over, special nuclear material.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.5(a).
This Decision will refer to such authorization as access authorization or security clearance.
2 The DOE’s exhibits were combined and submitted in a single, 190-page PDF workbook. Many of the exhibits are
marked with page numbering that is inconsistent with their location in the combined workbook. This Decision will
cite to the DOE’s exhibits by reference to the exhibit and page number within the combined workbook regardless of
any internal pagination.
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not report any foreign contacts,3 travel to the Bahamas in 2018 or Canada in 2019,4 any visa
sponsorship,5 previously possessing a foreign passport and/or visa,6 or having any delinquent
debts.7 See id. at 33–61. Upon performing a background investigation, DOE found that the
Individual failed to report twelve debts that were delinquent for more than 120 days. Id. at 76–77.
On January 6, 2022, the Individual underwent an enhanced subject interview (ESI). Id. at 71.
During the ESI, the Individual was asked to provide an investigator with his U.S. passport, which
showed that he had been issued two visas from a foreign country (Country B) and that he had
traveled to that country in July 2018 and May 2021 under those visas.8 Id. at 71. He additionally
stated that he had previously been issued a passport9 from Country B and reported the first names
of two citizens/residents of Country B (Foreign Contacts 1 and 2), both tour guides he met in July
2018.10 Id. at 71, 75. The Individual stated that he communicated with Foreign Contacts 1 and 2
approximately twice per year. Id. at 75. The Individual also disclosed for the first time that between
September 2012 and December 2014, he attended a college (College A); he additionally disclosed
that between 2018 and 2019, he traveled both to Canada (two trips, each lasting three days) and
the Bahamas (one night during a five-day cruise) with his girlfriend (Girlfriend), a U.S. citizen.11
Id. at 73, 75. Furthermore, after being confronted with evidence of twelve delinquent debts in his
3 The QNSP asked:
Do you have, or have you had, close and/or continuing contact with a foreign national within the
last seven (7) years with whom you, or your spouse, or legally recognized civil union/domestic
partner, or cohabitant are bound by affection, influence, common interests, and/or obligation?
Include associates as well as relatives, not previously listed in Section 18.
Ex. 4 at 51 (emphasis in original).
4 The QNSP asked: “Have you traveled outside the U.S. in the last seven (7) years?” Ex. 4 at 54 (emphasis in original).
5 The QNSP asked: “Have you in the last seven (7) years sponsored any foreign national to come to the U.S. as a
student, for work, or for permanent residence?” Ex. 4 at 53 (emphasis in original).
6 The QNSP asked: “Have you EVER been issued a passport (or identity card for travel) by a country other than the
U.S.?” Ex. 4 at 33.
7 The QNSP asked the Individual to report if he was “currently over 120 days delinquent on any debt.” Ex. 4 at 61.
8 In his December 2021 QNSP, the Individual answered “no” when asked if he had ever been issued an “identity card
for travel” by a foreign country. Ex. 4 at 33. The Individual also failed to report his travel to Country B in the “Foreign
Travel” section. Id. at 54–55.
9 The Individual was unsure of the date of issuance/expiration of his passport issued by Country B as he surrendered
it at the time he became a U.S. citizen in 2015. Ex. 4 at 71–72.
10 In his December 2021 QNSP, the Individual answered “no” when asked if he had ever been issued a foreign passport
or had any “foreign contacts.” Ex. 4 at 33, 51.
11 The Individual failed to report his attendance at College A and his two international trips to Canada and the Bahamas
as required in his December 2021 QNSP. See Ex. 4 at 38–39, 54–55.
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name, the Individual accepted responsibility for each one.12 Id. at 76–77. On January 11, 2022, the
Individual underwent a second ESI and provided additional information regarding Foreign
Contacts 1 and 2, including their full names. Id. at 79.
As the background investigation continued, DOE found that the Individual additionally failed to
report his current job (Employment 1), which he had held since November 2021, as well as his
employment from November to December 2017 (Employment 2). Id. at 97–98. DOE then asked
the Individual to complete a Letter of Interrogatory (LOI) in June 2022. Ex. 5. In the LOI, the
Individual provided further information regarding the omitted employments and also represented
that he did not have “close and/or continuing contact” with any foreign nationals, other than those
already reported, within the last seven years. Id. at 118–19.
At some point subsequent to the Individual’s completion of the June 2022 LOI, the DOE Office
of Counterintelligence (CI) uncovered information which led it to believe that the Individual “ha[d]
a foreign national wife (Wife) he did not report.”13 Ex. 6 at 121. DOE then issued a second LOI to
the Individual in October 2023. Ex. 7. In the second LOI, the Individual confirmed that he married
a citizen of Country B in July 2022 but asserted that he previously omitted his relationship with
the Wife from the QNSP and LOI because he “did not frequently interact with her.”14 Id. at 127–
28. He further stated that his “father reached out to her family in [Country B] for marriage[,]” and
he has contact with her approximately every two months “when [he] travel[s] to [his] parents’
home . . . .” Id. at 127. The Individual also provided over forty additional foreign contacts from
Country B that “ha[d] contacted [him] on [a telecommunications app].”15 Ex. 7 at 130–31.
DOE asked the Individual to complete a third LOI, which he signed and submitted in January
2024. Ex. 8. In the LOI, the Individual provided additional information regarding the Wife,
including that he sponsored her for a U.S. visa, which was issued in January 2022. Id. at 136. He
also stated that he and the Wife did not live together as he did not “live alone which would add to
the tense environment.” 16 Id. The Individual also denied knowing anyone by the exact first and
12 The Individual represented that the delinquent debts were student loan payments that were currently “paused due to
Covid.” Ex. 4 at 77. The Individual stated that he would begin paying approximately $200 per month towards these
debts staring in May 2022. Id.
13 In an October 2023 internal email communication, a CI analyst stated that the Individual was listed as the fiancé of
a foreign national from Country B on a K-1 visa application, which was issued on January 27, 2022. Ex. 6 at 121.
14 The Wife is not the person that he identified in the ESI as the Girlfriend and the person with whom he traveled to
Canada and the Bahamas. Ex. 4 at 75. One source, interviewed as part of the Individual’s background investigation,
indicated that, as of January 2022, the Individual “spends social time with [the Girlfriend].” See Ex. 4 at 87.
15 The Individual indicated that he knew fifteen of the foreign national contacts listed, seven of whom he identified as
cousins. Ex. 7 at 130–31. The remainder of the contacts were simply phone numbers that the Individual stated were
“unknown.” Id.
16 At the hearing, the Individual clarified that he lived with the Girlfriend in a “weird on-and-off.” Transcript of
Hearing, OHA Case No. PSH-25-0011 (Tr.) at 22–23.
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last name that he had previously provided for Foreign Contact 1.17 Ex. 8 at 137; Ex. 4 at 79. The
Individual additionally listed Foreign Contact 2 as his cousin and stated that he first met him in
July 2020.18 Ex. 8 at 162.
As questions remained, DOE asked the Individual to complete a fourth LOI in May 2024. Ex. 9.
In the LOI, the Individual clarified that the Wife “lives with [his] parents[,]” and he “do[es] not
intend to live with her.” Id. at 188. The Individual also stated that he communicates with the Wife
via text message “a few times weekly.” Id. at 189.
Due to unresolved security concerns, the Local Security Office (LSO) informed the Individual in
a Notification Letter that it possessed reliable information that created substantial doubt regarding
his eligibility to hold a security clearance. Ex. 1. In the Summary of Security Concerns (SSC)
attached to the Notification Letter, the LSO explained that the derogatory information raised
security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline E (Personal Conduct) of
the Adjudicative Guidelines. Ex. 2.
Upon receipt of the Notification Letter, the Individual exercised his right under the Part 710
regulations to request an administrative review hearing. Ex. 3. The Director of the Office of
Hearings and Appeals (OHA) appointed me the Administrative Judge in the case, and I
subsequently conducted an administrative hearing in the matter. At the hearing, the DOE Counsel
submitted nine numbered exhibits (Ex. 1–9) into the record. The Individual declined to submit any
exhibits, but he presented his own testimony.
II. Regulatory Standard
A DOE administrative review proceeding under Part 710 requires me, as the Administrative Judge,
to issue a Decision that reflects my comprehensive, common-sense judgment, made after
consideration of all the relevant evidence, favorable and unfavorable, as to whether the granting
or continuation of a person’s access authorization will not endanger the common defense and
security and is clearly consistent with the national interest. 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(a). The regulatory
standard implies that there is a presumption against granting or restoring a security
clearance. See Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988) (“clearly consistent with
the national interest” standard for granting security clearances indicates “that security
determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials”); Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d
1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1990) (strong presumption against the issuance of a security clearance).
The individual must come forward at the hearing with evidence to convince the DOE that granting
or restoring access authorization “will not endanger the common defense and security and will be
clearly consistent with the national interest.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.27(d). The individual is afforded a
17 The Individual, however, did list a foreign contact with a similar name as the name he originally provided for
Foreign Contact 1, but indicated that he did not meet the similarly named individual until May 2021. Ex. 8 at 139,
166. The Individual had previously reported that he met Foreign Contact 1 in July 2018. Ex. 4 at 75.
18 In the January 6, 2022, ESI, the Individual reported that he first met Foreign Contact 2 in July 2018, and the
Individual did not identify him as a cousin. Ex. 4 at 75.
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full opportunity to present evidence supporting his eligibility for an access authorization. The
Part 710 regulations are drafted to permit the introduction of a very broad range of evidence at
personnel security hearings. Even appropriate hearsay evidence may be admitted. Id. § 710.26(h).
Hence, an individual is afforded the utmost latitude in the presentation of evidence to mitigate the
security concerns at issue.
III. Notification Letter and Associated Security Concerns
As previously mentioned, the Notification Letter included the SSC, which sets forth the derogatory
information that raised concerns about the Individual’s eligibility for access authorization. The
SSC specifically cites Guideline B and Guideline E of the Adjudicative Guidelines. Ex. 1.
Guideline B relates to security risks arising from foreign contacts and interests.
Foreign contacts and interests . . . are a national security concern if they result in
divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create
circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a
foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S.
interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign
interest.
Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 6.
In raising Guideline B, the LSO first alleged that the Individual’s connections to foreign nationals
create a potential conflict of interest and “a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement,
manipulation, pressure, or coercion.” Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 7(a); Ex. 2 at 4 (quoting ¶ 7(a)
of the Adjudicative Guidelines). The LSO cited the following as support:
(1) The Individual was born in Country B, sponsored a citizen of Country B for a K-1 Fiancée
Visa, and married the Wife in July 2022. The Individual “does not, and has never lived
with his spouse, and does not know his spouse’s parents, family, or friends.” He
additionally stated that he “doesn’t live alone, which would add to a ‘tense’ environment
if the Wife to were to live with him.”
(2) The Individual’s mother is a citizen of Country A, a DOE-sensitive country.19
Ex. 2 at 4.
Under Guideline B, the LSO next alleged that the Individual “failed to report or fully disclose his
association with a country, persons, and governments.” Id. at 5 (invoking ¶ 7(c) of the Adjudicative
Guidelines). The LSO cited the following as support:
19 I cannot find that having a foreign national familial relation from a DOE sensitive country is a sufficient basis in
and of itself, to raise a security concern pursuant to Guideline B. The SSC does not explain how the Individual’s
contact with a familial relation from a DOE sensitive country “create[s] a heightened risk of foreign exploitation,
inducement, manipulation, pressure or coercion.” Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 7(a). As such, I cannot find that this
allegation was properly raised by the LSO, and I will not analyze it herein.
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(1) The Individual married the Wife who is a citizen from Country B in 2022 and sponsored
her for a U.S. K-1 visa. The Individual failed to disclose the Wife as a foreign contact and
failed to disclose the visa sponsorship in his December 2021 QNSP and during the January
2022 ESIs.
(2) The Individual was issued a passport by Country B in approximately 2002 and issued two
visas by Country B between 2018 and late 2021. The Individual failed to report this
information on the December 2021 QNSP.
(3) On the December 2021 QNSP, the Individual failed to list any foreign contacts. He later
admitted to having contact with eighteen other foreign national friends/relatives in addition
to the Wife. The Individual also provided contact information via a telecommunications
app for twenty additional nameless foreign contacts and acquaintances.
(4) The Individual failed to disclose foreign travel with the Girlfriend to Canada and the
Bahamas between early 2018 and late 2019.20
Id. at 5–6.
Under Guideline B, the LSO additionally alleged that “[c]ounterintelligence information . . .
indicates [the Individual’s access authorization] may involve [] unacceptable risk to national
security.” Id. at 6 (quoting ¶ 7(d) of the Adjudicative Guidelines). In support, the LSO again
asserted that the Individual is married to a citizen of Country B who he does not intend to live
with. Id.
Guideline E addresses conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or an
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations. Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 15. Such conduct
“can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect
classified or sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure to cooperate or provide truthful
and candid answers during national security investigative or adjudicative processes.” Id. In raising
Guideline E, the LSO alleged that the Individual “provid[ed] false or misleading information; or
. . . omit[ed] information” on his personnel security questionnaire and to an investigator and
security official involved in making a recommendation relevant to a national security
determination. Id. at ¶ 16(a), (b); Ex. 2 at 7–8 (summarizing ¶ 16(a) and ¶ 16(b) of the Adjudicative
Guidelines.) The LSO cited the following as support:
(1) The Individual omitted the following information from his December 2021 QNSP:
a) A foreign passport issued by Country B,
b) Two visas issued by Country B,
20 I cannot find that failing to disclose foreign travel to Cananda and the Bahamas fails within the purview of Guideline
B. The SSC does not make clear how mere travel to a foreign country is akin to “association with a foreign . . . group,
government or country” pursuant to paragraph 7(c). As such, I cannot find that this allegation was properly raised by
the LSO under Guideline B, and I will not analyze it herein.
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c) Education at College A,
d) Employment 1 from October 2021 to present,
e) Employment 2 from November to December 2017,
f) Over forty foreign contacts,
g) Sponsorship of a foreign national for a K-1 visa,
h) Foreign travel to the Bahamas in 2018 and Canada in 2019, and
i) Twelve financial accounts that had been delinquent for at least 120 days in the last
seven years.
(2) During the January 6, 2022, ESI, the Individual volunteered only two foreign national
contacts. The Individual later disclosed over forty foreign national contacts, including the
Wife.
(3) Despite disclosing Foreign Contact 1 during the January 6, 2022, ESI, the Individual later
denied knowledge of a contact by that name in his January 2024 LOI Response.
(4) During the January 6, 2022, ESI, the Individual stated he met Foreign Contact 2, a tour
guide, in 2018 while in Country B. In his January 2024 LOI Response, the Individual then
stated that Foreign Contact 2 was a cousin who he first met in July 2020.
Finally, the LSO alleged that “[t]he fact that [the Individual] has a girlfriend who is a U.S. Citizen,
and a foreign national spouse who he sponsored for permanent residency, yet lives separately from,
calls into question whether his marriage is bona fide.”
Ex. 2 at 7–8.
IV. Hearing Testimony
At the hearing, the Individual testified on his own behalf. The Individual confirmed that he
sponsored the K-1 visa for his then-fiancée, now-Wife, a citizen of Country B, to enter the United
States.21 Tr. at 19–20. The Individual acknowledged that he inaccurately answered “No” on the
QNSP when asked if he had sponsored any foreign national to come to the United States within
the previous seven years. Id. at 28, 49. He testified that he believed that he didn’t have to disclose
the visa sponsorship because the K-1 visa paperwork is “a record that the government has.” Id. at
60. The Individual further testified that he did not report the Wife as a foreign contact at the time
of the January 6, 2022, ESI because “most of the [visa sponsorship work] was being done through
a lawyer, so it was very difficult for [him] to recall a lot of that.” Id. at 29. Additionally, he stated
that at the time of the QNSP and January 2022 ESIs, he “didn’t really speak with [the Wife]
frequently,” so he didn’t think of her as a foreign contact. Id. at 33. When asked if he could see
how his then-fiancé could be also considered a foreign contact that he was required to report on
21 The Individual testified that the visa sponsorship was “an event that [he] ha[s] not kept track of,” so he was unsure
of the exact dates he completed the visa application or when the Wife entered the country. Tr. at 20. He initially
testified that the Wife entered the United States in 2019. Id. at 19. However, he also stated that he completed the K-1
visa paperwork sometime in 2021 and that the Wife did not enter the United States until after the issuance of the visa.
Id. at 20. The Individual later acknowledged that the Wife’s visa was issued on January 27, 2022. Id. at 30.
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the QNSP, the Individual acknowledged that he “do[es] see that.” Id. at 27. He later testified that
this omission was likely caused by him “rushing the paperwork to start working.” Id. at 60. The
Individual also acknowledged that he did not disclose the existence of the Wife as a foreign contact
in the June 2022 LOI and only conceded that he had been married22 after DOE confronted him
with that fact in October 2023. Id. at 31–33.
The Individual stated that at the time he completed the December 2021 QNSP, he lived with the
Girlfriend; however, he indicated this was a “complicated” relationship. Id. at 22–23. He testified
that his relationship with the Girlfriend continued until October 2024, at which point he purchased
a home to live in with the Wife. Id. at 57. He stated that the Wife, who had been living with his
parents since she arrived in the United States, moved in with him in November 2024. Id. at 24, 53.
The Individual also testified that he and the Wife had a daughter in February 2024. Id. at 24.
The Individual stated that prior to the Wife’s moving in with him, they talked “a few times in a
week,” and he would visit her in-person “twice a month.” Id. at 24, 58. The Individual stated that
he initially did not intend to live with the Wife because it “felt overwhelming at the time[,]” but
“that is not the case now.”23 Id. at 25. He explained that his father arranged the marriage, and the
Individual “wasn’t content with the way things were done.” Id. at 51–52. He stated that his
marriage was “not necessarily something [he] wanted to do.” Id. at 61. However, he stated that he
and the Wife now have a child together, “so there’s reality to life about that.” Id. at 52. The
Individual additionally testified that the Wife was aware that he was living with the Girlfriend at
the time they married, which “added to the . . . tension of [him] not wanting to” live with the Wife
initially. Id. at 59.
Regarding Foreign Contacts 1 and 2, the Individual testified that he did not disclose them on the
QNSP because he does not “frequently speak with or communicate with” and “didn’t think of them
as [] foreign contact[s].”24 Id. at 35. He stated that he reported them during the January 6, 2022,
ESI “just to be on the safe side.” Id. at 35. When asking about providing the first and last name of
Foreign Contact 1 during the January 2022 ESI, the Individual testified that he did not provide
DOE with that name. Id. at 63. He denied knowing anyone by that name. Id. He also stated that
the similarly named contact that he disclosed in the November 2023 and January 2024 LOIs was
22 The Individual initially testified that he and the Wife were married in April 2022, but later acknowledged that the
marriage occurred in June 2022. Id. at 18, 58.
23 The Individual later testified that he did not live with the Wife initially because of “religious reasons,” which
included a strict number of prayers per day that he “d[idn’t] want to [be] harassed by.” Tr. at 59.
24 The Individual testified that Foreign Contacts 1 and 2 “helped [him] and [his] family . . . navigate [Country B]”
when he traveled there in 2018. Tr. at 37. He also stated that although he listed Foreign Contact 2 as his cousin on the
January 2024 LOI, he was “not even sure [that] he’s really [his] cousin.” Id. at 41. He indicated that “if [someone is]
really close to [his] family, [they] just consider them as a cousin.” Id. He further clarified that Foreign Contact 2 is
“close to [his] family [in Country B][,]” but he does not “frequently contact [him] or talk to [him].” Id. at 42.
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not Foreign Contact 1, but rather, Foreign Contact 1 was likely a different person on that list.25 Id.
at 63–64.
The Individual explained that he listed over forty foreign contacts on the November 2023 and
January 2024 LOIs because he was confused as to “what was meant by ‘foreign contact,’ so [he]
just decided to go on the safe side and [] go through [his] list of . . . anyone who’s ever contacted
[him]” from a foreign country on the telecommunications app.26 Id. at 38. The Individual testified
that he “d[idn’t] even know” most of the contacts that he listed. Id. For those contacts that the
Individual indicated were cousins, he stated that his father provided him with that information.27
Id. at 39. He explained that because many of the contacts spoke a different language than he did,
it was “very difficult for [him] to talk back with them” and he would often ignore the messages.28
Id. at 40. The Individual stated that there was only one contact on the list that he provided, a cousin,
with whom he had recently communicated. Id. The Individual indicated that he was not aware of
any of the listed contacts being associated with a foreign government. Id. at 53.
The Individual acknowledged that he was issued a foreign passport from Country B in 2002, but
answered “No” on the QNSP when asked if he had ever been issued a foreign passport. Id. at 44–
45. He explained that the omission was likely caused by his “rush[ed]” completion of the QNSP.
Id. at 45. Regarding his omission of his attendance at College A from the QNSP, the Individual
stated that there “was no particular reason why” he omitted this information, but indicated that he
may have of thought he was only required to list schools that he graduated from, and he only
attended College A “for a brief time” before transferring to a different school.29 Id. at 46–47. The
Individual further testified that he did not list Employment 1 on the QNSP because that job is part-
time, and he thought his “main job was more of a priority.” Id. at 48. He additionally explained
that he also omitted Employment 2 because he “w[as] there for maybe five days” and “forgot that
[he] had [] work[ed] there.” Id.
Regarding the twelve delinquent debts that he failed to report on the QNSP, the Individual stated
that he ran a credit check “right before” completing the QNSP, so he was aware those accounts
25 At the hearing, the Individual identified the person on the list of foreign contacts who he believed was the individual
that he originally identified as Foreign Contact 1. Tr. at 63. The Individual’s description of this person in the January
2024 LOI matches that of the person he originally identified as Foreign Contact 1 in the January 6, 2022, ESI. See Ex.
4 at 75; Ex. 8 at 144.
26 The Individual testified that he “tried multiple times to reach out to [an LSO representative] to essentially define
‘foreign contact.’” Tr. at 26. He stated that he decided to submit the list of over forty contacts after “[the LSO] reached
back out.” Id. The Individual, however, did not submit any proof of those communications into the record. The
Individual noted that he “still do[esn’t] understand what is meant by ‘foreign contact.’” Id. at 36.
27 The Individual testified that many of the contacts would message him because his father would provide them with
his phone number. Tr. at 40.
28 The Individual testified that he would often ignore the messages “because they may ask [him] for money.” Tr. at
40. The Individual later clarified that although none of the contacts have directly asked for money, he “assume[s] that
[they might ask him for money] because they [] ask [his] dad for money.” Id. at 66.
29 The record reflects that the Individual attended College A for over two years. Ex. 4 at 73.
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were considered delinquent at that time. Id. at 62. He further testified that “[t]here was an error in
reporting” the delinquent accounts, and after filing a dispute with the relevant credit bureau, the
delinquent accounts were removed from his record. Id. at 50–51. The Individual also
acknowledged that he failed to disclose his foreign travel to the Bahamas and Canada in the
QNSP.30 Tr. at 23.
V. Analysis
I have thoroughly considered the record of this proceeding, including the submissions tendered in
this case and the testimony of the witnesses during the hearing. In resolving the question of the
Individual’s eligibility for access authorization, I have been guided by the applicable factors
prescribed in 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(c) and the Adjudicative Guidelines. After due deliberation, I have
determined that the Individual has not mitigated the security concerns cited by the LSO under
Guideline B and Guideline E of the Adjudicative Guidelines. Therefore, I find that the Individual’s
access authorization should not be granted. The specific findings that I make in support of this
decision are discussed below.
A. Guideline E
Conditions that may mitigate a Guideline E security concern include:
a) The individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission,
concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts;
b) The refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was caused or
significantly contributed to by advice of legal counsel or of a person with
professional responsibilities for advising or instructing the individual specifically
concerning security processes. Upon being made aware of the requirement to
cooperate or provide the information, the individual cooperated fully and truthfully;
c) The offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so
infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to
recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or
good judgment;
d) The individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change
the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances,
or factors that contributed to untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate
behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur;
e) The individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to
exploitation, manipulation, or duress;
30 Regarding his travel to the Bahamas, the Individual testified that it “was on a cruise[,] [so he] didn’t really think
too much of that.” Tr. at 23. Regarding his travel to Canada, the Individual stated that he also “didn’t really consider
that any significance.” Id. at 23–24.
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f) The information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable reliability;
and,
g) Association with persons involved in criminal activities was unwitting, has ceased,
or occurs under circumstances that do not cast doubt upon the individual's
reliability, trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness to comply with rules and
regulations.
Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 17.
Mitigating factors (a), (b), and (c) are the only factors relevant to this analysis, and as such, they
are the only factors I will address.
At the outset, I note that the Individual failed to fully disclose pertinent information regarding eight
separate topics within the QNSP: (1) sponsoring a foreign national for a visa, (2) holding a passport
from a foreign country, (3) obtaining visas from a foreign country, (4) traveling to foreign
countries, (5) reporting delinquent financial accounts, (6) disclosing his full education history, (7)
disclosing his full employment history, and (8) reporting his foreign contacts.
Regarding sponsoring the Wife for a visa, the Individual made no effort to reveal the sponsorship
or his relationship with her until he was confronted by DOE with these facts almost two years after
he completed the QNSP and over a year after he was already married. Regarding his failure to
fully disclose his history with Country B, the existence of the Individual’s two foreign visas issued
by Country B was only discovered by the investigator after asking to examine the Individual’s U.S
passport during the early January 2022 ESI. Further, the investigator also had to ask the Individual
about the existence of his passport issued by Country B and confront the Individual about the
delinquent debts and missing employment history before he volunteered that information.31
I now turn to the allegation that Individual failed to fully disclose his foreign contacts. There is no
doubt that the Individual was obligated to list the Wife on the QNSP as a foreign contact as it is
clear that he would have, at the very least, been bound to her by obligation given his sponsorship
of her K-1 fiancée visa. See Ex. 4 at 51. As stated, the Individual did not disclose his relationship
with her until after he was confronted by DOE, nearly two years after he completed the QNSP and
over a year after they were married.
Regarding the remaining foreign contacts, although the Individual may have volunteered the
existence of over forty foreign contacts during the ESI and LOIs, I note that this information was
not initially revealed in the QNSP, and with regard to Foreign Contacts 1 and 2, the Individual
provided inconsistent information about the names of the individuals as well as the nature and
extent of his relationship with them. If I accept as true that the Individual did not know or did not
maintain close relationships with the foreign nationals he reported, it is likely that he was not
31 Although the Individual testified that the delinquent debts were reported in error, he further stated that he was aware
the debts appeared as delinquent on his credit report at the time he completed the QNSP. Tr. at 62. And in any event,
the Individual failed to provide evidence corroborating his testimony regarding the delinquent debts.
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required to report these individuals and the allegation in the SSC was not properly raised.32
However, given the Individual’s extensive lack of candor throughout the security clearance
process, along with the inconsistencies he provided about Foreign Contacts 1 and 2, I have serious
doubts about the Individual’s credibility concerning his relationships with these individuals. Given
the Individual’s choice not to submit any evidence to corroborate his testimony that he did not
have close relationships with the foreign contacts he listed, I cannot make a finding that he was
under no obligation to report these foreign contacts. Given the Individual’s inconsistent statements
regarding Foreign Contacts 1 and 2 and his failure to disclose the additional contacts until
approximately two years after he completed the QNSP, I cannot find that the Individual made
prompt, good-faith efforts to correct these omissions.
For the aforementioned reasons, I cannot find that the Individual made prompt, good-faith efforts
to correct his omissions before being confronted with the facts. Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 17(a).
Although the Individual alleged that he attempted to seek guidance from someone who might be
able to advise him on the foreign contact reporting requirements, the Individual submitted nothing
in the record to support this contention. As such, I cannot find that mitigating factor (b) applies
here. Id. at ¶ 17(b). Furthermore, considering the extent and materiality the Individual’s omissions,
I cannot find that the behavior was minor, infrequent, or occurred under unique circumstances. Id.
at ¶ 17(c). Although many of these omissions occurred several years ago, given the scope of
untruthful answers, I cannot find that so much time has passed such that the Individual’s reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment is no longer in doubt. Id.
Turning finally to the LSO’s allegation that the Individual may not have been in a “bona fide”
marriage with the Wife, the Individual claims that he is now living with the Wife and their daughter
in a home that he purchased in October 2024. I note, however, that the Individual has not submitted
any evidence to support this contention, and even if I were to accept it as true, this change in
circumstances would not, in and of itself, mitigate the security concerns. As explained above, the
Individual did not disclose the relationship with the Wife until he was confronted with the
information regarding his sponsorship of her visa, and even after marrying her, he did not live with
her or maintain close contact with her for over two years, all while engaged in a relationship with
another woman. The Individual acknowledged that he did not necessarily want to marry the Wife.
Furthermore, he did not begin living with the Wife until little over one month prior to the hearing.
As such, I cannot find that this conduct is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is
so infrequent, or it happened under unique circumstances such that the Individual’s judgment,
reliability, or trustworthiness are no longer in doubt. Id. at ¶ 17(c).
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, I cannot find that the Individual has mitigated the
Guideline E concerns.
32 As stated previously, the Individual was only required to report foreign nationals that he had “close and/or
continuing” contact with such that he was “bound by affection, influence, common interests, and/or obligation.” Ex.
4 at 51.
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B. Guideline B
Conditions that may mitigate a Guideline B security concern include:
a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests
of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the United
States;
b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation
to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, government, or country is so minimal, or
the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United
States, that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the
U.S. interest;
c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is
little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation;
d) the foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government business or are approved by the
agency head or designee;
e) the individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the
reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons, groups, or organizations from a
foreign country; and
f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property interests is such
that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence,
manipulate, or pressure the individual.
Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 8.
The LSO alleged that that the Individual failed to report or fully disclose his history with Country
B, his contacts from Country B,33 his travel to Country B, and his relationship with his Wife, who
is from Country B, including his sponsorship of her visa. It further alleged that the Individual’s
history with Country B as well as his relationship with his Wife creates a potential conflict of
interest and a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or
coercion. I first note, as described above, that the Individual has displayed an extensive lack of
candor throughout the security clearance process in each of these areas. Aside from his testimony,
which lacks credibility due to the concerns regarding his candor, the Individual chose not to submit
any evidence addressing his relationship to Country B or its citizens. As such, given the very
limited and unverified information I have from the Individual, I cannot find that he has
demonstrated that he would not be a in a position of having to choose between the interests of
33 As stated above, I do not have enough information to make a determination as to whether the Individual was required
to report any of the foreign contacts aside from the Wife.
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Country B and the United States, that no conflict of interest exists, or that contact or
communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that
it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation. Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 8 (a)–(c).34
Turning specifically to his failure to report foreign contacts, even assuming the Individual was not
required to report his over forty foreign contacts on the QNSP, he did not disclose his relationship
with his Wife until confronted with the sponsorship of her visa, nearly two years later. Therefore,
I cannot conclude that the Individual promptly complied with existing agency requirements
regarding the reporting of contacts a foreign country. Id. at ¶ 8(e).
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, I cannot find that the Individual has mitigated the
Guideline B concerns.
VI. Conclusion
After considering all of the relevant information, favorable and unfavorable, in a comprehensive,
common-sense manner, including weighing all of the testimony and other evidence presented at
the hearing, I have found that the Individual has not brought forth sufficient evidence to resolve
the security concerns associated with Guideline B and Guideline E. Accordingly, I have
determined that the Individual’s access authorization should not be granted. This Decision may be
appealed in accordance with the procedures set forth in 10 C.F.R. § 710.28.
Katie Quintana
Administrative Judge
Office of Hearings and Appeals
34 Mitigating factors (d) and (f) do not apply to the circumstances of this case, and therefore, I will not analyze them
herein.