PSH-25-0210

*The original of this document contains information which is subject to withholding from disclosure
under 5 U.S. C. § 552. Such material has been deleted from this copy and replaced with XXXXXX’s.
United States Department of Energy
Office of Hearings and Appeals
In the Matter of: Personnel Security Hearing )
)
Filing Date: September 16, 2025 ) Case No.: PSH-25-0210
)
__________________________________________)
Issued: November 5, 2025
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Administrative Judge Decision
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Phillip Harmonick, Administrative Judge:
This Decision concerns the eligibility of XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (the Individual) to hold an
access authorization under the United States Department of Energy’s (DOE) regulations, set forth
at 10 C.F.R. Part 710, “Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Matter and
Special Nuclear Material or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position.”1 As discussed below, after
carefully considering the record before me in light of the relevant regulations and the National
Security Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information
or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position (June 8, 2017) (Adjudicative Guidelines), I conclude
that the Individual’s access authorization should not be restored.
I. BACKGROUND
The Individual has possessed access authorization since at least 2012 in connection with her
employment by DOE. See Exhibit (Ex.) 4 at 38‒39 (Individual providing her clearance
investigation history in a Questionnaire for National Security Positions (QNSP)).2 In 2016, the
Individual was disciplined for having “tapped” another employee with a cart in the workplace. Id.
at 24; Ex. 5 at 50‒51. In September 2023, the Individual was issued a memorandum indicating that
she had violated security policies concerning cellphone use in a restricted area. Ex. 6 at 53. The
Individual was directed to abide by cellphone use and storage policies and to refrain from
distracting guards at security stations. Id.
In 2024, the Individual was the subject of an insider threat report regarding allegedly threatening
and violent behavior. Ex. 7 at 63. On July 27, 2024, following an investigation, a report (DOE
1 The regulations define access authorization as “an administrative determination that an individual is eligible for access
to classified matter or is eligible for access to, or control over, special nuclear material.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.5(a). This
Decision will refer to such authorization as access authorization or security clearance.
2 DOE submitted its exhibits as a single PDF exhibit notebook. This Decision will cite to the pages in the exhibit
notebook in the order in which they appear regardless of their internal pagination.
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Memo) was issued concluding that the Individual did not present an insider threat but that the
Individual had demonstrated “concerning behaviors” related to workplace violence, had engaged
in “repeated insubordination,” and presented “an outstanding concern with time and attendance.”
Id. at 61. Among other things, witnesses reported that the Individual had threatened violence
against DOE personnel, displayed extreme emotion over minor workplace difficulties, was “curt”
and “aggressive” in her workplace interactions, and had negative interactions with contractor
personnel such that many of them refused to work with her. Id. at 65‒67. On October 18, 2024,
the Individual was issued a letter of reprimand for falsely claiming twenty hours of overtime she
did not work on her time and attendance records. Ex. 8 at 76.
On November 7, 2024, the local security office (LSO) received a personnel security information
report (PSIR) disclosing that the Individual had committed a security infraction several months
prior to the submission of the PSIR. Ex. 9 at 80‒82. The PSIR stated that the Individual left three
uncleared contractors she was escorting unattended in an area containing restricted data and/or
classified documents while she was socializing with guards at a security station. Id. The PSIR
further stated that the Individual had intentionally committed the security violation and attempted
to deceive officials investigating the violation. Id. The LSO issued the Individual a letter of
interrogatory (LOI) concerning the circumstances of the security infraction. Ex. 10. In her response
to the LOI, the Individual attributed her leaving the contractors unattended to “multitask[ing].” Ex.
11 at 90.
The LSO issued the Individual a Notification Letter advising her that it possessed reliable
information that created substantial doubt regarding her eligibility for access authorization. Ex. 1
at 2‒4. In a Summary of Security Concerns (SSC) attached to the letter, the LSO explained that
the derogatory information raised security concerns under Guidelines E and K of the Adjudicative
Guidelines. Ex. 2 at 6‒9.
The Individual exercised her right to request an administrative review hearing pursuant to
10 C.F.R. Part 710. Ex. 3. The Director of the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) appointed
me as the Administrative Judge in this matter, and I conducted an administrative hearing. The LSO
submitted thirteen exhibits (Ex. 1–13). The Individual submitted ten exhibits (Ex. A‒J). The
Individual testified on her own behalf and offered the testimony of her supervisor (Current
Supervisor). Transcript of Hearing, OHA Case No. PSH-25-0210 at 3, 13, 34‒35 (Tr.). The LSO
offered the testimony of the security official (Security Official) who authored the DOE Memo. Id.
at 3, 67.
II. THE NOTIFICATION LETTER AND THE ASSOCIATED SECURITY CONCERNS
The LSO cited Guideline E (Personal Conduct) of the Adjudicative Guidelines as one basis for its
substantial doubt regarding the Individual’s eligibility for access authorization. Ex. 2 at 6‒8.
“Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply
with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and
ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure to cooperate
or provide truthful and candid answers during national security investigative or adjudicative
processes.” Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 15. The SSC cited the Individual’s false certification of
her time and attendance which led to her discipline for claiming unworked overtime hours, her
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alleged false statements to investigatory officials and in response to the LOI related to the 2024
security violation, the conclusions of the DOE Memo that the Individual had a pattern of rule
violations, the Individual’s failure to comply with directions to refrain from distracting the guard
force, the Individual’s 2016 workplace discipline, and the accounts from witnesses of the
Individual’s alleged aggressive, threatening, or disruptive behavior. Ex. 2 at 6‒8. The LSO’s
allegations that the Individual deliberately omitted, concealed, or falsified information from the
LOI, deliberately provided false or misleading information to DOE personnel involved in making
a recommendation relevant to a national security eligibility determination, engaged in disruptive,
violent, or other inappropriate behavior, engaged in a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations, and
significantly misused Government time justify its invocation of Guideline E. Adjudicative
Guidelines at ¶ 16(a)‒(b), (d)(2)‒(4).
The LSO cited Guideline K (Handling Protected Information) of the Adjudicative Guidelines as
the other basis for its substantial doubt regarding the Individual’s eligibility for access
authorization. Ex. 2 at 8‒9. “Deliberate or negligent failure to comply with rules and regulations
for handling protected information-which includes classified and other sensitive government
information, and proprietary information-raises doubt about an individual’s trustworthiness,
judgment, reliability, or willingness and ability to safeguard such information, and is a serious
security concern.” Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 33. The SSC cited the Individual having violated
security escort procedures when she left three uncleared contractors unattended in an area
containing restricted and/or classified documents and the Individual’s repeated use of a personal
cell phone in a restricted area. Ex. 2 at 8‒9. The LSO’s allegations that the Individual failed to
comply with rules for the protection of classified or sensitive information and engaged in negligent
or lax security practices despite counseling by management justify its invocation of Guideline K.
Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 34(g)‒(h).
III. REGULATORY STANDARDS
A DOE administrative review proceeding under Part 710 requires me, as the Administrative Judge,
to issue a Decision that reflects my comprehensive, common-sense judgment, made after
consideration of all of the relevant evidence, favorable and unfavorable, as to whether the granting
or continuation of a person’s access authorization will not endanger the common defense and
security and is clearly consistent with the national interest. 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(a). The regulatory
standard implies that there is a presumption against granting or restoring a security clearance. See
Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988) (“clearly consistent with the national interest”
standard for granting security clearances indicates “that security determinations should err, if they
must, on the side of denials”); Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1990) (strong
presumption against the issuance of a security clearance).
An individual must come forward at the hearing with evidence to convince the DOE that granting
or restoring access authorization “will not endanger the common defense and security and will be
clearly consistent with the national interest.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.27(d). An individual is afforded a
full opportunity to present evidence supporting his or her eligibility for an access authorization.
The Part 710 regulations are drafted so as to permit the introduction of a very broad range of
evidence at personnel security hearings. Even appropriate hearsay evidence may be admitted. Id.
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§ 710.26(h). Hence, an individual is afforded the utmost latitude in the presentation of evidence to
mitigate the security concerns at issue.
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Workplace Incident Involving a Cart
In 2016, the Individual was issued a warning for bumping a coworker with a cart in the workplace.
Ex. 4 at 24; Ex. 5 at 50‒51. In a 2018 interview with an Office of Personnel Management
investigator as part of a routine reinvestigation of the Individual’s eligibility for access
authorization, the Individual characterized the incident as an accident which occurred when she
was pushing the cart through a narrow area. Ex. 5 at 50‒51.
B. Cellphone Use in a Restricted Area
On September 13, 2023, the Individual the Individual was observed on security video using her
personal cellphone and socializing with security guards for approximately thirty minutes in an area
where personal cellphone use was prohibited. Ex. 6 at 53; see also Tr. at 46 (Individual claiming
at the hearing that she had her “cell phone in there and [brought] it right back out”). As part of an
investigation of the incident, a senior manager in the Individual’s chain of command stated during
an interview that the Individual had “multiple issues” with bringing her personal cellphone into an
area where personal cellphone use is prohibited. Ex. 6 at 55; see also Tr. at 86 (Security Official
testifying that there were “several times where [the Individual] has brought a cell phone into the
restricted area”).
Following review of the Individual’s personal cellphone use, the Individual was issued a
memorandum stating that she had violated DOE policies regarding cellphone use. Ex. 6 at 53. The
Individual was directed to take several corrective actions, including not to bring a personal
cellphone into DOE facilities “unless it is properly stashed away in an approved location” and not
to “distract or hangout at the security guard stations.” Id.; see also Tr. at 87 (Security Official
testifying that the memorandum followed “over a year’s worth of counseling and correction” by
the Individual’s management related to distracting the guards through “long, drawn-out
conversations,” some of which resulted in the guards “miss[ing] security checks that they should
have gotten had they been paying attention”).
C. Insider Threat Report, Investigation, and Time and Attendance Falsification
At some point in 2024, a coworker of the Individual (Employee A) accused the Individual of
having sprayed his face with a cleaning product. Tr. at 39‒40. The Individual said that she only
used the cleaning product on a surface in her work area and denied Employee A’s accusation. Id.
Employee A’s allegation was investigated and, according to the Security Official, “turned out to
be not true . . . .” Id. at 91; see also id. (Security Official stating that he attributed the allegation to
“people [being] hypersensitive to events”).
Later in 2024, Employee A reported that the Individual displayed threatening behavior in the
workplace that presented insider threat concerns. Ex. 7 at 63; Tr. at 88‒89. Four witnesses were
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interviewed in connection with the review of this matter. Ex. 7 at 63, 66‒67, 70. Employee A
claimed that he had observed the Individual engage in loud and disruptive behavior due to her
volatile temper. Id. at 66. Employee A also alleged that he had observed the Individual engage in
multiple disputes with a senior leader (Senior Leader), one in June 2024 when Employee A said
that he observed the Senior Leader direct the Individual to stop distracting guards when they were
on duty and another in which the Individual was told that she could no longer work overtime on
Saturdays. Id. Employee A asserted that the Individual told the Senior Leader that she “hope[d]
your family prays for you” after the former incident and had said that she would “kill that mother
[f]***er” and that senior leaders “better watch their f***ing asses[ because] they could be
disappeared” after the second incident. Id.; but see Tr. at 50 (Individual denying that she ever
engaged in this conduct). Employee A further opined that, as a result of the Individual’s rudeness
and temper, contractor employees refused to work with the Individual and would contact
Employee A to avoid her and that the Individual would “trash her cubicle” in a rage. Ex. 7 at 66;
but see id. (Employee A admitting that he had never observed the Individual “destroy any
government property”); Tr. at 49‒50 (Individual testifying at the hearing that she “pound[ed] [her]
desk” but denying that she ever threw anything or destroyed property).
The Individual’s first line supervisor (Former Supervisor) corroborated to investigators that
contractors refused to work with the Individual due to her due to her aggressive behavior. Ex. 7 at
67. The Former Supervisor stated that the Individual was quick to anger, highly emotional,
demonstrated “extreme paranoia that everyone is out to get her or do her wrong,” and “hate[d] a
lot of people” with whom she worked. Id. However, the Former Supervisor opined that the
Individual was a hard worker, could be “very kind,” and would not “do anything to harm anyone.”
Id.
The Individual’s second line supervisor (Manager) corroborated that the Individual was highly
emotional and prone to perceiving “every interaction with co-workers [as] personal attacks on
her.” Id. at 70. However, he denied feeling threatened by the Individual or perceiving the
Individual as likely to harm anyone. Id. The Senior Leader stated that she had personally observed
the Individual displaying highly variable emotions and once observed the Individual engage in
disruptive behavior at an offsite event such that the Senior Leader directed her to leave. Id.
On July 27, 2024, the DOE Memo was issued concluding that the Individual did not present a
significant security threat. Id. at 61‒62. However, the DOE Memo noted that the Individual
engaged in “concerning behaviors” that “could increase the risk of an active threat if these factors
are not promptly mitigated.” Id. at 61. Among other things, the DOE Memo concluded that the
Individual had demonstrated “workplace violence” and “insubordination and an unwillingness to
comply with . . . direction.” Id. The DOE Memo also noted concerns regarding potential time and
attendance issues that had been uncovered during the investigation. Id.
A subsequent investigation concluded that the Individual had falsely reported twenty hours of
overtime on her time and attendance records for the month of May 2024 which she had not actually
worked. Ex. 8 at 76. During the investigation of the Individual’s misrepresentation of her work
time, she denied having engaged in the conduct. Id. at 76‒77. On October 18, 2024, the Individual
was issued a letter of reprimand for falsifying her time and attendance records. Id.
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In her hearing testimony, the Individual denied that she had falsified her time and attendance
records and claimed to have been physically present at work on the dates she was determined to
have falsely reported her time and attendance. Tr. at 52. However, the Security Official testified
that he had reviewed badge swipe data, alarm records in the Individual’s work area, and video
surveillance footage, none of which showed any indication of the Individual having been present
on several dates on which she claimed to have worked overtime. Id. at 82‒85. Considering the
results of the investigation and the information reviewed by the Security Official, I do not credit
the Individual’s claim and find that her testimony that she did not falsely report her time and
attendance calls her credibility into question.
D. Escort Security Violation and Inquiry From the LSO
On August 8, 2024, a DOE employee reported to the Security Official that he had observed
contractors working in a room containing “classified/controlled documents” without an escort. Ex.
9 at 82. The Security Official went to the room in question where he observed the Individual. Id.
at 83. The Security Official advised the Individual of the report he had received, to which the
Individual responded “you can see[] I’m here” and denied knowledge of why the Security Official
would have received that information. Id.; Tr. at 71.
A subsequent review of security footage showed the Individual saying that she was “putting [the
contractors] in the closet” as she signed them into the facility, escorting them to the room in
question, and leaving them unescorted in the room while she returned to the facility entrance to
“engage[] the guards in idle conversation . . . .” Ex. 9 at 83; see also Tr. at 56‒58 (Individual
testifying that she had said she would put the contractors in the closet in jest and claiming that she
had exchanged only a few words with the guards). The security footage showed that the Individual
had left the contractors unescorted in the room containing restricted data and/or classified
documents for approximately thirty-five minutes. Ex. 9 at 83; Tr. at 74‒78 (Security Official
testifying that he personally reviewed the security footage and concluded that the Individual had
left the contractors unescorted for approximately thirty-five minutes). A causal analysis by a senior
official assigned “accountability to [the Individual’s] supervision and management” for the
security violation due to a lack of supervision of the Individual. Ex. 9 at 83; Tr. at 99‒100.
However, the Security Official considered the Individual responsible for the security violation,
which he deemed a “significant security event,” based on the “premeditation” evinced by the
Individual’s remarks to the security guards and her efforts to deceive him when he questioned her
about the report he had received. Tr. at 98‒99.
On November 7, 2024, the LSO received the PSIR disclosing the Individual’s August 2024
security violation. Ex. 9 at 80‒81. On December 31, 2024, the LSO issued the Individual an LOI
(First LOI) requesting information about the security violation. Ex. 10. In her response, the
Individual claimed that she left the contractors unattended because she was “multitask[ing]” and
conducting other escort duties. Id. at 90. The LSO issued the Individual another LOI (Second LOI)
on February 26, 2025, wherein the LSO sought information concerning the Individual’s
falsification of her time and attendance records and the information developed through the insider
threat investigation. Ex. 12. In her response to the Second LOI, the Individual denied recollection
of the days on which she misrepresented that she had worked overtime on her time and attendance
reports and responded to additional questions concerning the August 2024 security incident by
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indicating that she believed she had already answered the questions in her previous submission.
Ex. 13 at 106‒07. The Individual admitted in her response to the Second LOI that she had “thrown
or banged” items in her cubicle when upset and that she behaved “unprofessional[ly]” towards the
Senior Leader. Id. The Individual represented that she had responded in kind after the Senior
Leader “came to [her] unprofessional[ly] and [with] aggression . . . .” Id. at 107; but see Ex. 7 at
70 (Manager stating in an interview related to the insider threat investigation that he had never
observed the Senior Leader “belittle or put [the Individual] down in any way”).
At the hearing, the Individual reiterated her claim that she had left the contractors unattended
because she was called to conduct other escort duties. Tr. at 35. She further asserted that if
Employee A had not been absent that day, she “would have had help . . . and he would have
maintained [her duties] downstairs” instead of her “trying to do multiple tasks” which led to the
security violation. Id. at 60‒61. The Security Official testified that if the Individual’s claim to
having been called to other escort duties was true she had several options for managing the
conflicting request without violating security policies by leaving the contractors unescorted, such
as communicating via radio with her supervisor that another escort would need to be found or
requiring the contractors to accompany her back to the entrance so that she could conduct the other
escort. Id. at 79.
E. Individual’s Recent Conduct
The Individual testified at the hearing that she had not committed any security infractions since
the escort violation and would strictly adhere to security rules in the future. Id. at 36. The Current
Supervisor, who began working as the Individual’s supervisor in April 2025, is not aware of the
Individual having committed any security violations during his time as her supervisor, has never
had occasion to counsel the Individual regarding excessive socializing or cellphone use in the
workplace, and has never experienced the Individual behaving insubordinately. Id. at 15, 18, 28‒
30; see also Ex. I (character letter from a coworker of the Individual who indicated that he had
observed the Individual adhere to rules and handle classified material appropriately); Ex. B (letter
from another coworker indicating that he had never observed the Individual commit a security
infraction).
The Individual claimed that, since September 2024, she had “been very professional” and
“swallow[ed] [her] pride” during difficult interactions in the workplace. Tr. at 41‒42. The Current
Supervisor, however, has observed “flare-ups” as a result of the Individual’s tone or way of
communicating information; though, the Current Supervisor did not consider the incidents unusual
and noted that other employees contributed to the “flare-ups” with their own defensiveness. Id. at
23‒25. The Current Supervisor also reported that the Individual continued to use vulgar language
and to display a high level of emotionality in the workplace, such as by crying, which he attributed
to her becoming overwhelmed by difficulties “quite fast.” Id. at 26; see also id. at 33 (testifying
that since late June or early July the Individual had refrained from this conduct in areas where she
might be overhead by new personnel with whom she shares a work area). As many as ten DOE
and contractor employees have told the Current Supervisor that they would prefer not to interact
with the Individual in the future, though the Current Supervisor characterized this as a small
minority of the people with whom the Individual has engaged in the workplace. Id. at 27; see also
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Ex. J (character letter from a former coworker of the Individual who retired in 2020 who observed
the Individual display positive interpersonal behaviors in the workplace).
V. ANALYSIS
A. Guideline E
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns under Guideline E include:
(a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or
falsification before being confronted with the facts;
(b) the refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was caused or significantly
contributed to by advice of legal counsel or of a person with professional
responsibilities for advising or instructing the individual specifically concerning
security processes. Upon being made aware of the requirement to cooperate or provide
the information, the individual cooperated fully and truthfully;
(c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent,
or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not
cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the
behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or
factors that contributed to untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior,
and such behavior is unlikely to recur;
(e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to
exploitation, manipulation, or duress;
(f) the information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable reliability; and
(g) association with persons involved in criminal activities was unwitting, has ceased, or
occurs under circumstances that do not cast doubt upon the individual’s reliability,
trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness to comply with rules and regulations.
Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 17.
The first mitigating condition is inapplicable to the Individual’s false statements to the Security
Official and in response to the First LOI concerning her August 2024 security violation. The
Individual was confronted with video evidence of her conduct rather than admitting that she had
been untruthful. Moreover, during the hearing she continued to offer an account of her conduct
that contradicted the conclusions drawn by the Security Official based on his investigation. For
these reasons, the first mitigating condition is inapplicable. Id. at ¶ 17(a).
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The second mitigating condition is irrelevant to the facts of this case because the Individual did
not assert that she relied on the advice of counsel or another representative with respect to any of
the behaviors cited by the LSO in the SSC. Id. at ¶ 17(b).
The Individual’s 2016 warning for bumping another employee with a cart is mitigated pursuant to
the third mitigating condition. The conduct in question was relatively minor, occurred
approximately nine years ago, and appears to be an unusual event in the Individual’s career
considering the absence of other instances in which the Individual engaged in potentially
physically harmful conduct. Accordingly, I find the security concerns presented by the 2016
warning to be resolved. Id. at ¶ 17(c).
The remaining allegations by the LSO under Guideline E are not resolved under the third
mitigating condition. Starting with the Individual’s falsifications, the Individual’s false statements
to the Security Official and in response to the First LOI related to her August 2024 security
violation were not minor. If the Security Official credited the Individual’s false statements without
independent investigation, they would have concealed a security violation that presented
independent security concerns under Guideline K and which the Security Official considered to be
a significant security event. The behavior was not infrequent because the Individual offered
similarly untruthful or incomplete accounts of her conduct in response to the First LOI and in her
hearing testimony. The conduct did not happen under unique circumstances because the
untruthfulness began in relation to the Individual’s performance of routine workplace duties.
Considering the remaining allegations by the LSO under Guideline E, the Individual’s false
reporting of her time and attendance, repeated violations of cellphone use policies, insubordination
and repeated failure to follow directions, disruptive behavior, and discordant relationships with
coworkers and contractors are relatively distinct events. However, considering that these events
all either occurred or escalated in an approximately one-year time frame, and that the Individual is
a mature adult who has held a security clearance for many years, I find that the circumstances
surrounding the conduct enhance the security concerns. See 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(c) (requiring
consideration of the “circumstances surrounding the conduct” and “the age and maturity of the
individual” in applying the Adjudicative Guidelines). While some of these events are relatively
minor, cumulatively they suggest that the Individual’s reliability and stability have degraded since
the time she was first granted access authorization. Taken together, I find that the alleged conduct
is not minor. Moreover, the behaviors in question occurred frequently in a short span of time under
routine workplace circumstances. While approximately one year has passed since the last instance
of misconduct cited in the SSC, I find that this period of time is not so long as to convince me that
the issues will not reemerge when the Individual is no longer under the scrutiny of the
administrative review process. Accordingly, I find that the Individual has not resolved the
aforementioned concerns pursuant to the third mitigating condition. Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶
17(c).
The fourth and fifth mitigating conditions are irrelevant to the facts of this case because the
Individual does not claim to have pursued counseling, and the LSO did not allege that the
Individual engaged in conduct that placed her at special risk of exploitation, manipulation, or
duress. Id. at ¶ 17(d)‒(e).
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The sixth mitigating condition is applicable to the allegations by Employee A that the Individual
threatened violence against senior leaders. Employee A previously made a claim against the
Individual which the Security Official did not substantiate and which he attributed to sensitivity
on the part of Employee A. Employee A also alleged that the Individual “destroyed” her work area
only to recant that claim. No witnesses supported Employee A’s claims with respect to the
Individual threatening violence, and numerous DOE employees, including the Manager, opined
that the Individual did not present a threat of violence towards others. Considering these facts, I
find the allegations from Employee A related to threats of violence by the Individual to be from a
source of questionable reliability. Accordingly, I find any security concerns associated with these
allegations mitigated pursuant to the sixth mitigating condition. Id. at ¶ 17(f).
The seventh mitigating condition is irrelevant to the facts of this case because the LSO did not
allege that the Individual associated with persons involved in criminal activities. Id. at ¶ 17(g).
For the aforementioned reasons, I find that the Individual has resolved the security concerns
alleged by the LSO under Guideline E related to the 2016 warning for bumping another employee
with a cart and Employee A’s claims that the Individual threatened violence against other DOE
employees. However, the Individual has not resolved the other security concerns asserted by the
LSO under Guideline E.
B. Guideline K
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns under Guideline K include:
(a) so much time has elapsed since the behavior, or it has happened so infrequently or
under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt
on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b) the individual responded favorably to counseling or remedial security training and now
demonstrates a positive attitude toward the discharge of security responsibilities;
(c) the security violations were due to improper or inadequate training or unclear
instructions; and
(d) the violation was inadvertent, it was promptly reported, there is no evidence of
compromise, and it does not suggest a pattern.
Id. at ¶ 35.
The Individual committed multiple security violations from 2023 to 2024 under normal
circumstances. Considering that the Individual’s security violation for failing to properly escort
uncleared contractors occurred less than one year after being issued a memorandum for her
cellphone-related security violation, and that in failing to properly escort the uncleared contractors
she also disregarded prior direction from her management regarding fraternizing with security
personnel when they were on duty, I am not convinced that the Individual will not once again
engage in lax security practices when she is no longer subject to monitoring as part of the
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administrative review process. Accordingly, I find the first mitigating condition inapplicable. Id.
at ¶ 35(a).
The Individual testified during the hearing as to her commitment to adhering to security rules going
forward. However, the fact that the Individual committed the 2024 security violation relatively
soon after her counseling for the 2023 security violation calls into question the extent to which she
has responded favorably to counseling. Moreover, considering the Individual’s dubious testimony
at the hearing, which I concluded called her credibility into doubt, it is unclear whether her
commitment to adhering to security rules in the future is reliable. Accordingly, I find the second
mitigating condition inapplicable. Id. at ¶ 35(b).
There is some question as to whether the Individual’s management contributed to the Individual’s
2024 security violation. However, considering the opinion of the Security Official to the contrary
and the fact that the Individual’s 2023 security violation was preceded by numerous warnings
about her cellphone use, I find it more probable that the Individual was aware of her escort
obligations and willfully failed to adhere to them. For these reasons, the third mitigating condition
is inapplicable. Id. at ¶ 35(c).
As previously indicated, I think it probable that the Individual’s 2023 and 2024 security violations
were willful. Even if they were not, for the reasons described above, I believe that they were part
of a pattern of lax security practices by the Individual in 2023 and 2024. Accordingly, I find the
fourth mitigating condition inapplicable. Id. at ¶ 35(d).
For the aforementioned reasons, I find that none of the mitigating conditions are applicable to the
facts of this case. Accordingly, the Individual has not resolved the security concerns asserted by
the LSO under Guideline K.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the above analysis, I found that there was sufficient derogatory information in the possession of
DOE to raise security concerns under Guidelines E and K of the Adjudicative Guidelines. After
considering all the relevant information, favorable and unfavorable, in a comprehensive, common-
sense manner, including weighing all the testimony and other evidence presented at the hearing, I
find that the Individual has not brought forth sufficient evidence to fully resolve the security
concerns asserted by the LSO. Accordingly, I have determined that the Individual’s access
authorization should not be restored. This Decision may be appealed in accordance with the
procedures set forth at 10 C.F.R. § 710.28.
Phillip Harmonick
Administrative Judge
Office of Hearings and Appeals