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ISCR Case 16-00526.h1 — CASE

ISCR Case 16-00526.h1granted

Case Headnote

ISCR Case No. 16-00526.h1

grantedFeb 22, 2017· Hon. Shari Dam· hearing

Summary

A 55-year-old U.S. citizen, originally from India, was granted a security clearance despite initial concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The Statement of Reasons cited potential disqualifying conditions related to contact with foreign family members, business associates, or friends, as well as connections to foreign entities that could create a conflict of interest. Concerns also included sharing living quarters with individuals who might pose a risk of foreign influence, and substantial business, financial, or property interests in a foreign country.

The applicant successfully mitigated these concerns by demonstrating strong ties and loyalties to the U.S. He established deep and longstanding relationships within the country and showed significant financial interests and property ownership in the U.S. that outweighed his connections to India.

Furthermore, the applicant's supervisors provided positive character references, attesting to his trustworthiness and ability to handle sensitive information. Based on these mitigating factors, the security clearance was granted.

Why the Applicant Prevailed

The applicant established deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S.
He demonstrated significant financial interests and property ownership in the U.S. that outweighed his ties to India.
The applicant's supervisors provided positive character references regarding his trustworthiness and ability to handle sensitive information.

Conditions Referenced

Disqualifying

AG ¶ 7(a)raisedContact with Foreign Family Members
AG ¶ 7(b)raisedConnections to Foreign Persons Creating Potential Conflict of Interest
AG ¶ 7(d)raisedSharing Living Quarters with Foreign Persons
AG ¶ 7(e)raisedSubstantial Financial Interest in a Foreign Country

Mitigating

AG ¶ 8(b)appliedMinimal Conflict of Interest Due to Strong U.S. Ties
AG ¶ 8(f)appliedRoutine Nature of Foreign Financial Interests

Key Rule Quoted

“The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration.”

Procedural Posture

SOR issuedJun 2, 2016
Answer filedJun 20, 2016
Hearing heldNov 30, 2016
Decision dateFeb 22, 2017

Cite For

Mitigation of Foreign Influence Concerns Under Guideline B
Importance of U.S. Citizenship and Ties in Security Clearance Decisions
Evaluation of Financial Interests in Foreign Countries Relative to U.S. Interests

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

Standardized Decision Profile

SEAD-4 Guideline B (Foreign Influence) · descriptive summary of a decided case

Posture: Decision on RecordDecided: granted

The judge found that the applicant mitigated the security concerns related to foreign influence due to his connections to India. The applicant's ties to the U.S. were deemed significant, leading to a decision to grant eligibility for access to classified information.

Country conditions:the decision took administrative notice of official facts about the foreign country (the Government’s country submission).

U.S. ties the decision noted: Naturalized U.S. Citizen · U.S. Spouse or Partner · U.S. Children · U.S. Home or Property · U.S. Career or Business · U.S. Financial Assets Predominant · Intent to Remain in U.S.

¶	Allegation	Finding	Relationship	Country	Response	Disqualifying (¶7)	Mitigating applied (¶8)	Mitigation
1.a	Contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.	For Applicant	Parent in Foreign Country Immediate Family	India HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (d) counterintelligence information indicating unacceptable risk (e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (f) foreign interests are minimal and could not be used to influence	Credited Deep U.S. Ties Claimed Other
1.b	Connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.	For Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	India HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (d) counterintelligence information indicating unacceptable risk (e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (f) foreign interests are minimal and could not be used to influence	Credited Deep U.S. Ties Claimed Other
1.c	Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.	For Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	India HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (d) counterintelligence information indicating unacceptable risk (e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (f) foreign interests are minimal and could not be used to influence	Credited Deep U.S. Ties Claimed Other
1.d	A substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation.	For Applicant	Foreign Real Estate Financial or Property Interest	India HEIGHTENED RISK	Admitted	(a) contact with a foreign family member/associate/friend creating a heightened risk of exploitation (b) connections creating a potential conflict of interest (d) counterintelligence information indicating unacceptable risk (e) shared living quarters creating a heightened risk	(b) deep/longstanding U.S. loyalties; conflict resolves in favor of the U.S. (f) foreign interests are minimal and could not be used to influence	Credited Deep U.S. Ties Claimed Other
1.e	specific text not stated in this decision	For Applicant	Unspecified Foreign Relationship Other	—	Unknown	—	—	—

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case (Guideline B). The verbatim source decision is shown in full below.

Full decision

The complete, official text — footnotes and signatures included — is in the original PDF.

Decision text, by section

DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

HEARING

APPEARANCES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 16-00526 ) ) ) Applicant for Security Clearance

For Government: Caroline Heintzelman, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se

02/22/2017 ______________

STATEMENT OF CASE

______________

DAM, Shari, Administrative Judge:

Applicant mitigated the security concerns arising from his connections to India. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

History of Case

On December 18, 2014, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing (e-QIP). On June 2, 2016, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DoD CAF) issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns under Guideline B, Foreign Influence. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DoD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the Adjudicative Guidelines effective within the DoD for SORs issued after September 1, 2006.

Applicant answered the SOR in writing on June 20, 2016, and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. On September 8, 2016, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) assigned the case to me. It issued a Notice of Hearing on November 8, 2016, setting the hearing for November 30, 2016. On that date, Department Counsel introduced Government Exhibits (GE) 1 through 3 into evidence without objection. Applicant testified. He did not submit any exhibits. DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on December 9, 2016. The record remained open until January 6, 2017, to give Applicant an opportunity to submit documents. He timely submitted three exhibits that I marked as Applicant Exhibits (AE) A through C, and admitted into the record without objection.

Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings

Request for Administrative Notice

Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice of certain facts relating to India. The request and attached documents pertinent to India are included in the record as Hearing Exhibit (HE) 1, along with 13 attachments. The documents were admitted without objection. (Tr. 13.) The facts administratively noticed are limited to matters of general knowledge pertinent to India, and not subject to reasonable dispute. The facts administratively noticed are set out in the Findings of Fact, below.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Applicant admitted all factual allegations contained in the SOR. Those admissions are incorporated into these findings of fact.

Applicant is 55 years old. He was born in India. He enlisted in the Indian Navy in May 1983. He graduated from an Indian university in 1990 with a master’s degree. In April 1996, he took an early retirement from the Indian Navy and was honorably discharged as a lieutenant commander. He does not receive a pension for his previous military service. He held an Indian security clearance while serving. In May 1996, he immigrated to the United States to join his wife, who was attending graduate school at a U.S. university. (Tr. 15-19, 36.) In February 2012, Applicant became a U.S. citizen. (GE 1.)

Applicant’s wife was born in India. In 1991, they married in India. In 1993, she immigrated to the United States to attend a university. Applicant and his wife have 17- year-old twins, who were born in the United States. She is a citizen of India, and a permanent resident of the United States. She works as a professor at a U.S. university. (Tr. 15-16; GE 1.) She owns an apartment in India, which she purchased in 2011 for $50,000 and has a minimal mortgage on it. She maintains a bank account in India to cover expenses related to it. Applicant’s mother lives in the apartment. (Tr. 28-30, 39.)

Both of Applicant’s parents were born in India. His father is deceased. He was an engineer in India. (Tr. 17.) His mother is 79 years old and is a citizen and resident of India. She is a retired teacher. Applicant speaks to his mother two or three times a week. She has visited him in the United States eight or nine times, the last visit being in 2015. Applicant has one sibling, who was born in India. She is an Indian citizen and resident of Malaysia since 1997. (Tr. 17, 21-22; GE 1.)

Applicant’s father-in-law and mother-in-law were born in India and reside there. His father-in-law is a retired civil servant and worked for the Indian government. His mother-in-law is a housewife. Applicant speaks to them once a week; his wife speaks to them more frequently. They have visited Applicant and his wife more than his parents have. Their last visit was in 2014. Applicant’s wife has one sibling, who is a citizen and resident of the United States. When Applicant’s in-laws come to the United States, they also visit their son. (Tr. 22-25.)

Applicant has three friends in India with whom he maintains contact two or three times a year by telephone or email. All of them served together in the Indian Armed Forces. Two of his friends are rear Admirals, and he saw both in July 2016, when he visited India. Another friend is a retired Army brigadier general. Applicant saw him during his July 2016 trip, but has not been in contact since then. (Tr. 33-37, 41; GE 2.)

Since arriving in the United States in 1996, Applicant has traveled to India between 12 and 20 times, his last visit being in July 2016. He visits his family and in-laws when he returns. (Tr. 26-27.) He ceased using an Indian passport when he became a U.S. citizen in 2012 and received a U.S. passport. (Tr. 43; GE 2.)

Applicant and his wife purchased a home in the U.S. in 2015 for $650,000. He and his wife have financial investments in the United States. The estimated value of all accounts is between $700,000 and $800,000. Other than his mortgage, he has minimal liabilities. (Tr. 38-41.) He also has a joint account with his mother in India. He puts money into it, in the event she needs additional monies. It has about $3,000 to $4,000 in it. He said the last time she used some of the money was for his father’s hospitalization before he died in 2012. (Tr. 30, 32, 42.)

Since October 2014, Applicant has worked for a state research institute. Prior to this position, he has worked for private companies and institutions since 1998. (GE 1.)

Applicant submitted two character references. Applicant’s supervisor for the past two years recommends Applicant “as a highly professional, trustworthy individual.” (AE A.) He has found Applicant to be conscientious in handling sensitive information and aware of the pertinent rules and policies. (AE A.) Another supervisor has known him for a year. He noted that Applicant worked on a project involving sensitive (unclassified) information and was “respectful of privacy, confidentiality, rules and restrictions.” (AE B.)

At the hearing, Applicant sincerely expressed pride in his U.S. citizenship. He recognized that it is a privilege to have access to classified information. He understands the significance of working in the Armed Forces and responsibilities it brings. He said, “When I was in the Armed Forces of India, it was the Indian flag that I embraced. But now I’m a U.S. citizen and it is the Star Spangled Banner. So, I have a lot of respect for that.” (Tr. 44.) India

I take administrative notice of the following facts: According to its constitution, India is a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic. It is a multiparty, federal, parliamentary democracy with a bicameral parliament and a population of approximately 1.1 billion. The Indian government generally respects the rights of its citizens, but numerous serious problems remain. Police and security forces have engaged in extrajudicial killings of persons in custody, disappearances, torture, and rape. A lack of accountability permeated the government and security forces, creating an atmosphere in which human rights violations went unpunished. A number of violent attacks were committed in recent years by separatist and terrorist groups. In November 2008, terrorists coordinated an attack at a hotel in Mumbai frequented by westerners.

The United States recognizes India as key to its strategic interests and has sought to strengthen diplomatic and economic relationships. The two countries are the world’s largest democracies, both committed to political freedom protected by representative government, and share common interests in the free flow of commerce, in fighting terrorism, and in creating a strategically stable Asia. However, differences over India’s nuclear weapons program and pace of economic reform exist. There are also concerns about India’s relations with Iran, including its increasing cooperation with the Iranian military.

There have been cases involving the illegal export, or attempted illegal export, of U.S. restricted, dual–use technology to India, including technology and equipment that were determined to present an unacceptable risk of diversion to programs for the development of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery. Foreign government and private entities, including intelligence organizations and security services, have capitalized on private-sector acquisitions of U.S. technology. In March 2008, an American businessman pleaded guilty to conspiring to illegally export technology to entities in India.

The United States views India as a growing world power with which it shares common strategic interests. There is a strong partnership between the two countries and they are expected to continue addressing differences and shaping a dynamic and collaborative future. The U.S. and India seek to elevate the strategic partnership further to include cooperation in counter-terrorism, defense, education, and joint democracy promotion.

POLICIES

When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines (AG) list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶¶ 2(b) and 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.

The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.

According to Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an “applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”

A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.

Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “[a]ny determination under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also Executive Order 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information.)

ANALYSIS

Guideline B, Foreign Influence

The security concern for foreign influence is set out in AG ¶ 6: Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign county in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.

AG ¶ 7 describes four conditions that could raise a security concern and be potentially disqualifying in this case:

(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;1

(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information;

(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and

(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation.

Applicant’s mother and in-laws are citizens and residents of India. His wife is a citizen of India and permanent resident of the United States. Two friends are officers in the Indian Navy; one friend is a retired officer in the Indian Army. Applicant has a joint bank account with his mother in India. India is the world’s largest democracy, works closely with the United States on many matters, shares common strategic interests, and generally respects the rights of its citizens; but, it also continues to have human rights issues, has been victimized by terrorist attacks, and has a history of seeking restricted dual-use technology, which has been illegally exported to India from the United States. This creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. It also creates a potential conflict of interest for Applicant. AG ¶¶ 7(a), (b), (d), and (e) have been raised by the evidence. After the Government produced substantial evidence of those disqualifying conditions, the burden shifted to Applicant to rebut their security significance or otherwise prove mitigation. Four mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 are potentially applicable to the disqualifying conditions raised in this case:

(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.;

(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;

(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation; and

(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.

The nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that Applicant and his family members are vulnerable to coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family member is associated with or dependent upon that government, the country is known to conduct intelligence operations against the United States, or there is a serious problem in the country with crime or terrorism. Although India has a close, friendly relationship with the United States, there is evidence that India illegally targets U.S. technology, which raises a security concern regarding Applicant’s relationships with citizens and residents of India. Applicant’s wife maintains Indian citizenship, and his mother, in-laws, and three friends are citizens and residents of India. His three friends have affiliations with the Indian military. Given the nature of these relationships, there is a possibility that Applicant could be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of India and the United States. Hence, AG ¶ 8(a) has limited application.

AG ¶ 8(b) has application. A key factor in the AG ¶ 8(b) analysis is Applicant’s “deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S.” Applicant has established deep connections to the United States. He has lived in the United States since 1996. He became a naturalized citizen in 2012. His two children were born in the United States. He owns property and has financial accounts in the United States. He has worked for U.S. institutions and companies since 1998. His current supervisors are confident of his ability to protect classified information. He considers himself a citizen of the United States and no longer a citizen of India. Based on these significant connections to the United States, there is a strong indication that Applicant could be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interests.

AG ¶ 8(c) does not have application to the security concerns raised because Applicant’s contacts with his mother and in-laws, residing in India, are sufficiently frequent and not casual. His communications with his friends have been less frequent. He has visited his family in India between 12 and 25 times since 1996, the most recent being in July 2016.

The evidence establishes mitigation under AG ¶ 8(f), as to the allegation in SOR ¶ 1.e. Applicant maintains money in a joint account in India with his mother to provide money for emergencies. Currently, there is between $3,000 and $4,000 in that account. His wife owns an apartment in India worth $50,000. Applicant and his wife have combined financial assets in the United States worth between $700,000 and $800,000, plus a home they purchased for $650,000. Those assets are more significant than their combined assets in India that total about $54,000.

WHOLE PERSON CONCEPT

Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):

(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

According to AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. The Appeal Board requires the whole-person analysis address “evidence of an applicant’s personal loyalties; the nature and extent of an applicant’s family’s ties to the U.S. relative to his [or her] ties to a foreign country; his or her social ties within the U.S.; and many others raised by the facts of a given case.” ISCR Case No. 04-00540 at 7 (App. Bd. Jan. 5, 2007).

I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Although this case pertains to Guideline B, the security concerns do not arise from any questionable conduct by Applicant, but rather from circumstances that warrant further analysis.

Applicant is a 55-year-old man, who was born in India and is a citizen and resident the United States. He now seeks a security clearance. Some facts weigh against granting Applicant a security clearance. Over the past 20 years, Applicant has maintained connections to his family in India. He communicates regularly with family members, in particular his mother, by phone and periodic visits. He maintains some, albeit limited, communications with three Indian military officers, two of whom are on active duty. While these contacts with his mother, in-laws, and old friends commendably demonstrate devotion and affection for them, those actions raise security concerns and potential conflicts of interest.

There are facts that weigh more heavily in favor of granting Applicant a security clearance. He has lived in the United States for 20 years and has been a citizen since 2012. His wife is a permanent resident of the United States and teaches at a U.S. university. His brother-in-law is a citizen and resident of the United States. His children were born in the United States. He has worked for U.S. companies and institutions since 1998. His supervisors recommend him for a security clearance. He has significant assets in the United States and not in India. He expressed sincere loyalty to the United States.

After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions, and all pertinent facts and circumstances in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant mitigated the security concerns pertaining to foreign influence. Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions and doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance.

FORMAL FINDINGS

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT

Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.e: For Applicant

CONCLUSION

In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

___________________ SHARI DAM Administrative Judge

FOOTNOTES

1 The mere possession of close family ties with a person in a foreign country is not, as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B. However, if only one relative lives in a foreign country and an applicant has contacts with that relative, this factor alone is sufficient to create the potential for foreign influence and could potentially result in the compromise of classified information. See ISCR Case No. 03-02382 at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 15, 2006); ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001).