PSH-26-0017

*The original of this document contains information which is subject to withholding from disclosure
under 5 U.S. C. § 552. Such material has been deleted from this copy and replaced with XXXXXX’s.
United States Department of Energy
Office of Hearings and Appeals
In the Matter of: Personnel Security Hearing )
)
Filing Date: November 18, 2025 ) Case No.: PSH-26-0017
)
__________________________________________)
Issued: June 11, 2026
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Administrative Judge Decision
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Kristin L. Martin, Administrative Judge:
This Decision concerns the eligibility of XXXXXXXXXXXXX (hereinafter referred to as “the
Individual”) for access authorization under the Department of Energy’s (DOE) regulations set
forth at 10 C.F.R. Part 710, entitled, “Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to
Classified Matter and Special Nuclear Material or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position.”1 For
the reasons set forth below, I conclude that the Individual’s security clearance should not be
granted.
I. BACKGROUND
The Individual is employed by a DOE Contractor in a position which requires that he hold a
security clearance. Derogatory information was discovered regarding the Individual’s
psychological condition. The Local Security Office (LSO) began the present administrative review
proceeding by issuing a Notification Letter to the Individual informing him that he was entitled to
a hearing before an Administrative Judge in order to resolve the substantial doubt regarding his
eligibility to continue holding a security clearance. See 10 C.F.R. § 710.21.
The Individual requested a hearing and the LSO forwarded the Individual’s request to the Office
of Hearings and Appeals (OHA). The Director of OHA appointed me as the Administrative Judge
in this matter. At the hearing I convened pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 710.25(d), (e), and (g), the
Individual testified on his own behalf. The LSO presented the testimony of the DOE-consultant
psychologist (Psychologist) who had evaluated the Individual. See Transcript of Hearing, OHA
Case No. PSH-26-0017 (hereinafter cited as “Tr.”). The LSO submitted eleven exhibits, marked
as Exhibits 1 through 11 (hereinafter cited as “Ex.”). The Individual submitted one exhibit, marked
as Exhibit A.
1 Under the regulations, “‘[a]ccess authorization’ means an administrative determination that an individual is eligible
for access to classified matter or is eligible for access to, or control over, special nuclear material.” 10 C.F.R.
§ 710.5(a). Such authorization will also be referred to in this Decision as a security clearance.
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II. THE NOTIFICATION LETTER AND THE ASSOCIATED SECURITY
CONCERNS
As indicated above, the Notification Letter informed the Individual that information in the
possession of the DOE created a substantial doubt concerning his eligibility for a security
clearance. That information pertains to Guideline I of the National Security Adjudicative
Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Eligibility to Hold
a Sensitive Position, effective June 8, 2017 (Adjudicative Guidelines). These guidelines are not
inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines
are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. 10 C.F.R. § 710.7.
Guideline I states that “[c]ertain emotional, mental, and personality conditions can impair
judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness. A formal diagnosis of a disorder is not required for there
to be a concern under this guideline.” Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 27.
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(a) Behavior that casts doubt on an individual’s judgment, stability, reliability,
or trustworthiness, not covered under any other guideline and that may
indicate an emotional, mental, or personality condition, including, but not
limited to, irresponsible, violent, self-harm, suicidal, paranoid,
manipulative, impulsive, chronic lying, deceitful, exploitative, or bizarre
behaviors;
(b) An opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional that the individual
has a condition that may impair judgment, stability, reliability, or
trustworthiness;
(c) Voluntary or involuntary inpatient hospitalization;
(d) Failure to follow a prescribed treatment plan related to a diagnosed
psychological/psychiatric condition that may impair judgment, stability,
reliability, or trustworthiness, including, but not limited to, failure to take
prescribed medication or failure to attend required counseling sessions; and
(e) Pathological gambling, the associated behaviors of which may include
unsuccessful attempts to stop gambling; gambling for increasingly higher
stakes, usually in an attempt to cover losses; concealing gambling losses;
borrowing or stealing money to fund gambling or pay gambling debts; and
family conflict resulting from gambling.
Id. at ¶ 28.
The LSO alleges that in August 2025, the Psychologist evaluated the Individual and opined in a
subsequent report that the Individual met sufficient Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental
Disorders, Fifth Ed., Text Revision (DSM-5 TR) diagnostic criteria for a diagnosis of
Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar type, which was a condition that could impair his judgement,
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reliability, trustworthiness, and stability. Ex. 1 at 5.2 Accordingly, the LSO’s security concerns
under Guideline I, concerning condition (b), are justified.
III. REGULATORY STANDARDS
A DOE administrative review proceeding under Part 710 requires me, as the Administrative Judge,
to issue a Decision that reflects my comprehensive, common-sense judgment, made after
consideration of all of the relevant evidence, favorable and unfavorable, as to whether the granting
or continuation of a person’s access authorization will not endanger the common defense and
security and is clearly consistent with the national interest. 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(a). The entire process
is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole person concept.”
Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 2(a). The protection of the national security is the paramount
consideration. The regulatory standard implies that there is a presumption against granting or
restoring a security clearance. See Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988) (“clearly
consistent with the national interest” standard for granting security clearances indicates “that
security determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials”); Dorfmont v. Brown, 913
F.2d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1990) (strong presumption against the issuance of a security clearance).
The Individual must come forward at the hearing with evidence to convince the DOE that granting
or restoring access authorization “will not endanger the common defense and security and will be
clearly consistent with the national interest.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.27(d). The Individual is afforded a
full opportunity to present evidence supporting his eligibility for an access authorization. The
Part 710 regulations are drafted so as to permit the introduction of a very broad range of evidence
at personnel security hearings. Even appropriate hearsay evidence may be admitted. Id. at
§ 710.26(h). Hence, an individual is afforded the utmost latitude in the presentation of evidence to
mitigate the security concerns at issue.
The discussion below reflects my application of these factors to the testimony and exhibits
presented by both sides in this case.
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT
The Individual has a history of mental health issues. Ex. 7 at 28. He began medication treatment
for Major Depressive Disorder, mild, with psychotic features, in December 2022. Id. He described
his primary stressor as being overworked. Id. He was prescribed Prozac, but he developed
insomnia and was eventually taken to the emergency room by his mother due to lack of sleep. Id.
The emergency room provider prescribed Hydroxyzine as an anxiolytic for the Individual. Id.
Around the same time, the Individual’s primary care physician transitioned him from Prozac to
Venlafaxine, a serotonin-norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor. Id. He continued taking Venlafaxine
and Hydroxyzine for about four or five months, but eventually he decided to wean himself off the
Hydroxyzine because he was sleeping better. Id. He continued feeling lethargic, so he decided to
wean himself off the Venlafaxine as well. Id. The Individual admitted to having weaned himself
off his prescribed psychiatric medications without his doctor’s approval. Tr. at 36. His energy level
increased and he felt “outstanding.” Ex. 7 at 28. He began experiencing excessive energy and his
2 DOE exhibit page numbers will be cited using the Bates stamp in the top right corner of the documents.
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sleep issues returned. Id. He later told the Psychologist that he developed psychosis due to lack of
sleep. Id. After weaning himself off his psychiatric medication, he felt paranoid and believed
people were conspiring against him. Id. He became withdrawn and began experiencing visual and
auditory hallucinations. Ex. 7 at 28. He described, for example, seeing a woman with a snake for
a tongue that sounded like his grandmother. Id. He later testified that he told his primary care
physician that he had weaned himself off of his medications and claimed that the doctor “took no
issue with that” and “said[] I was doing good and so there[] was no issue.” Tr. at 37. It is unclear
whether he told the doctor about his psychiatric symptoms. He was involuntarily committed to a
behavioral health facility for ten days in July 2023. Id. The providers there prescribed him
Risperidone for his psychotic symptoms and Trazadone as a sleep aid. Id. He had a post-
hospitalization meeting with a psychiatrist (the Psychiatrist), who he continued to see periodically
through 2026, and she prescribed him Wellbutrin as well. Id. at 29. He also began periodic therapy
sessions with a counselor. Id. at 30.
In July 2024, the Individual began experiencing suicidal ideation and intent. Ex. 7 at 29. He
purchased a container of antifreeze, intending to consume it to end his life. Id. At his mother’s
urging, he went to the emergency room and was voluntarily admitted to a behavioral health facility
for one week. Id. He felt better after his hospital stay, but his job was eliminated shortly after his
discharge, and his depressive state returned. Id.
By December 2024, the Individual had weaned himself off the Risperidone without the
Psychiatrist’s knowledge. Ex. 7 at 29. He abruptly stopped taking the Wellbutrin as well. Id. The
Individual began going to a wellness center run by a chiropractor. Id. at 30. In February 2025, he
began giving himself peptide injections prescribed by the chiropractor and doing “red light
therapy.”3 Id. He felt better, but began experiencing what the Psychologist described as manic
symptoms. Id. He began taking the Risperidone again. Id. In an effort to “suppress [his] racing
thoughts” and “mitigate the symptoms,” the Individual took five to six times his prescribed dose,
which resulted in an overdose on July 9, 2025. Tr. at 11, 34. He met with the Psychiatrist on July
10, 2025. Ex. 7 at 30. She sent him to a medical center to be admitted for inpatient treatment;
however, there were no beds available, so he was sent to a behavioral health center. Id. He was
discharged after ten days, during which his medications were adjusted. Id. The Individual later told
the Psychologist that he stopped injecting himself with peptides but continued the red light therapy.
Id.
The Individual reported his hospitalization as required to the LSO. Ex. 5; Ex. 6. He was referred
to the Psychologist for evaluation in mid-August 2025. Ex. 7 at 26. In a report of that evaluation
issued later that month, the Psychologist opined that the Individual met the DSM-5 TR criteria for
Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar type. Id. at 34. He noted that the Individual had reported
experiencing delusions, hallucinations, and apathy for weeks at a time. Id. He wrote that the
Individual appeared controlled and properly oriented during the evaluation, but he noted that the
Individual had a “history of making poorly informed judgements, such as weaning himself off
medication and substituting ‘natural’ remedies.” Id. at 34–35. He noted that the Individual
3 The Individual described this therapy as going into a room and having a red light shone on his back for about twenty
minutes. Tr. at 55. He testified, “I believe it’s supposed to interact with the mitochondria in the cells. . . . I might be
totally wrong with that, but it interacts with something, our body cells that promotes healing, restful sleep and[]
whatnot.” Id. at 55–56.
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experienced frequent manic episodes interspersed with depressive episodes, as well as beliefs,
perceptions, and sensations that “differ from what most individuals experience.” Id. at 35. He
opined that the Individual’s prognosis was poor because, despite having undergone treatment and
ongoing medical care and counseling, the Individual continued to have poor judgment and stop
taking his medications. Id.
The Individual submitted into evidence a clinical summary and status update from the Psychiatrist,
who he had been seeing since August 2023. Ex. A; Tr. at 24. The Psychiatrist wrote that the
Individual had been “100% compliant” with all scheduled appointments, therapeutic interventions,
and pharmacological recommendations.4 Ex. A. She wrote that as of an assessment on March 20,
2026, the Individual’s symptoms were stable and she saw no “evidence of recurrence or escalation
of symptoms that would impair his functioning.” Id. She further wrote that the Individual
“possesse[d] the cognitive and emotional capacity to exercise sound judgment. He shows no signs
of impulsivity, disorientation, or behavior that would suggest a lack of reliability or
trustworthiness.” Id. The Psychiatrist wrote that the Individual had a favorable prognosis and was
not a danger to himself or others. Id.
At the hearing, the Individual testified that he neither agreed nor disagreed with the Psychologist’s
diagnosis, but generally did not contest the facts listed in the Psychologist’s report. Tr. at 15–16.
He disagreed with the Psychologist’s prognosis because he had learned from his mistakes. Id. at
16. He believed that his prognosis was good. Id. He testified that for the past ten months, he had
been stable, unimpaired, and in possession of good judgment. Id. at 18. The Individual admitted
that prior to his July 2025 hospitalization, he had been noncompliant with both therapeutic and
pharmaceutical recommendations. Id. at 18–19. He testified that both his July 2023 and July 2025
hospitalizations were attributable at least in part to his decisions to stop taking medications outside
of a doctor’s supervision. Id. at 38. He testified that he had felt detached from the Psychiatrist, as
if he was on his own. Id. at 27. He had believed the medication was not helping him and did not
believe the Psychiatrist could help him either, so he felt he needed to “find something on my own.”
Id. at 27–28. He testified that many friends had told him “it’s up to you to[] get better.” Id. at 28.
The Individual testified that he had learned that he can trust his medical providers and that he needs
to follow their guidance. Id. at 38.
The Individual testified that he was attending therapy and psychiatric appointments regularly. Tr.
at 24–25. He testified that in therapy, he worked on managing stress and talked about “what’s on
my mind, just life situations, whatnot.” Id. at 25. His therapist had been aware of his use of red
light therapy, but the Psychiatrist had not. Id. at 28. The Individual testified that his therapist had
believed the red light therapy was “self-care” and that it was a good idea. Id. at 30. He further
testified that he had been influenced to try the red light therapy because the owner of his gym had
been heavily promoting it. Id. He testified that he stopped doing the red light therapy in October
2025 and stopped the peptide injections in early July 2025. Id. at 31. He testified that he was not
seeking any treatments or therapies outside of his therapist and Psychiatrist at the time of the
hearing. Id.
4 The Individual testified at the hearing that he withheld information from the Psychiatrist, including that he had
stopped taking his prescribed medications. Tr. at 27. He characterized the Psychiatrist’s assertions about his
compliance as incorrect. Id. at 24.
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The Individual testified that he had not experienced suicidal ideations or urges after his July 2024
hospitalization. Tr. at 39–40. Leading up to that hospitalization, the Individual had been taking his
medications as prescribed, but felt trapped by his job, had broken up with his girlfriend, and did
not see “a happy path forward” for himself. Id. at 40–41. Going through the motions of purchasing
antifreeze to end his life felt comforting because he felt like he was taking action to rid himself of
his problems. Id. at 41.
The Individual testified he believed that when he was initially evaluated by the Psychologist, he
did have a condition that impaired his judgment, reliability, trustworthiness, and stability. Tr. at
43. However, he believed that he had now stabilized and his condition was under control such that
he no longer experienced such impairment. Id. He felt calm, stable, and focused and believed that
his condition was no longer a problem. Id. at 45. He believed ten months was sufficient time to
show that he was stabilized. Id. He wanted to continue taking his medication as prescribed and
wanted to remain physically active to help maintain his mood. Id. at 53. The Individual planned to
handle elevated stress at work by staying in close communication with his boss. Id. at 63. He
testified that his boss was not aware of his psychiatric diagnosis. Id.
The Psychologist testified at the hearing that he believed the Individual still suffered from the same
mental health condition that had led to his hospitalizations—Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar
type. Tr. at 114, 136. He testified that the Individual’s prognosis remained poor. Id. at 123, 137.
He testified that Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar type, was a chronic condition that “moves in a
ton of waves in and out of a person’s life.” Id. The Psychologist noted the cyclical nature of the
Individual’s major mental health crises—hospitalization every July for the preceding three years—
and opined that the Individual’s mental health condition was not currently controlled by treatment
and medication such that it would not impair his judgment. Id. at 131. He testified that while some
people diagnosed with Schizoaffective Disorder can manage their symptoms, about 50% of those
diagnosed “just barely manage” their symptoms. Id. at 132. He testified that he did not know
whether adherence to treatment and medication plans would result in the Individual’s condition
being controllable. Id. He testified, “I believe his symptoms are managed, but we don’t know
what’s going to happen tomorrow or the next day.” Id. at 133. He hypothesized that perhaps after
eighteen more months of the Individual adhering to treatment he might be able to form a more
certain opinion. Id. The Psychologist testified that he would need to see “two years of compliance,
improvement, a lack of symptomology to be able to say something favorable about his prognosis.”
Id. at 134. He believed the Individual’s condition was permanent and that there was no evidence
that it was currently in remission. Id. Thus, the Psychologist testified that the Individual’s
Schizoaffective Disorder still constituted a condition that impaired his judgment, reliability,
trustworthiness, and stability. Id. at 136.
V. ANALYSIS
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the
government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours
and endures throughout off-duty hours. The government places a high degree of trust and
confidence in individuals to whom it grants access authorization. Decisions include, by necessity,
consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect
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or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible
extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
The issue before me is whether the Individual, at the time of the hearing, presents an unacceptable
risk to national security and the common defense. I must consider all the evidence, both favorable
and unfavorable, in a commonsense manner. “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered
for access for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.”
Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 2(b). In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions
that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. Because of the
strong presumption against granting or restoring security clearances, I must deny access
authorization if I am not convinced that the LSO’s security concerns have been mitigated such that
granting the Individual’s clearance is not an unacceptable risk to national security.
Conditions that could mitigate Guideline I security concerns include:
(a) The identified condition is readily controllable with treatment, and the
individual has demonstrated ongoing and consistent compliance with the
treatment plan;
(b) The individual has voluntarily entered a counseling or treatment program
for a condition that is amenable to treatment, and the individual is currently
receiving counseling or treatment with a favorable prognosis by a duly
qualified mental health professional;
(c) Recent opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional employed by,
or acceptable to and approved by, the U.S. Government that an individual's
previous condition is under control or in remission, and has a low
probability of recurrence or exacerbation;
(d) The past psychological/psychiatric condition was temporary, the situation
has been resolved, and the individual no longer shows indications of
emotional instability;
(e) There is no indication of a current problem.
Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 29. None of the mitigating conditions apply.
Regarding condition (a), the Individual’s psychological condition is not readily controllable with
treatment. According to the Psychologist, half of those diagnosed with Schizoaffective Disorder,
Bipolar type, are only barely able to manage their symptoms. Moreover, given the Individual’s
long history of noncompliance with medication regimens, the less than one year period since his
last hospitalization is not enough time to demonstrate consistent compliance. He also hid his
previous noncompliance from the Psychiatrist, calling into question whether her account of his
compliance with treatment since July 2025 is accurate.
Regarding condition (b), the Individual is attending counselling but, as previously stated, it is
unclear whether his condition is amenable to treatment. While the Psychiatrist wrote that his
prognosis is favorable, she did not have complete information about the Individual’s medication
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history, which reduces the weight of her prognosis. In contrast, the Psychologist, who had a more
complete view of the Individual’s history, gave the Individual a poor prognosis.
Regarding condition (c), as previously stated, the Psychologist—whose opinions carry more
weight than those of the Psychiatrist for reasons also previously stated—opined that the
Individual’s condition is not, at this time, under control or in remission. Similarly, regarding
condition (d), the Individual’s condition is not temporary and has not been resolved. Finally,
regarding condition (e), the uncertainty about the Individual’s compliance with treatment and
future symptoms indicates that, as of now, there is still a problem. The worry is not about today,
for we already know what has happened and can assess the risk with certainty. The worry is that
tomorrow, next month, or next year the Individual may go through another cycle of crisis,
instability, and hospitalization. Without confidence that he will be able to control his condition for
the long-term, I cannot find that there is no current problem.
For the foregoing reasons, I find that the Individual has not mitigated the security concerns raised
under Guideline I.
VI. CONCLUSION
Upon consideration of the entire record in this case, I find that there was evidence that raised
concerns regarding the Individual’s eligibility for access authorization under Guideline I of the
Adjudicative Guidelines. I further find that the Individual has not succeeded in fully resolving
those concerns. Therefore, I cannot conclude that granting DOE access authorization to the
Individual “will not endanger the common defense and security and is clearly consistent with the
national interest.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(a). Accordingly, I find that the DOE should not grant access
authorization to the Individual.
This Decision may be appealed in accordance with the procedures set forth at 10 C.F.R. § 710.28.
Kristin L. Martin
Administrative Judge
Office of Hearings and Appeals