PSH-25-0172

*The original of this document contains information which is subject to withholding from disclosure
under 5 U.S. C. § 552. Such material has been deleted from this copy and replaced with XXXXXX’s.
United States Department of Energy
Office of Hearings and Appeals
In the Matter of: Personnel Security Hearing )
)
Filing Date: July 29, 2025 ) Case No.: PSH-25-0172
)
__________________________________________)
Issued: October 6, 2025
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Administrative Judge Decision
____________________________
Phillip Harmonick, Administrative Judge:
This Decision concerns the eligibility of XXXXXXXXXXXXX (the Individual) to hold an access
authorization under the United States Department of Energy’s (DOE) regulations, set forth at 10
C.F.R. Part 710, “Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Matter and
Special Nuclear Material or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position.”1 As discussed below, after
carefully considering the record before me in light of the relevant regulations and the National
Security Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information
or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position (June 8, 2017) (Adjudicative Guidelines), I conclude
that the Individual’s access authorization should not be restored.
I. BACKGROUND
The Individual was granted access authorization in connection with his employment by a DOE
contractor. On September 24, 2024, the Individual submitted a Personnel Security Information
Report (First PSIR) in which he disclosed that he had been arrested and charged with Driving
Under the Influence (DUI). Exhibit (Ex.) 10 at 213.2 In the First PSIR, the Individual represented
that he had consumed “a couple” alcoholic beverages prior to his arrest. Id. at 214. The local
security office (LSO) issued the Individual a letter of interrogatory (LOI) concerning his arrest and
alcohol consumption. Ex. 9 at 210‒11. In his response to the LOI, the Individual stated that he had
consumed “about a case twisted teas/beer” prior to his arrest. Id. at 198. The Individual also
disclosed that he typically consumed “[a]bout 10 12-oz beers” per sitting on “weekends [on which
he did not] work.” Id. at 197.
1 The regulations define access authorization as “an administrative determination that an individual is eligible for access
to classified matter or is eligible for access to, or control over, special nuclear material.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.5(a). This
Decision will refer to such authorization as access authorization or security clearance.
2 The exhibits submitted by DOE were submitted as a single PDF exhibit notebook. This Decision will cite to the
pages in the exhibit notebook in the order in which they appear regardless of their internal pagination.
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On February 7, 2025, the Individual met with a DOE-contracted psychologist (DOE Psychologist)
for a psychological evaluation. Ex. 7 at 175. During the evaluation, the Individual reported that he
had last consumed alcohol “two or three weekends” prior to the evaluation. Id. at 177. However,
based the on results of laboratory testing, the DOE Psychologist concluded that the Individual had
likely “engaged in binge drinking . . . or moderate drinking episodes within about one week of the
test.” Id. Following the evaluation, the DOE Psychologist issued a report of the evaluation (Report)
in which he opined that the Individual habitually or binge consumed alcohol to the point of
impaired judgment. Id. at 179.
On May 15, 2025, the Individual submitted a PSIR (Second PSIR) reporting that he had been
charged with Ignition Interlock Violation. Ex. 5 at 120. The Individual denied that he had
consumed alcohol before operating the vehicle on which the ignition interlock device was installed
and attributed the positive result to mouthwash. Id. at 121.
The LSO issued the Individual a Notification Letter advising him that it possessed reliable
information that created substantial doubt regarding his eligibility for access authorization. Ex. 2
at 5‒7. In a Summary of Security Concerns (SSC) attached to the letter, the LSO explained that
the derogatory information raised security concerns under Guidelines E and G of the Adjudicative
Guidelines. Id. at 8‒10.
The Individual exercised his right to request an administrative review hearing pursuant to
10 C.F.R. Part 710. Ex. 1. The Director of the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) appointed
me as the Administrative Judge in this matter, and I conducted an administrative hearing in
September 2025. The LSO submitted eleven exhibits (Ex. 1–11). The Individual submitted four
exhibits (Ex. A‒D). The Individual testified on his own behalf and offered the testimony of his
fiancée and mother. Transcript of Hearing, OHA Case No. PSH-25-0172 at 3, 9, 36, 60 (Tr.). The
LSO offered the testimony of the DOE Psychologist. Id. at 3, 117.
II. THE NOTIFICATION LETTER AND THE ASSOCIATED SECURITY CONCERNS
The LSO cited Guideline E (Personal Conduct) of the Adjudicative Guidelines as one basis for its
substantial doubt regarding the Individual’s eligibility for access authorization. Ex. 2 at 9‒10.
“Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply
with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and
ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure to cooperate
or provide truthful and candid answers during national security investigative or adjudicative
processes.” Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 15. The SSC cited the Individual having reported drinking
only a “couple” of alcoholic beverages prior to his DUI arrest in the First PSIR but later admitting
to consuming a “case” of alcoholic beverages in his response to the LOI and also that the DOE
Psychologist opined that the Individual had consumed alcohol within about one week of the
psychological evaluation despite the Individual claiming to have done so two to three weekends
prior to the psychological evaluation. Ex. 2 at 10. The LSO’s allegation that the Individual
deliberately omitted, concealed, or falsified information on the First PSIR and during the
psychological evaluation justify its invocation of Guideline E. Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 16(a).
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The LSO cited Guideline G (Alcohol Consumption) of the Adjudicative Guidelines as the other
basis for its substantial doubt regarding the Individual’s eligibility for access authorization. Ex. 2
at 8‒9. “Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment or
the failure to control impulses, and can raise questions about an individual’s reliability and
trustworthiness.” Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 21. The SSC cited the Individual having been
arrested and charged with DUI and Ignition Interlock Violation and the opinion of the DOE
Psychologist that the Individual habitually or binge consumed alcohol to the point of impaired
judgment. Ex. 2 at 8‒9. The LSO’s allegations that the Individual experienced alcohol-related
incidents away from work and habitually or binge consumed alcohol to the point of impaired
judgment justify its invocation of Guideline G. Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 22(a), (c).
III. REGULATORY STANDARDS
A DOE administrative review proceeding under Part 710 requires me, as the Administrative Judge,
to issue a Decision that reflects my comprehensive, common-sense judgment, made after
consideration of all of the relevant evidence, favorable and unfavorable, as to whether the granting
or continuation of a person’s access authorization will not endanger the common defense and
security and is clearly consistent with the national interest. 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(a). The regulatory
standard implies that there is a presumption against granting or restoring a security clearance. See
Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988) (“clearly consistent with the national interest”
standard for granting security clearances indicates “that security determinations should err, if they
must, on the side of denials”); Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1990) (strong
presumption against the issuance of a security clearance).
An individual must come forward at the hearing with evidence to convince the DOE that granting
or restoring access authorization “will not endanger the common defense and security and will be
clearly consistent with the national interest.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.27(d). An individual is afforded a
full opportunity to present evidence supporting his or her eligibility for an access authorization.
The Part 710 regulations are drafted so as to permit the introduction of a very broad range of
evidence at personnel security hearings. Even appropriate hearsay evidence may be admitted. Id.
§ 710.26(h). Hence, an individual is afforded the utmost latitude in the presentation of evidence to
mitigate the security concerns at issue.
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Individual’s DUI Arrest and Disclosures to the LSO
On the evening of September 21, 2024, at which time he was twenty-one years of age, the
Individual had friends over to his home and consumed alcohol from approximately 7:00 PM until
2:00 AM the next day. Ex. 9 at 194; see also id. at 199 (indicating the Individual’s birthdate). The
next morning, the Individual attempted to drive, fell asleep behind the wheel, and was in a single-
vehicle accident. Id. at 195. The Individual was transported to a hospital due to injuries he suffered
in the accident and his blood alcohol content was measured at .164%. Id. at 198, 208. The
Individual was subsequently charged with DUI. Id. at 199.
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On September 24, 2024, the Individual submitted the First PSIR in which he disclosed that he had
been charged with DUI. Ex. 10 at 213. In the First PSIR, the Individual stated that he had consumed
“a couple twisted teas the night before” the accident that led to the DUI charge. Id. at 214; see also
Tr. at 92 (testifying that he and his friends would refer to consuming numerous alcoholic beverages
as having “a couple” and that he assumed at the time that DOE would understand that “not many
people just dr[i]nk like one beer or two”). The Individual also indicated that he occasionally
consumed “a case” of beer and estimated that he had been intoxicated ten times in the year prior
to the DUI. Ex. 10 at 214; see also Ex. 7 at 176 (reflecting in the DOE Psychologist’s Report that
the Individual understood a “case” to mean up to twelve alcoholic beverages).
The LSO issued the Individual the LOI on September 30, 2024, wherein the LSO sought details
concerning the circumstances of the DUI and the Individual’s alcohol consumption practices. Ex.
9 at 210‒11. In his October 2, 2024, response, the Individual stated that he consumed “a case of
twisted teas the night before” the DUI. Id. at 194. He further indicated that he began regularly
consuming alcohol at twenty-one years of age, and that he typically consumed “[a]bout a case” of
alcoholic beverages per sitting when he consumed alcohol. Id.
B. Evaluation by the DOE Psychologist
The Individual met with the DOE Psychologist for the psychological evaluation on February 7,
2025. Ex. 7 at 175. The Individual told the DOE Psychologist that he began consuming alcohol
regularly when he turned twenty-one in 2023. Id. at 176. The Individual’s alcohol consumption
accelerated quickly, and he and his fiancée hosted parties at his home “about every other weekend”
whereat the Individual would consume “about a case” of alcoholic beverages. Id. at 176; see also
Tr. at 13, 15 (testimony of fiancée corroborating the Individual’s self-described drinking habits
and indicating that she was always with him when he consumed alcohol because they reside
together and she acted as a designated driver when he would consume alcohol outside of the home).
The Individual represented to the DOE Psychologist that he had reduced his alcohol consumption
since being charged with DUI. Ex. 7 at 177. He claimed that he had last consumed alcohol “two
or three weekends” prior to the psychological evaluation at a birthday party where he consumed
“6 beers and shot [sic].” Id.; see also Tr. at 82 (Individual testifying at the hearing that the birthday
party in question occurred approximately one week prior to the psychological evaluation and that
he had misremembered the date when he reported it to the DOE Psychologist); Tr. at 145‒46 (DOE
Psychologist testifying that he could not recall whether the Individual reported consuming six
beers and one shot, six beers and six shots, or some other number of drinks).
Immediately following the psychological evaluation, the Individual provided laboratory samples
for two alcohol-related tests: an Ethyl Glucuronide (EtG) test and a Phosphatidylethanol (PEth)
test.3 Ex. 7 at 177. The EtG test was negative, which the DOE Psychologist understood to mean
that it was “very unlikely” that the Individual had “consumed significant amounts of alcohol within
the 96 hours prior to . . . the lab test.” Id. The PEth test was positive at 273 ng/mL, which the DOE
Psychologist claimed “provid[ed] medical evidence that [the Individual] ha[d] been drinking on a
3 “PEth is a biomarker for alcohol consumption that can be detected in blood for approximately thirty days following
moderate or greater episodes of alcohol consumption.” See Personnel Security Hearing, OHA Case No. PSH-25-0093
at 5 n.3 (2025) (summarizing information from a medical doctor and journal article concerning PEth testing).
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regular or heavy basis within a few weeks of the test, and likely ha[d] engaged in binge drinking
episodes or moderate drinking episodes within about one week of the test.” Id.; see also Tr. at 148‒
49 (testifying at the hearing that the Individual’s testimony that he engaged in binge drinking
approximately one week prior to the psychological evaluation was “consistent with the [PE]th
test”).
On March 14, 2025, the DOE Psychologist issued the Report wherein he opined that the Individual
habitually or binge consumed alcohol to the point of impaired judgment.4 Ex. 7 at 179‒80. The
DOE Psychologist recommended that the Individual attend outpatient substance abuse counseling
for six weeks followed by “further treatment to be determined by counselor.” Id.
C. Ignition Interlock Violation & Subsequent Court Orders
In January 2025, the Individual pleaded guilty to DUI and was ordered to attend an alcohol
education class, have an ignition interlock device installed on his vehicle for six months, and
refrain from driving except to work, medical appointments, and church. Tr. at 102‒03. On
February 9, 2025, the Individual binge consumed alcohol at home with friends while watching the
Super Bowl. Id. at 95 (Individual testifying that he drank “heavily” on that occasion); see also id.
at 21‒22 (Individual’s fiancée estimating that he consumed approximately twelve drinks that
night); id. at 130 (DOE Psychologist characterizing the Individual’s alcohol consumption on this
occasion as a binge episode). Early the next morning, the Individual attempted to move his vehicle,
which was blocking his fiancée’s vehicle in their driveway, and triggered the ignition interlock.
Id. at 29‒30, 70‒71.
In April 2025, the Individual enrolled in a ten-week substance abuse counseling program. Id. at
64‒65. The Individual attended group counseling once per week, during which a counselor
provided educational information about alcohol abuse and led group discussions regarding
participants’ experiences with substance abuse. Id. at 111‒12. The Individual successfully
completed the substance abuse counseling program on July 9, 2025. Ex. A.
On May 15, 2025, the Individual submitted the Second PSIR wherein he disclosed that he had
been charged with Interlock Ignition Violation. Ex. 5 at 119‒20. The Individual claimed in the
Second PSIR that the interlock violation occurred when he attempted to start his vehicle shortly
after having used mouthwash. Id. at 121. However, the Individual’s fiancée revealed in her hearing
testimony that the Individual had binge consumed alcohol the night before the incident. Tr. at 16‒
17, 21‒22.5
4 The DOE Psychologist cited a Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration definition of “binge
drinking” as “consuming five or more standard drinks per occasion . . . .” Ex. 7 at 182; but see Alcohol’s Effects on
Health, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM, https://www.niaaa.nih.gov/alcohols-effects-
health/alcohol-drinking-patterns) (Feb. 2025) (defining binge consumption of alcohol for men as consumption of
“five or more drinks . . . in about two hours”) (emphasis added). The DOE Psychologist defined habitual consumption
of alcohol to the point impaired judgment as “[b]ecoming intoxicated twice a month” based on OHA precedent. Ex. 7
at 183.
5 The Individual attempted to interrupt his fiancée’s testimony when she began describing his alcohol consumption on
the night of February 9, 2025. Tr. at 16. It is possible that this interruption was an attempt to alert the fiancée to the
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After the Individual’s interlock violation, his fiancée told him he “probably need[ed] to just cut
[his drinking] off completely.” Tr. at 25. The Individual testified that he had gradually reduced his
alcohol consumption since his DUI and last consumed alcohol in June 2025. Tr. at 94‒95; see also
Ex. C at 1 (PEth test collected on August 21, 2025, which was negative for traces of alcohol
consumption). The Individual’s fiancée testified at the hearing that she believed the Individual last
consumed alcohol while watching the Super Bowl in February 2025 and was apparently unaware
that the Individual consumed alcohol as recently as June 2025. Tr. at 22, 27.
In July 2025, the Individual appeared in court in connection with the Interlock Ignition Violation
charge. Tr. at 73; Ex. D at 2. The Individual was found guilty and ordered to maintain the interlock
device on his vehicle for an additional month, continue attending alcohol education classes, and
abstain from alcohol. Ex. D at 2.
The Individual stopped regularly associating with friends with whom he used to binge drink, and
he and his fiancée now spend time with friends who consume in moderation or not at all. Tr. at
27‒28, 99‒100; see also id. at 39, 52‒53 (testimony of the Individual’s mother, who lives across
the street from him, that she has not observed the Individual hosting parties since the interlock
violation and that she is aware that he spends more time with responsible friends, at the gym, and
attending church). He and his fiancée no longer maintain alcohol in their home. Id. at 34. The
Individual intends to abstain from alcohol going forward. Id. at 60‒61. The Individual’s fiancée
does not consume alcohol and supports the Individual’s abstinence from alcohol. Id. at 28, 33.
The Individual claimed that the interlock device on his vehicle was removed “a couple weeks”
prior to the hearing. Id. at 104; see also id. at 31 (Individual’s fiancée testifying that the interlock
device was removed). The Individual also claimed to have completed the court-ordered alcohol
education classes but provided no evidence to corroborate that he had done so. Id. at 103; see also
Ex. B (documenting that the Individual was scheduled to attend court-ordered weekly alcohol
education classes for four weeks beginning on August 19, 2025). The Individual testified that he
had completed all court-ordered obligations related to his DUI offense and was released from either
probation or a diversion program but did not provide evidence of this claim. Tr. at 106.
The DOE Psychologist testified at the hearing that the Individual’s counseling had satisfied his
treatment recommendation and demonstrated rehabilitation. Id. at 133, 142‒43. He opined that,
based on the Individual’s alcohol history and testimony at the hearing, the Individual should
“completely abstain” from alcohol because he had demonstrated himself unable to consume
alcohol in moderation. Id. at 134‒35. The DOE Psychologist further opined that the Individual
would have a positive prognosis if he continued to rely on his fiancée, mother, and friends who
fact that the question to which she was responding from the DOE counsel concerned the Individual’s alcohol
consumption on the night prior to his arrest for DUI and not the night prior to his triggering the ignition interlock. Id.
at 15‒16. It is also possible that this interruption was an attempt to prevent the fiancée from disclosing adverse
information concerning the reason for the Ignition Interlock Violation. Following the testimony of his fiancée, in
response to questions concerning why he failed to attribute the Interlock Ignition Violation to his binge drinking in
the Second PSIR, the Individual responded as follows: “I thought that I did put that in there, but I assumed that – I
actually thought I did put – what, now I see how it looks bad. Yeah, I thought that I had put in there that I drank the
previous night, and I just thought it was the mouthwash at first, but . . . [Individual’s testimony trails off without
further explanation].” Id. at 76.
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used alcohol responsibly as social support for his abstinence from alcohol, avoided social
situations which could lead him to relapse, and completely abstained from alcohol rather than
trying to “dabble” in controlled drinking. Id. at 136‒37, 142‒43. The DOE Psychologist explained
that, in his opinion, the Individual appeared to have had “a wake-up call” as to the seriousness of
his alcohol misuse, was motivated to address the situation, and had positive social supports to help
him avoid future alcohol misuse. Id. at 140.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Guideline E
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns under Guideline E include:
(a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or
falsification before being confronted with the facts;
(b) the refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was caused or significantly
contributed to by advice of legal counsel or of a person with professional
responsibilities for advising or instructing the individual specifically concerning
security processes. Upon being made aware of the requirement to cooperate or provide
the information, the individual cooperated fully and truthfully;
(c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent,
or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not
cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the
behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or
factors that contributed to untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior,
and such behavior is unlikely to recur;
(e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to
exploitation, manipulation, or duress;
(f) the information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable reliability; and
(g) association with persons involved in criminal activities was unwitting, has ceased, or
occurs under circumstances that do not cast doubt upon the individual’s reliability,
trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness to comply with rules and regulations.
Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 17.
With respect to the Individual’s statement to the DOE Psychologist during the clinical interview
that he had engaged in binge drinking two to three weeks prior to the psychological evaluation,
the Individual testified at the hearing that the binge drinking episode in fact occurred one week
prior to the psychological evaluation. The DOE Psychologist testified that he believed that the
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Individual’s revised estimate of when he last binge consumed alcohol prior to the psychological
evaluation was consistent with the result of the PEth test conducted immediately following the
clinical interview.6 Whether the Individual last binge consumed alcohol one week, two weekends,
or three weekends prior to the psychological evaluation is a distinction without a difference; the
salient fact is that the Individual truthfully told the DOE Psychologist during the psychological
evaluation that he binge consumed alcohol shortly before his meeting with the DOE Psychologist.
As the Individual’s misstatement of the date of his last binge episode to the DOE Psychologist was
of no consequence to the adjudication of the Individual’s alcohol-related security concerns, I find
that the Individual’s misstatement was so minor that it is mitigated pursuant to the third mitigating
condition. Id. at ¶ 17(c).
Turning to the Individual’s statements in the First PSIR related to his alcohol consumption prior
to his DUI arrest, two mitigating conditions are present. First, the Individual admitted in his
response to the LOI, little over one week after he submitted the PSIR, that he had consumed a case
of alcoholic beverages the night before his DUI arrest. There is no indication in the record that the
Individual was confronted with having consumed more than “a couple” alcoholic beverages before
he provided his response to the LOI, and his admission to having consumed a case of alcohol prior
to the arrest a mere eight days after the misleading statement was prompt. Accordingly, I find that
the Individual’s misleading statement in the PSIR is mitigated pursuant to the first mitigating
condition. Id. at ¶ 17(a).
Additionally, while the Individual’s statement that he consumed “a couple” alcoholic beverages
prior to the arrest might have misled the LSO, the Individual was also forthcoming in the PSIR
that he commonly consumed “a case” of alcoholic beverages per sitting and had been intoxicated
about ten times in the prior year. Considering that the Individual was forthcoming in the PSIR that
he consumed alcohol in a binge pattern, I find that the misleading statement regarding the
Individual’s alcohol consumption on the night prior to his DUI arrest was relatively minor since
the PSIR as a whole clearly communicated to the LSO that the Individual engaged in maladaptive
alcohol consumption. Accordingly, I find that the Individual’s underreporting of his alcohol
consumption on the night prior to his DUI arrest in the PSIR is mitigated pursuant to the third
mitigating condition. Id. at ¶ 17(c).
Having concluded that the LSO’s allegations concerning the Individual’s statements in the PSIR
and to the DOE Psychologist during the psychological evaluation are mitigated, I find that the
Individual has resolved the security concerns asserted by the LSO under Guideline E.
B. Guideline G
6 If the DOE Psychologist had opined that the Individual’s testimony was inconsistent with the results of the PEth test,
I would likely still have concluded that the LSO’s allegation either was resolved or did not present a concern at all
because the DOE Psychologist was not established as an expert in the interpretation of PEth tests and therefore there
was no basis for me to conclude that the Individual’s account of his drinking was inconsistent with the result of the
PEth test. Tr. at 7 (indicating that the DOE Psychologist was recognized as an expert in clinical psychology as opposed
to a psychiatrist or medical doctor); see also id. at 146‒47 (DOE Psychologist testifying that he does not have any
formal training or credentials related to the interpretation of PEth tests, does not interpret them outside of the context
of DOE consulting evaluations, and could only identify one paper as the basis for his knowledge of the interpretation
of the PEth test).
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Conditions that could mitigate security concerns under Guideline G include:
(a) so much time has passed, or the behavior was so infrequent, or it happened under such
unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the
individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or judgment;
(b) the individual acknowledges his or her pattern of maladaptive alcohol use, provides
evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and has demonstrated a clear and
established pattern of modified consumption or abstinence in accordance with
treatment recommendations;
(c) the individual is participating in counseling or a treatment program, has no previous
history of treatment and relapse, and is making satisfactory progress in a treatment
program; or,
(d) the individual has successfully completed a treatment program along with any required
aftercare, and has demonstrated a clear and established pattern of modified
consumption or abstinence in accordance with treatment recommendations.
Id. at ¶ 23.
The Individual’s binge consumption of alcohol, which resulted in his DUI and Ignition Interlock
Violation, was a regular practice and occurred under ordinary circumstances. Moreover, the
Ignition Interlock Violation following a binge drinking episode by the Individual occurred only
about seven months prior to the hearing, and the Individual did not significantly modify his alcohol
consumption until some time after that. Considering the frequency, recency, and ordinary
circumstances in which the Individual engaged in binge drinking and alcohol-related incidents, I
find that he has not demonstrated the applicability of the first mitigating condition. Id. at ¶ 23(a).
The Individual has acknowledged his pattern of maladaptive alcohol use and taken action to
overcome this problem, most notably by participating in counseling as recommended by the DOE
Psychologist. Consequently, the DOE Psychologist opined that the Individual had demonstrated
rehabilitation. Furthermore, there is no record evidence that the Individual was provided a
treatment recommendation concerning modified consumption or abstinence until the DOE
Psychologist recommended permanent abstinence from alcohol at the hearing. Accordingly, I find
that the Individual has established the applicability of the second mitigating condition. Id. at
¶ 23(b).
The third mitigating condition is irrelevant to the facts of this case because the Individual is not
currently receiving alcohol-related treatment. Id. at ¶ 23(c).
As the Individual successfully completed counseling in compliance with the DOE Psychologist’s
recommendations, and there is no evidence that he was provided with recommendations
concerning modified consumption or abstinence prior to the hearing, I find that he has established
the applicability of the fourth mitigating condition. Id. at ¶ 23(d).
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Although the Individual has established the applicability of two mitigating conditions under
Guideline G, the Adjudicative Guidelines provide that the mitigating conditions could mitigate
security concerns under Guideline G, not that they necessarily do so. Id. at ¶ 23 (emphasis added).
In applying the mitigating conditions, I have been guided by regulatory considerations set forth at
10 C.F.R. § 710.7(c), including “the age and maturity of the [I]ndividual at the time of the
conduct,” “the frequency and recency of the conduct,” and “the likelihood of continuation or
recurrence.” The Individual’s youth and immaturity during the events cited in the SSC weigh in
his favor. Considering that he was only twenty-one years old at the time of his arrest for DUI, his
judgment and reliability were likely still in the process of developing. However, the Individual has
aged only one year since that time. And further, the Individual’s conduct after his DUI calls into
question both whether such a maturation has occurred and whether the Individual’s alcohol misuse
is likely to recur. The Individual’s binge consumption of alcohol which led to the Ignition Interlock
Violation strongly suggests that he did not learn a sufficient lesson from his DUI to modify his
behavior. Even after the Ignition Interlock Violation, the Individual continued to consume alcohol
until shortly before he was court-ordered to abstain from alcohol. These behaviors suggest that he
will be at risk of returning to alcohol misuse when he is no longer subject to the scrutiny of the
administrative review process related to his access authorization.
Further weighing against the Individual, I find it notable that he continued to consume alcohol for
months while attending substance abuse counseling and after his fiancée believed he had stopped
consuming alcohol. Moreover, although the DOE Psychologist found the Individual had
demonstrated rehabilitation, his positive prognosis was qualified upon the Individual taking
numerous actions, including completely abstaining from alcohol. I cannot reliably conclude when
the Individual last consumed alcohol. As noted, the Individual’s fiancée believed that he began
abstaining from alcohol in February 2025 when, by his own admission, he continued to consume
alcohol until at least June 2025. The August 2025 PEth test produced by the Individual only
corroborates his claimed abstinence in the four weeks prior to the PEth test. Considering the
Individual’s misrepresentation to the LSO in the Second PSIR, which was only revealed by the
Individual’s fiancée at the hearing, and the Individual’s lack of forthcomingness to his fiancée
concerning the recency of his alcohol consumption, I cannot rely on the Individual’s
unsubstantiated account of his alcohol consumption prior to or after the period measured by the
August 2025 PEth test. In light of these considerations, the Individual’s maladaptive alcohol use
may have occurred recently and is likely at high risk of recurrence.
Considering the foregoing, I am not convinced that the youth and immaturity that led to the
Individual’s alcohol-related misconduct is no longer present, I cannot reliably conclude when the
Individual most recently engaged in alcohol misuse, and I harbor significant concerns that the
Individual’s alcohol misuse and alcohol-related misconduct will recur. Weighed against these
negative considerations, I find that the Individual’s limited substance abuse counseling and
approximately one month of demonstrated abstinence from alcohol, while sufficient to technically
establish the applicability of two mitigating conditions, are insufficient to resolve the security
concerns asserted by the LSO under Guideline G.
VI. CONCLUSION
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In the above analysis, I found that there was sufficient derogatory information in the possession of
DOE to raise security concerns under Guidelines E and G of the Adjudicative Guidelines. After
considering all the relevant information, favorable and unfavorable, in a comprehensive, common-
sense manner, including weighing all the testimony and other evidence presented at the hearing, I
find that the Individual has brought forth sufficient evidence to resolve the security concerns
asserted by the LSO under Guideline E but has not resolved the security concerns under Guideline
G. Accordingly, I have determined that the Individual’s access authorization should not be
restored. This Decision may be appealed in accordance with the procedures set forth at 10 C.F.R.
§ 710.28.
Phillip Harmonick
Administrative Judge
Office of Hearings and Appeals