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Department of Energy · Office of Hearings and Appeals

PSH-25-0205

A personnel-security hearing decision under 10 CFR Part 710. The individual is not named in the decision. Descriptive of the published record, never a prediction.

ResultNot favorable (“should not be restored”)
Administrative JudgeErin C. Weinstock
Decision issued2025-12-03
Filed2025-09-11
Concerns (guidelines)Personal conduct (E), Financial considerations (F)
RepresentationNot stated
Read the full decision
*The original of this document contains information which is subject to withholding from disclosure
under 5 U.S. C. § 552. Such material has been deleted from this copy and replaced with XXXXXX’s.
United States Department of Energy
Office of Hearings and Appeals
In the Matter of: Personnel Security Hearing )
)
Filing Date: September 11, 2025 ) Case No.: PSH-25-0205
)
__________________________________________)
Issued: December 3, 2025
____________________________
Administrative Judge Decision
____________________________
Erin C. Weinstock, Administrative Judge:
This Decision concerns the eligibility of XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (the Individual) to hold an
access authorization under the United States Department of Energy’s (DOE) regulations, set forth
at 10 C.F.R. Part 710, “Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Matter and
Special Nuclear Material or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position.”1 As discussed below, after
carefully considering the record before me in light of the relevant regulations and the National
Security Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information
or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position (June 8, 2017) (Adjudicative Guidelines), I conclude
that the Individual’s access authorization should not be restored.
I. BACKGROUND
The Individual was granted access authorization in connection to his employment with a DOE
contractor. Exhibit (Ex.) 2 at 1–2.2 In April 2025, DOE received a report of suspicious activity
from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) explaining that the Individual was
involved in transactions with bitcoin through Cash App that raised concerns about money
laundering. Hearing Transcript, OHA Case No. PSH-25-0205 (Tr.) at 77–78. As a result of this
report, the Local Security Office (LSO) issued the Individual a Letter of Interrogatory (First LOI),
which the Individual completed on May 21, 2025. Ex. 6. The LSO issued the Individual a second
Letter of Interrogatory (Second LOI) to answer some outstanding questions, which the Individual
completed on May 29, 2025. Ex. 8.
1 The regulations define access authorization as “an administrative determination that an individual is eligible for access
to classified matter or is eligible for access to, or control over, special nuclear material.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.5(a). This
Decision will refer to such authorization as access authorization or security clearance.
2 References to the Local Security Office’s (LSO) exhibits are to the exhibit number and the PDF page number in the
exhibit notebook.
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The LSO subsequently issued the Individual a Notification Letter advising him that it possessed
reliable information that created substantial doubt regarding his eligibility for access authorization.
Ex. 1 at 2–4. In a Summary of Security Concerns (SSC) attached to the letter, the LSO explained
that the derogatory information raised security concerns under Guideline E and Guideline F of the
Adjudicative Guidelines. Ex. 2 at 6–8.
The Individual exercised his right to request an administrative review hearing pursuant to
10 C.F.R. Part 710. Ex. 3. The Director of the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) appointed
me as the Administrative Judge in this matter, and I conducted an administrative hearing. The LSO
submitted eight exhibits (Ex. 1–8). The Individual submitted 4 exhibits (Ex. A–D). The Individual
testified on his own behalf and presented the testimony of his wife. Tr. at 12, 30. The LSO
presented the testimony of the DOE personnel security specialist involved in this case. Id. at 75.
II. THE SECURITY CONCERNS
Under Guideline E, “[c]onduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s
reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information.” Adjudicative
Guidelines at ¶ 15. In citing Guideline E, the LSO relied upon the Individual’s admission that he
had been involved in an online relationship with a person that he had never met in person or spoken
to on the phone, including making financial transactions totaling approximately $26,000 for this
person and giving them around $5,000 in gift cards. Ex. 2 at 7–8; Ex. 6 at 24; Ex. 8 at 37–39. The
information cited by the LSO justifies its invocation of Guideline E. See Adjudicative Guidelines
at ¶ 16(d)(3), (e)(1), (g) (indicating that a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations, engaging in
activities which, if known, could affect a person’s personal, professional, or community standing,
and association with persons involved in criminal activity may raise security concerns under
Guideline E).
Guideline F, under which the LSO raised additional security concerns, relates to security risks
arising from financial concerns. “Failure to live within one’s means, satisfy debts, and meet
financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to abide
by rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions about an individual’s reliability,
trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information.” Id. at ¶ 18. In citing
Guideline F, the LSO alleged that the Individual had purchased an unknown person $5,000 worth
of gift cards, converted funds to bitcoin for that same unknown person, had his Cash App account
closed due to a “policy violation,” and did not tell his wife about these financial transactions. Ex.
2 at 6–7. The LSO alleged that these behaviors raised a concern that the Individual “has been
involved in money transfers that are inconsistent with known legal sources of income.” Ex. 2 at 6.
Under the Adjudicative Guidelines, such money transfers could raise a Guideline F concern if they
show “unexplained affluence.” Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 19(g). As there is no assertion that the
Individual gained any affluence from these transactions, the transactions themselves do not raise
a security concern under ¶ 19(g) of the Adjudicative Guidelines. Accordingly, I find that the
information cited by the LSO does not justify its invocation of Guideline F. At the hearing, the
personnel security specialist testified that an ODNI alert had raised concerns that the Individual
was involved with money laundering. Tr. at 77–78. While such an alert could raise a Guideline F
concern of “deceptive or illegal financial practices,” see Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 19(d), this
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concern was not raised in the SSC, and therefore I do not consider it as Guideline F concern
properly raised by the LSO. Rather, I consider the personnel security specialist’s testimony to the
extent that it supports assertions by the LSO under Guideline E that the Individual exercised poor
judgment in his dealings with the unknown person.
As none of the allegations enumerated in the SSC support the security concern the LSO specifically
alleged under Guideline F, I find that there is no properly invoked Guideline F concern here.
III. REGULATORY STANDARDS
A DOE administrative review proceeding under Part 710 requires me, as the Administrative Judge,
to issue a Decision that reflects my comprehensive, common-sense judgment, made after
consideration of all the relevant evidence, favorable and unfavorable, as to whether the granting
or continuation of a person’s access authorization will not endanger the common defense and
security and is clearly consistent with the national interest. 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(a). The regulatory
standard implies that there is a presumption against granting or restoring a security clearance. See
Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988) (“clearly consistent with the national interest”
standard for granting security clearances indicates “that security determinations should err, if they
must, on the side of denials”); Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1990) (strong
presumption against the issuance of a security clearance).
An individual must come forward at the hearing with evidence to convince the DOE that granting
or restoring access authorization “will not endanger the common defense and security and will be
clearly consistent with the national interest.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.27(d). An individual is afforded a
full opportunity to present evidence supporting their eligibility for an access authorization. The
Part 710 regulations are drafted to permit the introduction of a very broad range of evidence at
personnel security hearings. Even appropriate hearsay evidence may be admitted. Id. at
§ 710.26(h). Hence, an individual is afforded the utmost latitude in the presentation of evidence to
mitigate the security concerns at issue.
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT
The Individual has held a security clearance since around 2015. Tr. at 42. Since that time, he has
received at least annual briefings about scams, phishing, and reporting suspicious activity. Id. at
43.
Around 2023, the Individual met a new “friend”3 online and began regularly communicating with
her. Ex. 6 at 24; Ex. 8 at 37; Tr. at 55. The Individual and the friend would text “daily,” and “at
first the narrative was flirtatious.” Ex. 8 at 37. The Individual and his friend have never met in
person, spoken on the telephone, or spoken via video call. Id.; Tr. at 57–58. The Individual never
verified the friend’s identity, but she sent him “pictures of herself.” Ex. 8 at 38. At some point after
they began communicating the friend told the Individual that “[s]he wanted to help in our
3 Throughout this Decision, I refer to the person that the Individual met online as his “friend” because the Individual
referred to her as such in his responses to DOE and during the hearing. That designation is not meant to indicate that
this person was truly a friend of the Individual, as opposed to a person of unknown identity who “played” him, as
the Individual eventually came to believe. See Tr. at 52, 65–66.
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relationship and suggested getting cash app.” Id. at 37. The Individual said the friend told him
“[s]he wanted to share financial [sic] as our relationship was growing.” Id. The friend would have
her friends or family transfer money to the Individual’s Cash App account, and then, the Individual
would use this money to purchase bitcoin. Id.; Tr. at 46–47. The Individual would then transfer
the money to the friend’s digital wallet. Ex. 8 at 37; Tr. at 47. The Individual made over $26,000
in bitcoin related transactions for his friend. Ex. 6 at 27–31. The Individual could not recall when
he started making these bitcoin purchases for his friend. Tr. at 53. The friend had told the Individual
that she could not purchase the bitcoin herself because even though she said that she lived in the
United States, her bank accounts were based in another country where bitcoin could not be
purchased. Ex. 8 at 37–38; Tr. at 62. At the time he was making these transfers, the Individual did
not see any “red flags” that indicated to him that something illegal might have been occurring. Tr.
at 48. He thought he was just “helping a friend.” Id. at 52. The Individual’s family, including his
wife, was not aware of his relationship with the friend until the relationship created a problem with
his security clearance. Id. at 21; Ex. 8 at 37. The testimony at the hearing did not make it clear
what the Individual had told his wife or others about his relationship with the online friend or the
nature of that relationship. Tr. at 21 (testimony from the Individual’s wife indicating that it was
her understanding that the Individual had a text message friendship with the friend but never spoke
on the phone to her).
Cash App closed the Individual’s account for a “policy violation” in the middle of 2025. Ex. 7 at
24. At the time of the hearing, the Individual did not understand what rule he had violated to cause
the account closure. Tr. at 71.
In addition to carrying out transactions involving Cash App and bitcoin, the Individual purchased
approximately $5,000 in gift cards for the friend using his own money. Ex. 8 at 37. The Individual
stated that he had not gained any money from his transactions with his friend. Tr. at 72–73. The
personnel security specialist agreed with this assessment. Id. at 90–91.
The Individual stopped engaging in the bitcoin transactions with his friend when he learned that it
could create a problem for his security clearance, but he continued communicating with the friend
until August 2025. Id. at 59–60. He testified that while he was completing the bitcoin transactions
for his friend, he was unaware that his actions could be seen to have been part of a money
laundering scheme. Id. at 64–65. In retrospect, he knows he “got played,” and he testified that he
will not do anything like this again. Id. at 52, 65–66.
At the time of the hearing, the Individual was undergoing counseling to help him to discover why
he felt the need to form the relationship he did with his friend and how he can recognize red flags
in relationships in the future. Id. at 66–67; Ex A (letter from the Individual’s counselor confirming
that he was being treated). He said that talking to a counselor will help him to identify why he
“engaged” with this friend rather than his wife or other in-person friends or family. Tr. at 67. The
Individual had undergone three sessions with his counselor at the time of the hearing. Id. at 68.
When asked what he has learned in these sessions that will prevent him from getting into similar
situations in the future, the Individual testified that he was working on “recognizing why” he began
the relationship with the friend “in the first place.” Id. at 69–70. His response did not specifically
indicate how “recognizing why” he began the relationship would help him to avoid similar
situations in the future. Id. at 70–71.
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V. ANALYSIS
Guideline E
Conditions that can mitigate security concerns based on personal conduct include the following:
(a) The individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission,
concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts;
(b) The refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was caused or
significantly contributed to by advice of legal counsel or of a person with
professional responsibilities for advising or instructing the individual
specifically concerning security processes. Upon being made aware of the
requirement to cooperate or provide the information, the individual cooperated
fully and truthfully;
(c) The offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so
infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to
recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or
good judgment;
(d) The individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to
change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors,
circumstances, or factors that contributed to untrustworthy, unreliable, or other
inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur;
(e) The individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to
exploitation, manipulation, or duress;
(f) The information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable
reliability; and
(g) Association with persons involved in criminal activities was unwitting, has
ceased, or occurs under circumstances that do not cast doubt upon the
individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness to comply
with rules and regulations.
Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 17.
Mitigating factor (a) does not apply here because there is no allegation that the Individual has
omitted, concealed, or falsified information.
There is no allegation that the Individual refused or otherwise failed to cooperate with the LSO.
Therefore, mitigating factor (b) is not applicable.
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I cannot find that the Individual’s behavior is mitigated pursuant to mitigating factor (c) because
the behavior is recent and repeated, and the Individual has not articulated clear steps he is taking
that will prevent it from reoccurring in the future. The Individual’s concealed his relationship with
his friend from his family for a period of nearly two years while he was engaging in daily text
conversations with her. He was in contact with her until about August 2025. He made regular
transactions of large sums of money for his friend without telling his wife. I cannot find that this
conduct, involving secrecy and large sums of money, is minor. Further, the Individual presented
no evidence showing that this behavior occurred under unique circumstances that were unlikely to
recur.
As to mitigating factor (d), the Individual testified that he has obtained counseling to understand
why he began this relationship with his friend, and he provided a letter from the counselor to
support his testimony. However, at the time of the hearing, the Individual had only completed three
sessions with his counselor, and he testified that these sessions had been devoted to determining
why he felt the need to begin the relationship with the friend, rather than work on strategies that
would prevent similar relationships from occurring in the future without the knowledge of his wife,
or prevent him from being “played” by someone who was using him to carry out potentially illegal
financial transactions. Therefore, I cannot find that the three counseling sessions are sufficient to
change the behavior and make the Individual more trustworthy and reliable.
As noted above, while the Individual has begun to take steps to reduce his vulnerability, his
testimony showed that his counseling had not yet addressed how he would prevent future
vulnerabilities. It is also unclear from the hearing testimony how much information the Individual
has revealed to his wife, friends, and family members about his online relationship. Without further
information about his counseling sessions or additional clarity regarding whether the Individual is
still susceptible to blackmail about his relationship with the friend, I cannot find that the Individual
has mitigated the security concerns pursuant to mitigating factor (e).
The Individual admitted to the behavior raised by the LSO. Therefore, mitigating factor (f) does
not apply.
To the extent that the security concerns arise from the Individual’s association with his friend and
any potential criminal activity in which she may be engaged, mitigating factor (g) could be present
here because the Individual testified at the hearing that he was unaware that the transactions he
was making for his friend could be seen as money laundering. However, given the Individual’s
heavy involvement in the financial transactions with the friend, his inability to recognize the
potential criminality of those actions at the time, and the absence of concrete information about
how the Individual will prevent himself from becoming unwittingly involved in a similar scheme
in the future, I do not find that the Individual has mitigated the security concerns regarding his
involvement with “persons involved in criminal activity.” See 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(c) (explaining
that DOE officials should consider the “nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct” and “the
absence or presence of . . . pertinent behavioral changes” in applying the Adjudicative Guidelines).
Therefore, I cannot find that mitigating factor (g) is present here. Further, even if I had concluded
that his association with persons involved in criminal activity was unwitting and resolved pursuant
to ¶ 17(g), the concerns about the Individual’s judgment and vulnerability to exploitation,
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manipulation, or duress would remain, and I would still conclude that the security concerns under
Guideline E were not fully resolved.
Accordingly, I find that the Individual has not mitigated the security concerns asserted by the LSO
under Guideline E.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the above analysis, I found that there was sufficient derogatory information in the possession of
DOE to raise security concerns under Guideline E, but not under Guideline F of the Adjudicative
Guidelines. After considering all the relevant information, favorable and unfavorable, in a
comprehensive, common-sense manner, including weighing all the testimony and other evidence
presented at the hearing, I find that the Individual has not brought forth sufficient evidence to
resolve the security concerns set forth under Guideline E in the Summary of Security Concerns.
Accordingly, I have determined that the Individual’s access authorization should be not be
restored. This Decision may be appealed in accordance with the procedures set forth at 10 C.F.R.
§ 710.28.
Erin C. Weinstock
Administrative Judge
Office of Hearings and Appeals

This is the Department of Energy’s own published decision, kept separate from the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals record used elsewhere on this site. General information from a public decision, not legal advice about any particular case.