PSH-26-0011

*The original of this document contains information which is subject to withholding from disclosure
under 5 U.S. C. § 552. Such material has been deleted from this copy and replaced with XXXXXX’s.
United States Department of Energy
Office of Hearings and Appeals
In the Matter of: Personnel Security Hearing )
)
Filing Date: November 3, 2025 ) Case No.: PSH-26-0011
)
__________________________________________)
Issued: June 12, 2026
__________________________
Administrative Judge Decision
__________________________
Kristin L. Martin, Administrative Judge:
This Decision concerns the eligibility of XXXXXXXXXXXXX (hereinafter referred to as “the
Individual”) for access authorization under the Department of Energy’s (DOE) regulations set
forth at 10 C.F.R. Part 710, entitled, “Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to
Classified Matter and Special Nuclear Material or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position.”1 For
the reasons set forth below, I conclude that the Individual’s security clearance should not be
restored.
I. BACKGROUND
The Individual is employed by a DOE Contractor in a position which requires that he hold a
security clearance. Derogatory information was discovered regarding the Individual’s candor and
psychological health. The Local Security Office (LSO) began the present administrative review
proceeding by issuing a Notification Letter to the Individual informing him that he was entitled to
a hearing before an Administrative Judge in order to resolve the substantial doubt regarding his
eligibility to continue holding a security clearance. See 10 C.F.R. § 710.21.
The Individual requested a hearing and the LSO forwarded the Individual’s request to the Office
of Hearings and Appeals (OHA). The Director of OHA appointed me as the Administrative Judge
in this matter. At the hearing I convened pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 710.25(d), (e), and (g), the
Individual presented the testimony of two colleagues, referred to as Security Police Officers (SPO)
1 and 2, and testified on his own behalf. The Personnel Security Specialist who prepared the case
for the LSO testified as well. The LSO presented the testimony of the DOE contractor psychologist
who had evaluated the Individual. See Transcript of Hearing, OHA Case No. PSH-26-0011
(hereinafter cited as “Tr.”). The LSO submitted twelve exhibits, marked as Exhibits 1 through 12
(hereinafter cited as “Ex.”). The Individual submitted a list of exhibits he planned to submit (Ex.
1 Under the regulations, “‘[a]ccess authorization’ means an administrative determination that an individual is eligible
for access to classified matter or is eligible for access to, or control over, special nuclear material.” 10 C.F.R.
§ 710.5(a). Such authorization will also be referred to in this Decision as a security clearance.
2
A),2 a Word document with inaccessible links to cloud-stored documents not identified in the
exhibit list, and a brief arguing that the legal basis for the security clearance program was flawed
and that, under the whole person concept, the Individual was not at risk of becoming a “traitor.”3
Ind. Brief at passim. The Individual also submitted statements of support from two colleagues. Ex.
B; Ex. C.4
II. THE NOTIFICATION LETTER AND THE ASSOCIATED SECURITY
CONCERNS
As indicated above, the Notification Letter informed the Individual that information in the
possession of the DOE created a substantial doubt concerning his eligibility for a security
clearance. That information pertains to Guidelines E and I of the National Security Adjudicative
Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Eligibility to Hold
a Sensitive Position, effective June 8, 2017 (Adjudicative Guidelines). These guidelines are not
inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines
are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. 10 C.F.R. § 710.7.
Guideline E states that “[c]onduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s
reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Of special
interest is any failure to cooperate or provide truthful and candid answers during national security
investigative or adjudicative processes.” Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 15. Conditions that could
raise a security concern include:
(a) Deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any
personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used
2 The list included a Power of Attorney form, the Summary of Security Concerns and “associated due
process/procedural materials,” the Individual’s declaration, declarations of support from witnesses, and “further
evidence of mitigation, notably psychological condition documentation post-dating the Government’s evidence,
evaluating treatment and a favorable prognosis.” Ex. A at 1.
3 Regarding the Individual’s evidence, OHA received the submission on April 8, 2026, after the April 7, 2026, 5:00
PM due date, of which the Individual had been aware for over three months. Email from Judge Martin to DOE Counsel
and Individual’s Attorney (April 8, 2026 2:16 PM) (2:16 Email). The submission was a Word document with links to
Google Drive folders, a format expressly prohibited in the scheduling order the Individual received on January 7,
2026. Id. Moreover, the links were secured such that DOE Counsel and I could not access them prior to the pre-hearing
conference, which was to be held seven days prior to the hearing in accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 710.25(f). Id.; Email
from DOE Counsel to Judge Martin and Individual’s Attorney (April 8, 2026 1:53 PM) (1:53 Email). DOE Counsel
moved that the late submission should not be accepted into evidence. 1:53 Email. I directed the Individual’s counsel
to submit any opposition to the motion by 5:00 PM that day. 2:16 Email. The Individual’s counsel made no submission
by the deadline. Email from Judge Martin to Individual’s Attorney and DOE Counsel (April 9, 2026 10:37 AM).
Because the Individual failed to submit evidence in a permissible, or even accessible, format prior to the deadline, I
granted the motion. Id.; 2:16 Email. I gave the Individual leave to submit written statements of support in lieu of
duplicative witness testimony, which he did. Pre-Hearing Conference Memorandum at 2. I also allowed the materials
submitted on April 8, 2026, which were sent as accessible documents (not links) to be entered into evidence. 2:16
Email. These included the list of exhibits he planned to submit and the legal brief.
4 The Individual initially submitted a third statement, but rescinded it because the person it was attributed to had not
written or authorized the use of the statement. Tr. at 11, 230–32.
3
to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or
status, determine national security eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary
responsibilities;
(b) Deliberately providing false or misleading information; or concealing or omitting
information, concerning relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security
official, competent medical or mental health professional involved in making a
recommendation relevant to a national security eligibility determination, or other
official government representative;
(c) Credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is not
sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single guideline, but which,
when considered as a whole, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable
judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply
with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the individual
may not properly safeguard classified or sensitive information;
(d) Credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any other
guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse determination, but
which, when combined with all available information, supports a whole-person
assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of
candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics
indicating that the individual may not properly safeguard classified or sensitive
information. This includes, but is not limited to, consideration of:
(1) Untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of client
confidentiality, release of proprietary information, unauthorized release of
sensitive corporate or government protected information;
(2) Any disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior;
(3) A pattern of dishonesty or rule violations; and
(4) Evidence of significant misuse of Government or other employer’s time or
resources;
(e) Personal conduct, or concealment of information about one’s conduct, that creates
a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress by a foreign intelligence
entity or other individual or group. Such conduct includes:
(1) Engaging in activities which, if known, could affect the person’s personal,
professional, or community standing;
(2) While in another country, engaging in any activity that is illegal in that
country;
4
(3) While in another country, engaging in any activity that, while legal there, is
illegal in the United States;
(f) Violation of a written or recorded commitment made by the individual to the
employer as a condition of employment; and
(g) Association with persons involved in criminal activity.
Id. at ¶ 16.
Guideline I states that “[c]ertain emotional, mental, and personality conditions can impair
judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness. A formal diagnosis of a disorder is not required for there
to be a concern under this guideline.” Id. at ¶ 27. Conditions that could raise a security concern
and may be disqualifying include:
(a) Behavior that casts doubt on an individual’s judgment, stability, reliability, or
trustworthiness, not covered under any other guideline and that may indicate an
emotional, mental, or personality condition, including, but not limited to,
irresponsible, violent, self-harm, suicidal, paranoid, manipulative, impulsive,
chronic lying, deceitful, exploitative, or bizarre behaviors;
(b) An opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional that the individual has a
condition that may impair judgment, stability, reliability, or trustworthiness;
(c) Voluntary or involuntary inpatient hospitalization;
(d) Failure to follow a prescribed treatment plan related to a diagnosed
psychological/psychiatric condition that may impair judgment, stability, reliability,
or trustworthiness, including, but not limited to, failure to take prescribed
medication or failure to attend required counseling sessions; and
(e) Pathological gambling, the associated behaviors of which may include unsuccessful
attempts to stop gambling; gambling for increasingly higher stakes, usually in an
attempt to cover losses; concealing gambling losses; borrowing or stealing money
to fund gambling or pay gambling debts; and family conflict resulting from
gambling.
Id. at ¶ 28.
The LSO alleges in the Summary of Security Concerns (SSC):
• The Individual listed in his September 24, 2024, Questionnaire for National Security
Positions (QNSP) that he was disciplined in August 2023 (estimated) for not attending
training on a single specific date.
5
• The Individual omitted four disciplinary actions (listed below), occurring between May
2021 and October 2024, from his QNSP and did not correct the QNSP before being
confronted about the omissions by an investigator.
• The Individual was disciplined for multiple security infractions and for missing required
training:
o Verbal counseling on May 28, 2021, for not completing his building checks
properly.
o Counseling in July 2023 for missing an assigned exercise.
o Verbal counseling in August 2024 for failure to use his key card to access a
building.
o Written reprimand in October 2024 for failing to report missing equipment.5
• A source who had extensive contact with and knowledge about the Individual did not
recommend the Individual for a security clearance when contacted by investigators. He
reported that:
o The Individual had engaged in multiple questionable behaviors in August 2024 and
his Human Reliability Program (HRP) status was revoked;6
o During a training exercise in November 2024, in which the participants (protective
force employees) used laser weapons instead of live ammunition, the Individual
was “unable to operate weapons systems he should be familiar with, became very
overwhelmed, and was firing his weapons system at his own teammates.”7 The
source added that the Individual eventually became so overwhelmed that he lay
down in place and was pulled off the exercise.
o In December 2024, the Individual told medical staff at his worksite that “he was by
a building when he heard loud explosions which damaged his hearing and gave him
vertigo.” However, the source reported, the Individual’s body camera footage
showed that he was never in the reported location when he reported the incident
and that there were no explosions. The source added that the Individual underwent
a medical review that day and was “evaluated as not being able to perform his duties
and was required to have four psychological counseling sessions.”
o The source was concerned the Individual may harm himself or others.
5 I note that this occurred after the Individual completed his QNSP.
6 At the hearing, the Individual testified that he was “returned to full duty status, full duty, armed HRP status on April
7th of 2025.” Tr. at 189.
7 The alleged firing on his own teammates is commonly referred to throughout the hearing testimony as “fratricide.”
6
• A DOE contractor psychologist (the Psychologist) evaluated the Individual on June 30,
2025, and reported that:
o There are “indications of unreliability which involve, in part, a disavowed yet
impairing psychiatric condition (anxiety), which is explicitly noted in [the
Individual’s] medical treatment record.”
o Although the Individual denied treatment for a mental condition with psychiatric
medication, his medical record indicated the use of Cymbalta/Duloxetine for
anxiety.
o The Individual’s “deceit and integrity problems . . . are not amenable to
rehabilitation with the use of psychiatric medication or counseling treatments for
anxiety.”
o The Individual could “inadvertently become a danger to others due to non-
conformance with weapons operation and tactical training, and an inability to
maintain focus and manage stress when involved in stressful training conditions.”
o The Individual’s behavior and impaired functioning “represent a current
psychological condition that may significantly impair his judgement, stability,
reliability, and trustworthiness and calls into question . . . his ability to perform
duties as a SPO and carry a firearm.”
Ex. 3 at 4–6.
The Individual is alleged to have omitted information from his QNSP, committed multiple security
infractions in the course of his duties, behaved in an erratic and unsafe manner in the course of his
duties, and fabricated a report of an explosion on site. These concerns fall under conditions (a) and
(d) of Guideline E. The Individual is also alleged to have a disavowed psychiatric condition,
general deceit and integrity problems not amenable to rehabilitation, and a potential to become a
danger to others due to his poor decision-making and inability to manage stress. It is also alleged
that the Psychologist opined that the Individual had a current psychological condition that may
impair his judgment, stability, reliability, or trustworthiness. These concerns fall under conditions
(a)8 and (b) of Guideline I. The LSO’s security concerns under Guideline E are justified. The
security concerns raised under Guideline I, as I explain infra, are not.
III. REGULATORY STANDARDS
A DOE administrative review proceeding under Part 710 requires me, as the Administrative Judge,
to issue a Decision that reflects my comprehensive, common-sense judgment, made after
8 Guideline E condition (d) and Guideline I condition (a) include the caveat that the behavior not be covered under
another guideline. Here, the Individual’s history of rule violations and security infractions in the course of his duties
at a secure DOE site, as well as the accusations of fratricide arising from the November 2024 training exercise, are
the basis for the Guideline E condition (d) concerns. His general issues with the ability to manage stress are the basis
for the Guideline I condition (a) concerns. While the two sets of facts are related and somewhat similar, they represent
separate concerns.
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consideration of all of the relevant evidence, favorable and unfavorable, as to whether the granting
or continuation of a person’s access authorization will not endanger the common defense and
security and is clearly consistent with the national interest. 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(a). The entire process
is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole person concept.”
Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 2(a). The protection of the national security is the paramount
consideration. The regulatory standard implies that there is a presumption against granting or
restoring a security clearance. See Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988) (“clearly
consistent with the national interest” standard for granting security clearances indicates “that
security determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials”); Dorfmont v. Brown, 913
F.2d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1990) (strong presumption against the issuance of a security clearance).
The Individual must come forward at the hearing with evidence to convince the DOE that granting
or restoring access authorization “will not endanger the common defense and security and will be
clearly consistent with the national interest.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.27(d). The Individual is afforded a
full opportunity to present evidence supporting his eligibility for an access authorization. The
Part 710 regulations are drafted so as to permit the introduction of a very broad range of evidence
at personnel security hearings. Even appropriate hearsay evidence may be admitted. Id. at
§ 710.26(h). Hence, an individual is afforded the utmost latitude in the presentation of evidence to
mitigate the security concerns at issue.
The discussion below reflects my application of these factors to the testimony and exhibits
presented by both sides in this case.
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT
The Individual’s background investigation uncovered several derogatory facts about the
Individual. On his September 24, 2024, QNSP, the Individual reported that in August 2023
(estimated), his current employer gave him “coaching and counseling for not attending a training
on a single specific date.” Ex. 10 at 22. He marked on the QNSP that he had no other discipline in
the preceding seven years to report for that employer. Id. Official personnel records obtained
subsequently from his current employer listed one disciplinary action: an “Oral Reminder” for
“Inappropriate Behavior” in May 2021. Id. at 59–60. The description of the behavior stated “You
annotated on your security check sheet that you had conducted a security check of a security area
identified on your check sheet. A review of the cameras identified that you did not complete the
security check as annotated on your []check sheet, falsifying an official record.” Id.
Subsequently, during his Enhanced Subject Interview (ESI) conducted by an investigator on
November 25, 2024, the Individual admitted to the following, as well as the disciplinary action he
listed on his QNSP:
• Counseling in July 2023 for missing an exercise;
• Written disciplinary action in October 2024 for failing to report a missing magazine of live
ammunition as required;
• Verbal counseling in May 2021 for failing to conduct a building check; and
8
• Verbal counseling in August 2024 for failing to use his key card to check into a secure
area.
Ex. 10 at 55–58. When interviewed as part of the background investigation, the Individual’s
supervisor recommended him for a security clearance, but stated that the Individual had had write-
ups or disciplinary actions in the past that he could not recall with specificity. Id. at 60. He
recommended talking to a certain higher-level supervisor for more complete information on the
Individual’s employment issues. Id.
The higher-level supervisor did not recommend the Individual for a “position involving the
national security due to [his] erratic behavior at work, and his decline in mental health over the
last few months.” Ex. 10 at 63. He alleged the following disciplinary events the Individual
received:
• Oral counseling on August 29, 2022, for illegally parking at the visitor’s center while
getting breakfast; his car was blocking an access road.
• Written warning on October 29, 2024, for failing to report a lost weapons magazine after a
training exercise:
[The Individual] was on video when he realized his magazine was missing
[and was] speaking with another [SPO] and telling the officer his magazine
was missing. The other Officer advised the [Individual] to report it, and the
[Individual] informed the other Officer that he thought the leadership was
messing with him. . . . [The Individual] did not report that magazine as
missing until 0700 the following morning. . . . [The Individual] was written
up for indications of a deceitful nature, irresponsibility in his duties, and
failure to follow directives following this incident.
• Written disciplinary action November 17, 2023, for attendance issues. The Individual
called out of work for illness or family issues on March 29, July 18, and September 23–24,
2023. He missed a weapons qualification on October 12, 2023, even though notice was
posted on the training board and the Individual received a text message notification. The
Individual missed a large-scale performance test on November 8, 2023, which was also
posted to the training board and for which he also received a text message notification. The
Individual “made excuses that did not make sense for missing the qualification and the
performance test.”
• “Write-up”9 on May 23, 2021, for falsifying an official record. The Individual indicated
that he conducted a required check, but a review of video footage found that he did not
complete the check.
9 Because the official disciplinary record listed this incident as an “Oral Reminder,” I find that this discipline was
verbal, not written.
9
• Written disciplinary action on September 18, 2024, for accessing a building improperly.
The Individual “was supposed to gain entry on his key card by registering with [building
owner] to be able to access the building.” The Individual used physical keys, rather than a
key card, to access the building on September 12 and 14, 2024. He attempted to enter the
building “with a group of other coworkers on 09/18/2024 and could not use his physical
key as there were others there.” His lack of access was reported and it was discovered that
he had been improperly entering the building.
Id. at 63–64. The higher-level supervisor also described an alleged incident during a force-on-force
training on November 6, 2024, where the Individual was unable to operate weapons he should
have been familiar with, fired laser weapons on teammates, and “eventually became so
overwhelmed that he just laid down in place and was pulled off the exercise.” Id. at 64–65. The
higher-level supervisor described another alleged incident in which, on December 2, 2024, the
Individual reported to medical that he was “by a building when he heard a loud explosion which
damaged his hearing and gave him vertigo. A review of the [Individual’s] body cam footage
showed that the [Individual] was never in the reported location when [he] reported the incident,
and there were no explosions.” Id. at 65. That day, during a medical evaluation requested by his
leadership, the Individual was deemed not able to perform his duties and required to have four
psychological counseling sessions. Id. The higher-level supervisor expressed concern for the
Individual’s mental and physical health and was worried that he may be a danger to himself or
others. Id. He also stated that though the Individual often mentioned that leadership was “after
him,” he was unable to give an example of that when asked to provide one. Id.
A Personnel Security Specialist with the LSO testified that he was the analyst assigned to the
Individual’s case. Tr. at 16. The Personnel Security Specialist testified that when reviewing the
Individual’s QNSP, he noted that the Individual admitted to receiving verbal counseling for a
missed training event. Id. at 17. Reviewing the results of the ESI, the Personnel Security Specialist
discovered four additional disciplinary actions—the May 2021, July 2023, August 2024, and
October 2024 disciplinary actions—that the Individual had not listed on his QNSP. Id. at 18. The
Personnel Security Specialist testified that these omissions, along with a pattern of other
disciplinary actions and concerning behavior reported by sources, led him to conclude that security
concerns existed under Guideline E. Id. at 26‒27. Based on reports of unreliable and erratic
behavior, the Personnel Security Specialist also developed concerns under Guideline I and
recommended a psychological evaluation. Id. at 31–34.
The Psychologist evaluated the Individual on June 30, 2025, and issued a report on his evaluation
on July 10, 2025. Ex. 11 at 1. The Psychologist was asked to answer the following questions about
the Individual:
1. Determine whether [the Individual] is a danger to himself or others based on the
multiple disciplinary actions between May 2021 and October 2024, the reports of
his dangerous and erratic behavior during a training exercise in November 2024
where he was unable to operate a training weapon properly, engaged in fratricide,
and disengaged from the exercise by lying down, and a report of not being found
fit for duty in December 2024 after a potential false report of a medical condition.
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2. Determine whether [the Individual’s] reported behavior during a training exercise
in November 2024, and report of not being found fit for duty in December 2024
represents a current psychological or emotional health condition that may
significantly impair [the Individual’s] judgement, stability, reliability, or
trustworthiness?
3. Determine if [the Individual] currently has a psychological or emotional health
problem that may significantly impair his judgement, stability, reliability, or
trustworthiness and calls into question his ability to perform duties as a Security
Police Officer (SPO) and carry a firearm.
4. If not rehabilitated or reformed, what type of treatment and length of time would
be necessary for adequate evidence of rehabilitation or reformation?
Id. He performed a “whole person” assessment, including psychological testing,10 and found a
pattern of non-compliance with work directives and behaviors that raised questions about
deception and stress handling. Tr. at 279–81. During his clinical interview with the Individual, the
Individual displayed a profound lack of insight into the seriousness of his work deficits and his
own performance. Ex. 11 at 5. His thought processes were within normal limits with no evidence
of paranoia or hallucinations, but certain self-reported information was discrepant from the
information provided to him by the LSO. Id. The Individual expressed surprise about why he was
being evaluated and regarded some of the feedback from his command as “unfair” or inaccurate.
Id. Regarding the November 6 training exercise, the Individual told the Psychologist, “I felt like I
did awesome,” and rated his own performance an 8 out of 10, despite acknowledging his command
would likely rate him a 3 out of 10. Id. He told the Psychologist he was not pulled from the
exercise—which the Psychologist noted was discrepant with his supervisor’s account of the
November 6 exercise—and admitted that a case could be made for the inadvisability of throwing
simulated grenades near one’s own teammates, which he was alleged to have done during the
November 6, 2024, training exercise. Id. at 5, 7. For the incident involving the missing magazine,
the Individual told the Psychologist that he waited several hours to report the magazine as missing
because he was concerned about negative repercussions. Id. at 8. The Individual denied making a
false medical report about explosions causing vertigo, and was unsure why others at work
suspected he had done so. Id. at 12–13. When asked at the hearing why, where the Individual and
the higher-level supervisor provided differing accounts he believed the higher-level supervisor
over the Individual, the Psychologist testified that he had seen the Individual deflect, justify, and
minimize flaws, and he had not had that experience with the higher-level supervisor. Tr. at 310.
He then testified that had no experience with the higher-level supervisor apart from reading the
10 The Psychologist administered the following tests, listed with the acronyms often used to refer to them:
• Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI)
• Paulhus Deception Scales (PDS)
• Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test - (AUDIT)
• Beck Depression Inventory (BDI)
• Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI)
• Adverse Childhood Experience Questionnaire for Adults (ACE)
• Columbia-Suicide Severity Rating Scale (C-SSRS)
Ex. 11 at 4.
11
investigator’s notes of his report.11 Id. (“If I’ve ever met the person or know them, I certainly don’t
know it. I just know it as a name on the report.”) Tr. at 309–10, 312. He added that he had seen
enough from the Individual to raise questions about the Individual’s ability to follow rules and
behave safely. Id. at 340–41.
The Individual denied suffering from depression, anxiety, suicidality, or any type of mental health
condition. Ex. 11 at 6–7, 11. He told the Psychologist that he viewed treatment of mental health
conditions “as a stigma.” Id. at 9. While the psychological testing administered at the evaluation
did not show elevated scores for depression or anxiety, it did show elevated scores for
defensiveness, which could affect the validity of the test scores. Id. at 10. The Psychologist opined
that the Individual’s response style “reflected the potential for moderate defensiveness and
proneness to employ denial and repression when dealing with problems,” which could hinder
effective problem-solving. Id.
The Psychologist did not review, or request, the Individual’s medical records from HRP or his
primary care doctor. Tr. at 328–30, 339. He did ask the Individual, during the clinical interview,
to access on his phone the conditions and medications lists on his patient portal so he could “have
a glance at some of the medical information.” Id. at 288–89. He testified that the information he
saw on the Individual’s phone was not “a comprehensive review of every history of medical
treatment over a period of years,” but more “like, well, I’m seeing, you know, this specialist, that
specialist.” Id. at 316–17. The Psychologist did not indicate in his report or at the hearing that he
had seen evidence of the Individual seeing a mental health specialist, nor did he indicate seeing an
anxiety diagnosis in the Individual’s list of conditions. He did note that the Individual was taking
Cymbalta, which he stated was listed as treatment for anxiety. Id. at 317. The Individual told the
Psychologist that he was prescribed the medication off-label for pain (which he later specified was
myalgia pain) and later added that the anxiety rationale was given because when he began taking
it in 2011 or 2013, anxiety was the only approved use of the drug, so the system defaulted to that.12
Tr. at 178, 290. The Psychologist opined that there was “evidence to indicate the presence of
anxiety symptoms that impair [the Individual’s] work functioning.” Ex. 11 at 13. The Psychologist
cited reports of the Individual’s poor stress management and concerning behavior at work, his
repressive style of coping, and his prescription medication as evidence of anxiety symptoms. Id. at
7.
The Psychologist noted that the Individual had recently attended eight counseling sessions, which
was more than the four required by his employer, but he did not see adequate evidence that this
resolved his anxiety or integrity issues, stating “[t]he persistent lack of insight, tendency to
minimize responsibility, and externalize blame is a formidable hindrance to successful
rehabilitation, especially when combined with demonstrable integrity issues.” Ex. 11 at 6, 12. The
Psychologist recommended that the Individual continue outpatient counseling and consult a
11 I note that the lower-level supervisor did not corroborate the higher-level supervisor’s account of the November 6
training exercise, which does not help the credibility of that account, given the extreme behavior alleged.
12 While there was evidence that the Individual was prescribed a medication that could treat anxiety, there was
insufficient evidence presented to show that the prescription was intended to treat anxiety specifically. Ex. 11 at 6; tr.
at 178, 326.
12
physician or psychiatrist about medication to mitigate anxiety symptoms. Id. at 13. However, the
Psychologist also concluded that such treatments were not expected to resolve the underlying
integrity issues involving deceitful behavior and willful violation of work directives. Id. at 11, 13.
The Psychologist concluded that the Individual had a psychological or emotional health problem,
specifically anxiety,13 that could significantly impair his judgment, stability, reliability, or
trustworthiness and which called into question his ability to perform SPO duties and carry a
firearm. Id. at 12–13.
After receiving the Psychologist’s report, the Personnel Security Specialist found his concerns
about the Individual’s mental health validated and made his final recommendation to suspend the
Individual’s clearance. Tr. at 52. The Personnel Security Specialist stated that his adjudicative
process involved reviewing the entire investigative file, including the QNSP, ESIs, and source
reports, and making a risk-based decision based on the totality of the information. Id. at 39–44. He
did not do the actual investigation, but he could request further investigation. Id. at 39. He testified
that he made a risk-based analysis, not a factual determination, and in this case he did not need
further factual investigation about the incidents described by the background sources. Id. at 43–
44, 48. He believed the information he had was sufficient for him to identify an unmitigated
security concern, and the Psychologist’s report “added another layer to that risk assessment.” Id.
at 48, 52–53.
At the hearing, the Individual testified that he believed the allegations of not reporting disciplinary
actions and of actions committed during the November 6 exercise were mischaracterized and
misrepresented. Tr. at 129.
Regarding the failure to report disciplinary actions, the Individual stated that he did not consider
verbal counseling on May 28, 2021, for not completing building checks to be a formal disciplinary
action requiring reporting, as he was allegedly “promised there would be no disciplinary action.”
Tr. at 138–39. He testified that he did report a missed exercise in July 2023 on his QNSP but
disputed the circumstances, stating that the schedule was not properly posted. Id. at 139–40. He
admitted, however, that all the scheduled trainees attended except him. Id. at 140. He testified that
he also missed another training exercise around that time, claiming that the schedule was never
posted and that the other trainees learned about it by word of mouth. Id. at 140–41.
Concerning the August 2024 failure to use his badge to access a secure area of a building, the
Individual testified that this gave rise to an informal discussion, which was not a disciplinary
action. Tr. at 141–42, 164. He testified that he had been out on short-term disability and had
forgotten that there was a badge reader for the door; he used a physical key to unlock the door and
enter on two occasions. Id. at 142–43, 165. On a third occasion, he remembered to try his badge
and discovered that he did not have access to that secure area. Id. at 165. He testified that he was
denied access because of a “major training requirement within the system.” Id. at 166. It is unclear
whether he entered the area as a part of his regular job duties.
The Individual described receiving oral counseling in August 2022 for “illegally parking in the
visitor center.” Tr. at 150. He testified that a background source had used “some heavy language”
13 The Psychologist did not, however, diagnose the Individual with an anxiety disorder. Tr. at 318–20.
13
when describing that behavior as blocking access to a road. Id. at 150–51. He confirmed that he
was “for sure illegally parked,” but described it as “such a minor incident.” Id. at 151.
The Individual acknowledged that he received a written reprimand in October 2024 for failing to
report a missing magazine but stated he reported it to the investigator as occurring after his QNSP
submission. Tr. at 143, 151. The Individual claimed that he asked management for his magazine,
which had had been taken from him prior to starting an exercise. Id. at 151–52. He further claimed
that management was taking a long time trying to find the magazine, so he stepped aside and left
without the magazine because “a lot of people were behind me and I wanted to get out of the way.”
Id. at 152. He testified that when he “rediscovered” that he was missing a magazine, he “knew I
didn’t drop the magazine. I knew there was no sense on even searching for it. I knew that
management still had it.” Id. The Individual testified that later that night, he told a colleague
identified in this Decision as SPO 2 about the situation and that SPO 2 told him he may want to
report the situation. Id. at 153. He testified that he told SPO 2 he did not trust his manager and that
he was afraid that if he reported the missing magazine, management would call in everyone to
search, waking them up in the middle of the night. Id. He testified that he knew his colleagues
would be back in “a couple more hours and then I could just get it back from them then.” Id. He
testified that “it just seemed logical.” Id. He admitted he made the wrong decision by not reporting
it immediately but thought it was the right decision at the time to avoid a disruption. Id. at 152,
155. The Individual further testified that his supervisor must have dropped the magazine, not him.
Id. at 154. He admitted that it was his responsibility to account for all his ammunition at the end
of a shift and that missing ammunition was supposed to be reported immediately. Id. at 154–55.
He also admitted that there was not an exception in the policy allowing reporting later to avoid
waking others in the middle of the night. Id. at 155. He testified, “I was afraid of making people
mad at me for having them being called in the middle of the night.” Id. at 239. When asked about
committing a security infraction to avoid making his colleagues mad, he responded, “I don’t think
it was a security infraction.” Id. Regarding his manager, the Individual testified, “I did trust him,
but I just felt like he would make a big deal out of it, and I made the mistake.” Id. at 155.
The Individual testified that his decision to substitute his judgment for following set rules “shows
that I kind of think outside of the box sometimes, and it can get me in trouble.” Tr. at 156. He
testified that thinking outside the box was both the strongest and weakest parts of his personality:
I’ve always had the ability to think critically and to be able to think on my feet for
myself. Despite being instructed or taught to do it a certain way, I always try to find
ways to do it better. I am the type of person who I feel is able to establish some of
these protocols that you read about to be taught. And I believe that I’m somebody
who can actually find better ways of doing things.
Id. at 236.
The Individual admitted to being given “a piece of paper” in November 2023 coaching and
counseling him about attendance issues. Tr. at 157. Initially, he asserted that it was not a written
disciplinary action, but shortly after that, he admitted that it could be called a disciplinary action.
Id. He testified that “the actual reason why I received the discipline or, well, the coaching
14
counseling” was that he had missed a performance test, but the document also discussed his having
missed a weapons qualification earlier that year. Id. at 158.
Regarding falsifying an official record by stating he had conducted a building check that he had
not actually conducted, the Individual testified, “Now that sounds pretty serious. However, this is
the one that I was brought in and I was told, listen, there is no disciplinary action resulting of this.”
Tr. at 158–59. He testified that he “just got an email that had a form or wording in it saying that
my, and the way I took it, on reading the email, my actions could be perceived as falsifying an
official record. However, what happened was, is I just forgot to do the check.” Id. at 159. He
testified that he did the paperwork ahead of time and that the incident was being taken out of
context and “weaponized to make it look like I falsified an official record. But I didn’t do it
intentionally. . . . I marked on my timesheet the times that I was going to do my check and I just
forgot to do one of them.” Id. at 160–61. He added that “[i]t looks bad. But it happens to
everybody.” Id. at 161.
Regarding the November 6, 2024, training exercise, the Individual testified that he performed very
well and denied intentionally firing a laser weapon or throwing dummy grenades at his team. Tr.
at 172, 208. He attributed the “fratricide” incident to his machine gun accidentally bumping a wall,
which made the gun’s laser go off. Id. at 173–74. He also attributed it to a grenade taking a “bad
bounce” off something in the way of the grenade’s arc when he threw it past his teammates while
standing some distance behind them. Id. at 173–74, 175. He testified:
I was throwing a grenade past them. Not really over them, but past them. And the
one that took the funny bounce hit something in the air. It just ricocheted off of that
and it didn’t make it all the way to my intended target area. But it made it where—
it made it safely away enough.
Id. at 175. The Individual claimed that SPOs at his site are not trained in the use of grenades beyond
their basic function. Id. at 175–76. He stated that “all of the interior video footage of me
specifically was either destroyed or corrupted,” but claimed that it would have exonerated him. Id.
at 195–96. The Individual rated his performance in that exercise as an “[e]ight or nine out of ten.”
Id. at 208. He added, “I thought outside the box,” and “I did a lot of great things.” Id. He testified
that he was seen to have behaved erratically because he was trying to get the attention of someone
in his line of fire. Id. He claimed that his machine gun malfunctioned, so he “ripped it apart, . . .
slapped it back together and got back up on site.” Id. at 209. He testified that “as I was sitting there
waiting, about two or three minutes after that, the exercise just ended. So, I mean, I did an amazing
job to be honest with you.” Id.
Regarding the being sent to medical after reporting an explosion, the Individual disputed that he
reported an explosion, stating it was a steam pipe release in September 2024 that damaged his
hearing, and that there was no body camera footage because they do not wear them; he claimed
surveillance footage confirmed his location. Tr. at 168–71. He testified that he continued hearing
loud steam pipe releases and saw a maintenance crew working on the pipe during his shift. Id. at
169. He testified that he confronted a supervisor that night about the continued noise and told him
a work crew had been sent to handle it. Id. at 170. The Individual testified that the supervisor said
he had not gotten around to sending out a work crew. Id. He testified that someone else had sent
15
the workers because someone else had also reported the noise. Id. It was not clear why the
Individual confronted his supervisor despite having seen a maintenance crew working on the steam
pipe. The Individual testified that the derogatory information the higher-level supervisor gave to
the investigator related to this incident was in retaliation for his having reported an issue with the
steam pipe. Id. at 146. The Individual testified that he expected to be sent to medical for evaluation
the day he reported the steam pipe issue, but he was not, so he “eventually [] got to reporting it up
to medical.” Id. at 170–71. The Individual testified that the incident occurred throughout the day
and night on September 18, 2024, that he escalated his reporting to the site’s safety office on
October 22, 2024, that he reported to medical on November 18, 2024, and that he “filed the actual
safety report” on December 3, 2024. Id. at 216, 222. The Individual testified that he did not go to
medical immediately because he did not detect any effects on his hearing at the time and his vertigo
ended as soon as the initial noise stopped. Id. at 222–23. He testified that at some point he had a
hearing exam that showed a “significant drop in my ability to hear, but I can’t really tell the
difference.” Id. The Individual testified that he was referred to psychological counseling for marital
issues and because “the psychologist felt like I was self-isolating and just needed somebody to talk
to,” disputing the inference that the recommendation of psychological counseling was related to
his reporting of the steam pipe release. Id. at 172.
Concerning Guideline I, the Individual disputed having an anxiety condition, stating that a
prescription for Cymbalta was for myalgia pain, and the anxiety notation in his medical record was
a system default error. Tr. at 178. He disputed the Psychologist’s opinion, claiming it was based
on false information from a single source given in retaliation for the Individual reporting the steam
pipe release noise. Tr. at 144, 146, 179–80. The Individual testified that his site’s occupational
medicine doctor had recommended that he attend four counseling sessions and that he attended
eight sessions in total. Id. at 211–12. He testified that he enjoyed the therapy because he usually
did not have someone he could talk to. Id. He testified that he had tried a few times to follow up
with the counselor he had seen for his recommended sessions, but she was “unresponsive.” Id. at
206. He added that he did not feel like he needed counseling, but it would just be for him to have
someone to talk to. Id. He testified that he did not currently have a treatment plan and was not
taking medication specifically for anxiety. Id. at 212. He testified, “I do not have anxiety. I’m not
being treated for anxiety.” Id. at 178. See also id. at 202 (“And just for the record, I do not have
anxiety and I am not being treated for anxiety.”).
The Individual entered statements of support from two colleagues into evidence. Ex. B; Ex. C. The
statements described the Individual as emotionally stable, reliable, and professional. Ex. B at 1;
Ex. C at 1. They also stated that though the purported author had not witnessed the events described
in SSC, those events appeared inconsistent with their experience of the Individual. Id. The
Individual stated that he had prepared the written statements in the record attributed to his
coworkers. Tr. at 230. He testified that he shared statements with three colleagues and all except
one approved them for him to send in. Id. at 230–31. When asked why he had not had the
coworkers sign the statements, the Individual testified:
I guess because of difficulty of having it done, [one coworker] was willing to have
it signed and notarized. But having them respond, all of them respond to actually,
you know, typing it up and sending it and all that stuff. They were kind of just—
16
they didn’t seem proactive about it. So I felt like I needed to give them a little bit
of assistance. And I said, hey, is this good? And they said, yeah, that sounds good.
Id. at 233. The Individual then testified that he had actually never asked the coworkers to sign the
statements, only asked for their approval. Id. at 233–34.
SPO 1 testified that he had known the Individual since 2019 and considered their relationship both
professional and personal. Tr. at 77–78. They had only worked together about once per month in
the preceding year and a half, excepting four months during which SPO 1 was on leave. Id. at 101–
02. SPO 1 stated that he had never seen the Individual more or less stressed than any other
teammate in their high-stress profession and believed the Individual performed his duties as well
as any other SPO. Id. at 81. He testified that he believed the Individual was reliable and
trustworthy, citing the Individual’s willingness to help teammates and his performance in training
exercises. Id. at 82–85. SPO 1 testified that the Individual was open with him about having to do
retraining and a medical review after an incident involving throwing fake grenades and dropping
a magazine, which he believed was an “anomaly” and not a pattern. Id. at 87–88, 92, 94–95. He
testified that his knowledge about the grenade incident came from the Individual and from others
at the site. Id. at 113. He testified that the majority of people who had discussed the incident said
that the grenade did not ricochet. Id.
SPO 2 testified that he was present for the November 6, 2024, exercise, but not in the same area
as the Individual. Tr. at 245–46, 259. He also testified that he was with the Individual when he
discovered his magazine was missing and that he advised the Individual to report it. Id. at 247.
SPO 2 testified that the Individual did not trust his supervisor because he felt management was
against him and treated him unfairly due to his repeated use of short-term disability. Id. at 248–50.
SPO 2 testified that the laser guns used in the exercises cannot fire without the trigger being pulled,
unless it is a “runaway gun” that fires an entire cartridge in rapid succession. Id. at 263–64. He
further testified:
[I]t would be frowned upon deeply that if you throw a grenade from behind me.
That would make me kind of mad. Yeah I would not, I would not appreciate you
throwing a grenade behind, from behind me because of the distance that they need
to travel.
Id. at 265. He testified that he had not received training on which situations were appropriate for
grenade use. Id. at 265–66.
The Psychologist testified that the Individual “was too willing to operate according to his own set
of rules and not the ones that are required.” Tr. at 346. He believed the Individual may persist with
“out of the box” thinking that could result in poor decision-making, rule-breaking, and potentially
dangerous actions. Id. at 282–83, 293–94, 340–41. The Psychologist still had concerns about the
Individual’s trustworthiness and reliability after hearing the Individual’s testimony, stating that he
had not seen a significant change in the Individual’s insight since the initial evaluation. Id. at 300–
01, 308, 310, 321–22, 341. He testified that it had taken the Individual a long time during his
testimony to admit any wrongdoing on his part instead of blaming his behavior on “defective
information.” Id. at 314. The Psychologist believed the Individual repressed his stress and did not
17
have an appropriate emotional outlet, which could result in maladaptive behavior in the future. Id.
at 311–13. He noted that the Individual had cited fear of social repercussions and upsetting others
as reasons he did not comply with rules; he opined that this showed “a deficit in terms of judgment,
decision making and a willingness to hold himself accountable to certain rules.” Id. at 284. The
Psychologist recommended that the Individual participate in “reality therapy” so he could better
embrace the truths of what happened at work and the detrimental roles of stress, anxiety, and “out-
of-the-box” thinking. Id. at 295–96.14 The Psychologist also testified that he did not believe the
Individual was a danger to himself or others. Id. at 292.
When asked if he believed the Individual still had a mental or psychological condition that
impaired his judgment, reliability, trustworthiness, or stability, the Psychologist testified that he
believed the Individual was “subject to symptoms of anxiety that are stress-related, that can
sometimes lead to poor decision-making and may cause him to deflect things that he needs to learn
from . . . rather than examining himself closer.” Tr. at 349. He believed that the Individual
remained vulnerable to situational spikes in anxiety, which would be more challenging to deal with
because the Individual “guard[ed] against acknowledging” those difficulties. Id. at 294.
V. ANALYSIS
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the
government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours
and endures throughout off-duty hours. The government places a high degree of trust and
confidence in individuals to whom it grants access authorization. Decisions include, by necessity,
consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect
or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible
extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
The issue before me is whether the Individual, at the time of the hearing, presents an unacceptable
risk to national security and the common defense. I must consider all the evidence, both favorable
and unfavorable, in a commonsense manner. “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered
for access for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.”
Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 2(b). In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions
that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. Because of the
strong presumption against granting or restoring security clearances, I must deny access
authorization if I am not convinced that the LSO’s security concerns have been mitigated such that
restoring the Individual’s clearance is not an unacceptable risk to national security.
14 At the hearing, the Individual repeatedly acknowledged that he had made mistakes in regard to his disciplinary
matters. See, e.g., Tr. at 155–56, 162, 214, 314. As previously stated, the Psychologist’s assessment that the higher-
level supervisor’s report is the truth is based on the uncorroborated information in the investigator’s report. I cannot
say with any certainty that the higher-level supervisor’s account November 6 incident is truth any more than I can say
it is false. Therefore, I do not accept the Psychologist’s opinion about the need for reality therapy because there is
insufficient evidence in the documents provided to him, and to the court, to support a finding that the Individual is not
accepting “the truth.”
18
While the allegations in the SSC, if taken as true, justify the invocation of Guideline I, I find
otherwise after considering the evidence.
Concerning condition (b) requires an opinion from a duly qualified medical professional, and I am
not convinced by the Psychologist’s assessment of the Individual. The Individual stated that he
does not have anxiety, provided a plausible explanation for his Cymbalta prescription, and was
cleared by HRP to return to duty and carry a firearm. In addition, the Individual’s psychological
testing results did not indicate that the Individual had symptoms of anxiety or depression. While
the Psychologist noted the Individual’s high defensiveness scores, he did not assert with any
certainty that they invalidated the other test results, saying only that there was the potential for
moderate defensiveness. Moreover, the Psychologist did not request the Individual’s medical
records from his primary care provider or from HRP while relying heavily on the uncorroborated
report of the higher-level supervisor to support his conclusion that the Individual suffered from
deceit and integrity problems. Taken together, these facts do not, in my view, support a finding
that the Individual has a psychological condition that impairs his judgment, trustworthiness,
reliability, or stability.
The basis for the concerns raised under condition (a), as I determined supra, is the Individual’s
alleged issues with the ability to manage stress. Those alleged issues stem largely from his alleged
behavior during the November 6 exercise. As discussed above, I do not find that the November 6
exercise allegations are enough to show a general difficulty managing stress sufficient to raise a
concern under condition (a). For the foregoing reasons, I find that there is inadequate evidence to
support the presence of security concerns under Guideline I.
The Individual argued at length during the hearing that the basis for the security concerns raised
came from a single source and, therefore, was not sufficient to justify those concerns. However,
as seen in the reports of the background investigation, multiple sources—the disciplinary action in
the Individual’s personnel file, the lower-level supervisor’s reports that the Individual had had
disciplinary actions, and the higher-level supervisor’s report—provided information about the
Individual’s history of disciplinary action at work, which are sufficient to raise a Guideline E
concern. The Individual also confirmed much of the higher-level supervisor’s report in his own
ESI. Thus, those security concerns were not based on the account of a single source. Moreover,
the threshold for raising a concern is not definitive proof, but simply that the facts available show
that granting an individual access authorization would present an unacceptable risk to the national
security, as pointed out by the Personnel Security Specialist. Once DOE has met that burden, the
burden shifts to the Individual to bring forth sufficient evidence to mitigate the concerns. The
Individual has failed to do so in this case.
A. Guideline E
Conditions that could mitigate Guideline E concerns include:
(a) The individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission,
concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts;
19
(b) The refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was caused or
significantly contributed to by advice of legal counsel or of a person with
professional responsibilities for advising or instructing the individual specifically
concerning security processes. Upon being made aware of the requirement to
cooperate or provide the information, the individual cooperated fully and truthfully;
(c) The offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so
infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to
recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or
good judgment;
(d) The individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change
the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances,
or factors that contributed to untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate
behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur;
(e) The individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to
exploitation, manipulation, or duress;
(f) The information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable reliability;
and
(g) Association with persons involved in criminal activities was unwitting, has ceased,
or occurs under circumstances that do not cast doubt upon the individual’s
reliability, trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness to comply with rules and
regulations.
Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 17. None of the mitigating conditions apply. Mitigating condition (b)
cannot apply because the Individual has not alleged that he was instructed by legal counsel or a
person advising on the security clearance process not to list certain disciplinary events on his
QNSP, and mitigating condition (g) is not germane to the allegations raised in the SSC. The
allegations listed in the SSC support the invocation of Guideline E. However, after hearing the
Individual’s testimony, I also have significant concerns under the whole person concept that
contribute to my overall decision.
The Individual did not admit to having received disciplinary counseling for several violations until
the ESI. While there may be some merit to the Individual’s claim that there was no official
discipline issued, some of the counseling was accompanied by written materials outlining that he
had committed rule violations. Moreover, the Individual’s personnel file contained a record of
verbal counseling for falsifying an official record. Crucially, the Individual’s QNSP disclosure
itself was not consistent with the truth because he specified he missed a single training in August
2023, when in reality he missed multiple trainings in 2023 and admitted such at the hearing. Given
the timing of the ESI, it is unlikely that the Individual was confronted with the facts of the three
disciplinary actions he is alleged to have omitted from the QNSP15 before he disclosed them to the
15 I count the alleged omissions as three instead of four, since, as noted supra, the October 2024 disciplinary action
occurred after the Individual completed the QNSP.
20
investigator because the investigator did not learn about them before the ESI. However, his
disclosure on the QNSP stating that he missed a single specific training exercise in 2023 was
unambiguously misleading, which I take into account when evaluating the Individual’s whole
person and assessing his overall credibility. With this in mind, there is a degree of doubt as to
whether the Individual did not include on his QNSP the May 2021, July 2023, and August 2024
disciplinary actions with the intent to deceive.
Drawing on the Individual’s testimony, when advised by a trusted colleague that he should follow
policy and immediately report a missing magazine of live ammunition, the Individual intentionally
concealed the information until the following day, citing fear of upsetting others as his motivating
rationale. This is concerning for multiple reasons. First, the Individual intentionally acted contrary
to security policy. This is the type of behavior the security clearance review process is designed to
predict and circumvent. Second, the Individual committed the security violation so that his peers
would not be upset with him. This reveals a vulnerability to peer pressure and social coercion that
can pose a risk to the national security.
The Individual’s testimony shows that, whether intentionally or not, he circumvented security
protocols to access an area in which he was not authorized to be. The issue is not that others did
not prevent him from doing so or that he was technically able to gain access with physical keys.
The issue is that he entered an area he was not allowed to enter, as evidenced by the fact that his
badge did not grant entry when he eventually tried to use it and by the Individual’s admission that
he was denied access due to missing a training requirement. This is another example of the type
of behavior security clearance review process is designed to predict and circumvent. This behavior
demonstrates that the Individual cannot be trusted to protect the integrity of restricted spaces.
Moreover, the Individual’s assertion that he had performed a building check when he had not done
so adds an additional layer of concern about the Individual’s ability to protect restricted spaces.
The Individual’s actions and statements, when considered as part of the whole person concept, do
not suggest that the Individual takes responsibility for his actions when he can plausibly deflect
blame or claim ignorance. Therefore, while the LSO’s allegations are not supported by such
irrefutable evidence that there can be no question as to why the Individual did not list those
disciplinary actions on his QNSP, there is enough evidence that, when considered in the light of
the Individual’s whole person, it is plausible—if not likely—that these were deliberate omissions.
The burden then shifts to the Individual to prove that he did not deliberately omit the disciplinary
actions from his QNSP. He has failed to do so here. Having reached a finding on whether the
Individual made the omissions, I turn to the mitigating conditions.
Condition (a) does not apply because, while there is insufficient evidence to show that the
Individual was confronted with the all the facts before admitting to them, there is sufficient
evidence to introduce doubt about whether he volunteered the information about the May 2021
discipline. The notes from the ESI do not say he volunteered the information, as they do for
information about the August 2024 counseling, and the investigator received that information from
the Individual’s personnel file prior to the ESI. The Individual’s lack of candor in his QNSP
disclosure regarding the number of missed training exercises he was disciplined for contributes to
a whole person concern about the Individual’s honesty, which does nothing to mitigate the doubt
raised about the ESI disclosures. All doubt must be resolved in favor of the national security, so
21
mitigating condition (a) does not apply. Moreover, mitigating condition (a) is insufficient to
mitigate all the Guideline E concerns because it does not address the behavioral issues raised in
the SSC.
Mitigating condition (c) does not apply. The behaviors raised in the SSC were serious security
infractions involving failure to protect the integrity of restricted spaces, failure to secure live
ammunition, and failure to follow security procedures. These offenses were not minor, and they
continued occurring over a period of years. The Individual deflected responsibility for these
offenses and did not appear to believe that violating policies that he disagreed with was
problematic, leading to concerns that he will deviate from policy in the future. There is significant
doubt about the Individual’s ability to follow rules and reporting requirements in the future and he
has not fully accepted responsibility for his past violations, saying only that each was a mistake he
would not make again because, unlike when he committed the violation, he now knows what he
should do in such a situation. Given the repeated nature of his violations, I am not persuaded by
his assurances. Accordingly, I find that there is a likelihood that he will commit future violations.
For that reason, mitigating condition (d) also does not apply.
Mitigating condition (e) does not apply because the LSO did not allege that the Individual engaged
in conduct that left him vulnerable to exploitation, manipulation, or duress. Even if it had, it is
apparent that the Individual’s susceptibility to peer pressure and fear of social consequences can
lead, and indeed has led, to his committing security infractions. At the hearing, the Individual
testified that he did not report the missing magazine in a timely manner because that would result
in his colleagues being woken up in the middle of the night. He testified that he did not want to
upset them. While he admitted at the hearing that this was a mistake, he also cast his decision in a
somewhat positive light by describing the decision as “out-of-the-box” thinking that was one of
his strongest, and somehow also weakest, qualities. The Individual’s vulnerability to external
pressure, including pressure he merely worries about rather than concrete threats, remains and
presents a risk to the national security that cannot be ignored under the whole person concept.
With respect to the Individual’s alleged security infractions, mitigating condition (f) does not
apply, despite the Individual’s argument that this administrative review proceeding is based
entirely on the uncorroborated report from the higher-level supervisor. The Individual in fact
admits that the security infractions occurred, which is enough to find the derogatory information
substantiated. Condition (f) does apply, however, with respect to the concerns regarding the
November 6 exercise and the report of an explosion. While the Individual is not the most reliable
narrator, DOE did not provide any evidence corroborating the higher-level supervisor’s version of
events. While some of the higher-level supervisor’s report was corroborated—particularly the
allegations regarding the disciplinary matters—the allegations about the explosion reporting were
not corroborated, and neither were the allegations regarding the November 6 exercise, particularly
regarding the Individual lying down because he was overwhelmed; I would expect that kind of
behavior to be known and confirmed by other witnesses. DOE’s evidence in support of the security
concerns regarding the November 6 exercise and the explosion report are not sufficient to justify
their inclusion in the SSC. However, the security violations themselves provide ample basis for
finding the Guideline E concerns have not been mitigated. The Individual has admitted to breaking
the rules in a way that harmed the national security and did not show adequate evidence for me to
22
be certain he will not do so again. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, I find that the Individual
has not mitigated the security concerns raised under Guideline E.
VI. CONCLUSION
Upon consideration of the entire record in this case, I find that there was evidence that raised
concerns regarding the Individual’s eligibility for access authorization under Guideline E, but not
Guideline I, of the Adjudicative Guidelines. I further find that the Individual has not succeeded in
fully resolving the Guideline E concerns. Therefore, I cannot conclude that restoring DOE access
authorization to the Individual “will not endanger the common defense and security and is clearly
consistent with the national interest.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(a). Accordingly, I find that the DOE
should not restore access authorization to the Individual.
This Decision may be appealed in accordance with the procedures set forth at 10 C.F.R. § 710.28.
Kristin L. Martin
Administrative Judge
Office of Hearings and Appeals