ISCR Case No. 24-01764

______________ ______________ DEPARTMENT OF WAR DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 24-01764 ) Applicant for Security Clearance ) Appearances For Government: Carroll J. Connelley, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se 03/23/2026

FOREMAN, LeRoy F., Administrative Judge: This case involves security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations). Clearance is denied. Statement of the Case Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA) on October 18, 2023. On September 17, 2025, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) sent her a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under Guideline F. The DCSA acted under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated in Security Executive Agent Directive 4, National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (December 10, 2016), which became effective on June 8, 2017.

Applicant answered the SOR on September 29, 2025, and requested a decision on the written record without a hearing. Department Counsel submitted the Government’s written case on December 30, 2025. A complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM) was sent to Applicant, who was given an opportunity to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the Government’s evidence. She received the FORM on January 13, 2026, and she did not respond. The FORM consists of seven exhibits. Government Exhibit (GX) 1 contains the pleadings in the case. GX 2 through 7 are the evidence in support of the allegations in the SOR, and they are admitted in evidence.

In Applicant’s answer to the SOR, she admitted all the allegations in the SOR. Her admissions are incorporated in my findings of fact. Applicant is a 40-year-old mail clerk sponsored for a clearance by a federal contractor. She is a high school graduate. She has worked for her current employer since June 2023. She has never married but lived with a cohabitant between 2005 and 2024, and they have two children, ages 14 and 11. She and her cohabitant are in the process of separating. The SOR alleges 16 delinquent debts totaling more than $23,000. The debts are reflected in credit reports from September 2025, August 2024, and October 2023. (FORM Items 3, ,4, and 5) Applicant admitted all the debts in her answer to the SOR without explanation. When she was interviewed by a security investigator, she admitted all the debts, but could identify only the delinquent personal loan alleged in SOR ¶¶ 1.f ($1,324) and the delinquent credit-card accounts alleged in SOR ¶¶ 1.c, 1.d, 1.h, and 1.n. She attributed her debts to being laid off in 2022 after being employed since 2005 and the refusal of her cohabitant to share expenses. In response to DCSA interrogatories in August 2024, she submitted a personal financial statement reflecting a net monthly income of approximately $3,398, expenses of $2,398, a debt payment of $538 on a car loan, and a net remainder of about $463. Her monthly income includes child-support payments of $1,000 per month from her cohabitant. She has not disputed any of the debts alleged in the SOR, and she has taken no action to resolve them.

“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to “control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants

eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 2.

Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance. Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan at 531. Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion in light of all the contrary evidence in the same record.” See ISCR Case No. 17-04166 at 3 (App. Bd. Mar. 21, 2019). It is “less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [a Judge’s] finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. ISCR Case No. 15-01253 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 20, 2016). Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition,

and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02- 31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01- 20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan at 531.

Guideline F, Financial Considerations The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 18: Failure to live within one’s means, satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. . . . An individual who is financially overextended is at greater risk of having to engage in illegal or otherwise questionable acts to generate funds. . . . This concern is broader than the possibility that a person might knowingly compromise classified information to raise money. It encompasses concerns about a person’s self-control, judgment, and other qualities essential to protecting classified information. A person who is financially irresponsible may also be irresponsible, unconcerned, or negligent in handling and safeguarding classified information. See ISCR Case No. 11-05365 at 3 (App. Bd. May 1, 2012). Applicant’s admissions and the evidence submitted in the FORM establishes two following disqualifying conditions under this guideline: AG ¶ 19(a): (“inability to satisfy debts”) and AG ¶ 19(c) (“a history of not meeting financial obligations”). The following mitigating conditions are relevant: AG ¶ 20(a): the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; AG ¶ 20(b): the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person’s control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, a death, divorce or separation,

clear victimization by predatory lending practices, or identity theft), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances; AG ¶ 20(d): the individual initiated and is adhering to a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts; and AG ¶ 20(e): the individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy of the past-due debt which is the cause of the problem and provides documented proof to substantiate the basis of the dispute or provides evidence of actions to resolve the issue. AG ¶¶ 20(a) and 20(b) are not fully established. Applicant’s delinquent debts are numerous and recent. The breakup of her relationship was a condition largely beyond her control. However, her lack of concern about her debts and failure to take any meaningful action to resolve them falls short of responsible conduct and casts doubt on her current reliability, trustworthiness, and good judgment. AG ¶ 20(d) is not established. Applicant submitted no evidence of a good-faith effort to repay or otherwise resolve her debts AG ¶ 20(e) is not established. Applicant has not disputed any of the debts alleged in the SOR.

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. An administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s security eligibility by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all the relevant circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. I have incorporated my comments under Guideline F in my whole-person analysis and applied the adjudicative factors in AG ¶ 2(d). Because Applicant requested a

determination on the record without a hearing, I had no opportunity to evaluate her credibility and sincerity based on demeanor. See ISCR Case No. 01-12350 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Jul. 23, 2003). After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guideline F and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns raised by her delinquent debts.

I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR: Guideline F (Financial Considerations): AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraphs 1.a-1.p: Against Applicant

I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the national security interests of the United States to grant Applicant eligibility for access to classified information. Clearance is denied. LeRoy F. Foreman Administrative Judge