ISCR Case No. 25-01194

______________ ______________ DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS ___________________________ In the matter of: )

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ISCR Case No. 25-01194

) Applicant for Security Clearance ) ___________________________________) Appearances For Government: Cynthia Ruckno, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Sean Rogers, Esq. 09/28/2026 Decision GLENDON, John Bayard, Administrative Judge: Applicant did not mitigate the security concerns under Guidelines D (Sexual Behavior), J (Criminal Conduct), and E (Personal Conduct) arising from his conduct during the period 2007 through 2024. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case Applicant submitted a Questionnaire for National Security Positions on July 19, 2023 (the Questionnaire). On December 11, 2025, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guidelines D, J, and E. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within DOD after June 8, 2017.

On March 2, 2026, Applicant responded to the SOR allegations (Answer) and requested a decision based upon the administrative (written) record, without a hearing before an administrative judge from the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA). Department Counsel prepared a File of Relevant Material, dated April 10, 2026. On May 25, 2026, Applicant requested a hearing, and his case was converted on June 1, 2026, to provide for a hearing. He retained counsel, and on June 24, 2026, his attorney filed a Notice of Appearance and requested a hearing. Department Counsel advised that she was ready to proceed on July 2, 2026. The case was assigned to me on July 20, 2026. On August 4, 2026, DOHA scheduled the case to be heard via Microsoft Teams video teleconference on September 3, 2026. I convened the hearing as scheduled. Department Counsel offered five documents marked as Government Exhibits (GE) 1 through 5, which I admitted without objection. Applicant’s attorney offered seven documents marked as Applicant Exhibit (AE) A through G. Applicant was the only witness. I kept the record open until September 10, 2026, to give Applicant the opportunity to submit a document discussed at the hearing. Nothing further was submitted, and the record closed on September 10, 2026. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on September 15, 2026. (Tr. at 10-13, 114-115.) Findings of Fact Applicant is 52 years old, married, and has two children, ages 22 and 19. He received an associate’s degree in 2001. He was granted national security eligibility in 2015 or 2016 while working for a government contractor. In 2022, he lost that employment due to a reduction in workforce. He obtained new employment with a defense contractor in 2023 as an engineer. (Tr. at 14-17, 54, 88-89; GE 1 at 5, 8-11, 17-20, 30-31.) DCSA alleged in the SOR that Applicant is ineligible for a security clearance due to his conduct that raised security concerns under three guidelines, D, J, and E. The Government alleged that he was charged with criminal sexual behavior in March 2020 and that he had four other charges of criminal behavior brought against him during the period 2007 through 2018. Also, he was caught trespassing on a resort’s property in 2010 and engaged in inappropriate conduct while at the resort. He was questioned about this incident in a March 2024 national security background interview, and he refused to answer. I find the following facts developed at the hearing and detailed in the documentary record: Paragraph 1, Guideline D ( Sexual Behavior) SOR ¶ 1.a. March 2020 Arrest on Charge of Felony Sexual Assault on a Minor. Applicant became embroiled in a criminal prosecution when he took his wife and daughter to a natural hot springs pool in a neighboring state ( State 2) on March 1, 2020 (the 2020 Hot Springs Incident). A seven-year-old girl claimed that Applicant touched her on her buttocks while she was swimming in the pool. Applicant testified that he was walking back to the side of the “packed” pool when the girl swam in front of him, kicking and splashing 2

water in his face, almost kicking him in the face. He “lightly” shoved her away with his hand in a ball in a “slowing moving shove” to avoid getting kicked in the face. His contact with the girl lasted two or three seconds, although he also described the contact as a “split second” occurrence. He further testified that he had no intention of touching a private part of her body. The girl complained to her mother, who yelled at Applicant. According to a witness, the girl was crying at that time. Applicant avoided being confronted by the mother by disappearing underwater. He was embarrassed. He then exited the pool and told his wife that they needed to leave the resort, even though he testified that he was not aware of the girl’s accusation at that time. However, he also testified that the girl’s mother had accused him while he was still in the p ool of “grabbing” her daughter’s “butt.” (Tr. at 18- 26, 54-68, 90-91; GE 3 at 4-6; GE 4 at 19-20, 37-41.) The mother complained to the facility’s security personnel. As he was leaving, Applicant put a towel over his head. The security officer stopped Applicant in the parking lot and questioned him. Applicant apologized and claimed the incident was accidental. The officer called t he police. The police qu

estioned Applicant, and he denied having a ny sexual intent when he touched her. He testified at the h earing that he had consumed three beers prior to this incident. Shortly thereafter, he drove himself, his wife and his daughter away from the pool. As noted below, after a DUI charge and conviction in 2007, Applicant claimed he no longer drives a vehicle after drinking alcohol. He denied being intoxicated after three beers. (Tr. at 18-26, 54-68, 90-91; GE 3 at 4-6; GE 4 at 19-20, 37- 41.) In the verified, corrected, and adopted report of his February 5, 2024 security background interview (the 2024 Background Interview), Applicant described his contact with the girl a little differently. He told the government investigator that he was trying to exit the crowded pool and tripped. He reached out to catch himself and inadvertently placed his hand on the buttocks of the girl. He advised that the contact was purely accidental. (GE 3 at 4.) The local police in State 2 investigated and interviewed the victim, her mother, and witnesses. She reported that Applicant touched her in the middle of her buttocks once and held his hand there. Two other young girls, who were in the pool at the time of this incident, reported that Applicant was staring at them in the pool and advised her parents that he was acting “creepy.” (GE 4 at 37-40.) Three months later, Applicant received a call from the police in State 2. He asked to have a lawyer present during the call. He was served at this home in State 1 with a criminal complaint filed at the location of the hot springs pool in State 2. Applicant was charged with Felony Sexual Assault on a Minor, or in the alternative, Assault on a Minor. He was never formally arrested. Applicant failed to report this felony charge to his former employer’s security manager. Subsequently, the prosecutor and Applicant entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement for a two-year period that included a requirement that he engage in 20 hours of counseling and that he not return to the same resort area in State 2 for two years. (Tr. at 13, 26-29, 60-62; GE 1 at 25-26; GE 3 at 4; GE 4 at 42-45.) 3

Applicant never admitted that he was guilty of sexual assault on a minor. He completed the counseling on June 30, 2021, and on January 27, 2023, the prosecutor filed a motion asking the court to dismiss the criminal information against Applicant with prejudice, which the court granted the same day. (Tr. at 13, 26-29, 60-62; GE 1 at 25-26; GE 3 at 4; GE 4 at 42-45; AE C at 1.) Paragraph 2, Guideline J (Criminal Conduct) SOR ¶ 2.a. Cross Allegation of SOR ¶ 1.a. See the findings under SOR ¶ 1.a, above. SOR ¶ 2.b. July 2018 Disorderly Conduct Charge. Applicant was at his home and set off aerial fireworks, which had just been l egalized in his home state, State 1. These fireworks shoot 100 feet into the air, “crack and boom,” and drop debris back on the ground. Applicant had “quite a bit” of these fireworks. His across-the-street neighbor warned him that he better not damage his property with the fireworks. A day or two after he shot off the fireworks, his neighbor confronted Applicant when he drove to his house. The neighbor was upset, and they got into a verbal “fight” (the 2018 Fireworks Incident). The neighbor complained that the fireworks damaged his vehicle. Applicant did not believe him and said that was not possible. He never inspected the neighbor’s car for damage. The neighbor put his hand inside Applicant’s car window and said he “was going to teach Applicant a lesson.” Applicant “freaked out” and “hit the gas and took off.” The neighbor fell. He then reported Applicant’s actions to the police a nd claimed that Applicant had run him over. The police called the EMT, and they checked the neighbor out. The EMT concluded he was not hurt. The police issued citations to both men for Disorderly Conduct. Applicant paid a $100 fine. Applicant claims that he has since become friends with the neighbor. (Tr. at 29-34, 68-70; GE 1 at 26-27; GE 3 at 5.) SOR ¶ 2.c. July 2011 Obstruction of Justice and Trespass Charges. On July 21, 2011, Applicant was arrested on two misdemeanor charges: Trespass and Obstructing Justice. Applicant was in the backyard of his house, which was a “townhome.” He had lived there since 1999. For reasons he could not fully explain at the hearing, he ended up opening the backdoor of his neighbor, a female, and entered her townhome (the 2011 Trespass Incident). He testified that “the condos all look the same.” The resident heard him and came down the stairs and s topped him. He then exited her residence. He claimed at the hearing that he had just made a mistake entering the back door of the wrong house. The neighbor called the police, and they showed up at his house immediately and knocked on his door, but he had left his house. He testified that he does not recall where he went. The police had reason to believe he was in the house and was avoiding them. The Obstruction charge was based on Applicant’s refusal to answer the door. The next day the police returned, and he answered the door. They apparently did not accept Applicant’s story that he accidentally entered the wrong home, and they cited him for Trespass and Obstructing Justice. The charges were dismissed without prejudice on August 31, 2011. Applicant did not disclose t hese charges in his January 20, 2015 4

National Security Questionnaire (2015 Questionnaire). (Tr. at 34-37; GE 2 at 30; GE 5 at 8-9.) At the hearing, Applicant did not describe the neighbor as living next door, so it is unclear how many townhomes were between their properties. He tried to explain his actions by saying that he was simply not “paying attention.” He described the back areas of both his house and the neighbor’s house as having a patio and a small porch with no fence separating adjoining properties. They looked identical to him. Applicant could not explain why he was in the back common areas of the townhomes. He denied having previously consumed any alcohol. He was unable to describe the incident in more detail than he walked out his back door, and at some point, he walked into a neighbor’s back door by “accident.” (Tr. at 70-76.) SOR ¶ 2.d. July 2009 Disorderly Conduct and Open Container Charges. On July 14, 2009, Applicant was stopped by the police, after being followed by the police while he made s everal turns through a neighborhood trying to evade the police. At the hearing, Applicant provided no reason to explain why he was trying to avoid the police. He argued with the police about the reason for the stop. He testified that the officer told him he was pulled over for suspicion of burglary. A second officer observed an open beer can in the backseat of his vehicle. They cited him for Disorderly Conduct and Open Container of Alcohol in Vehicle. Applicant asserted at the hearing that he had not been drinking alcohol prior to this incident and that the beer can was empty. The prosecutor dismissed both charges without prejudice. During his February 5, 2024 security interview (the 2024 Security Interview), Applicant claimed that the prosecutor dropped the charges because the police had no reason for stopping him. At the hearing, Applicant testified that he appeared in court with an attorney and the Judge dismissed the case. Applicant did not disclose t hese charges in his 2015 Questionnaire. During the 2024 Security Interview, he was asked about this omission. He responded that his failure to disclose this alcohol- related incident and criminal charges on that questionnaire was an oversight. (Tr. at 37- 39; GE 2 at 30-31; GE 3 at 6; GE 5 at 7-8.) SOR ¶ 2.e. August 2007 Driving Under the Influence Charge. On August 17, 2007, Applicant’s car became stuck on the road w hile he was driving home from a concert. He had consumed ten beers that evening. The police stopped Applicant, gave him a field sobriety test, which he failed, and then arrested him on a misdemeanor charge of Driving Under the Influence-Alcohol/Drugs (the 2007 DUI Incident). Applicant pleaded no contest. The court sentenced him to 90 days of jail time, suspended, 12 months of probation, a six-month suspension of his driver’s license, DUI classes, and a fine of $1,332. (Tr. at 39- 41; GE 1 at 27-28; GE 2 at 31; GE 3 at 5-6; GE 4 at 7; GE 5 at 6-7.) Paragraph 3, Guideline E (Personal Conduct) SOR ¶ 3.a. Refusal to Answer Questions During the Security Interview. Applicant was questioned during t he February 5, 2024 Security Interview about the December 2010 incident (the 2010 Candy Incident), described in the findings under SOR 5

¶ 3.b, below. He refused to answer the investigator’s questions (the 2024 Interview Incident) . He testified at the hearing that he lost his temper because the investigator knew about this incident when he thought it had been “expunged.” Since no charges were filed against him, as discussed under SOR ¶ 3.b, below, it is difficult to understand what he meant by that comment. According to the investigator’s report, Applicant replied to the investigator’s question, “this is all [BS], it’s not like I whipped my [penis] out.” The investigator further described Applicant in the report as “very defensive” and commented that he “refused to talk about the incident.” Applicant told the investigator, “nothing happened there is no incident, it is not an issue.” The investigator wrote further that “the importance of answering questions and possible consequences [of not answering questions] was discussed” with Applicant. The report continues that Applicant stated further that “the record from the [identified police department] could be obtained if there was such a great concern about his action during this incident.” The report concluded that Applicant “declined further comment on this incident.” (Tr. at 51-53, 81-83; GE 3 at 8.) In Applicant’s April 30, 2025 sworn responses to DCSA Interrogatories and again in his September 25, 2025 sworn responses to the DOHA’s Interrogatories, he attached an undated written description of the December 2010 incident (the 2010 Candy Statement). He advised in the statement that he had not been drinking alcohol that day, and he passed an alcohol breath test. The initial disclosure occurred about one year and two months after his refusal to answer questions about the incident at his February 2024 Security Interview. (GE 3 at 9, 13-15; GE 4 at 17-18.) At the hearing, Applicant testified that he tried to “redeem” himself by giving the investigator “a writeup of what had happened, which is what he wanted to hear in the first place. So I apologized for being unprofessional with that and vulgar.” His attorney clarified that the writeup he is referring to is what Applicant attached to GE 4, DCSA’s interrogatories and Applicant’s April 30, 2025 interrogatory responses (GE 3). The record contains no clarifying information confirming that Applicant sent a copy of the statement to the investigator at any point after the Security Interview. (Tr. at 100; GE 4 at 17-18.) SOR ¶ 3.b. December 2010 Incident at a Private Resort. Applicant was involved in an incident at a resort involving strange behavior around minor girls. On December 31, 2010, Applicant took his two children to the resort to play in the game room and to swim in the r esort’s pool. He was not a paying guest at the resort, and as a result, he was not authorized to use t he pool. He was unemployed at the time and was “broke.” Applicant and his daughter went to the resort’s public game room. His daughter played a game machine repeatedly involving prizes of candy. She won a lot of candy. Applicant held the candy for her, and at one point, he offered some candy to a teenage girl playing pool or ping pong with another girl near him. The girl was offended and concerned. He wrote in the 2010 Candy Statement that she gave him “a weird look” and he thought “I had just creeped her out.” The public safety employees at the resort were notified and investigated. They learned that Applicant had been trespassing on the property for more than one day. They also learned that he had been observed watching the same girls swim in the pool while he was underwater wearing googles. They interviewed the parents of 6

the girls, and the parents advised they did not believe that Applicant had committed any crimes. (Tr. at 42-51, 76-83; AE E.) The next evening, Applicant was approached by the resort’s officials and confirmed that he was trespassing on the resort property. They asked him to come to their office. A police officer arrived and asked him questions. Applicant denied that he was intending to act weirdly with the girls the day before. He also denied the claim made by the girls that he was looking at them while he was swimming underwater earlier that day. He advised that he was not even aware that they were swimming in the pool near him. He told the officer that he had not been drinking alcohol that day and that he had passed a breath test. No charges were filed. The security officials at the resort advised Applicant not to trespass on the resort property again. One year later, he was denied permission to buy a pass to visit the resort. He wrote the resort and apologized for his past trespassing. The resort has since allowed him to buy passes, and he has paid to visit the resort many times. He has never returned to the resort’s pool. (Tr. at 42-51, 80-83; GE 3 at 13, 15; GE 4 at 40.) Mitigating and Whole-Person Evidence Applicant asserts that he has had no security incidents in his 15 years holding a clearance and working with classified information. Applicant submitted his resume, which evidenced his responsible work history, but he did not provide any performance records from his employer or character letters from supervisors, co-workers, or friends. He testified that he tried to obtain a statement from a colleague, but he did not submit one. He submitted evidence of three professional certifications that he has received. There is no evidence in the record that anyone outside of his immediate family and those involved in the incidents described above are aware of any of Applicant’s criminal charges, the 2010 Candy Incident, or the 2024 Interview Incident. (Tr. at 16, 62; AE F at 1-3, 4-5; AE G.) Applicant testified at the hearing that he no longer drinks to excess. He said he occasionally consumes a cocktail or two. To avoid concerns about driving after drinking, he takes Uber rides. He advised the Government in April 30, 2025 responses to DCSA’s Interrogatories that he stopped drinking beer and whiskey in May 2020, shortly after the March 2020 Hot Springs Incident. He informed the investigator in 2024 that he consumes about eight beers on Friday and Saturday nights. His wife is aware of all of the SOR allegations. Applicant introduced at the hearing three Certificates of Expungement Eligibility relating to the charges discussed in SOR ¶¶ 2.c, 2.d, and 2.e. He sought to expunge the records of these charges to conceal the charges from security clearance investigators. He thought that having these charges on his record “would slow any Application down.” He said, “Apparently, expungement does not work for clearances.” His plan was unsuccessful. (Tr. at 17, 40-42, 63, 65; GE 3 at 4-7; GE 4 at 4; GE 5 at 6-8; AE A at 1-3.) 7

At the hearing, Applicant explained that his “initial reaction to most things is to tuck tail and run.” This was his reaction to the accusations against him at the 2020 Hot Spring Incident, as well as the 2011 Trespass Incident, and the 2009 Open Container Incident. He explained that he is an introvert and does not like to confront accusations against him and other problems. He tried to avoid disclosures of three of his criminal incidents, described a bove by not disclosing t hem in his questionnaires. He also tried to avoid having the 2010 Candy Incident come up in a future security clearance investigation by trying to “expunge” that incident from his record. (Tr. at 59; GE 1 at 24-27; GE 2 at 29- 31.) Policies When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for national security eligibility, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the AG list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant’s national security eligibility. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. The entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires, “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. I have not drawn inferences based on mere speculation or conjecture. Directive ¶ E3.1.14, requires the Government to present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “The applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants national security eligibility. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the 8

applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified or sensitive information. Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “Any determination under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also Executive Order 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information.) Analysis Paragraph 1, Guideline D (Sexual Behavior) The security concerns relating to the guideline for sexual behavior are set out in AG ¶ 12, which reads as follows: Sexual behavior that involves a criminal offense; reflects a lack of judgment or discretion; or may subject the individual to undue influence of coercion, exploitation, or duress. These issues, together or individually, may raise questions about an individual’s judgment, reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Sexual behavior includes conduct occurring in person or via audio, visual, electronic, or written transmission. No adverse inference concerning the standards in this Guideline may be raised solely on the basis of the sexual orientation of the individual. AG ¶ 13 sets forth three potentially disqualifying conditions that could apply to the facts of this case: (a) sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the individual has been prosecuted; (c) sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (d) sexual behavior of a public nature or that reflects lack of discretion or judgment. AG ¶ 13(a) is established. The 2020 Hot Springs Incident involved Applicant’s sexual touching of a minor that was treated by law enforcement and the court as criminal behavior. Applicant denies that he had any criminal intent. Based upon the police investigation, the prosecutor determined that there was probable cause to believe that Applicant’s actions were intentional and the evidence satisfied the intent element of the crime of Felony Sexual Assault of a Minor. AG ¶ 13(a) explicitly applies regardless of whether Applicant has been prosecuted. Accordingly, the fact that the prosecutor entered 9

into the Deferred Prosecution Agreement is not relevant to the application of this condition. That Agreement is not evidence that the prosecutor believed that the charge was not meritorious. The prosecutor could have any number of concerns causing him to resolve the charges without a trial, such as seeking to avoid traumatizing the young girl further by forcing her to testify about the incident. The fact remains that Applicant was required to live two years with a pending felony charge and had other requirements that are all typically imposed after a conviction. AG ¶ 13(c) is established. Applicant’s behavior in the hot springs pool and the accusation made by the young girl and her mother understandably caused Applicant great embarrassment. He hid from the mother underwater so that he could not hear her loud public complaints that others at the pool heard. He then exited the pool and told his wife and children that they had to leave. Moreover, Applicant provided no evidence that anyone outside of his family, the victim and her mother, resort security, and law enforcement authorities knew about this incident and prosecution. At the hearing, Applicant did not contend that anyone at his employment was aware of this felony charge. In light of the nature of the offense, he remains vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or duress even six years later. AG ¶ 13(d) is also established. Applicant’s touching of a young girl he does not know in a public pool for any reason other than the child’s safety reflects a lack of judgment. The Government’s evidence satisfies its “substantial evidence” burden of proof as to all three potentially disqualifying conditions. The burden, therefore, shifts to Applicant to mitigate security concerns under Guideline D. The guideline includes the following three conditions in AG ¶ 14 that could mitigate security concerns arising from Applicant’s criminal sexual behavior: (b) the sexual behavior happened so long ago, so infrequently, or under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or judgment; (c) the behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (e) the individual has successfully completed an appropriate program of treatment, or is currently enrolled in one, has demonstrated ongoing and consistent compliance with the treatment plan, and/or has received a favorable prognosis from a qualified mental health professional indicating the behavior is readily controllable with treatment. AG ¶ 14(b) is only partially established. Applicant’s behavior at the 2020 Hot Springs Incident occurred several years ago and was infrequent. I cannot, however, conclude that the circumstances were so unusual that they are unlikely to recur or that 10

his behavior does not cast doubt on his current reliability, trustworthiness or judgment. Applicant handled this situation with the young girl with very poor judgment. He gave no consideration to the safety of the child and to her need to avoid being touched by a stranger. Also, he has provided two inconsistent versions of how he came into contact with the seven-year-old girl. At his 2024 Security Interview, Applicant reported while he was trying to exit the pool, he tripped and accidentally touched the girl on the buttocks trying to regain his balance. At the hearing, he testified that he deliberately pushed the girl away to keep her from kicking and splashing water in his face. This inconsistency undermines his credibility in denying that he had any sexual intent in touching the girl’s buttocks. Having had the difficult experience of being accused of misconduct involving a girl at a resort in 2010, Applicant exercised poor judgment again ten years later by not being more cautious around a young girl and by swimming underwater in an area occupied by two teenage girls. He should have exercised good judgment and avoided any possible contact with others in the crowded pool. AG ¶ 14(c) is not established. Applicant introduced no evidence to support a claim that his behavior at the 2020 Hot Springs Incident no longer serves as a basis for coercion, exploitation, or duress. He never claimed that his employer and co-workers are fully aware of this 2020 felony charge. He admitted that he did not report the felony charge to his former employer’s security manager. The charge of Felony Sexual Assault on a Minor is a highly embarrassing criminal complaint, and Applicant testified about his embarrassed behavior once the girl’s mother loudly and publicly confronted him while he was still in the pool shortly after the incident and how he left the resort quickly with his family in tow. AG ¶ 14(e) is not established. Applicant only completed 20 hours of counseling as directed by his Deferred Prosecution Agreement and the court’s approval of that agreement. He provided no evidence of compliance with a treatment plan or a favorable prognosis from a mental health professional. In fact, Applicant never acknowledged the underlying behavior that gave rise to the criminal charges, rendering the concepts of a successful treatment program and that his behavior is readily controllable with treatment meaningless. Paragraph 2, Guideline J (Criminal Conduct) The security concerns relating to the guideline for criminal conduct are set out in AG ¶ 30, which reads as follows: Criminal activity creates doubt about a person’s judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its very nature, it calls into question a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. 11

AG ¶ 31 sets forth two potentially disqualifying conditions that apply to the facts of this case: (a) a pattern of minor offenses, any one of which on its own would be unlikely to affect a national security eligibility decision, but which in combination cast doubt on the individual’s judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness; and (b) evidence (including, but not limited to, a credible allegation, an admission, and matters of official record) of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the individual was formally charged, prosecuted, or convicted. Applicant has been charged with a number of minor offenses that establish a pattern of behavior that when viewed together casts doubt on Applicant’s judgment, reliability and trustworthiness. Also, the 2020 Hot Springs Incident was charged as a felony. That charge alone satisfies AG ¶ 31(b). The burden, therefore, shifts to Applicant to mitigate security concerns under Guideline J. The guideline includes the following three conditions in AG ¶ 32 that can mitigate security concerns arising from a pattern of criminal behavior and a serious single offense: (a) so much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior happened, or it happened under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; (c) no reliable evidence to support that the individual committed the offense; and (d) there is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including, but not limited to, the passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, restitution, compliance with the terms of parole or probation, job training or higher education, good employment record, or constructive community involvement. The pattern of Applicant’s minor criminal behavior and charges began in 2007 and continued up to 2018. If that had been the end of such behavior it might have been mitigated by the passage of time. However, he was charged with Felony Sexual Assault on a Minor in 2020. In light of the extent of the long pattern of Applicant’s criminal behavior, insufficient time has passed to mitigate security concerns raised by this continued pattern of criminal behavior. Also, I cannot conclude under these circumstances that his behavior is unlikely to recur. His repeated criminal acts evidence poor judgment, which was repeated in 2024 when he refused to answer a U.S. Government investigator’s questions during a security clearance background interview. Moreover, his criminal behavior casts doubt on his reliability, trustworthiness, and good judgment. AG ¶ 32(a) is not established. 12

The Government’s evidence supports findings of probable cause for each of the six separate incidents in which charges were brought against Applicant, either by the police or a prosecutor. With respect to the most recent criminal charge, a felony, the evidence provided by the seven-year-old child of what she experienced in the pool with Applicant is sufficiently reliable to meet the Government’s substantial evidence burden of proof. Also, the fact that she complained to her mother about Applicant’s action immediately after his contact with her renders her complaint against Applicant reliable. AG ¶ 32(c) is not established with respect to any of the criminal behavior discussed above under paragraph 2 of the SOR. AG ¶ 32(d) is not established. Insufficient time without the recurrence of criminal behavior has passed to establish successful rehabilitation. Moreover, Applicant has presented no evidence of rehabilitation through his employment record since 2020, any higher education or job experiences, or community involvement. The absence of character reference evidence in this case is striking. That gap in the evidence suggests how embarrassed Applicant is by his criminal record and how unwilling he is to discuss that record with his employer, supervisors, co-workers, and friends who might have written letters of support discussing how he has improved his life since 2020. Paragraph 3, Guideline E (Personal Conduct) The security concerns relating to the guideline for financial considerations are set out in AG ¶ 15, which reads as follows: Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure to cooperate or provide truthful and candid answers during national security investigative or adjudicative processes. The following will normally result in an unfavorable national security eligibility determination, security clearance action, or cancellation of further processing for national security eligibility: (a) refusal, or failure without reasonable cause, to undergo or cooperate with security processing, including but not limited to meeting with a security investigator for subject interview, completing security forms or releases, cooperation with medical or psychological evaluation, or polygraph examination, if authorized and required; and (b) refusal to provide full, frank, and truthful answers to lawful questions of investigators, security officials, or other official representatives in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination. (Emphasis added.) 13

AG ¶ 16 sets forth three potentially disqualifying conditions that could apply to the facts of this case: (b) deliberately providing false or misleading information; or concealing or omitting information, concerning relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent medical or mental health professional involved in making a recommendation relevant to a national security eligibility determination, or other official government representative; (c) credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the individual may not properly safeguard classified or sensitive information; and (d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available information, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the individual may not properly safeguard classified or sensitive information. This includes, but is not limited to, consideration of: (1) untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of client confidentiality, release of proprietary information, unauthorized release of sensitive corporate or government protected information; (2) any disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior; (3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations; and (4) evidence of significant misuse of Government or other employer's time or resources. The facts establishing SOR ¶ 3.a, above, provide a basis for applying AG ¶ 15(b). Applicant’s refusal to discuss the 2010 Candy Incident with the investigator raises a serious security concern. As set forth in AG ¶ 15, his refusal “will normally result in an unfavorable national security eligibility determination.” I interpret the use of the word “normally” as implicating the mitigating conditions set forth in AG ¶ 17 in exceptional situations where there is overwhelming evidence of mitigation directed specifically to the failure to answer questions of an investigator, such as an applicant pleading the Fifth 14

Amendment pursuant to the advice of an attorney relating to questions of possible criminal conduct. See AG ¶ 17(b). AG ¶ 16(b) also applies because Applicant deliberately concealed information from a security official. The facts of this case render AG ¶ 16(c) inapplicable because they are sufficient for an adverse determination under Guideline D and J. AG ¶ 16(d)(3) is also established with respect to Applicant’s trespass at the resort in December 2010. This incident was a part of a pattern of rule violations that began with the 2007 and 2009 criminal offenses, as set forth in SOR ¶¶ 2.d and 2.e, respectively, and continued with the 2011 Trespass Incident and the 2020 Hot Springs Incident. The burden, therefore, shifts to Applicant to mitigate security concerns under Guideline E. The guideline includes the following four conditions in AG ¶ 17 that might apply to mitigate security concerns arising from Applicant’s personal conduct: (a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts; (b) the refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was caused or significantly contributed to by advice of legal counsel or of a person with professional responsibilities for advising or instructing the individual specifically concerning security processes. Upon being made aware of the requirement to cooperate or provide the information, the individual cooperated fully and truthfully; (c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and (d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that contributed to untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur. AG ¶ 17(a) is not established because Applicant did not make a prompt, good-faith effort to correct his concealment before being confronted with the facts. After his February 2024 interview when he was uncooperative, he did not come forth with any information about the incidents at the resort until he responded to DCSA’s Interrogatories on April 30, 2025, which was about one year and two months after the interview. According to the investigator’s report of the interview, the investigator advised Applicant that it was important that he answer questions during the interview and that there were possible 15

consequences if he did not respond. He continued to refuse to answer the investigator’s questions about the incident. Applicant’s refusal to cooperate with the investigator was not caused by advice of legal counsel. AG ¶ 17(b) has no application to either SOR ¶¶ 3.a or 3.b. AG ¶ 17(c) has no application to SOR ¶ 3.a. The concealment was a very significant offense inconsistent with the requirements of security clearance background investigative procedures and casts significant doubt on Applicant’s reliability, trustworthiness, and judgment. AG ¶ 17(c) is only partially established with respect to SOR ¶ 3.b. The 2010 Candy incident was minor and much time has passed since this incident. However, when the 2010 incident is viewed in light of Applicant’s earlier and later criminal incidents, particularly the 2020 Hot Springs Incident, it becomes part of a pattern of behavior that casts doubt on Applicant's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment . AG ¶ 17(d) is not established because Applicant has not acknowledged that his behavior involving the girls in 2010 was inappropriate. He has acknowledged that he was trespassing at the resort in December 2010, however, he obtained no counseling to help him change such irresponsible behavior. Most significantly, Applicant has not provided any mitigating evidence that is sufficient to overcome the disqualification language set forth in AG ¶ 15(b) with respect to his refusal to answer questions at his 2024 Security Interview regarding the 2010 Candy Incident. Whole-Person Concept Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for national security eligibility by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant national security eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I considered the 16

above whole-person factors and the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant’s conduct over the period 2007 through 2024 consists of repeated situations in which he exercised poor judgment and unreliable behavior. In each incident, he made young girls, neighbors, or the police, uncomfortable with his conduct, reflecting a consistent pattern of poor judgment. His refusal to answer the investigator’s questions during a national security eligibility interview is the most recent instance of this kind of behavior and is particularly concerning because it shows an indifference or even a hostility towards national security matters. The offensive language used in his response to the investigator’s questions is also troubling. Most significantly, Applicant’s conduct during his background interview is “normally” disqualifying under AG ¶ 15(b), and Applicant has not shown any mitigation sufficient to treat that incident as other than disqualifying. Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions and doubts as to Applicant’s suitability for national security eligibility and a security clearance. Formal Findings Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline D: Subparagraph 1.a: AGAINST APPLICANT Against Applicant Paragraph 2, Guideline J: Subparagraphs 2.a through 2.e: AGAINST APPLICANT Against Applicant Paragraph 3, Guideline E: Subparagraphs 3.a and 3.b: AGAINST APPLICANT Against Applicant Conclusion In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. John Bayard Glendon Administrative Judge 17