ISCR Case No. 18-02118

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

In the matter of: )

)

)

ISCR Case No. 18-02118

) Applicant for Security Clearance )

For Government: Bryan J. Olmos, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se 08/21/2019

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LOUGHRAN, Edward W., Administrative Judge:

Applicant mitigated the foreign influence security concerns. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

Statement of the Case

On January 25, 2019, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guideline B, foreign influence. Applicant responded to the SOR on February 21, 2019, and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. The case was assigned to me on June 24, 2019. The hearing was convened as scheduled on August 7, 2019.

Evidence

Government Exhibits (GE) 1 through 3 were admitted in evidence without objection. Applicant testified and submitted Applicant’s Exhibit (AE) A, which was admitted without objection.

Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts about Iraq. Without objection, I have taken administrative notice of the facts contained in the request. The facts are summarized in the written request and will not be repeated verbatim in this decision. Of particular note is the significant threat of terrorism and ongoing human rights problems in Iraq.

Applicant is a 43-year-old employee of a defense contractor. He has worked for his current employer for almost two years. He has the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree. He is married with two children. (Tr. at 31, 70; GE 1-3)

Applicant was born in Iraq to Iraqi parents. He performed 18 months of mandatory military service from 1998 to 1999. His wife and two children were also born in Iraq. Applicant’s wife’s brother applied for his family, including Applicant, Applicant’s wife, and Applicant’s children, to immigrate to the United States as refugees. The petition was approved. Applicant, his wife, and their children immigrated to the United States in 2009. They all became U.S. citizens in 2015. (Tr. at 19-20, 52-53; Applicant’s response to SOR; GE 1-3)

Applicant’s parents have been separated for a long time. His mother and four siblings have all immigrated to the United States and are U.S. citizens. Two of his siblings work as linguists supporting the U.S. military; one in Saudi Arabia and one in Syria. His brother in Syria has a DOD security clearance. A third sibling served in the U.S. military. Applicant and most of his family are dual citizens of the United States and Iraq. (Tr. at 23-29, 58-60, 71; Applicant’s response to SOR; GE 1-3)

Applicant’s father at one time was relatively senior in the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but he left that position more than 30 years ago. He has lived in Turkey for about 15 years. Applicant is not close to his father and only has sporadic contact with him. He has not seen him in about 15 years, and he has not had any other contact with him since about 2015. (Tr. at 25-26, 38-42, 53; Applicant’s response to SOR; GE 1-3)

Applicant’s father-in-law is deceased. His mother-in-law and siblings-in-law are citizens and residents of Iraq. His brother-in-law who submitted the refugee petition decided not to immigrate to the United States. He served in the Iraqi military for about 18 years and currently works in an administrative position in the Iraqi government. Applicant’s other sibling-in-law works for the Iraqi government in the health section. (Tr. at 21, 37, 60-63; Applicant’s response to SOR; GE 1-3)

Applicant has worked under dangerous conditions in Iraq as a linguist for the U.S. military for about 16 months. A U.S. military officer wrote a glowing recommendation for Applicant to obtain a security clearance. He wrote that Applicant’s “performance has been exemplary in every way,” and that he is confident to serve with Applicant “in garrison or in combat.” Applicant credibly testified that his family in Iraq and Turkey could not be used to coerce or intimidate him into revealing classified information. (Tr. at 43-51; AE A)

This case is adjudicated under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG), which became effective on June 8, 2017.

When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.

These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.

The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.”

Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel.” The applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision.

A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.

Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).

Guideline B, Foreign Influence

The security concern for foreign influence is set out in AG ¶ 6:

Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism.

The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 7. The following are potentially applicable in this case:

(a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;

(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information or technology; and

(e) shared living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.

Applicant’s father is an Iraqi citizen living in Turkey. Applicant’s mother-in-law and siblings-in-law are citizens and residents of Iraq. The potential for terrorist violence against U.S. interests and citizens remains high in Iraq, and it continues to have human rights problems. The same is true for Turkey. Applicant’s foreign contacts create a potential conflict of interest and a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, and coercion, both directly and through his wife. The above disqualifying conditions have been raised by the evidence.

Applicant’s brothers are dual citizens of Iraq and the United States. Two of his brothers work in Saudi Arabia and Syria as linguists supporting the U.S. military. Their

work in those countries does not raise security concerns. SOR ¶¶ 1.b and 1.c are concluded for Applicant.

Conditions that could mitigate foreign influence security concerns are provided under AG ¶ 8. The following is potentially applicable: (b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.

I considered the totality of Applicant’s ties to Iraq and Turkey. The nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are vulnerable to government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family member is associated with or dependent upon the government, the country is known to conduct intelligence operations against the United States, or the foreign country is associated with a risk of terrorism.

Applicant is a loyal U.S. citizen who has worked overseas under dangerous conditions in support of the national defense. He credibly testified that his family in Iraq and Turkey could not be used to coerce or intimidate him into revealing classified information. The Appeal Board has stated that such a statement, standing alone, is of limited value, unless there is record evidence that the applicant has acted in a similar manner in the past in comparable circumstances, or that the applicant has a previous track record of complying with security regulations and procedures in the context of dangerous, high-risk circumstances in which he made a significant contribution to the national security. See, e.g., ISCR Case 07-06030 at 3-4 (App. Bd. June 19, 2008). In ISCR Case No. 05-03846 at 6 (App. Bd. Nov. 14, 2006), the Appeal Board discussed this issue as follows:

As a general rule, Judges are not required to assign an applicant’s prior history of complying with security procedures and regulations significant probative value for the purposes of refuting, mitigating, or extenuating the security concerns raised by that applicant’s more immediate disqualifying conduct or circumstances. See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 01-03357 at 4 (App. Bd. Dec. 13, 2005); ISCR Case No. 02-10113 at 5 (App. Bd. Mar. 25, 2005); ISCR Case No. 03-10955 at 2-3 (App. Bd. May 30, 2006). However, the Board has recognized an exception to that general rule in Guideline B cases, where the applicant has established by credible, independent evidence that his compliance with security procedures and regulations occurred in the context of dangerous, high-risk circumstances in which the applicant had made a significant contribution to the national security. See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 04-12363 at 2 (App. Bd. July 14,

2006). The presence of such circumstances can give credibility to an applicant’s assertion that he can be relied upon to recognize, resist, and report a foreign power’s attempts at coercion or exploitation. Applicant has worked under dangerous conditions as a linguist for the U.S. military in Iraq for about 16 months. A U.S. military officer who worked with him praised his service. I find that Applicant can be expected to resolve any potential conflict of interest in favor of the United States. AG ¶ 8(b) is applicable.

Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):

(1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I have incorporated my comments under Guideline B in my whole-person analysis.

Applicant’s work with the U.S. military in Iraq earned him high praise from a U.S. military officer. The Appeal Board has held that “an applicant’s proven record of action in defense of the United States is very important and can lead to a favorable result for an applicant in a Guideline B case.” ISCR Case 04-02511 at 4 (App. Bd. Mar. 20, 2007). The complicated state of affairs in Iraq places a significant burden of persuasion on Applicant to demonstrate that his foreign family members do not pose an unacceptable security risk. He has met that burden.

Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts about Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. I conclude Applicant mitigated the foreign influence security concerns.

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1, Guideline B:

For Applicant

Subparagraphs 1.a-1.f:

For Applicant

It is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

________________________ Edward W. Loughran Administrative Judge