Read the full decision
*The original of this document contains information which is subject to withholding from disclosure
under 5 U.S. C. § 552. Such material has been deleted from this copy and replaced with XXXXXX’s.
United States Department of Energy
Office of Hearings and Appeals
In the Matter of: Personnel Security Hearing )
)
Filing Date: June 24, 2026 ) Case No.: PSH-26-0140
)
__________________________________________)
Issued: September 17, 2026
____________________________
Administrative Judge Decision
________________________
James P. Thompson III, Administrative Judge:
This Decision concerns the eligibility of XXXXXXXXXXX (the Individual) to hold an access
authorization under the United States Department of Energy’s (DOE) regulations, set forth at 10
C.F.R. Part 710, “Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Matter and
Special Nuclear Material or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position.”1 As discussed below, after
carefully considering the record before me in light of the relevant regulations and the National
Security Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information
or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position (June 8, 2017) (Adjudicative Guidelines), I conclude
that the Individual’s access authorization should not be restored.
I. BACKGROUND
The Individual is employed by a DOE contractor in a position that requires a security clearance.
In January 2026, the DOE Local Security Office (LSO) received notice through a Continuous
Evaluation System Report that the Individual had been arrested and charged with Driving Under
the Influence (DUI) and Resisting Stop, Frisk, Halt, or Search, Evading Arrest, and Implied
Consent License Suspension. Exhibit (Ex.) 7 at 16.2 Thereafter, the LSO received additional
information, described in detail below, regarding the circumstances of the Individual’s arrest and
the Individual’s history of criminal conduct and being issued Temporary Orders of Protection
(TOP). Id. at 38; Ex. 8 at 51–53; Ex. 12; Ex. 13. Based on the information gathered by the LSO,
the LSO informed the Individual by letter (Notification Letter) that it possessed reliable
information that created substantial doubt regarding his eligibility to possess a security clearance.
1 The regulations define access authorization as “an administrative determination that an individual is eligible for access
to classified matter or is eligible for access to, or control over, special nuclear material.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.5(a). This
Decision will refer to such authorization as access authorization or security clearance.
2 References to the LSO exhibits are to the exhibit number and the page number of the combined .pdf of the exhibit
book.
- 2 -
Ex. 2. In an attachment to the Notification Letter, entitled Summary of Security Concerns (SSC),
the LSO explained that the derogatory information raised security concerns under Guideline E,
Guideline G, and Guideline J of the Adjudicative Guidelines. Id.
The Individual exercised his right to request an administrative review hearing pursuant to 10
C.F.R. Part 710. The Director of the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) appointed me as the
Administrative Judge in this matter, and I subsequently conducted an administrative review
hearing on August 13, 2026. Transcript of Hearing, OHA Case No. PSH-26-0140 (Tr.) at 1. At the
hearing, the Individual testified on his own behalf. Id. at 4. The LSO presented the testimony of
the state trooper (State Trooper) who arrested and charged the Individual with the 2026 DUI and
related charges. Id. at 4, 87. The LSO submitted fourteen exhibits, marked Exhibits 1 through 14.
The Individual did not submit any exhibits.
II. THE NOTIFICATION LETTER AND THE ASSOCIATED SECURITY
CONCERNS
As indicated above, the LSO cited Guideline E (Personal Conduct), Guideline G (Alcohol
Consumption), and Guideline J (Criminal Conduct) of the Adjudicative Guidelines as the bases
for concern regarding the Individual’s eligibility to possess a security clearance. Ex. 2 at 9–13.
Guideline E provides that “[c]onduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty,
or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s
reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information.” Adjudicative
Guidelines at ¶ 15. “Of special interest is any failure to cooperate or provide truthful and candid
answers during national security investigative or adjudicative processes.” Id. The SSC cited the
Individual’s aforementioned 2026 arrest and the circumstances surrounding his conduct that led to
his arrest, including the Individual making false statements to the State Trooper and an attempt to
flee from custody after being transported to a hospital for the purpose of testing his blood alcohol
level. Ex. 2 at 8. However, none of these cited allegations justify the invocation of Guideline E.
They do not involve falsifying or omitting information from a “personnel security, personal history
statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications,
award benefits or status, determine national security eligibility or trustworthiness, or award
fiduciary responsibilities.” Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 16(a). They do not involve providing false
information or omitting information “concerning relevant facts to an employer, investigator,
security official, competent medical or mental health professional involved in making a
recommendation relevant to a national security eligibility determination, or other official
government representative.” Id. at ¶ 16(b). They do not constitute “credible adverse information
in several adjudicative issue areas that is not sufficient for an adverse determination under any
other single guideline” because his behavior is specifically covered under Guidelines G and J and,
as concluded below, is sufficient for an adverse determination under those conditions. Id. at
¶ 16(c). They do not constitute “credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under
any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse determination” for the same
reason. Id. at ¶ 16(d). They do not constitute “personal conduct, or concealment of information
about one’s conduct, that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress by a
foreign intelligence entity or other individual or group” because the cited allegations do not
demonstrate he is particularly vulnerable to exploitation, manipulation, or distress. Id. at
- 3 -
¶ 16(e). They do not involve “a violation of a written or recorded commitment made by the
Individual[.]” Id. at ¶ 16(f). And they do not involve any allegations that the Individual
“associate[d] with persons involved in criminal activity.” Id. at ¶ 16(g). For these reasons, I
decline to consider the allegations asserted under Guideline E, except to the extent they raise
Guideline G and Guideline J concerns, as outlined below.
Guideline G provides that “[e]xcessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of
questionable judgment or the failure to control impulses, and can raise questions about an
individual’s reliability and trustworthiness.” Id. at ¶ 21. The SSC cited the above referenced
criminal charges in 2026 and that the Individual was arrested for Aggravated Assault in 2023 after
consuming alcohol. Ex. 2 at 7–8.3 The LSO’s allegations that the Individual’s alcohol-related
incidents away from work demonstrate excessive alcohol consumption justify the LSO’s
invocation of Guideline G. Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 22(a).
Guideline J provides that “[c]riminal activity creates doubt about a person’s judgment, reliability,
and trustworthiness.” Id. at ¶ 30. “By its very nature, it calls into question a person’s ability or
willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations.” Id. The SSC cited the Individual’s two
arrests cited above under Guideline G, that the Individual had been issued four TOPs between
September 2022 and July 2023, and that he had been charged with Failure to Appear in 2018. Ex.
2 at 9. The LSO’s allegation that the Individual’s criminal conduct over the years creates doubt
about his judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness justifies the LSO’s invocation of Guideline J.
Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 31(b).
III. REGULATORY STANDARDS
A DOE administrative review proceeding under Part 710 requires me, as the Administrative Judge,
to issue a Decision that reflects my comprehensive, common-sense judgment, made after
consideration of all of the relevant evidence, favorable and unfavorable, as to whether the granting
or continuation of a person’s access authorization will not endanger the common defense and
security and is clearly consistent with the national interest. 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(a). The regulatory
standard implies that there is a presumption against granting or restoring a security
clearance. See Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988) (“clearly consistent with
the national interest” standard for granting security clearances indicates “that security
determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials”); Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d
1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1990) (strong presumption against the issuance of a security clearance).
The Individual must come forward at the hearing with evidence to convince the DOE that granting
or restoring access authorization “will not endanger the common defense and security and will be
clearly consistent with the national interest.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.27(d). The Individual is afforded a
full opportunity to present evidence supporting his or her eligibility for an access authorization.
3 The remaining allegations set forth in the SSC under Guideline G do not raise security concerns in themselves.
Specifically, the allegations contained in paragraphs II.B.1–3, which describe the circumstances of the Individual’s
2026 arrest, do not in themselves constitute any of the specified conditions that could raise a security concern under
Guideline G. Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 22(a)–(g); see 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(d) (information shall be regarded as
derogatory if it “tend[s] to establish the validity and significance of one or more areas of concern as set forth in the
Adjudicative Guidelines”).
- 4 -
The Part 710 regulations are drafted to permit the introduction of a very broad range of evidence
at personnel security hearings. Even appropriate hearsay evidence may be admitted. Id.
§ 710.26(h). Hence, an individual is afforded the utmost latitude in the presentation of evidence to
mitigate the security concerns at issue.
The discussion below reflects my application of these factors to the testimony and exhibits
presented by both sides in this case.
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT
In 2018, the Individual was charged with Failure to Appear as a result of failing to timely pay a
speeding ticket and subsequently missing the scheduled court date. Ex. 14 at 132; Tr. at 16. He
explained that his wife failed to pay the ticket, but acknowledged it was ultimately his
responsibility to ensure it got paid. Tr. at 16. He resolved the matter by paying the dues. Id. The
charge was consequently dismissed. Ex. 14 at 132.
In September 2022, a TOP was issued against the Individual to protect his ex-wife and two minor
children by restraining the Individual from “assaulting, threatening, abusing, [h]arassing,
following, interfering, or stalking the protected person and/or [t]he child of the protected person.”
Ex. 13 at 123 (capitalization removed). On the same date that TOP was set to expire, another TOP
was issued in November 2022 protecting the same parties. Ex. 12 at 120. The November TOP was
set to expire January 2023. Id. at 121. Although the Individual could not clearly recall the details
of these TOPs at the hearing, he testified that in 2022 his ex-wife had been preventing him from
contacting his minor son by failing to respond to his several phone calls. Tr. at 22. He said that he
then received notice that an order of protection was requested, and a TOP was issued after he
represented himself at the hearing. Id. at 23. He testified that during the hearing he asked the judge
to “[j]ust stick the order of protection on [him]” because he “just want[s] to see [his child].” Id.
However, he also testified that he did not agree to the terms that were placed in the order. Id. He
testified that he continued to text message his child and ex-wife despite there being an active TOP,
which resulted in later being charged with a violation of the court’s order.4 Id. at 31; see also Ex.
9 at 57.
Then, in February 2023 a third TOP was issued against the Individual. Ex. 11 at 117. It restrained
him from the same behavior as the September 2022 and November 2022 TOPs and protected the
same parties. Id. at 116, 118; Tr. at 17. He testified that the order resulted from his ex-wife alleging
that he followed her on a local public road on three occasions. Tr. at 19. The petitions filed with
the court to initiate the 2023 TOP provide the narratives supplied by his adult daughter and ex-
wife. Ex. 9 at 63. In the daughter’s petition, she described her mother receiving calls from the
Individual on a Thursday, February 16, 2023, and on the following day a vehicle the daughter
“suspected” was driven by the Individual followed her and her mother on a public road despite
their attempts to evade him by turning around. Id. at 65. The daughter described the actions as
“stalking.” Id. at 64. The ex-wife similarly described the Individual’s “harassing and threatening”
calls and text messages on Thursday evening and asserted that he had made those calls and text
messages despite there being a restraining order in place. Id. at 74; but see Ex. 12 at 121 (indicating
the TOP was set to expire January 13, 2023). She described that the following day the Individual
4 The record does not include the final protective order issued by the court.
- 5 -
followed her vehicle, getting “really close” to her “rear bumper” before “fall[ing] back.” Id. The
ex-wife also categorized the behavior as “stalking.” Id. at 73. At the hearing, the Individual
testified that timesheets from his employer demonstrated he could not have been driving behind
his ex-wife on the day in question. Tr. at 81. However, the timesheets merely demonstrate that he
left his work shift on February 16 and February 17 at 3:30 p.m. Ex. 9 at 102. Furthermore, an email
from the Individual contained in the record, sent in 2023, contains his assertion that his ex-wife
alleged he had followed her at 5:30 p.m. Id. at 58. Given that the ex-wife’s petition stated that the
harassing and threatening communications on Thursday occurred in the “evening,” the
Individual’s own email indicates she alleged he followed her the following day at 5:30 p.m., and
there is no evidence that indicates the incident on the road occurred prior to 3:30 p.m., the
timesheets do not support the Individual’s testimony that he did not have the opportunity to engage
in the complained of behavior. Id. at 63–74. The Individual also testified that on the day of the
road incident he was assisting a friend on a manual task after work. Tr. at 81. That testimony is
uncorroborated. The Individual also testified that his lawyer advised him to text his ex-wife in an
attempt to contact one of his children to document his desire to contact that child. Id. at 29. That
testimony is also uncorroborated.
In July 2023, the Individual was charged with Aggravated Assault. Id. at 31; Ex. 9 at 94. The
following day, a fourth TOP was issued against the Individual, this time protecting a woman whom
he testified was a former romantic partner. Tr. at 31–32; Ex. 10. When describing the incident
during the hearing, the Individual explained that he contacted the police to have his former
romantic partner removed from his property because she repeatedly came to his property despite
their relationship being over. Tr. at 32. However, he also testified that the two had been consuming
alcohol together prior to the arrival of police, which undermines the inference that this woman
appeared at his house uninvited. Id. He also testified that at the time he called the police he was
unaware that he had “a violation of order of protection from [his] ex-wife,” and the police arrested
him as a result. Id. The TOP was eventually dismissed by the former romantic partner thirteen days
later. Id. at 34; Ex. 9 at 89.
The police report from the July 2023 incident states that law enforcement arrived at the
Individual’s home based on his report that the romantic partner was vandalizing his property and
being unruly. Ex. 9 at 94. An officer reportedly observed a “severe laceration over [the romantic
partner’s] left eye,” which she reported was the result of the Individual “pushing her around” and
“into the porch railing” after they got into an argument. Id. The Individual told the officer that the
romantic partner had damaged his vehicle during their argument, and the officer observed
superficial scratches on his face. Id. The officer determined that the Individual was the aggressor
and arrested and charged him with Aggravated Assault. Id. The Individual provided a narrative of
the incident to security personnel. Id. at 60. Therein, he stated that he and his romantic partner had
been consuming alcohol together before he broke up with her and asked her to leave his house. Id.
She responded by hitting, scratching, and “clawing” him—which drew blood on his face and
head—and she damaged his vehicle after he accidentally damaged her vehicle during their
argument. Id. He also reported that her laceration resulted from hitting her head on a porch railing
after he pushed her in self-defense because she had just hit him with a “metal [car] jack stand.” Id.
There is no mention of him being in violation of a protective order in the police report, being
attacked with a metal object, nor acting in self-defense.
- 6 -
Turning to the recent 2026 DUI and related charges, the Individual’s description of his arrest
differs significantly from that of the State Trooper. The Individual testified that prior to his arrest
he had consumed five beers after arriving home from work. Id. at 43. He reported that he had also
been dealing with a kidney stone and had purchased the beer on the way home that night because
he wanted to “flush [it] out” and believed that “beer does it quicker” than water. Id. at 41–42. After
consuming the beer, the pain became unbearable, and he had to drive himself to the hospital. Id.
at 41, 43 (testifying that the pain was so severe that he passed out and vomited before leaving for
the hospital); Ex. 9 at 42.
The Individual testified that on the way to the hospital he felt the urge to urinate, so he stopped on
the side of the road and relieved himself in the woods. Tr. at 69. Feeling relief, he decided to head
back home. Id. Heading back home, the acute pain started again, and he decided to immediately
get off the road. Id. at 68–69. He pulled into a church parking lot and saw the State Trooper, who
was using a “radar” to check the speed of vehicles, and flagged him down for help. Id. at 67–68.
In his response to a letter of interrogatory (LOI) issued by the LSO on February 4, 2026, the
Individual reported
I . . . drove up to the police car that was on the side of the road to ask for help. He
rolled down his window and asked what the problem was. I realized by his attitude
that I had made another bad decision. He left the parking lot before I did. I followed
him out then he pulled over on the side of the road. He then pulled me over and
performed a sobriety test. I was taken to the hospital for a blood alcohol test with
no regards to the pain I was in.
Ex. 9 at 42.
He testified that he had knee surgery and therefore could not complete the field sobriety testing.
Tr. at 44. He also testified that when he arrived at the hospital for the purpose of obtaining a sample
of his blood, which he did not consent to, he felt the urge to urinate and asked the security guards
in the room for permission to use the restroom. Id. at 45, 72. He testified that he had informed both
the guards and the State Trooper of his kidney stones. Id. at 46, 73. He testified that the guards
ignored his request so he decided to walk past the guards, with handcuffs hanging off his arm, to
look for the restroom. Id. at 45. After taking ten steps, “he heard them coming”; they then “tackled
[him] from behind” and stated that he was trying to escape. Id. The Individual denied that he was
attempting to escape, and testified that, if he was trying to get past the guards, “I promise you I
could have.” Id. at 46. He testified that he had to be held “down to take [his] blood ‘cause [he] was
refusing.” Id. at 72. The blood test results indicated his blood alcohol level was 0.18 and confirmed
that he was under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 46, 70. The charges were still pending on the
hearing date. Id. at 47.
The State Trooper testified that the Individual drove his vehicle up next to the State Trooper’s
vehicle while the State Trooper was sitting in a church parking lot working on reports. Id. at 88–
89. The Individual then rolled down his window but did not say anything until the State Trooper
asked if he was okay or needed something. Id. at 89. According to the State Trooper, the Individual
responded that he was going to sit there to let everybody know there is a “[t]rooper right here,
running radar.” Id. Feeling “some type of tension,” the State Trooper then backed his vehicle up
- 7 -
to view the Individual’s license plate and report it to the dispatcher. Id. The State Trooper then
shined his vehicle’s spotlight into the Individual’s vehicle to ensure there were no weapons, and
the Individual “shined a [flash]light back in [the State Trooper’s] eyes.” Id. at 89–90, 104.
Concerned, the State Trooper decided to leave the parking lot so he could observe the Individual’s
actions from a distance, but the Individual followed the State Trooper’s vehicle, honking his horn
and yelling. Id. at 89. The Individual then attempted to leave by turning around, but the State
Trooper followed him and initiated a traffic stop. Id. at 92.
The State Trooper testified that he attempted to administer field sobriety tests but discontinued
them for the Individual’s safety because he observed the Individual stumbling. Id. at 94. He also
confirmed the Individual refused to consent to a blood draw and so he obtained a warrant to
complete the test. Id. at 95. He informed the Individual before they arrived at the hospital that he
was going to jail after the blood draw. Id. at 111. The State Trooper testified that while he was out
of the presence of the Individual, hospital security guards had to pin the Individual to the floor
because he tried to leave and would not listen to them. Id. at 95, 110. The State Trooper testified
that the Individual also became aggressive when they attempted to obtain his blood, so the State
Trooper had to physically restrain the Individual because the Individual was actively resisting and
the State Trooper was concerned that he may injure a nurse. Id. at 97, 107.
The State Trooper testified that the Individual mentioned an issue with his kidneys but never asked
for help. Id. at 102, 109. He also testified that he did not observe the Individual inform the hospital
medical staff that he had an issue with his kidneys. Id. at 108.
The Individual testified that he began attending Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings two
months prior to the hearing and that some participants’ stories “hit home.” Id. at 48. He testified
that he began attending AA because he has a problem with alcohol. Id. at 83.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Guideline G Considerations
Conditions that can mitigate security concerns based on alcohol consumption include the
following:
(a) So much time has passed, or the behavior was so infrequent, or it happened under
such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the
individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or judgment;
(b) The individual acknowledges his or her pattern of maladaptive alcohol use,
provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and has demonstrated
a clear and established pattern of modified consumption or abstinence in
accordance with treatment recommendations;
(c) The individual is participating in counseling or a treatment program, has no
previous history of treatment and relapse, and is making satisfactory progress in a
treatment program; and
- 8 -
(d) The individual has successfully completed a treatment program along with any
required aftercare, and has demonstrated a clear and established pattern of modified
consumption or abstinence in accordance with treatment recommendations.
Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 23.
I conclude that none of the above mitigating conditions apply to resolve the Guideline G security
concerns. Paragraph 23(a) does not apply because I do not conclude that the passage of time,
frequency of the conduct, or circumstances are such that the concerning conduct is unlikely to
recur. The Individual’s January 2026 DUI occurred less than one year prior to the hearing. Thus,
a relatively short period of time has passed since his concerning conduct. Furthermore, the
frequency of his conduct does not establish that his behavior is unlikely to recur because only two
and a half years had passed since his 2023 alcohol-related incident that resulted in his arrest for
Aggravated Assault. In other words, his behavior is relatively frequent as he has been arrested two
times in the past three years as a result of his behavior.
Lastly, the circumstances surrounding his alcohol-related criminal charges were not unusual. Most
recently, he accosted state law enforcement unprovoked at a time when he was unquestionably
intoxicated. He was consequently arrested on suspicion of DUI after engaging in belligerent road
behavior, attempted to escape custody, and initiated a physical struggle with state law enforcement
attempting to implement a lawful blood draw. I find the State Trooper’s description of the incident
more credible than the Individual’s testimony for a number of reasons. For example, I do not credit
his testimony that he walked past security to find the restroom because it escapes reason for a
person to conclude that they could “walk” past hospital security, while handcuffed and in custody,
to wander the halls in an to attempt find a restroom prior to receiving permission. There is no
credible explanation for why hospital security would tackle him other than to prevent his escape.
Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record to corroborate the Individual’s testimony that he
was suffering from a kidney stone. The lack of evidence of that fact is consistent with the
Individual’s bizarre behavior prior to his arrest during which he made no reference to or action
consistent with being in severe, debilitating pain from a kidney stone. It seems far more likely that
the Individual fabricated the kidney stone story in an attempt to excuse his behavior. I also find
the Individual’s explanation for his behavior during the 2023 incident that resulted in his
Aggravated Assault charge to be dubious. While the Individual attempted to justify his behavior
as self-defense when reporting the incident to security personnel, he made no mention of the same
to the police officer. Additionally, the police officer described the scratches on the Individual’s
face as “superficial” while the Individual reported to security personnel that the attack left him
bloody. This tends to demonstrate that he likely made up the self-defense theory after he made his
report to the police and exaggerated his injuries when reporting the incident to security personnel.
There are other inconsistencies present in the different narratives the Individual provided when
compared with the police report. For example, the police officer made no mention of the Individual
being in violation of a TOP as the reason for his arrest, which indicates that the Individual likely
fabricated that fact in an attempt to avoid the consequences to his security clearance that might
result if it were determined he was instead arrested for physically assaulting his former romantic
partner. Similarly, the fact that the Individual first reported to security personnel that the argument
with the former romantic partner began after he ended the relationship with her the same night
- 9 -
after consuming alcohol together but at the hearing he indicated that the romantic partner came to
his home uninvited prior to the incident also undermines his credibility given the inconsistency.
This likely represents another attempt by the Individual to alter the facts in order to represent
himself in a more positive light by painting his former romantic partner as an uninvited visitor who
damaged his property and then attacked him as opposed to somebody he got drunk with and
assaulted and injured during an argument. I also note that it was not until he responded to the LOI
after his initial report to personnel security that he first disclosed that he had been consuming
alcohol prior to his arrest. When these inconsistencies are viewed in light of the inconsistencies
outlined above regarding the 2026 incident, it further demonstrates that the Individual’s testimony
is not credible. I therefore conclude that the circumstances surrounding the 2023 incident do not
indicate that his alcohol-related behavior is unlikely to recur, and the Individual has not resolved
the resulting concerns regarding his reliability, trustworthiness, and judgment under ¶ 23(a).
I further find that ¶ 23(b) does not apply. Even if I were to take at face value the fact the Individual
acknowledged his pattern of maladaptive alcohol use by admitting he has a problem with alcohol,
the Individual has provided no evidence to corroborate his claimed attendance at AA meetings,
and there is no indication that he has taken any other positive action, including treatment, to resolve
the concerns.
Lastly, I find that ¶ 23(c) does not apply because the Individual is not participating in counseling
or a treatment program, and ¶ 23(d) does not apply because the Individual has not successfully
completed a treatment program or required aftercare. Accordingly, I conclude that the Individual
has not resolved the Guideline G security concerns.
B. Guideline J Considerations
Conditions that can mitigate security concerns based on criminal conduct include the following:
(a) So much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior happened, or it happened
under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt
on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b) The individual was pressured or coerced into committing the act and those
pressures are no longer present in the person’s life;
(c) No reliable evidence to support that the individual committed the offense; and
(d) There is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including, but not limited to, the
passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, restitution, compliance with
the terms of parole or probation, job training or higher education, good employment
record, or constructive community involvement.
Adjudicative Guidelines at ¶ 32.
I find that none of the mitigating conditions apply to resolve the Guideline J security concerns.
The first mitigating condition does not apply to resolve the concerns because relatively little time
has passed since the Individual’s recent DUI, and it did not happen under unusual circumstances
- 10 -
other than what was directly the consequence of the Individual’s exercise of extremely poor
judgment. As I determined in the preceding section, I find his explanation for his behavior to be
without merit. I also conclude that while he denies he committed the alleged assault of his former
romantic partner, the police report from that incident, like the police report and State Trooper
testimony for the 2026 incident, provides credible observations by law enforcement that contradict
the Individual’s uncorroborated claims. Finally, with respect to the unlawful behavior that
supported the issuance of the TOPs, he admitted that he violated at least one of the TOPs and also
provided evidence that actually tends to show he had the opportunity to commit the acts that
supported the court issuing the TOPs on behalf of his ex-wife and child. Given that I find his
testimony generally unreliable, I conclude that his criminal behavior is not mitigated based on the
factors outlined in ¶ 32(a). The fact that he paid his 2018 citation does not disturb my conclusion.
I further find that ¶ 32(b) does not apply to resolve the security concerns because there is no
evidence that the Individual was pressured or coerced into committing the offenses.
Next, I conclude that ¶ 32(c) does not apply due to my above reasoning. The evidence in the record
that the Individual committed the criminal offenses cited in the SSC is reliable.
Lastly, I conclude that ¶ 32(d) does not apply because the Individual has not demonstrated
successful rehabilitation. In addition to my analysis under ¶ 32(a), less than a year has passed since
his most recent criminal charge, his recent charges are still pending, and I find his statements to
security personnel in the LOI and his testimony regarding the same to represent his most recent
attempts to, unsuccessfully, avoid responsibility for this criminal conduct. Accordingly, I conclude
that the Individual has not resolved the Guideline J security concerns.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the above analysis, I found that there was sufficient derogatory information in the possession of
the DOE that raised security concerns under Guideline G and Guideline J, but not Guideline E, of
the Adjudicative Guidelines. After considering all of the relevant information, favorable and
unfavorable, in a comprehensive, common-sense manner, including weighing all of the testimony
and other evidence presented at the hearing, I conclude that the Individual has not brought forth
sufficient evidence to resolve the security concerns. Accordingly, I have determined that the
Individual’s access authorization should not be restored.
This Decision may be appealed in accordance with the procedures set forth at 10 C.F.R. § 710.28.
James P. Thompson III
Administrative Judge
Office of Hearings and Appeals