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United States Department of Energy
Office of Hearings and Appeals
In the Matter of: Personnel Security Hearing )
)
Filing Date: May 15, 2026 ) Case No.: PSH-26-0117
)
__________________________________________)
Issued: August 28, 2026
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Administrative Judge Decision
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James P. Thompson III, Administrative Judge:
This Decision concerns the eligibility of XXXXXXXXXXX (the Individual) to hold an access
authorization under the United States Department of Energy’s (DOE) regulations, set forth at 10
C.F.R. Part 710, “Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Matter and
Special Nuclear Material or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position.”1 As discussed below, after
carefully considering the record before me in light of the relevant regulations and the National
Security Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information
or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position (June 8, 2017) (Adjudicative Guidelines), I conclude
that the Individual’s access authorization should not be restored.
I. BACKGROUND
The Individual is employed by a DOE contractor in a position that requires a security clearance.
In February 2025, the DOE Local Security Office (LSO) received information that the Individual
was involuntarily hospitalized after an intentional overdose. Exhibit (Ex.) 4 at 8–9.2 In order to
gather additional information, the LSO sent the Individual a Letter of Interrogatory (LOI) which
she completed on June 25, 2025. Ex. 7 at 14; Ex. 8 at 16. Subsequently, the LSO requested that a
DOE-consultant psychologist (DOE Psychologist) evaluate the Individual. Ex. 10 at 64.
Based on the information gathered by the LSO, including a January 2026 report (Report) produced
by the DOE Psychologist, the LSO informed the Individual by letter (Notification Letter) that it
possessed reliable information that created substantial doubt regarding the Individual’s eligibility
to possess a security clearance. Ex. 1. In an attachment to the Notification Letter, entitled Summary
1 The regulations define access authorization as “an administrative determination that an individual is eligible for access
to classified matter or is eligible for access to, or control over, special nuclear material.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.5(a). This
Decision will refer to such authorization as access authorization or security clearance.
2 References to the LSO exhibits are to the exhibit number and the Bates number located in the top right corner of
each exhibit page.
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of Security Concerns (SSC), the LSO explained that the derogatory information raised security
concerns under Guideline I of the Adjudicative Guidelines. Id. at 5.
The Individual exercised her right to request an administrative review hearing pursuant to 10
C.F.R. Part 710. The Director of the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) appointed me as the
Administrative Judge in this matter, and I convened an administrative review hearing on July 8,
2026. See Transcript of Hearing, OHA Case No. PSH-26-0117 (Tr.). At the hearing, the Individual
provided her own testimony. Id. at 6. The LSO presented the testimony of the DOE Psychologist.
Id. The Individual submitted four exhibits, marked Exhibits A through D.3 The LSO submitted
eleven exhibits, marked Exhibits 1 through 11.
II. THE NOTIFICATION LETTER AND THE ASSOCIATED SECURITY CONCERNS
As indicated, the LSO cited Guideline I (Psychological Conditions) of the Adjudicative Guidelines
as the basis for concern regarding the Individual’s eligibility for a security clearance. Ex. 1.
Guideline I provides that “[c]ertain emotional, mental, and personality conditions can impair
judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness.” Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 27. “A formal diagnosis of
a disorder is not required for there to be a concern under this guideline.” Id. Conditions that could
raise a security concern include “an opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional that the
individual has a condition that may impair judgment, stability, reliability, or trustworthiness” and
“voluntary or involuntary inpatient hospitalization.” Id. at ¶ 28(b)–(c). The SSC cites the DOE
Psychologist’s conclusion in the Report that the Individual has a history of recurrent major
depressive disorder and endorsed “clinically significant trauma-related symptoms in addition to
persistent depressive symptoms, both of which can impair judgment, emotional stability, and
reliability.” Ex. 1 at 4. Additionally, the SSC cites the Individual’s involuntary hospitalization. Id.
at 5. The cited information justifies the LSO’s invocation of Guideline I.
III. REGULATORY STANDARDS
A DOE administrative review proceeding under Part 710 requires me, as the Administrative Judge,
to issue a Decision that reflects my comprehensive, common-sense judgment, made after
consideration of all of the relevant evidence, favorable and unfavorable, as to whether the granting
or continuation of a person’s access authorization will not endanger the common defense and
security and is clearly consistent with the national interest. 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(a). The regulatory
standard implies that there is a presumption against granting or restoring a security
clearance. See Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988) (“clearly consistent with
the national interest” standard for granting security clearances indicates “that security
determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials”); Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d
1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1990) (strong presumption against the issuance of a security clearance).
The Individual must come forward at the hearing with evidence to convince the DOE that granting
or restoring access authorization “will not endanger the common defense and security and will be
3 The Individual submitted her Exhibits A through C as a single PDF file. The Individual submitted Exhibit D as a
separate standalone PDF. This Decision references the Individual’s exhibits by their exhibit letter and the PDF page
number.
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clearly consistent with the national interest.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.27(d). The Individual is afforded a
full opportunity to present evidence supporting his or her eligibility for an access authorization.
The Part 710 regulations are drafted to permit the introduction of a very broad range of evidence
at personnel security hearings. Even appropriate hearsay evidence may be admitted. Id.
§ 710.26(h). Hence, an individual is afforded the utmost latitude in the presentation of evidence to
mitigate the security concerns at issue.
The discussion below reflects my application of these factors to the testimony and exhibits
presented by both sides in this case.
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT
The Individual has a history of recurrent major depressive disorder, with mental health treatment
beginning in the 1990s when she was in her early twenties. Ex. 10 at 65; Ex. 4 at 8 (indicating the
Individual’s birth year). She intermittently engaged in psychiatric medication management and
psychotherapy over the years but went through periods of disengagement. Ex. 10 at 65. In the
months leading up to February 2025, the Individual experienced a worsening of depressive
symptoms, including “persistent low mood, fatigue, crying spells, feelings of failure as a mother
and daughter, social withdrawal, and diminished self-care.” Id. at 66. She did not contact her
mental health providers, seek urgent care, or disclose her symptoms to others because she “didn’t
have an appointment.” Id.
On February 23, 2025, the Individual was found unconscious by a family member and was taken
to the hospital by ambulance. Ex. 7 at 28. She stated to medical staff that she took approximately
50 Xanax pills and an unspecified amount of Klonopin pills and that she had no reason to live
anymore. Id. According to the Individual’s response to the LOI, she was moved to the mental
health floor of the hospital on February 25, 2025, where she stayed until she was released on March
3, 2025, with the agreement that she would continue psychotherapy on an outpatient basis. Ex. 8
at 16. She attended group psychotherapy for three hours three times a week from March 10, 2025,
to April 2, 2025,4 and has followed up with her psychiatrist once every one to two months since
her hospitalization. Id.; Tr. at 26–27. The Individual did not pursue ongoing psychotherapy beyond
the group psychotherapy required following hospitalization. Ex. 10 at 67.
The Individual’s employer restricted the Individual’s site access on February 25, 2025, when her
family notified them that the Individual was admitted for inpatient psychiatric services. Ex. 4 at
11. On May 5, 2025, after an evaluation by the employer’s medical director, the employer notified
the Individual that it was not aware of any outstanding concerns and that she could return to her
workplace on May 8, 2025. Ex. 5 at 12. The employer’s medical director opined that the Individual
was currently reliable, trustworthy, and using good judgment. Ex. 6 at 13. Based on the
documentation it possessed, the employer was under the impression that the Individual admitted
4 In the LOI dated June 9, 2025, the Individual responded to a question regarding the dates of her mental health
treatment with “March 10th – April 2[nd].” Ex. 8 at 16. However, at the hearing, the Individual testified that she did
it “from the end of April or beginning of May” and “continued it . . . the first day of May or first week of May or end
of April.” Tr. at 53. Therefore, the record is not clear regarding what dates the Individual was in group therapy after
her hospitalization. I conclude as a matter of fact that the Individual attended psychotherapy from March 10, 2025, to
April 2, 2025, because her recollection was more likely to be accurate when she responded to the LOI, only one or
two months after completing psychotherapy, than it was at the hearing over one year after completing the treatment.
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herself to the hospital, which is not what is reflected in the Individual’s medical records from the
hospital. Compare Ex. 5 at 11 (indicating the Individual admitted herself) with Ex. 8 at 24
(indicating the Individual was admitted by involuntary mental health commitment). The Individual
also testified during the hearing that she did not share any information regarding the trauma from
her childhood with the employer’s medical director during their evaluation. Tr. at 59–60.
On January 30, 2026, the Individual was evaluated by the DOE Psychologist. Ex. 10 at 64. As part
of the evaluation, the DOE Psychologist reviewed the Individual’s personnel security file, medical
records from the hospitalization, and employer medical clearance documentation, and conducted
a 90-minute clinical interview. Id. at 70–71. The DOE Psychologist also conducted the following
psychological screenings and diagnostic testing: (1) Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9); (2)
Generalized Anxiety Disorder 7-item (GAD-7); (3) PTSD Checklist PCL-5 Criterion A (PCL-5);
(4) Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT); (5) Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale
(ASRS-v1.1 Symptom Checklist); and (6) Drug Abuse Screening Test (DAST-10). Id. at 72–74.
The results were “clinically significant in terms of childhood experiences, depression, anxiety, and
ADHD symptoms.” Id. at 62. During the clinical interview, the Individual endorsed “clinically
significant trauma-related symptoms associated with a history of childhood abuse” and “reported
that this trauma has not been fully addressed in individual therapy and continues to contribute to
emotional distress, negative self-concept, and interpersonal withdrawal.” Id. at 67. She also
reported significant loneliness and social isolation, with limited social support outside of her three
children who are her primary source of support and motivation. Id. at 68. After the evaluation, the
DOE Psychologist concluded that the Individual has “depressive and trauma-related conditions
[that] can impair judgment, stability, reliability, and trustworthiness, particularly during periods of
symptom exacerbation, elevated stress, or insufficient support.” Id. at 74. In the months leading
up to her intentional overdose and involuntary psychiatric hospitalization, the Individual
“experienced exacerbated depressive symptoms accompanied by impaired judgment” which was
evidenced by her not contacting a provider for help. Id. at 74–75. Further, the DOE Psychologist
concluded that although the Individual demonstrated partial rehabilitation, her conditions were not
in full remission because she continued to endorse clinically significant symptoms. Id. at 75–76.
The DOE Psychologist stated that the probability of recurrence of acute psychiatric
decompensation in the foreseeable future was low and the Individual’s overall prognosis was best
characterized as “guarded to fair.” Id. at 76.
To address concerns regarding residual depressive symptoms, unresolved trauma, maladaptive
self-concept, and limited help-seeking behavior, the DOE Psychologist recommended “consistent
engagement in individual psychotherapy” for six months, “with evidence of participation and
clinical monitoring . . . .” Id. at 76–77. The recommendation was shared with the Individual during
her evaluation, and she acknowledged that individual psychotherapy would likely be beneficial.
Id. at 77.
In May 2026, the Individual completed intake and established weekly psychotherapy sessions with
a Licensed Professional Counselor (LPC). Ex. A at 2–3. The Individual provided documentation
from the LPC, which states that the Individual has “presented positively, motivated, and goal
oriented throughout sessions” and that the current treatment goals are to “identify triggers, events,
or situations to her negative thoughts and feelings related to past trauma and anxiety” before
beginning to implement healthy coping strategies. Ex. B at 19. The Individual also submitted
documentation from her psychiatrist, whom she has been under the care of since November 2024,
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which states that the Individual has been “stable and compliant with all treatment
recommendations.” Ex. C at 21; see also Tr. 86 (DOE Psychologist’s testimony that “treatment
records from both providers don’t indicate specifically what symptoms [the Individual] is currently
experiencing, what has improved, what has not improved” and that “[t]here’s not any specific
information and their notes don’t discuss symptoms”).
At the hearing, the Individual testified that she has had depression and been on medication for it
since she was young, “probably before [her] early 20s,” but there were periods of time when she
would stop taking the medication because she felt better and then the cycle would repeat itself. Tr.
at 15–17. However, the Individual testified that it was not until she met her current LPC and the
DOE Psychologist that she had ever really spoken about her past, which she “knows is [her]
problem.” Id. at 17–18. When asked about what happened leading up to the 2025 incident, the
Individual testified that she had been feeling unworthy due to her lack of healthy relationships and
that she did not understand why that was until she met with the DOE Psychologist and talked about
her traumatic past. Id. at 20. She also testified that her medications stopped helping her and “at
that point [she] just wanted to go to sleep and not wake up” but that she didn’t think she was trying
“to not wake up, like, dead.” Id. at 48. The Individual also testified that she turns to her adult
children for support when she is feeling down, but that they did not know she had depression
because she hid it from them. Id. at 37. After the incident in February 2025, the Individual had a
conversation with them about her depression, and they were accepting of her. Id. at 38.
Regarding treatment, the Individual testified that the group psychotherapy she participated in after
her hospitalization was “not for her” because it was virtual and it did not feel personal. Id. at 23.
She acknowledged that she did not seek any follow-up treatment after completing the required
group psychotherapy sessions. Id. at 24. The documentation from the Individual’s psychiatrist
stated that the treatment plan involved “psychotherapy with medication management,” but the
Individual testified that she did not remember the psychiatrist ever telling her to see a therapist. Id.
at 25. The Individual further testified that she remembered the DOE Psychologist recommending
therapy during the January 30, 2026, evaluation but she “did not pursue [psychotherapy] until April
. . . .” Id. at 30–32. However, the Individual “absolutely” believes that psychotherapy with the LPC
is beneficial, and she plans to continue until she feels more confident that the “feelings and
emotions of what [she has] been harboring for so many years are just completely gone.” Id. at 41.
The Individual testified that she has been journaling, doing things with her kids, reconnecting with
an old friend, listening to music, and dancing. Id. at 33, 41, 49. Whenever she feels sad, she turns
her attention to something else, like changing movies whenever a certain movie has a trigger, going
to see one of her kids, or taking her dog for a walk. Id. at 49–50.
Upon hearing the Individual’s testimony and reviewing the documentation submitted by the
Individual’s providers, the DOE Psychologist testified that the Individual’s prognosis had
improved from “guarded but fair” to “cautiously favorable” with the caveat that the Individual had
only been in consistent psychotherapy for less than two months. Id. at 68, 72. The DOE
Psychologist also testified that it was difficult to ascertain if the Individual was in remission
because the psychiatrist’s documentation stated there is no recurrence of symptoms, but the LPC’s
documentation stated that she is working with the Individual to address active symptoms. See Tr.
at 85–86 (DOE Psychologist’s testimony); see also Ex. B at 19 (LPC’s documentation); but see
Ex. C at 21 (psychiatrist’s documentation). The DOE Psychologist recommended that the
Individual continue psychotherapy and medication management for “another three months, at a
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minimum” to demonstrate adequate evidence of rehabilitation, noting that the “treating providers
would need to be the ones at that point to make any recommendations about ongoing or further
treatment.” Id. at 72. If the Individual maintains continued treatment, the DOE Psychologist opined
that the probability is low that the Individual’s judgment, reliability, or emotional stability will be
impaired based on her condition. Id. at 80.
V. ANALYSIS
Guideline I Considerations
Under Guideline I, the following relevant conditions can mitigate security concerns associated
with a psychological condition:
(a) The identified condition is readily controllable with treatment, and the individual
has demonstrated ongoing and consistent compliance with the treatment plan;
(b) The individual has voluntarily entered a counseling or treatment program for a
condition that is amenable to treatment, and the individual is currently receiving
counseling or treatment with a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified mental
health professional;
(c) Recent opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional employed by, or
acceptable to and approved by, the U.S. Government that an individual’s previous
condition is under control or in remission, and has a low probability of recurrence
or exacerbation;
(d) The past psychological/psychiatric condition was temporary, the situation has been
resolved, and the individual no longer shows indications of emotional instability;
(e) There is no indication of a current problem.
Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 29.
The first mitigating condition, ¶ 29(a), does not apply to resolve the concerns related to the
Individual’s recurrent major depressive disorder and trauma-related symptoms because the
Individual has not demonstrated ongoing and consistent compliance with psychotherapy which is
an integral part of her treatment plan. The Individual has established care with the LPC and has
been consistently engaged in weekly psychotherapy for three months now, but the DOE
Psychologist recommended six months of psychotherapy in January 2026. Accordingly, I cannot
find that three months, initiated three months after the recommendation was received, is sufficient
to demonstrate “ongoing and consistent treatment with the treatment plan.”
Regarding the second mitigating condition, ¶ 29(b) does not apply because the Individual was
involuntarily hospitalized, and the group psychotherapy that she completed after her
hospitalization was a condition of her discharge from the hospital. The Individual has voluntarily
started individual psychotherapy with the LPC, but she lacks a favorable prognosis. The
documentation from the LPC did not provide a prognosis and the DOE Psychologist indicated that
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it was too soon to provide an unqualified positive prognosis given the Individual had only been in
psychotherapy for two months.
Paragraph 29(c) does not apply because the DOE Psychologist could not opine whether the
Individual’s condition was under control or in remission because the psychiatrist’s conclusion that
the Individual had no recurring symptoms was contradicted by the LPC’s statement that she is
working with the Individual to address active symptoms. Additionally, the Individual has not been
in psychotherapy for six months, which is a clinically significant amount of time to demonstrate
full remission according to the DOE Psychologist.
Additionally, ¶ 29(d)–(e) do not apply because the past psychological conditions were not
temporary as the Individual has been diagnosed with recurrent major depressive disorder since she
was in her twenties and her active symptoms indicate a current problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the above analysis, I found that there was sufficient derogatory information in the possession of
the DOE that raised security concerns under Guideline I of the Adjudicative Guidelines. After
considering all of the relevant information, favorable and unfavorable, in a comprehensive,
common-sense manner, including weighing all of the testimony and other evidence presented at
the hearing, I find that the Individual has not brought forth sufficient evidence to resolve the
Guideline I security concerns. Accordingly, I have determined that the Individual’s access
authorization should not be restored.
This Decision may be appealed in accordance with the procedures set forth at 10 C.F.R. § 710.28.
James P. Thompson III
Administrative Judge
Office of Hearings and Appeals