PSH-25-0152

*The original of this document contains information which is subject to withholding from disclosure
under 5 U.S. C. § 552. Such material has been deleted from this copy and replaced with XXXXXX’s.
United States Department of Energy
Office of Hearings and Appeals
In the Matter of: Personnel Security Hearing )
)
Filing Date: June 13, 2025 ) Case No.: PSH-25-0152
)
__________________________________________)
Issued: February 3, 2026
____________________________
Administrative Judge Decision
____________________________
Phillip Harmonick, Administrative Judge:
This Decision concerns the eligibility of XXXXXXXXXXXXXX (the Individual) to hold an
access authorization under the United States Department of Energy’s (DOE) regulations, set forth
at 10 C.F.R. Part 710, “Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Matter and
Special Nuclear Material or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position.”1 As discussed below, after
carefully considering the record before me in light of the relevant regulations and the National
Security Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information
or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position (June 8, 2017) (Adjudicative Guidelines), I conclude
that the Individual’s access authorization should not be restored.
I. BACKGROUND
The Individual was granted access authorization in approximately October 2020. Transcript of
Hearing, OHA Case No. PSH-25-0152 (Tr.) at 13. On October 16, 2024, the local security office
(LSO) received Personnel Security Information Reports (October PSIR) indicating that the
Individual had been involuntarily admitted for inpatient mental health treatment after expressing
suicidal ideation and using medication with alcohol against treatment recommendations. Exhibit
(Ex.) 6 at 29; see also Ex. 7 at 35‒36.2 The October PSIR also noted that the Individual was
attending Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings and an intensive outpatient program (First IOP)
1 The regulations define access authorization as “an administrative determination that an individual is eligible for access
to classified matter or is eligible for access to, or control over, special nuclear material.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.5(a). This
Decision will refer to such authorization as access authorization or security clearance.
2 The exhibits submitted by the LSO were Bates numbered in the upper right corner of each page. This Decision will
refer to the Bates numbering when citing to exhibits submitted by the LSO.
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for alcohol misuse.3 Ex. 6 at 29. The Individual submitted a PSIR (December PSIR) to the LSO
on December 30, 2024, disclosing that she had been arrested and charged with Domestic Assault
and Resisting Arrest following an altercation with her boyfriend after consuming alcohol. Ex. 5 at
25; Ex. 9 at 562‒63.
In January 2025, the Individual underwent a psychological evaluation with a DOE-contracted
Psychologist (DOE Psychologist). Ex. 7 at 34. During the clinical interview portion of the
evaluation, the Individual reported a history of heavy alcohol use, indicated that she had resumed
alcohol consumption since completing the First IOP, and stated that she had consumed alcohol to
intoxication three times in December 2024. Id. at 35, 37‒38. The DOE Psychologist obtained
treatment records for the Individual indicating that the Individual had been diagnosed with Major
Depressive Disorder (MDD), Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD), and Alcohol Use Disorder (AUD), and that she reported suicidal ideation during
her October 2024 inpatient mental health treatment. Id. at 62, 64, 98. The DOE Psychologist
subsequently issued a report of the evaluation (Report) in which she opined that the Individual met
sufficient criteria for a diagnosis of AUD, Severe, under the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Health Disorders – Fifth Edition – Text Revision (DSM-5-TR), and also diagnosed the
Individual with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) under the DSM-5-TR, which the DOE
Psychologist opined could impair the Individual’s judgment, stability, reliability, and
trustworthiness. Id. at 46‒47.
The LSO issued the Individual a Notification Letter advising her that it possessed reliable
information that created substantial doubt regarding her eligibility for access authorization. Ex. 1
at 7‒9. In a Summary of Security Concerns (SSC) attached to the letter, the LSO explained that
the derogatory information raised security concerns under Guidelines G, I, and J of the
Adjudicative Guidelines. Id. at 5‒6.
The Individual exercised her right to request an administrative review hearing pursuant to
10 C.F.R. Part 710. Ex. 2. The Director of the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) appointed
me as the Administrative Judge, and I conducted an administrative hearing in January 2026. The
LSO submitted eleven exhibits (Ex. 1–11) and the Individual submitted seven exhibits (Ex. A‒
G).4 The Individual testified on her own behalf and offered the testimony of a senior manager in
her chain-of-command (Manager), her second-line supervisor (Supervisor), and her ex-husband.
Tr. at 3, 12, 73, 83, 95. The LSO offered the testimony of the DOE Psychologist. Id. at 4, 120.
3 Two PSIRs were submitted to the LSO on October 16, 2024; one concerning the Individual’s involuntary admission
for mental health treatment and a second concerning the Individual’s alcohol-related treatment. Ex. 6 at 29 (indicating
that the alcohol-related PSIR was “a follow up to the original [PS]IR dated 10/16/2024”); Ex. 7 at 35 (indicating that
the Individual reported her inpatient mental health treatment to her employer). The alcohol-related PSIR indicated that
the Individual was attending the First IOP, though it does not appear that the IOP began until October 17, 2024.
Compare Ex. 6 at 29 with Ex. 7 at 103. The PSIR in which the Individual’s inpatient hospitalization for mental health
reasons was disclosed to the LSO is not present in the record.
4 The Individual submitted Exhibits A‒E in one PDF and Exhibits F and G as individual PDFs. This Decision cites to
the Individual’s exhibits by reference to the exhibit label and the pagination of each PDF.
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II. THE NOTIFICATION LETTER AND THE ASSOCIATED SECURITY CONCERNS
The LSO cited Guideline G (Alcohol Consumption) of the Adjudicative Guidelines as the first
basis for its substantial doubt regarding the Individual’s eligibility for access authorization. Ex. 1
at 5. “Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment or the
failure to control impulses, and can raise questions about an individual’s reliability and
trustworthiness.” Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 21. The SSC cited the Individual’s routine
consumption of alcohol to the point of intoxication, diagnosis with AUD by treating clinicians and
the DOE Psychologist, consumption of alcohol to the point of intoxication prior to the physical
altercation with her boyfriend that led to her arrest for Domestic Assault, and consumption of
alcohol and prescription medication the night prior to her hospitalization for mental health
treatment. Ex. 1 at 5‒6. The LSO’s allegations that the Individual engaged in alcohol-related
incidents away from work, habitually or binge consumed alcohol to the point of impaired
judgment, and was diagnosed with AUD by a duly qualified medical or mental health professional
justify its invocation of Guideline G. Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 22(a), (c)‒(d).
The LSO cited Guideline I (Psychological Conditions) of the Adjudicative Guidelines as another
basis for its substantial doubt regarding the Individual’s eligibility for access authorization. Ex. 1
at 6. “Certain emotional, mental, and personality conditions can impair judgment, reliability, or
trustworthiness. A formal diagnosis of a disorder is not required for there to be a concern under
this guideline.” Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 27. The SSC cited the Individual’s involuntary
hospitalization for mental health treatment, the Individual’s statements to clinicians that she
experienced suicidal ideation prior to her hospitalization, the Individual’s diagnosis with MDD
and PTSD, and the DOE Psychologist’s diagnosis of the Individual with BPD under the DSM-5-
TR and opinion that this condition could impair her judgment, stability, reliability, and
trustworthiness. Ex. 1 at 6. The LSO’s citation to the Individual’s suicidal ideation, the DOE
Psychologist’s opinion that the Individual had a condition that may impair her judgment, stability,
reliability, or trustworthiness, and the Individual’s involuntary inpatient hospitalization for
psychological reasons justifies its invocation of Guideline I. Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 28(a)‒
(c).
The LSO cited Guideline J (Criminal Conduct) of the Adjudicative Guidelines as the final basis
for its substantial doubt regarding the Individual’s eligibility for access authorization. Ex. 1 at 6.
“Criminal activity creates doubt about a person’s judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its
very nature, it calls into question a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and
regulations.” Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 30. The SSC cited the Individual having been arrested
and charged with Domestic Assault and Resisting Arrest. Ex. 1 at 6. The LSO’s allegation that the
Individual engaged in criminal conduct justifies its invocation of Guideline J. Adjudicative
Guidelines at ¶ 31(b).
III. REGULATORY STANDARDS
A DOE administrative review proceeding under Part 710 requires me, as the Administrative Judge,
to issue a Decision that reflects my comprehensive, common-sense judgment, made after
consideration of all of the relevant evidence, favorable and unfavorable, as to whether the granting
or continuation of a person’s access authorization will not endanger the common defense and
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security and is clearly consistent with the national interest. 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(a). The regulatory
standard implies that there is a presumption against granting or restoring a security clearance. See
Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988) (“clearly consistent with the national interest”
standard for granting security clearances indicates “that security determinations should err, if they
must, on the side of denials”); Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1990) (strong
presumption against the issuance of a security clearance).
An individual must come forward at the hearing with evidence to convince the DOE that granting
or restoring access authorization “will not endanger the common defense and security and will be
clearly consistent with the national interest.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.27(d). An individual is afforded a
full opportunity to present evidence supporting his or her eligibility for an access authorization.
The Part 710 regulations are drafted so as to permit the introduction of a very broad range of
evidence at personnel security hearings. Even appropriate hearsay evidence may be admitted. Id.
§ 710.26(h). Hence, an individual is afforded the utmost latitude in the presentation of evidence to
mitigate the security concerns at issue.
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Individual’s History of Mental Health Treatment and Alcohol Misuse
The Individual first experienced symptoms of depression as a juvenile and was prescribed
antidepressant medication beginning at age twenty-one. Ex. 7 at 34‒35. In 2016, when the
Individual was in her early thirties, a therapist diagnosed her with BPD.5 Ex. 11 at 637; see also
id. at 602 (identifying the Individual’s birthdate).
The Individual began using alcohol to cope with stress at least as early as 2017. See id. at 644
(Individual reporting on a Questionnaire for National Security Positions that she used alcohol to
cope with stress in 2017). In February 2018, the Individual presented at a hospital due to what she
characterized as “a mental breakdown.” Id. According to the Individual, clinicians at the hospital
told her that she “was just overly stressed, exhausted, and that the alcohol wasn’t helping the
situation.” Id. The Individual subsequently attended AA meetings “for a few months” which she
“found [] very helpful.” Id. at 645.
The Individual reduced her alcohol consumption for a period of time after her hospital visit and
AA attendance. Id. at 661. However, in November 2019 the Individual’s alcohol consumption
increased to three to four glasses of wine every night due to stress. Id.
The Individual began meeting with an advanced practice registered nurse (APRN) in March 2022
for medication management. Ex. 7 at 348. At an intake meeting with the APRN, the Individual
5 At the hearing, the Individual testified that an investigator told her that the therapist had said in an interview as part
of the background investigation of her eligibility for access authorization in 2020 that the therapist “in fact does not
think that [the Individual] ha[d] BPD.” Tr. at 70. The investigative report indicates that the therapist told an
investigator that the Individual had a “[g]reat” prognosis. Ex. 11 at 679. However, it makes no mention of the therapist
retracting a BPD diagnosis. Id. I find it much more likely that the Individual misunderstood or misremembered
information conveyed to her by the investigator years prior to the hearing than that the investigator failed to record
this critical information in the investigative report. Accordingly, I find that the therapist likely did not make this
statement to the investigator.
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complained of symptoms of anxiety and depression and reported “she had been drinking a lot . . . .”
Id. The APRN diagnosed the Individual with Anxiety Disorder, Unspecified, MDD, Recurrent,
and Alcohol Abuse Disorder, Uncomplicated. Id. at 351. The APRN prescribed the Individual
medication and recommended she decrease her alcohol consumption. Id.
The Individual met with the APRN until February 2023 when she failed to appear at a scheduled
appointment and discontinued treatment. Id. at 476. During these sessions, the Individual initially
reported binge consumption of alcohol, feelings of dissatisfaction with her body and desire to
appear “skeletal,” severe anxiety, feelings of depression, episodes of anger and “blow-up[s]”
towards her husband and son, and relational difficulties with her husband and family members,
but her symptoms somewhat stabilized and she reported ten months of abstinence from alcohol in
a January 2023 session. Id. at 353, 356‒57, 359, 362, 364, 366, 472.
In November 2023, the Individual began meeting with a psychiatric nurse practitioner (NP). Ex. 7
at 84‒85, 89. Treatment records from the NP indicate that the Individual was diagnosed with MDD
and GAD. Id. at 85, 89. In her initial session with the NP, the Individual reported that she had
resumed “self medicating w[ith] alcohol” after of several years of abstinence. Id. at 84; but see Tr.
at 59 (testifying at the hearing that her longest period of abstinence from alcohol was eighteen
months). The Individual complained of high levels of anxiety and panic attacks, which she
attributed to recent negative events that affected friends and a family member. Ex. 7 at 84.
Following a January 2024 meeting with the NP, during which the Individual complained of
continuing anxiety which she reported self-medicating by consuming four beers three to four times
weekly, the NP prescribed the Individual Klonopin on a “trial basis.” Id. at 80; see also
Clonazepam, MAYO FOUND. FOR MED. EDUC. & RSCH. (Jan. 1, 2026),
https://www.mayoclinic.org/drugs-supplements/clonazepam-oral-route/description/drg-
20072102 (last visited Jan. 13, 2026) (indicating that Klonopin is the brand name for clonazepam,
a benzodiazepine used to treat “panic disorder”). The NP “[c]autioned [the Individual] not to
combine [Klonopin] with alcohol . . . .” Ex. 7 at 80.
In February 2024, the Individual told the NP that she was filing for divorce from her husband and
seeing a coworker (Boyfriend) from the DOE site where she worked. Id. at 79; see also id. at 43
(indicating that the Individual reported in a June 2024 counseling session that the divorce was
precipitated by the Individual’s husband’s discovery that the Individual was having an extramarital
affair with the Boyfriend, who was also married); Tr. at 15 (indicating that the Individual’s divorce
was finalized in August 2024). Due to the Individual’s stress from the divorce proceedings, and
the Individual’s self-reported positive response to the Klonopin, the NP continued the Individual’s
Klonopin prescription. Ex. 7 at 79. In sessions from March through September 2024, the Individual
reported continuing to rely on alcohol to manage anxiety but assured the NP that she was not using
alcohol with Klonopin which the NP counseled the Individual against due to the “dangers of
combining [Klonopin] w[ith] alcohol.” Id. at 71, 73, 75, 78.
B. Individual’s October 2024 Inpatient Mental Health Treatment
On October 8, 2024, the Individual intentionally used Klonopin with alcohol, despite knowing the
risks of combining the substances, and asked a friend to “check on her the next morning to make
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sure she was ‘OK’.” Id. at 36. The next day, the NP requested that law enforcement conduct a
welfare check on the Individual after the Individual stated during a telehealth session with the NP
that she was experiencing a “severe depressive episode,” added that she “can’t do this anymore,”
and refused to go to inpatient treatment. Id. at 35‒36; but see Tr. at 38 (Individual testifying at the
hearing that when she said that she “can’t do this anymore” she was expressing frustration and not
an intent to commit suicide). Law enforcement subsequently transported the Individual to a
hospital, involuntarily, for evaluation. Ex. 7 at 36. The Individual refused treatment and was
involuntarily committed for stabilization and treatment. Id.
The Individual reported to clinicians at the hospital that she had consumed alcohol “almost daily”
for several months to cope with worsening depression. Id. at 62. The Individual further indicated
that she consumed “5 or 6” alcoholic drinks daily. Id. at 63. The hospital provided the Individual
with medication for “alcohol detox.” Id. at 64. The Individual also reported having experienced
suicidal ideations for several days prior to her admission to the hospital but, in the opinion of the
hospital clinicians, was “very guarded” regarding the details of her ideation. Id. at 62. The
Individual was discharged from the hospital on October 14, 2024, after having been stabilized. Id.
at 62, 64.
Following her release from the hospital, the Individual was required to undergo an evaluation by
a psychologist (Site Psychologist) employed at the DOE site at which she worked. Id. at 36. Based
on the Individual’s intentional use of Klonopin with alcohol despite knowing the risks, as well as
the Individual’s “emotionally dysregulated” presentation during the evaluation, the Site
Psychologist formed the opinion that the Individual’s behavior was “risky [] at best but could also
represent suicide rehearsal, a cry for help, or an actual suicide attempt.” Id. at 37.
C. Individual’s Participation in the First IOP
On October 17, 2024, the Individual enrolled in the First IOP for alcohol and mental health-related
treatment. Id. at 103. During an intake evaluation, the Individual reported consuming nine beers
per sitting approximately once per week. Id. at 104. She also reported high levels of depression
and anxiety and endorsed a history of being “violent or aggressive” under the influence of alcohol.
Id. at 115‒17. The Individual agreed to abstain from alcohol during her participation in the First
IOP. Id. at 123.
The Individual participated in individual and group therapy sessions through the First IOP from
October 22, 2024, to November 21, 2024, covering topics such as anger management, relapse
prevention, and psychoeducation. Id. at 298‒321. Clinicians conducting the First IOP determined
that the Individual demonstrated “fair” insight in most sessions, with good insight in some sessions
and poor insight in one session. Id. Despite her agreement to abstain from alcohol, the Individual
consumed alcohol during the First IOP. Id. at 37, 40‒41, 312, 502. On November 21, 2024, the
Individual completed the First IOP. Id. at 321.
D. December 2024 Domestic Dispute
Following her completion of the First IOP, the Individual continued to consume alcohol. Id. at 37,
44. On December 28, 2024, the Boyfriend contacted law enforcement and showed an officer a
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video he had taken of a domestic dispute with the Individual. Ex. 9 at 567. According to an incident
report prepared by the officer, the video showed the Individual striking the Boyfriend, the
Boyfriend pushing her away, and the Individual returning to strike him again. Id. Law enforcement
officers subsequently interviewed the Individual, who they perceived to be under the influence of
alcohol. Id.; see also Ex. 7 at 38 (Individual stating during the psychological evaluation with the
DOE Psychologist that she “drank to heavy intoxication” on the evening of December 28, 2024).
When the officers questioned the Individual, she initially denied that there had been a physical
altercation, then changed her statement to allege that the Boyfriend had “pushed her down.” Ex. 9
at 567.
The law enforcement officers arrested the Individual, who attempted to pull away from the officer
who placed her in wrist restraints and to prevent the officer from closing the door of his vehicle
with her foot after she had been placed inside for transport to a detention facility. Id. After the
Individual was transported to the detention facility, she alleged that the Boyfriend had anally raped
her earlier that evening. Id. Officers questioned the Boyfriend who stated that he and the Individual
had consensual anal sex. Id. Evidence was collected from the Individual using a rape kit, but the
results of any forensic evaluation concerning her allegations are not present in the record. See id.
(indicating that “a rape kit will be performed”); Ex. 7 at 38 (indicating that “a rape kit was
completed” at a hospital).
The Individual was charged with Domestic Assault and Resisting Arrest. Ex. 9 at 562‒63. Both
charges were ultimately dismissed and in April 2025 the charges were expunged from the
Individual’s criminal record. Ex. C at 10‒11. The December 2024 domestic dispute was the only
occasion on which she was arrested in her life. Tr. at 14 (Individual testifying to never having been
arrested prior to December 2024); Ex. 11 at 680 (indicating that the results of the 2020 background
investigation into the Individual’s eligibility for access authorization uncovered no law
enforcement records related to the Individual).
E. Psychological Evaluation by the DOE Psychologist
The Individual met with the DOE Psychologist for a clinical interview on January 7, 2025. Ex. 7
at 34. In addition to the clinical interview, the DOE Psychologist reviewed information from the
Individual’s personnel security file which reflected substantially the same information as has been
heretofore described in this Decision. Id. at 34‒38.
1. Assessment of the Individual’s Alcohol Use
During the clinical interview, the Individual reported significant stress and anxiety related to the
events of December 28, 2024, and indicated she had resumed residing with her ex-husband and
had pursued sexual intercourse with him to “reduce her stress and anxiety.” Id. at 38. She also
reported consuming alcohol, typically four shots of bourbon per sitting, as a coping mechanism.
Id.; see also id. at 40 (Individual characterizing her pattern of alcohol consumption as “‘binge’
drinking”). The Individual denied having consumed any alcohol in the week prior to the
psychological evaluation. Id. at 38.
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Immediately following the clinical interview, the Individual provided a sample for
phosphatidylethanol (PEth)6 testing. Id. at 55. The PEth test was positive at 353 ng/mL, which the
medical doctor who interpreted the test opined was evidence that the Individual regularly engaged
in heavy, high-risk drinking. Id. at 54‒55; see also William Ulwelling & Kim Smith, The PEth
Blood Test in the Security Environment: What it is; Why it is Important; and Interpretative
Guidelines, J. OF FORENSIC SCI., July 2018 at 5 (journal article cited by the MD proposing
guidelines for interpreting PEth test results and suggesting that PEth levels exceeding 200 ng/mL
be interpreted as likely indicative of heavy alcohol consumption). Based on the Individual’s self-
described alcohol consumption and the PEth test results, the DOE Psychologist indicated that the
Individual binge consumed alcohol to the point of impaired judgment.7 Ex. 7 at 39. Additionally,
the DOE Psychologist concluded that the Individual met seven diagnostic criteria for AUD under
the DSM-5-TR, and therefore concluded that the Individual met sufficient criteria for a diagnosis
of AUD, Severe. Id. at 41; see also id. at 50‒51 (excerpting from the DSM-5-TR which provides
that AUD, Severe, is characterized by the presence of six or more of the eleven diagnostic criteria).
The DOE Psychologist recommended that the Individual demonstrate rehabilitation from her AUD
by showing at least twelve months of abstinence from alcohol through PEth testing at least every
two months, participating in inpatient treatment, and attending in-person AA meetings and
working with a sponsor or participating in another in-person alcohol cessation support group8 and
“following the guidelines” of that group for twelve months. Id. at 47.
2. Assessment of the Individual’s Psychological Health
As indicated above, at the time of the psychological evaluation the Individual was experiencing
high levels of stress and anxiety, which she attempted to manage by consuming alcohol and relying
on her ex-husband. Id. at 38. The DOE Psychologist obtained treatment records from the APRN
and NP which, as described above, showed that the Individual had long-standing symptoms of
depression and anxiety that varied in severity over time and were not sustainably controlled even
with medication. Id. at 44. Contrary to the APRN’s and NP’s diagnoses, the DOE Psychologist
concluded that the Individual met sufficient diagnostic criteria for a diagnosis of BPD under the
DSM-5-TR. Id. at 44, 47. Specifically, the DOE Psychologist found that the Individual met the
following criteria for BPD:
• Frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment;
6 PEth is a biomarker for alcohol consumption that can be detected in blood for approximately one month following
moderate or greater episodes of alcohol consumption. Ex. 7 at 53‒55.
7 The DOE Psychologist defined binge drinking for women as consumption of four or more alcoholic drinks on one
occasion. Ex. 7 at 49; but see NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON ALCOHOL ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM, ALCOHOL’S EFFECTS ON
HEALTH (2025), available at https:// https://www.niaaa.nih.gov/alcohols-effects-health/alcohol-drinking-patterns (last
visited Jan. 14, 2026) (defining binge drinking for women as consumption of “four or more drinks . . . in about two
hours” as compared to “heavy drinking” which includes “four or more drinks on any one day” regardless of the time
within which the drinks are consumed) (emphasis added). Considering that the Individual repeatedly admitted to
drinking to heavy intoxication, the DOE Psychologist’s reliance on a definition of binge drinking that did not consider
the time within which alcohol was consumed is not material to my Decision.
8 The DOE Psychologist provided several examples of alternative programs the Individual could have pursued in lieu
of AA. Ex. 7 at 47.
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• A pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterized by
alternating between extremes of idealization and devaluation;
• Identity disturbance: markedly and persistently unstable self-image or sense of self;
• Impulsivity in at least two areas that are potentially self-damaging;
• Affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood;
• Inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty controlling anger.
Id. at 45. The DOE Psychologist noted that BPD is characterized by “a pervasive pattern of
behavioral, emotional and relational instability,” and opined that the Individual had demonstrated
the effects of such impairments to her judgment, stability, and reliability when “she was recently
divorced due to her having an ongoing affair, involuntarily hospitalized for suicidality, admitted
to IOP for alcohol use disorder, and arrested for domestic assault.” Id. at 47. The DOE Psychologist
opined that the Individual’s prognosis was guarded due to her lack of responsiveness to prior
mental health and substance abuse treatment. Id. at 47‒48.
F. Individual’s Recent Actions and Updated Opinion of the DOE Psychologist
Following the evaluation by the DOE Psychologist, the Individual enrolled in a Mental Health IOP
(Second IOP) through the same organization that provided her with the First IOP. Ex. D at 13‒14.
According to the Individual, the Second IOP “was more focused on mental health and trauma”
than the First IOP. Tr. at 22; see also Ex. D at 13 (letter from a treatment professional with the
Second IOP indicating that the Individual was drug tested during the Second IOP but making no
mention of alcohol testing). According to the Individual, the group sessions in the Second IOP
were more beneficial in helping her abstain from alcohol than alcohol-focused interventions had
been. Tr. at 22, 55; see also id. at 53‒54 (testifying that she learned how alcohol contributed to her
depression and anxiety, as well as “bad decisions” that led to her inpatient treatment and arrest).
The Individual successfully completed the Second IOP on March 28, 2025. Ex. D at 14.
On April 30, 2025, the Individual met with a psychologist (Consulting Psychologist) for a
psychological evaluation. Ex. G at 1. The Consulting Psychologist conducted a clinical interview
of the Individual and administered the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) psychological test
to the Individual. Id. at 2‒3. In the clinical interview, the Individual described her history of
maladaptive alcohol use and noted her 2024 suicidal ideation, inpatient hospitalization, and arrest.
Id. at 2. Although the Individual acknowledged “some mild mood lability,” there is no mention in
the Consulting Psychologist’s report of the anxiety, panic attacks, significant depression, or
feelings of frustration and anger that the Individual reported to prior clinicians. Id. On the PAI, the
Individual endorsed a history of alcohol-related issues but “denied significant problems . . . [with]
unhappiness and depression, . . . marked anxiety, problematic behaviors used to manage anxiety,
and difficulties with health or physical functioning.” Id. at 3. Based on the Individual’s self-reports
in the clinical interview and the PAI, the Consulting Psychologist diagnosed the Individual with
Alcohol Dependence, in full remission, MDD, and GAD, and opined that the Individual did not
present in a manner indicative of BPD. Id.
The Individual’s ex-husband moved into her home in November 2025, though he considered the
couple to have “informally” resumed cohabitating in approximately January 2025. Tr. at 95, 111.
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According to the ex-husband, the Individual does not keep alcohol in her home. Id. The Individual
and her ex-husband are considering remarrying. Id. at 64.
The Individual testified at the hearing that she had abstained from alcohol since January 17, 2025.
Id. at 21‒22, 43. She provided samples for PEth testing in April 2025, October 2025, and January
2026, each of which was negative for traces of alcohol consumption. Ex. A at 4; Ex. B at 7; Ex. F
at 4. The Individual testified she did not obtain more frequent PEth testing, as recommended by
the DOE Psychologist, because she “thought that they tested a longer period” and therefore more
frequent testing was unnecessary. Tr. at 48. The Individual testified that she intends to permanently
abstain from alcohol. Id. at 24.
Since completing the Second IOP, the Individual has participated in weekly sober yoga meetings,
where participants recovering from alcohol and drug misuse engage in yoga together. Id. at 24,
55‒57. She also participates in aerial yoga at home, which helps her to “take [her] mind off of”
alcohol. Id. at 52, 55. The Individual testified she had attended some AA meetings, but preferred
being around other people in early recovery as opposed to AA participants who had “been in
recovery for years . . . [and were] not as close to” the issues she was confronting. Id. at 55‒56; see
also id. at 104 (ex-husband testifying that the Individual went “to AA a couple times”). The
Individual did not participate in AA meetings regularly because she felt doing so was “impossible”
considering her full-time employment and parenting responsibilities. Id. at 49. The Individual
would tell her ex-husband if she experienced a craving to consume alcohol. Id. at 53; see also id.
at 109 (ex-husband testifying that he would “bluntly and frankly” counsel the Individual against
consuming alcohol if she expressed the intention to do so and would tell her that “it could be a
problem like for even me and her moving forward, because . . . she just can’t go back there again”).
Regarding psychological treatment, the Individual testified that she was participating in weekly
therapy with a therapist and receiving medication management from a psychiatric nurse
practitioner. Id. at 50, 61. According to the Individual, her therapy involved “talk[ing] about [her]
frustrations . . . [and] anxieties” as well as triggers for alcohol consumption and how to mitigate
them. Id. at 52. She testified she was prescribed an antidepressant, a mood stabilizer, and an
antipsychotic medication. Id. at 28. According to the Individual, her symptoms of anxiety and
depression had been “low” for approximately two to three months prior to the hearing. Id. at 65‒
66.
According to the Individual, the working diagnoses of her current treating professionals are
“depression and anxiety.” Id. at 62. The Individual testified that her therapist did not concur with
the DOE Psychologist’s diagnosis of BPD and that the therapist does not accept patients for
treatment with that condition. Id.
The Individual testified, and the Manager and her supervisor confirmed, that she has performed
her work competently without having been disciplined or experiencing issues with time and
attendance. Id. at 20, 78, 84‒85, 90.
The DOE Psychologist testified that the Individual had not complied with her recommendations
for alcohol-related treatment because she had not undergone PEth testing with sufficient frequency
to establish twelve months of abstinence from alcohol, participated in inpatient treatment, or
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consistently attended AA and worked the twelve steps of the AA program with a sponsor. Id. at
124‒26. The DOE Psychologist further opined that the Individual’s attendance of the Second IOP,
while likely beneficial, was not consistent with her recommendations because it was primarily
focused on mental health rather than substance misuse. Id. at 125. She also found it concerning
that the Individual felt that “she knew better” how to support her recovery regarding PEth testing
frequency and not attending AA. Id. at 126, 129. The DOE Psychologist further opined that sober
yoga was not a substitute for AA because it lacked the “accountability” or opportunities for
mentorship from persons with longstanding recovery that AA would provide and which would
support the Individual’s recovery. Id. at 129.
For the aforementioned reasons, the DOE Psychologist testified that the Individual had not
demonstrated rehabilitation or reformation. Id. at 127. She further opined that the Individual’s
prognosis for avoiding future alcohol misuse was guarded. Id. at 157. The DOE Psychologist noted
that the Individual’s prior abstinence from alcohol for at least eighteen months before relapsing
supported her conclusion that the Individual was at heightened risk of relapse without additional
interventions. Id. at 128.
With respect to mental health diagnoses provided by the Individual’s treatment providers that
differed from the DOE Psychologist’s diagnosis of BPD, the DOE Psychologist testified that she
believed her diagnosis was more likely correct because “someone with [GAD], depressive
disorder, in general, who is in like weekly talk therapy and taking some medications, does not end
up being involuntarily committed. That’s very, very rare, especially if they’re denying suicidal
ideation or plan.” Id. at 160. However, considering the Individual’s behavioral history, she opined
that the conditions diagnosed by the Individual’s treatment providers would raise doubt as to the
Individual’s judgment, reliability, and stability even if the Individual did not suffer from BPD. Id.
at 162. Moreover, she testified that even if the other diagnoses were appropriate, she had no
information from the treatment providers that would allow her to conclude that the conditions were
under control, and thus the Individual’s prognosis would be fair.9 Id. at 162‒63.
Regarding her BPD diagnosis, the DOE Psychologist opined that BPD is not readily controllable
with treatment due to its treatment-resistant nature and clinicians’ difficulty in establishing rapport
with patients with BPD. Id. at 164. The DOE Psychologist testified that rapid, temporary
improvement in patients with BPD was not unusual considering the fluid nature of their identities,
and that the Individual’s and her ex-husband’s accounts of the Individual’s recent well-being were
insufficient to establish durable recovery. Id. at 166‒67. The DOE Psychologist testified that BPD
is a chronic, not temporary, condition and that because of its chronic nature it continued to
potentially impair the Individual’s judgment, stability, reliability, and trustworthiness. Id. at 168‒
69.
9 The DOE Psychologist testified that the Individual’s prognosis for managing these alternative diagnoses would be
good “if she remains in treatment and on medications . . . .” Tr. at 163 (emphasis added). As this positive prognosis
from the DOE Psychologist was conditioned on speculative future behavior, I do not interpret this prognosis as
applying to the Individual’s current status.
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V. ANALYSIS
A. Guideline G
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns under Guideline G include:
(a) so much time has passed, or the behavior was so infrequent, or it happened under such
unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the
individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or judgment;
(b) the individual acknowledges his or her pattern of maladaptive alcohol use, provides
evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and has demonstrated a clear and
established pattern of modified consumption or abstinence in accordance with
treatment recommendations;
(c) the individual is participating in counseling or a treatment program, has no previous
history of treatment and relapse, and is making satisfactory progress in a treatment
program; or,
(d) the individual has successfully completed a treatment program along with any required
aftercare, and has demonstrated a clear and established pattern of modified
consumption or abstinence in accordance with treatment recommendations.
Id. at ¶ 23.
The Individual has a lengthy history of alcohol misuse and routine use of alcohol to cope with
stress and mental health symptoms. Consequently, her alcohol misuse was neither infrequent nor
occurred under unusual circumstances. While the Individual claimed to have abstained from
alcohol for one year as of the date of the hearing, she did not undergo sufficient alcohol testing to
corroborate this claim. Even if she had, considering the Individual’s prior return to maladaptive
alcohol use after at least eighteen months of abstinence from alcohol, I conclude that her current
claimed period of abstinence is not so long that the passage of time alone is sufficient to convince
me that she will not resume misusing alcohol in the future. Therefore, the first mitigating condition
is inapplicable. Id. at ¶ 23(a).
The Individual has acknowledged her maladaptive alcohol use and taken some actions to overcome
the problem. However, these actions are inconsistent with those recommended by the DOE
Psychologist. While the DOE Psychologist’s recommendations are not the only pathway for the
Individual to address her alcohol misuse, I was convinced by the DOE Psychologist’s testimony
that the Individual’s sober yoga is not a sufficient intervention to support her abstinence without
AA or the other mutual support groups she recommended. The DOE Psychologist’s Report was
not as specific as it might have been as to the nature of an acceptable mutual support group.
However, her recommendation that the Individual work the steps of the AA program with a
sponsor or follow the guidelines of another mutual support group specified participation in a
program with some formal alcohol-related curriculum sufficiently clearly that it should have been
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apparent to the Individual that a yoga-based support group would not be sufficiently structured to
meet the DOE Psychologist’s recommendation.
Moreover, the Individual did not document her claimed twelve months of abstinence through PEth
testing as recommended by the DOE Psychologist and therefore failed to demonstrate a clear and
established pattern of abstinence in accordance with treatment recommendations. Considering the
severe and longstanding nature of the Individual’s alcohol misuse, and her history of relapse
following treatment, I find her testimony and that of her ex-husband regarding her abstinence
insufficient to overcome the substantial gaps in her alcohol testing. See 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(c)
(requiring consideration of the “nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct” in applying the
mitigating conditions). Accordingly, the Individual has not demonstrated the applicability of the
second mitigating condition. Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 23(b).
The third mitigating condition is irrelevant because the Individual did not bring forward evidence
that she was participating in a counseling or treatment program specifically related to alcohol as
of the date of the hearing. Even if she were, her history of relapse despite completing the First IOP
would preclude the applicability of the third mitigating condition. Id. at ¶ 23(c).
There is insufficient evidence in the record to conclude that the Second IOP was adequately
alcohol-focused to constitute alcohol treatment and, in any case, the Individual did not complete
the treatment recommended by the DOE Psychologist. Moreover, for the reasons explained above,
the Individual has not demonstrated a clear and established pattern of modified consumption or
abstinence in accordance with treatment recommendations. For these reasons, the fourth mitigating
condition is inapplicable. Id. at ¶ 23(d).
For the aforementioned reasons, I find that none of the mitigating conditions are applicable to the
facts of this case. Accordingly, the Individual has not resolved the security concerns asserted by
the LSO under Guideline G.
B. Guideline I
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns under Guideline I include:
(a) The identified condition is readily controllable with treatment, and the individual
has demonstrated ongoing and consistent compliance with the treatment plan;
(b) The individual has voluntarily entered a counseling or treatment program for a
condition that is amendable to treatment, and the individual is currently receiving
counseling or treatment with a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified mental
health professional;
(c) Recent opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional employed by, or
acceptable to and approved by, the U.S. Government that an individual’s previous
condition is under control or in remission, and has a low probability of recurrence
or exacerbation;
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(d) The past psychological/psychiatric condition was temporary, the situation has been
resolved, and the individual no longer shows indications of emotional instability;
(e) There is no indication of a current problem.
Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 29.
The Individual has received numerous diagnoses from clinicians which are inconsistent with the
DOE Psychologist’s diagnosis of BPD. While the Individual’s various treating clinicians have had
the benefit of more interactions with her than the DOE Psychologist, the DOE Psychologist may
have unique insight into the Individual’s psychological well-being based on access to a patient
history compiled from a diverse range of sources which is not dependent on the Individual’s
account of events and her own symptoms. The Consulting Psychologist does not appear to have
had access to such robust, objective sources, and instead appears to have relied on the Individual’s
self-report and the PAI results. Considering that the information the Individual reported to the
Consulting Psychologist was inconsistent with what she provided to prior treating clinicians, and
omitted numerous significant negative symptoms, I find the Consulting Psychologist’s opinion
unreliable. While the Individual’s current treating clinicians may have greater insight, the only
record evidence as to their diagnoses is the Individual’s hearing testimony. Without information
from the clinicians, I cannot definitively determine the accuracy of the Individual’s account of
their diagnoses or the information they relied on in reaching those diagnoses. In light of the
aforementioned considerations, I credit the DOE Psychologist’s diagnosis of the Individual despite
contrary opinions cited by the Individual.
The DOE Psychologist testified that BPD is not readily controlled with treatment and, in any case,
the Individual denied that her current clinicians are treating her for BPD. With respect to the
alternative diagnoses provided by some of the Individual’s clinicians, even if I credited them, I
lack information from the Individual’s current clinicians to establish that the Individual was
compliant with a treatment plan. Further, the DOE Psychologist opined that the Individual’s
prognosis with respect to managing the alternative diagnoses was only fair. Accordingly, the first
two mitigating conditions are inapplicable. Id. at ¶ 29(a)‒(b).
The DOE Psychologist opined that BPD is a chronic condition and, due to its tendency to cause
sharp, unexpected personality changes, the Individual’s current self-reported stability does not
indicate that the condition is under control or poses no current problem. On the contrary, the DOE
Psychologist opined that the Individual’s BPD continued to potentially undermine her judgment,
stability, reliability, and trustworthiness. Moreover, regarding the alternative diagnoses, I lack any
information from the Individual’s current clinicians concerning their opinions as to her status.
Therefore, I find the remaining mitigating conditions inapplicable. Id. at ¶ 29(c)‒(e).
For the aforementioned reasons, I find that none of the mitigating conditions are applicable to the
facts of this case and that the Individual has not resolved the security concerns asserted by the LSO
under Guideline I.
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C. Guideline J
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns under Guideline J include:
(a) so much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior happened, or it happened
under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt
on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b) the individual was pressured or coerced into committing the act and those pressures
are no longer present in the person’s life;
(c) no reliable evidence to support that the individual committed the offense; and
(d) there is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including, but not limited to, the
passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, restitution, compliance with
the terms of parole or probation, job training or higher education, good employment
record, or constructive community involvement.
Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 32.
In evaluating the first mitigating condition under Guideline J, I note that the Individual had no
history of arrests or charges prior to her December 2024 arrest. See 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(c)
(requiring consideration of the “frequency . . . of the conduct” in applying the mitigating
conditions). Another consideration is that the Individual asserted her assault on the Boyfriend
was preceded by his sexually assaulting her, though the absence of evidence that the Boyfriend
was arrested or charged with any offense and the fact that she did not make this allegation to
law enforcement until after denying that an altercation occurred, modifying her account to
allege that he pushed her to ground, and then resisting arrest, casts doubt on her allegation. See
id. (requiring consideration of the “circumstances surrounding the conduct”). However, several
other considerations weigh squarely against the Individual. I find it concerning that the
December 2024 incident occurred when the Individual was approximately forty years old and
had held a clearance for over four years, both of which should have led her to exercise better
judgment than to binge drink and resist arrest. See id. (requiring consideration of “the age and
maturity of the individual at the time of the conduct”). Moreover, it appears that the
Individual’s mental health issues and alcohol misuse, which almost certainly contributed to the
events of December 2024, progressively worsened over a period of years despite the Individual
regularly participating in mental health treatment and abstaining from alcohol for a lengthy
period. See id. (requiring consideration of the “circumstances surrounding the conduct”). Also,
as noted above, the Individual has not resolved her alcohol and mental health issues, increasing
the likelihood that she will engage in future disinhibited misconduct. See id. (requiring
consideration of “the likelihood of continuation or recurrence”).
In consideration of all the aforementioned factors, I find that the passage of little over one year
since the Individual’s December 2024 arrest is insufficient, in of itself, to convince me that she
will not commit similar misconduct in the future. Likewise, considering that the Individual’s
conduct was likely influenced by longstanding, unresolved alcohol and mental health issues, I
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cannot find that the conduct occurred under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to
recur. Accordingly, I find the first mitigating condition inapplicable. Adjudicative Guidelines
at ¶ 32(a).
The second mitigating condition is irrelevant to the facts of this case because the Individual
does not assert that she was pressured or coerced into committing criminal conduct. Id. at
¶ 32(b).
The Individual has established that the charges against her in connection with her December
2024 arrest were dismissed. However, the incident report prepared by the law enforcement
officer who arrested the Individual is at least some reliable evidence that the Individual
committed both Domestic Assault and Resisting Arrest. There are many reasons why the
charges against the Individual may have been dismissed; thus, this fact alone is insufficient to
establish the applicability of the third mitigating condition. Id. at ¶ 32(c).
Other than a positive employment record, which the Individual appears to have had prior to
her arrest, none of the factors under the fourth mitigating condition are applicable. Most
importantly, as described above, I find that the Individual’s unresolved alcohol and mental
health issues indicate that too little time has passed since her December 2024 arrest for me to
conclude that the conduct is unlikely to recur. Accordingly, I find that the Individual has not
established the applicability of the fourth mitigating condition. Id. at ¶ 32(d).
Having concluded that none of the mitigating conditions are applicable, I find that the
Individual has not resolved the security concerns asserted by the LSO under Guideline J.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the above analysis, I found that there was sufficient derogatory information in the possession of
DOE to raise security concerns under Guidelines G, I, and J of the Adjudicative Guidelines. After
considering all relevant information, favorable and unfavorable, in a comprehensive, common-
sense manner, including weighing all testimony and other evidence presented at the hearing, I find
that the Individual has not brought forth sufficient evidence to resolve the security concerns
asserted by the LSO. Accordingly, I have determined that the Individual’s access authorization
should not be restored. This Decision may be appealed in accordance with the procedures set forth
at 10 C.F.R. § 710.28.
Phillip Harmonick
Administrative Judge
Office of Hearings and Appeals