ISCR Case No. 24-01366

FOR GOVERNMENT Andrea M. Corrales, Esq., Deputy Chief Department Counsel FOR APPLICANT Joseph G. Pia Jacob B. Stone The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance. On November 26, 2024, DoD issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis of that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) in Appendix A of Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (effective June 8, 2017) and DoD Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive). On July 14, 2026, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Administrative Judge Richard A. Cefola denied Applicant national security eligibility. Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30. Background Applicant is in his late fifties. He earned a bachelor’s degree in 1992 and a master’s degree in accounting in 1993. Married in 1991, Applicant divorced in 2009 and has four children, all adults. Self-employed as president of an IT consulting firm from 1999 until late 2023, he now seeks initial national security eligibility for his employment with a government contractor, for whom he has worked since October 2023.

In his October 2023 security clearance application, Applicant reported that he failed both to file and to pay his federal taxes for tax year 2022 and estimated that he owed $20,000 for that year. Government Exhibit (GE) 1 at 25. In a follow-up investigative interview in April 2024, Applicant clarified that he in fact had not filed federal or state taxes returns or paid any federal or state income tax since about 2002. He stated that he was working with an accountant, who advised him to focus first on his most recent tax year of 2022 before working on prior years. In explaining his failure to file the returns, Applicant attributed the problem to being self-employed. He stated that he was not a detail person, that he procrastinated in getting the necessary records together, and that the problem “eventually snowball[ed] to a situation where it was overwhelming to complete.” GE 2 at 5. Applicant acknowledged that he did not know the total amount owed for all the years he failed to file, that he would need to contact both the IRS and his state to arrange payment, and that he had not yet done so. Applicant stated his intent to contact his accountant by the end of April 2024 to start the process of filing returns. The subsequent SOR alleged that Applicant failed to file both federal and state income tax returns for at least tax years 2003 through 2023 and that the tax returns remained unfiled. In his April 2025 Answer to the SOR (Answer), Applicant admitted both the federal and state tax allegations, with the following caveat: “I feel that Guideline F’s reasoning does not capture my situation. I feel a more accurate description of my situation is getting overwhelmed by running my own business and all that entails . . . while taking my responsibilities as a father very seriously.” Answer at 1. Under cross-examination at his May 2026 hearing, Applicant largely reiterated the answers given in his April 2024 interview and testified in pertinent part as follows: his income while self- employed fluctuated greatly from year to year, depending on how many months of the year his company was under contract; he made approximately $200,000 when working for the full year, but would sometimes go six to nine months without a contract; although he estimated that he owed $20,000 in taxes for tax year 2022, he could not estimate how much he owed for tax years 2003 through 2023; and he did not know whether he could afford to repay his taxes on an installment plan, if he ever filed his returns and entered into such a plan. Transcript (Tr.) at 20–21. Applicant also testified that he had filed federal and state returns for tax years 2024 and 2025, as he had by then become a salaried W-2 employee, with taxes withheld by his employer. He admitted, however, that he had still taken no steps to file his federal or state tax returns for tax years 2003 though 2023. When asked why he had taken no action, Applicant responded, “Just life. Busy.” Tr. at 26. In his decision, the Judge concluded that Applicant’s failure to file his federal and state income tax returns for 2003 through 2023 established a security concern under AG ¶ 19(f).1 Turning to a mitigation analysis, the Judge noted that he “considered all of the mitigating 1 AG ¶ 19(f): failure to file or fraudulently filing annual Federal, state or local income tax returns or failure to pay annual federal, state or local income tax as required. 2

conditions under AG ¶ 20,” and he specifically highlighted AG ¶ 20(g).2 Decision at 4. He concluded, however, that no mitigating conditions applied: Applicant’s tax problems are ongoing. He clearly knew of the Government’s concerns when Applicant answered the SOR in April of 2025, more than a year before his hearing. He has done nothing to answer those concerns. He has not demonstrated that future financial problems are unlikely. Mitigation under AG ¶ 20 has not been established. Id. In his Whole-Person Concept analysis, the Judge recited the nine factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d), incorporated his comments under Guideline F, and concluded that the record evidence left him with “questions or doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability.” Id. at 5. Discussion Pro se at hearing and now represented, Applicant does not challenge any of the Judge’s specific findings of fact on appeal. Rather, he argues that the Judge’s decision is arbitrary and capricious because “it merely offers a blanket statement disregarding the mitigation factors enumerated in [Guideline F].” Appeal Brief at 1. Echoing Applicant’s closing argument at hearing, his counsel argues that “Applicant’s tax issues are one small part of Applicant’s entire history of decision-making and commitment keeping.” Id. at 5. Counsel asserts that the Judge “was obligated to explain” why he found none of the Guideline F mitigating factors applicable and that his decision failed to establish a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Id. We are thoroughly unpersuaded by Counsel’s argument and affirm the Judge’s adverse decision for the reasons below. First, the Directive requires an appealing party to “state the specific issue or issues being raised” and to “cite specific portions of the case record supporting any alleged error.” Directive ¶ E3.1.30. Here, Counsel broadly asserts that the Judge failed to consider any mitigating condition other than AG ¶ 20(g) but fails to point us to any other mitigating condition under AG ¶ 20 that might possibly apply to his client’s case and to the record evidence that would support such a contention. That is, Counsel does not argue for application of any other enumerated condition, such as: that Applicant’s failure to file was so long ago that it no longer reflects on his judgment; that his failure to file was a condition beyond his control; that he has received financial counseling from a legitimate source and the problem is being resolved; that he initiated and has adhered to a good-faith effort to repay the debt; or that he has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy of his tax obligation and has provided proof to substantiate the same. AG ¶¶ 20(a) – 20(e). Indeed, such an argument would be fallacious, as these factors are clearly not applicable to Applicant’s case. As we have previously stated, a judge is not required to discuss each analytical factor set forth in the Directive. See ISCR Case No. 14-06135 at 2, n.1 (App. Bd. Jun. 15, 2016). That is particularly true in a case such as this one, in which the other mitigating conditions are inarguably not raised by the evidence. The Judge stated that he had considered the possible applicability of 2 AG ¶ 20(g): the individual has made arrangements with the appropriate tax authority to file or pay the amount owed and is in compliance with those arrangements. 3

all mitigating conditions, and he reasonably focused on AG ¶ 20(g), the mitigating condition that directly corresponded to Applicant’s failure to file his tax returns. We note that Applicant did not challenge the Judge’s adverse conclusion that AG ¶ 20(g) did not apply, a conclusion that is amply supported by the record. This allegation of error is wholly without merit. Second, we briefly address Applicant’s argument that his tax issues are “one small part of Applicant’s entire history of decision-making and commitment keeping.” Appeal Brief at 5. The implicit argument that tax issues alone do not raise security concerns ignores both common sense and decades of precedent. The Directive presumes a nexus between admitted or proven conduct under any of the Guidelines and an applicant’s eligibility for clearance. That nexus is nowhere more evident than in a case such as this one. A security clearance represents an obligation to the federal government to protect its national secrets. Applicant’s long-term and continued failure to honor a fundamental obligation to the federal government has a direct, adverse bearing on his reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified information. See ISCR Case No. 14­ 03358 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct. 9, 2015). Finally, Applicant also broadly challenges the Judge’s analysis under the Whole-Person Concept. The Whole-Person Concept requires a judge to analyze an applicant’s circumstances based on consideration of the full record; however, a judge is not required to discuss each AG ¶ 2(d) factor. See ISCR Case No. 11-08546 at 4 (App. Bd. Feb. 27, 2013) (citations omitted). Notably, Applicant again does not articulate which factor under AG ¶ 2(d) might be favorably applied to his case, and our review reveals none. In the instant case, the Judge evaluated Applicant’s security concerns in light of the entirety of the evidence, as is required for a Whole- Person analysis. Nothing in the record or Applicant’s brief provides a basis to conclude that his evaluation was insufficient. Conclusion Applicant has not established that the Judge’s conclusions were arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The Judge examined the relevant evidence, weighed the disqualifying and mitigating conditions, and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision. The record is sufficient to support that the Judge’s findings and conclusions are sustainable. “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’” Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” AG ¶ 2(b). 4

Order The decision in ISCR Case No. 24-01366 is AFFIRMED. Signed: Moira Modzelewski Moira Modzelewski Administrative Judge Chair, Appeal Board Signed: Allison Marie Allison Marie Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board Signed: Eric H. Borgstrom Eric H. Borgstrom Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board 5

FOR APPLICANT Joseph G. Pia Jacob B. Stone The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance. On November 26, 2024, DoD issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis of that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) in Appendix A of Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (effective June 8, 2017) and DoD Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive). On July 14, 2026, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Administrative Judge Richard A. Cefola denied Applicant national security eligibility. Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30. Background Applicant is in his late fifties. He earned a bachelor’s degree in 1992 and a master’s degree in accounting in 1993. Married in 1991, Applicant divorced in 2009 and has four children, all adults. Self-employed as president of an IT consulting firm from 1999 until late 2023, he now seeks initial national security eligibility for his employment with a government contractor, for whom he has worked since October 2023.

In his October 2023 security clearance application, Applicant reported that he failed both to file and to pay his federal taxes for tax year 2022 and estimated that he owed $20,000 for that year. Government Exhibit (GE) 1 at 25. In a follow-up investigative interview in April 2024, Applicant clarified that he in fact had not filed federal or state taxes returns or paid any federal or state income tax since about 2002. He stated that he was working with an accountant, who advised him to focus first on his most recent tax year of 2022 before working on prior years. In explaining his failure to file the returns, Applicant attributed the problem to being self-employed. He stated that he was not a detail person, that he procrastinated in getting the necessary records together, and that the problem “eventually snowball[ed] to a situation where it was overwhelming to complete.” GE 2 at 5. Applicant acknowledged that he did not know the total amount owed for all the years he failed to file, that he would need to contact both the IRS and his state to arrange payment, and that he had not yet done so. Applicant stated his intent to contact his accountant by the end of April 2024 to start the process of filing returns. The subsequent SOR alleged that Applicant failed to file both federal and state income tax returns for at least tax years 2003 through 2023 and that the tax returns remained unfiled. In his April 2025 Answer to the SOR (Answer), Applicant admitted both the federal and state tax allegations, with the following caveat: “I feel that Guideline F’s reasoning does not capture my situation. I feel a more accurate description of my situation is getting overwhelmed by running my own business and all that entails . . . while taking my responsibilities as a father very seriously.” Answer at 1. Under cross-examination at his May 2026 hearing, Applicant largely reiterated the answers given in his April 2024 interview and testified in pertinent part as follows: his income while self- employed fluctuated greatly from year to year, depending on how many months of the year his company was under contract; he made approximately $200,000 when working for the full year, but would sometimes go six to nine months without a contract; although he estimated that he owed $20,000 in taxes for tax year 2022, he could not estimate how much he owed for tax years 2003 through 2023; and he did not know whether he could afford to repay his taxes on an installment plan, if he ever filed his returns and entered into such a plan. Transcript (Tr.) at 20–21. Applicant also testified that he had filed federal and state returns for tax years 2024 and 2025, as he had by then become a salaried W-2 employee, with taxes withheld by his employer. He admitted, however, that he had still taken no steps to file his federal or state tax returns for tax years 2003 though 2023. When asked why he had taken no action, Applicant responded, “Just life. Busy.” Tr. at 26. In his decision, the Judge concluded that Applicant’s failure to file his federal and state income tax returns for 2003 through 2023 established a security concern under AG ¶ 19(f).1 Turning to a mitigation analysis, the Judge noted that he “considered all of the mitigating 1 AG ¶ 19(f): failure to file or fraudulently filing annual Federal, state or local income tax returns or failure to pay annual federal, state or local income tax as required. 2

conditions under AG ¶ 20,” and he specifically highlighted AG ¶ 20(g).2 Decision at 4. He concluded, however, that no mitigating conditions applied: Applicant’s tax problems are ongoing. He clearly knew of the Government’s concerns when Applicant answered the SOR in April of 2025, more than a year before his hearing. He has done nothing to answer those concerns. He has not demonstrated that future financial problems are unlikely. Mitigation under AG ¶ 20 has not been established. Id. In his Whole-Person Concept analysis, the Judge recited the nine factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d), incorporated his comments under Guideline F, and concluded that the record evidence left him with “questions or doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability.” Id. at 5. Discussion Pro se at hearing and now represented, Applicant does not challenge any of the Judge’s specific findings of fact on appeal. Rather, he argues that the Judge’s decision is arbitrary and capricious because “it merely offers a blanket statement disregarding the mitigation factors enumerated in [Guideline F].” Appeal Brief at 1. Echoing Applicant’s closing argument at hearing, his counsel argues that “Applicant’s tax issues are one small part of Applicant’s entire history of decision-making and commitment keeping.” Id. at 5. Counsel asserts that the Judge “was obligated to explain” why he found none of the Guideline F mitigating factors applicable and that his decision failed to establish a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Id. We are thoroughly unpersuaded by Counsel’s argument and affirm the Judge’s adverse decision for the reasons below. First, the Directive requires an appealing party to “state the specific issue or issues being raised” and to “cite specific portions of the case record supporting any alleged error.” Directive ¶ E3.1.30. Here, Counsel broadly asserts that the Judge failed to consider any mitigating condition other than AG ¶ 20(g) but fails to point us to any other mitigating condition under AG ¶ 20 that might possibly apply to his client’s case and to the record evidence that would support such a contention. That is, Counsel does not argue for application of any other enumerated condition, such as: that Applicant’s failure to file was so long ago that it no longer reflects on his judgment; that his failure to file was a condition beyond his control; that he has received financial counseling from a legitimate source and the problem is being resolved; that he initiated and has adhered to a good-faith effort to repay the debt; or that he has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy of his tax obligation and has provided proof to substantiate the same. AG ¶¶ 20(a) – 20(e). Indeed, such an argument would be fallacious, as these factors are clearly not applicable to Applicant’s case. As we have previously stated, a judge is not required to discuss each analytical factor set forth in the Directive. See ISCR Case No. 14-06135 at 2, n.1 (App. Bd. Jun. 15, 2016). That is particularly true in a case such as this one, in which the other mitigating conditions are inarguably not raised by the evidence. The Judge stated that he had considered the possible applicability of 2 AG ¶ 20(g): the individual has made arrangements with the appropriate tax authority to file or pay the amount owed and is in compliance with those arrangements. 3

all mitigating conditions, and he reasonably focused on AG ¶ 20(g), the mitigating condition that directly corresponded to Applicant’s failure to file his tax returns. We note that Applicant did not challenge the Judge’s adverse conclusion that AG ¶ 20(g) did not apply, a conclusion that is amply supported by the record. This allegation of error is wholly without merit. Second, we briefly address Applicant’s argument that his tax issues are “one small part of Applicant’s entire history of decision-making and commitment keeping.” Appeal Brief at 5. The implicit argument that tax issues alone do not raise security concerns ignores both common sense and decades of precedent. The Directive presumes a nexus between admitted or proven conduct under any of the Guidelines and an applicant’s eligibility for clearance. That nexus is nowhere more evident than in a case such as this one. A security clearance represents an obligation to the federal government to protect its national secrets. Applicant’s long-term and continued failure to honor a fundamental obligation to the federal government has a direct, adverse bearing on his reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified information. See ISCR Case No. 14­ 03358 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct. 9, 2015). Finally, Applicant also broadly challenges the Judge’s analysis under the Whole-Person Concept. The Whole-Person Concept requires a judge to analyze an applicant’s circumstances based on consideration of the full record; however, a judge is not required to discuss each AG ¶ 2(d) factor. See ISCR Case No. 11-08546 at 4 (App. Bd. Feb. 27, 2013) (citations omitted). Notably, Applicant again does not articulate which factor under AG ¶ 2(d) might be favorably applied to his case, and our review reveals none. In the instant case, the Judge evaluated Applicant’s security concerns in light of the entirety of the evidence, as is required for a Whole- Person analysis. Nothing in the record or Applicant’s brief provides a basis to conclude that his evaluation was insufficient. Conclusion Applicant has not established that the Judge’s conclusions were arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The Judge examined the relevant evidence, weighed the disqualifying and mitigating conditions, and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision. The record is sufficient to support that the Judge’s findings and conclusions are sustainable. “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’” Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” AG ¶ 2(b). 4

Order The decision in ISCR Case No. 24-01366 is AFFIRMED. Signed: Moira Modzelewski Moira Modzelewski Administrative Judge Chair, Appeal Board Signed: Allison Marie Allison Marie Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board Signed: Eric H. Borgstrom Eric H. Borgstrom Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board 5