ISCR Case No. 25-01492

______________ ______________ DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS ________________________________ In the matter of: )

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ISCR Case No. 25-01492

) Applicant for Security Clearance ) ___________________________________) Appearances For Government: George Hawkins, Esquire, Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se 09/16/2026 Decision ROSS, Wilford H., Administrative Judge: Applicant mitigated the security concerns under Guideline H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse). Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. Statement of the Case On February 10, 2026, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guideline H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse). The action was taken under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by the DOD on June 8, 2017. Applicant responded to the SOR (Answer) on March 14, 2026, and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was prepared to proceed on March 31, 2026. The case was assigned to me on April 6, 2026. The Defense Office of

Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Notice of Hearing on April 7, 2026. I convened the hearing as scheduled on April 30, 2026. The Government offered Government Exhibits 1 and 2, which were admitted without objection. Applicant testified on his own behalf, called one witness, and submitted Applicant Exhibits A through E, which were admitted without objection. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on May 11, 2026. Findings of Fact Applicant is 32 years old and married. He has a master’s degree in engineering. He has worked for his current defense contractor employer since November 2024 as an engineer. He held government security clearance at a second defense contractor from 2016 to 2018. Applicant did not have national security eligibility between 2018 and 2024 because his employer was not a defense contractor. He currently has national security eligibility. (Government Exhibit 1 at Sections 12, 13A, 17, and 25; Tr. 5-7, 23.) Guideline H: Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse The Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) alleged that Applicant is not eligible for access because he has used illegal drugs. He admitted in part and denied in part SOR allegations 1.a, 1.b, and 1.g under Paragraph 1 with explanations. He admitted SOR allegations 1.c, 1.d, 1.e, 1.f, and 1.h. He denied SOR allegations 1.i and 1.j. Applicant submitted a written statement of intent not to use any illegal drugs or misuse prescription drugs in the future. He also submitted a second written statement confirming that fact and also stating, “Since discontinuing this conduct in late 2024, I have deliberately distanced myself from environments and associations connected with that earlier behavior.” (Applicant Exhibits A and B; Tr. 43.) SOR ¶¶ 1.a and 1.g. Applicant admitted using tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) about 200 times between approximately August 2020 and August 2024. His use was in the form of marijuana gummies. In his e-QIP (Government Exhibit 1) at Section 23 Applicant stated he used THC until January 2025. He testified that this statement was in error and that he did not use any illegal drugs after beginning his current employment because of the classified nature of the work. Applicant purchased the THC gummies from legal retail establishments in his state of residence. He has no intention of using THC in the future. (Government Exhibit 2 at 5, 9, 10, 14-15; Applicant Exhibit A; Tr. 23-32, 40, 47.) SOR ¶¶ 1.b, 1.h, and 1.i. Applicant admitted using Adderall that was not prescribed for him between about March 2020 and January 2024. Applicant was unsure of his total use of Adderall, but the evidence indicates it was between one and ten times during this period. He admitted illegally purchasing Adderall. Applicant has no intention of using Adderall in the future. (Government Exhibit 1 at Section 23; Government Exhibit 2 at 5-6, 9-10, 14-15; Applicant Exhibit A; Tr. 32-36, 40, 47.) 2

SOR ¶¶ 1.c, 1.f, and 1.j. Applicant admitted illegally using ketamine about six times between about November 2022 and October or November 2024. He admitted to illegally purchasing ketamine one time. Applicant has no intention of using ketamine in the future. (Government Exhibit 1 at Section 23; Government Exhibit 2 at 6, 10, 14-15; Applicant Exhibit A; Tr. 36-40, 47.) SOR ¶ 1.d. Applicant admitted illegally using hallucinogenic mushrooms from approximately April 2021 through August 2024 between 10 and 15 times. He has no intention of using hallucinogenic mushrooms in the future. (Government Exhibit 1 at Section 23; Government Exhibit 2 at 6, 14-15; Applicant Exhibit A; Tr. 39-41, 47.) SOR ¶ 1.e. Applicant admitted illegally using lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) one time in November 2021. He has no intention to use LSD in the future. (Government Exhibit 1 at Section 23; Government Exhibit 2 at 6, 14-15; Applicant Exhibit A; Tr. 40, 47.) Applicant was asked about some discrepancies in his responses to drug questions on various forms, versus his testimony. He indicated that the usages described in his testimony were accurate stating, “I wanted to be really cautious not to underrepresent something or such, knowing how important this is.” (Tr. 44, 47.) Mitigation Applicant is a respected and trusted employee and friend. He provided letters of recommendation from his current manager, a former co-worker, and a current co-worker. The current co-worker also testified on Applicant’s behalf. (Applicant Exhibits C, D, and E; Tr. 49-55.) Policies When evaluating an applicant’s national security eligibility for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines (AG) list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant’s national security eligibility. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. The entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. 3

The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires, “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. I have not drawn inferences based on mere speculation or conjecture. Directive ¶ E3.1.14, requires the Government to present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “The applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants national security eligibility. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified or sensitive information. Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “Any determination under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also Executive Order 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information.) Analysis Guideline H: Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse The security concern relating to Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse is set forth in AG ¶ 24: The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of prescription and non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior may lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises questions about a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. Controlled substance means any “controlled substance” as defined in 21 U.S.C. §802. Substance misuse is the generic term adopted in this guideline to describe any of the behaviors listed above. 4

I have examined the disqualifying conditions under AG ¶ 25 and especially considered the following: (a) any substance misuse (see above definition); (c) illegal possession of a controlled substance, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia; and (g) expressed intent to continue drug involvement and substance misuse, or failure to clearly and convincingly commit to discontinue such misuse. All of the stated disqualifying conditions have application to this case. The burden then shifts to Applicant to mitigate them. The following mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 26 have also been considered: (a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and (b) the individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence, including, but not limited to: (1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts; (2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; and (3) providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security eligibility. This decision turns first to Applicant’s minor illegal use and purchase of Adderall without a prescription, ketamine, hallucinogenic mushrooms, as well as his one-time illegal use of LSD. I have specifically considered the illegality of Applicant’s actions, and the timeframe in which they occurred. All of this drug use occurred in the past, from one to five years ago, and each drug was used between one and fifteen times. Applicant acknowledged the poor judgment of his drug use and expressed a credible intent not to use any illegal drugs in the future. In the following THC analysis, I have taken administrative notice of the Security Executive Agent (SecEA) “Clarifying Guidance Concerning Marijuana for Individuals 5

Eligible to Access Classified Information or Eligible to Hold a Sensitive Position,” dated December 21, 2021. (Guidance.) In her Guidance, the SecEA noted the increased number of states that have legalized or decriminalized the use of marijuana and issued the Guidance to “provide clarifying guidance.” She reaffirmed SecEA’s 2014 memorandum regarding the importance of compliance with Federal law on the illegality of the use of marijuana by holders of security clearances. She provided further clarification of Federal marijuana policy, writing that “prior recreational marijuana use by an individual may be relevant to adjudications but [is] not determinative.” She noted that the adjudicative guidelines provided various opportunities for a clearance applicant to mitigate security concerns raised by his or her past use of marijuana. Applicant’s THC use ended more than a year ago. He explained at length that he thoroughly understands the consequences of any future drug use or exposure, and has taken several steps to avoid it. He credibly testified and submitted a written declaration of his intent not to misuse drugs in the future. He also acknowledged that such misuse would be grounds for revocation of national security eligibility. It weighs in Applicant’s favor that he did not use marijuana in any form during his prior employment in the defense industry when he held a security clearance. This shows a clear knowledge of his responsibilities when having national security eligibility. Viewing his THC and other drug use in the context of the whole person, Applicant has mitigated the security significance of his past drug involvement. Security concerns under Guideline H are mitigated. Paragraph 1 is found for Applicant. Whole-Person Concept Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for national security eligibility by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant national security eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Viewing the evidence as a 6

whole, Applicant has presented sufficient evidence to mitigate the security concerns of his now-ended illegal drug use. Formal Findings Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline H: FOR APPLICANT Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.j: For Applicant Conclusion In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. WILFORD H. ROSS Administrative Judge 7