ISCR Case No. 26-00359

___________ ___________ DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: Applicant for Security Clearance ) ) ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 26-00359 Appearances For Government: Brittany C. White, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Alan Edmunds, Esq. 09/28/2026 Decision HARVEY, Mark, Administrative Judge: Guideline E (personal conduct) security concerns are not mitigated. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case On June 3, 2024, Applicant completed a security clearance application (SCA). (Government Exhibit (GE) 1) On April 27, 2026, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) issued a statement of reasons (SOR) to Applicant under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960); Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Directive) (January 2, 1992), as amended; and Security Executive Agent Directive 4, establishing in Appendix A, the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position (AGs), effective June 8, 2017. (Hearing Exhibit (HE) 1) The SOR detailed reasons why DCSA did not find under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant and stated his case would be submitted to an Administrative Judge for a determination whether to grant, deny, or revoke his security clearance.

Specifically, the SOR set forth security concerns arising under Guideline E. (HE 1) On May 6, 2026, Applicant responded to the SOR. (HE 2) On June 29, 2026, Department Counsel was ready to proceed. On July 10, 2026, the case was assigned to me. On July 16, 2026, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a notice scheduling the hearing for August 27, 2026. (HE 3) The hearing was held as scheduled, using the Microsoft Teams video teleconference system. During the hearing, Department Counsel offered nine exhibits; Applicant offered 17 exhibits; and all proffered exhibits were admitted into evidence without objection. (Tr. 17-19. 42-45; GE 1-GE 9; Applicant Exhibit (AE) A-AE Q) On September 21, 2026, DOHA received a copy of the transcript. The record was not held open after the hearing. Some details were excluded to protect Applicant’s right to privacy. Specific information is available in the cited exhibits and transcript. Findings of Fact In Applicant’s SOR response, he admitted the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.a and 1.c, and he denied the allegation in SOR ¶ 1.b. He also provided extenuating and mitigating information. His admissions are accepted as findings of fact. Applicant is a 46-year-old staff development operations engineer, who is an employee of a government contractor. (Tr. 46, 85) He has worked for his current employer off and on for 10 years. (Tr. 46) His current annual salary is about $200,000. (Tr. 47) In 2005, he married, and in July of 2022, he divorced. (Tr. 48; GE 1 at 17) His three children are ages 9, 11, and 13. (Tr. 48) In 1999, he graduated from high school. (Tr. 86) In 2004, he received a bachelor’s degree with a major in computer science and a minor in military science, and in 2010, he received a master’s degree in business administration and management information systems. (Tr. 86, AE B) He served in the Army National Guard (ARNG) from 1998 to 2006, and he r eceived an honorable discharge. (Tr. 86; GE 1 at 14- 15; AE H) He has held a security clearance for 25 years. (Tr. 60) His resume provides additional information about his professional background and experiences. (AE B) Personal Conduct Applicant’s coworker, C, at his employment with company B said he pressured her to spend time with him. (Tr. 63) She was on his team; however, he was not her supervisor. (Tr. 64) Ms. C went on several “team building” social activities with Applicant and others; however, she said during one of the outings, she felt that the conversation with him became too personal, so she subsequently avoided future team-building activities with him outside of work. (Tr. 69-70; GE 8) In April of 2024, Applicant asked Ms. C about her dating life. (Tr. 71) He said he did not realize she was uncomfortable discussing her dates with him. (Tr. 71) For example, he told her he was “lonely.” (Tr. 88) He said, “I miss sexual companionship with females.” (Tr. 88) Ms. C “indicate[d] things to me like she would prefer 2

sex in the morning over the afternoon.” (Tr. 88)1 Applicant said, “I do remember warning her because she had indicated to me that [her boyfriend] was coming into town to stay with her. And I warned her that he might be looking for more if he’s trying to stay the night.” (Tr. 72) Ms. C said on April 24, 2024, Applicant asked her several questions about why she was so cheerful lately and about her relationship with her boyfriend. (GE 7 at 5; GE 8) She reluctantly answered some of his questions about her dating situation. (GE 8) Applicant responded, “Well I guess soon we’ll see what your hair looks like all messed up.” Id. Applicant said he could not remember making this statement to Ms. C. (Tr. 72) On May 2, 2024, Applicant sent an email in which he indicated company B contacted him on April 30, 2024, and told him about a sexual harassment claim that was made against him. (GE 4) He said in his email that he had a friendly relationship with Ms. C; he was aware that she accused others of sexual harassment; and he denied that he sexually harassed her. (GE 4) On May 3, 2024, the contracting officer representative (COR) obtained written statements from three of Applicant’s coworkers. (GE 3) The COR sent the statements to the contracting officer with a request to remove Applicant from the command task order for company B’s contract immediately. (GE 3) The command also requested Applicant’s immediate removal from all access and interim suspension from sensitive compartment information (SCI) access. (GE 3) The term “access” was not defined in the command’s correspondence; however, the term appears to apply to access to the command’s building. At his hearing, Applicant said he worked with Ms. C for about 18 months. (Tr. 34, 51) He said they went “to lunch maybe once a week. We would go hiking. We w ould g o utility terrain vehicle (UTV) riding. Periodically we would go out to, like, a bar

setting together.” (Tr. 50-51) Some of the outings consisted of Applicant and Ms. C without others; however, Applicant did not consider these occasions to be “dates” because they were strictly platonic. (Tr. 89-90) They shared personal cell phone numbers with each other. (Tr. 55) The office had a Christmas party outside of the workplace and barbecues. (Tr. 53) Ms. C never told him that she did not want to accompany him outside the workplace, and he believed they were friends. (Tr. 51-52, 59) In mid-2023, Applicant and a coworker, Mr. S, at company B received counseling from a supervisor, Mr. G, about making inappropriate comments to Ms. C. However, Applicant believed the counseling was primarily directed toward Mr. S because he asked Ms. C for a date. (Tr. 53) On May 1, 2024, Mr. G provided a statement in which he stated he told Applicant and Mr. S that such “behavior would not be tolerated in the workplace . . . [however, Applicant] did not seem to understand and felt the need to further justify his 1 Ms. C’s written statement does not indicate that she disclosed to Applicant any sexual activity or preferences. (GE 8) 3

action.” (GE 5) A few months later, Applicant made a comment to Ms. C about her appearance, and Mr. G told Applicant “not to interact with [Ms. C] other than in a group work setting.” (GE 5) Several months later, Mr. G again told Applicant not to contact Ms. C, except on official matters. (GE 5) After Ms. C made a statement in April of 2024 about Applicant’s behavior towards her, Mr. G stated, “It is my opinion that [Applicant] does show signs of grooming and possible predatory behavior toward the young ladies in our division. I no longer feel comfortable having [him] in the workplace around female employees without [division] leadership direct supervision.” (GE 5) Applicant was never told that he was “barred from the [command] building.” (Tr. 92) He said he was told to telework because there was an accusation, and he was under investigation. (Tr. 90) Applicant said he did not kiss Ms. C or otherwise engage in sexual activity with her. (Tr. 35, 55) He denied that he pressured Ms. C to spend time with him. (Tr. 63) He admitted that he asked female coworkers about their dating lives. (Tr. 73) He understands now that these were inappropriate questions. (Tr. 73) A DCSA special agent, SA P, provided information about Applicant’s February 11, 2026 enhanced interview at his hearing. (Tr. 23-41) Applicant described his friendship with a coworker, Ms. C, in detail. (Tr. 24) Applicant said he and Ms. C had a friendly relationship outside of their office, which included going out to eat with other coworkers and on hikes. (Tr. 31-36) He mentioned the appearance of Ms. C’s hair to Ms. C, implying that it was tousled after sleeping with her boyfriend; and he discussed his own sexual history, and asked Ms. C about her sexual history. (Tr. 24-25) Applicant said Ms. C provided information about her sexual history. (Tr. 25-26) Applicant viewed the counseling from his supervisor as primarily to address Mr. S’s behavior because Mr. S asked Ms. C for a date, and Applicant did not ask her for a date. (Tr. 26) Ms. C declined to go on a date with Mr. S. (GE 9) After the counseling, Applicant made additional inappropriate comments to Ms. C. Applicant lost his employment because his command excluded him from their building, and access to the building was a prerequisite of his employment. (Tr. 27; GE 9) There was no criminal investigation of Applicant. (Tr. 38) SOR ¶ 1.a alleges, and Applicant admitted the following conduct: [O]n about May 9, 2024, your observed/documented behavior was determined to be incongruent with [DOD and command] standards. Specifically, your actions violated the standards with regards to your work ethic, job performance, security and safety. As a result, you were removed from the task order supporting [your command], your SCI Access was suspended and your employer, [company B] had to terminate your employment as your access to [your command] had been revoked. In his SOR response, Applicant stated: [Applicant] was removed from [his command’s] task order following an allegation; however, he was never provided formal written findings, 4

documentation, or a final determination substantiating the alleged violations related to work ethic, performance, security, or safety. His SCI access status was not clearly communicated to him as revoked, and his separation from [company B] was officially documented as a layoff, not a termination for cause, as reflected in his separation letter. No misconduct finding or disciplinary determination was issued by [company B]. (HE 2) Applicant said, [company B] appealed [the military decision to bar him from the building], and they tried to keep me. They did try to find me another position at [the command], but it was unsuccessful.” (Tr. 59) A June 19, 2024 letter from company B’s manager of human resources states, “This letter confirms your discussion with Human Resources that you are being laid off from your employment with [company B] effective June 15, 2024.” (GE 2 at 1) At his hearing, Applicant emphasized he was laid off and not fired from his employment. (Tr. 50, 59) Applicant’s statement, “No misconduct finding or disciplinary determination was issued by [company B]” in his SOR response was based on the absence of a formal notice or finding that he committed misconduct. (Tr. 50-51) SOR ¶ 1.b alleges, and Applicant denied the following conduct: You falsified material facts on [an SCA], executed by you on June 3, 2024, in response to “Section 13A - Employment Activities [company B] Summary of Discipline and Warnings Do you have another instance of discipline or a warning to provide?” You answered “No” and deliberately failed to disclose that you had been placed on telework as of April 30, 2024, pending a review of complaints that led to your SCI Access at [your command] to be suspended. In his SOR response, Applicant stated: [Applicant] acknowledges that the information regarding the telework status was not included in the SF-86; however, he did not intentionally falsify or deliberately omit material facts. At the time he completed the SF-86 on June 3, 2024, he had not been formally disciplined, issued a written warning, or separated from employment, and remained in a temporary, unresolved employment status while the matter was under review. The absence of formal documentation and clear guidance regarding whether the telework status constituted a reportable “discipline or warning” contributed significantly to his misunderstanding of the reporting requirement. [Applicant] later acknowledged during the [counterintelligence (CI)] process that he should have erred on the side of full disclosure and takes responsibility for that omission. (HE 2) Applicant’s SCA asked the following question about his employment at company B, “For this employment, in the last seven (7) years have you received a written warning, been officially reprimanded, suspended, or disciplined for misconduct in the workplace, 5

such as a violation of security policy?” (GE 1 at 10) Applicant answered, “Yes,” and disclosed in April 2024, he accidentally brought a phone into his command’s building, and he immediately disclosed his mistake to security. Id. at 11. The next question was, “Do you have another instance of discipline or a warning to provide?”, and Applicant answered, “No.” Id. He said he did not receive any disciplinary action for bringing his phone into the command’s building. (Tr. 79) At Applicant’s hearing, he said that he had completed about four SCAs during his career and had about four background interviews. (Tr. 61) On April 30, 2024, company B told Applicant that he was placed on telework because “There’s a work conduct situation that they’re evaluating.” (Tr. 62, 76) He assumed the telework was related to his conduct with Ms. C because she was absent from the workplace. (Tr. 77) At the time he completed his SCA, he was still working for company B. (Tr. 77) As for reporting the removal on his SCA, he said, “I misunderstood whether it was reportable because the situation was unresolved and undocumented, and I hadn’t received a formal employment action.” (Tr. 55-56) SOR ¶ 1.c alleges, and Applicant admitted the following conduct: On about February 11, 2026, during an interview with an authorized investigator with the [DCSA], you admitted to omitting material facts as set forth in subparagraph 1.a above on an SCA, executed by you on June 3, 2024, because you were fearful it would prevent you from getting a job. Applicant’s employer supported a military command, and the military command said Applicant could not enter their building because he had inappropriate contacts with a coworker. (Tr. 37-38) Company B, in turn, released him from his employment. (Tr. 27; GE 2 at 1; GE 9) The February 11, 2026 DCSA summary of interview included Applicant’s comprehensive statement about his relationships and conversations with female coworkers, counseling by his supervisor, and his being barred from the building where his command was located. (GE 9) Applicant verified the accuracy of the DCSA summaries of interviews, on February 11 and 19, 2026, and he provided information about his mental state during the DCSA interviews. (AE F) The DCSA summary of interview states: Subject was asked why he didn’t report his security incident/sexual harassment on his security questionnaire. Subject initially didn’t realize he was required to report it, but when read the question directly from the questionnaire, Subject explained he omitted this information because he was fearful it would prevent him from getting the job. When asked directly if the omission was an intentional effort to secure the position, Subject answered yes. Subject also stated he did not mention the incident during his interview with [his future at the time employer (N)] for the same reason, confirming he was afraid he would not be hired. Subject felt remorseful for 6

not listing this incident and stated several times he doesn’t understand why he didn’t list it. (GE 9 at 4) In his SOR response, Applicant stated: During the February 11, 2026, interview, [Applicant] acknowledged that concern about potential employment impact was a factor in his decision- making; however, it was not the sole or primary reason for the omission. His statements reflected his recollection under stress while attempting to accurately describe events that occurred during a period of uncertainty. The primary contributing factor to the omission was confusion regarding reporting requirements, given the absence of formal discipline, documentation, or a clearly defined employment action at the time of the SF-86 submission. [Applicant] later clarified that the situation was stressful and that he was not thinking clearly due to the uncertainty and lack of understanding at the time (also noted by the interviewer). He has since accepted full responsibility for the omission and taken steps to ensure complete future compliance. (HE 2) Applicant’s February 19, 2026 DCSA summary of interview states: Subject stated he had some questions he wanted clarified. Subject stated he felt guilt the moment he stepped into the interview room and he was “purposely backed into a corner”. Subject claimed he failed to report the incident on his security form and during his interview with [company N] because he was unaware of the requirement to do so. Subject was reminded this contradicted his TESI interview, where he stated he omitted the incident out of fear it would cost him the job. Subject denied ever saying that and reiterated he didn’t report the incident on his form or to [company N] because he wasn’t aware of the requirements to do so. (GE 9 at 6 (emphasis added)) At his hearing, Applicant reiterated his SOR response to SOR ¶ 1.c. (Tr. 57-58) SA P said in a follow-up DCSA interview on February 19, 2026, that Applicant stated to her: [H]e didn’t know that he was supposed to list his incident on the [SCA]. And I said to him that that contradicts what you shared with us during the interview. And then he became very upset, and he started accusing myself and the other investigator of being basically biased. . . . And then he became very upset, and he was yelling. And I said, “I no longer feel comfortable in this conversation.” (Tr. 28-29) Applicant said that he told SA P in the February 19, 2026 interview that he omitted the information about being on telework for five weeks because he was fearful it would 7

prevent him from getting a job. (Tr. 81, 83) He also told SA P that fear of loss of employment was not the only factor for his failure to disclose the information about the telework on his SCA. (Tr. 82) He told SA P the other two factors were that he “was unsure about reporting requirements due to the timing,” and he was in a stressful situation. (Tr. 84-85) His primary reason for not disclosing the employment issue was that he “misunderstood what was being required to report.” (Tr. 85) Applicant made the following closing statement: I want to close by taking responsibility for the mistakes that brought me here, while also asking that they be considered in their full context. In 2024, I was removed from [a DOD] contract following an allegation, but I was never provided a formal finding or final determination explaining exactly what had been substantiated. I received no disciplinary action from [company B] or [DOD], and [company B] continued trying to place me in another position before ultimately laying me off. At the time I had completed my SF-86, I was still employed, and the situation was unresolved. I did not clearly understand what had occurred, or what my reporting obligation was. I want to be clear that uncertainty does not excuse me from omission, I should have contacted my security office and asked before completing the form, and I accept responsibility for doing that -- for not doing that, I’m sorry. Concern about future employment was a factor, and I do not deny that, but it was not the entire explanation. I was under a significant amount of stress, and I did not fully understand the allegation or its status. And I made the wrong reporting judgment. . . . Even in February 2026, when I did the CI interview, I documented that I still hadn’t received the formal documentation describing the outcome or the statements against me. I didn’t actually see the allegations and supporting statements until about a month ago, more than two years after the incident had occurred. This experience has fundamentally changed the way I approach both security reporting and professional conduct. I understand that when there is any uncertainty, I do not make reporting determination[s] myself. I contact security, and I disclose the circumstances, and I ask for guidance. I have also learned that professional boundaries must remain clear, regardless of friendship or regardless of my intent. I would ask the [Administrative Judge] to please consider these events against the entirety of my 25-year career. This is not part of a continuing pattern of dishonesty or security misconduct. I reflected on my actions, and I accept responsibility. I’ve completed additional training. I have changed my professional practices and demonstrated since then, when I recognize a security concern, I will report it. I cannot change the decisions I made in 2024, but I can demonstrate what I’ve learned from them. I believe my record, my corrective actions, and my conduct since these events 8

demonstrate that I can be trusted to exercise the judgment, candor, and responsibility expected of a clear professional. I respectfully ask the [Administrative Judge] to consider the whole-person concept and allow me the opportunity to continue to serve our country in that capacity. (Tr. 93-95) Character Evidence Applicant received multiple cash awards for his excellent work performance and contributions to employer N. (AE C) He received outstanding performance evaluations from his current employer. (AE C) The general sense of five character statements from coworkers is that Applicant is professional, diligent, responsible, loyal, respectful, trustworthy, and mission focused. (AE L-AE P) Policies The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion of the Executive Branch in regulating access to information pertaining to national security emphasizing, “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicant eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended. Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, nothing in an unfavorable decision should be construed to suggest that it is based on any express or implied determination about an applicant’s allegiance, loyalty, or patriotism. An unfavorable decision is merely an indication the applicant has not met the 9

strict guidelines the President, Secretary of Defense, and Director of National Intelligence have established for issuing a clearance. Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996). Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant “has the ultimate b urden of demonstrating t hat it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his [or her] security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). The burden of disproving a mitigating condition never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02- 31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sept. 22, 2005). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b). Analysis Personal Conduct AG ¶ 15 explains why personal conduct is a security concern, stating: Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other failure to cooperate with the security clearance process. . . . AG ¶ 16 provides personal conduct conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying in this case: (a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine national security eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities; and 10

(d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available information, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the individual may not properly safeguard classified or sensitive information. This includes, but is not limited to, consideration of: (1) untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of client confidentiality, release of proprietary information, unauthorized release of sensitive corporate or government protected information; (2) any disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior; (3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations; and (4) evidence of significant misuse of Government or other employer’s time or resources. AG ¶ 16(a) applies to Applicant’s false statement alleged in SOR ¶ 1.b. AG ¶ 16(d) applies to Applicant’s use of inappropriate and unprofessional language in the workplace to Ms. C alleged in SOR ¶ 1.a. SOR ¶ 1.c alleges, and Applicant admitted the following conduct: On about February 11, 2026, during an interview with an authorized investigator with the [DCSA], you admitted to omitting material facts as set forth in subparagraph 1.a above on an SCA, executed by you on June 3, 2024, because you were fearful it would prevent you from getting a job. Applicant made a

n honest statement on February 11, 2026, to the DCSA investigator about why he omitted information from his SCA concerning his being under investigation and receiving adverse action, and this honest statement does not raise a security concern. SOR ¶ 1.c corroborates SOR ¶ 1.b; however, it does not independently raise a security concern. SOR ¶ 1.c is refuted. Further details concerning SOR ¶¶ 1.a and 1.b will be discussed in the disqualification and mitigation analysis, infra. AG ¶ 17 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns in this case: (a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts; (b) the refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was caused or significantly contributed to by advice of legal counsel or of a person with professional responsibilities for advising or instructing the individual specifically concerning security processes. Upon being made aware of the 11

requirement to cooperate or provide the information, the individual cooperated fully and truthfully; (c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; (d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that contributed to untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur; (e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress; and (f) the information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable reliability. The Appeal Board in ISCR Case No. 10-04641 at 4 (App. Bd. Sept. 24, 2013) explained Applicant’s responsibility for proving the applicability of mitigating conditions as follows: Once a concern arises regarding an applicant’s security clearance eligibility, there is a strong presumption against the grant or maintenance of a security clearance. See Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991). After the Government presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut or mitigate those concerns. See Directive ¶ E3.1.15. The standard applicable in security clearance decisions is that articulated in Egan, supra. “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” Directive, Encl. 2 ¶ 2(b). Discussion of Disqualifying and Mitigating Conditions Applicant admitted that he made inappropriate comments in the workplace to Ms. C when he discussed his own relationships with women and asked Ms. C about her relationships with men. I find that he made the comment to Ms. C that her hair might be messed up in the morning in the context of asking about her boyfriend, and he falsely stated at the hearing that he could not remember whether he made this comment or a similar comment to Ms. C. Applicant’s February 19, 2026 summary of interview states: Subject stated he had some questions he wanted clarified. Subject stated he felt guilt the moment he stepped into the interview room and he was 12

“purposely backed into a corner”. Subject claimed he f ailed to report the incident on his security form and during his interview with [company N] because he was unaware of the requirement to do so. Subject was reminded this contradicted his TESI interview, where he stated he omitted the incident out of fear it would cost him the job. Subject denied ever saying that and reiterated he didn’t report the incident on his form or to [company N] because he wasn’t aware of the requirements to do so. (GE 9 at 6 (emphasis added)) On February 19, 2026, Applicant’s falsely denied that he stated during his February 11, 2026 DCSA interview about intentionally omitting the information concerning his improper behavior at company B because of employment concerns. His false statement to the DCSA investigator on February 19, 2026, and his false claim that he could not remember making the comment about Ms. C’s hair, will not be considered for disqualification purposes. However, they will be considered in the credibility, mitigation, and whole-person assessments. Applicant’s SCA asked the following question about his employment at company B, “For this employment, in the last seven (7) years have you received a written warning, been officially reprimanded, suspended, or disciplined for misconduct in the workplace, such as a violation of security policy?” (GE 1 at 10) After Applicant reported one incident of accidentally bringing his phone into a building where phones were not permitted, the next question was, “Do you have another instance of discipline or a warning to provide?” He failed to disclose that he was under investigation and had been placed on telework because the command the contractor was supporting wanted him not to return to the command’s workplace. He was aware that he was under investigation because of his comments to Ms. C. Applicant said he did not report the information because he was worried about his employment, and he said, “I misunderstood whether it was reportable because the situation was unresolved and undocumented, and I hadn’t received a formal employment action.” (Tr. 55-56) “Applicant’s statements about his intent and state of mind when [he] executed his Security Clearance Application were relevant evidence, but they [are] not binding on the Administrative Judge.” ISCR Case No. 04-09488 at 2 (App. Bd. Nov. 29, 2006) (citation omitted). In ADP Case No. 17-03932 at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 14, 2019), the Appeal Board recognized the importance of circumstantial evidence of intent in falsification cases: When evaluating the deliberate nature of an alleged falsification, a Judge should consider the applicant’s mens rea in light of the entirety of the record evidence. See, e.g., ADP Case No. 15-07979 at 5 (App. Bd. May 30, 2017). As a practical matter, a finding regarding an applicant’s intent or state of mind may not always be based on an applicant’s statements, but rather may rely on circumstantial evidence. Id. 13

At his hearing, Applicant said when he completed his SCA, he knew the allegations of using inappropriate language in the workplace were under investigation but unresolved; he was under stress; and he did not understand the reporting requirement. Ultimately, he did not receive adverse action from his employer. The SCA’s questions clearly seek information about adverse employment actions, including suspensions from duties. Applicant was suspended from entering the command’s workplace at the time he completed the SCA. He was well aware that he made inappropriate unprofessional comments to Ms. C. The investigation did not exonerate him from making inappropriate comments to Ms. C. His employer did not indicate his position was unnecessary under the contract or that the command terminated the contract. The Appeal Board has “frequently noted that a security clearance adjudication is not the place to split hairs or to engage in the parsing of words.” ISCR Case No. 25-00811 at 6 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2026). He had an obligation to fully and frankly disclose the suspension and the basis for the suspension on his SCA. He violated this obligation because he was worried it might harm his future employment. In ISCR Case No. 24-00278 at 3 (App. Bd. Jan. 14, 2026) (emphasis in original), the Appeal Board stated: The Directive is clear that an applicant’s failure to respond truthfully and candidly during a national security investigation is of special concern, specifically stating that the “refusal to provide full, frank, and truthful answers to lawful questions of investigators, security officials, or other official representatives” in connection with an investigation and adjudication will normally result in an unfavorable eligibility determination. Directive ¶ 6.2; AG ¶ 15. . . . A person holding a security clearance has a duty to fully disclose conduct of security concern, and the record supports a conclusion that Applicant failed in this regard. Moreover, the Appeal Board has stated, “In cases involving the deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of material information, an applicant has a “’heavy burden in demonstrating evidence of reform, rehabilitation, or changed circumstances sufficient to justify a conclusion that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant him access to classified information.’” ISCR Case No. 24-01331 at 7 (App. Bd. Aug. 14, 2026) (citation omitted). None of the mitigating conditions fully apply. I find that Applicant made inappropriate comments to Ms. C, and he intentionally failed to disclose on his SCA that his suspension from working in the command’s building was due to his being under investigation for making inappropriate comments to Ms. C. These actions continue to cast doubt on his reliability, trustworthiness, and good judgment. Personal conduct security concerns are not mitigated. 14

Whole-Person Concept Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. Under AG ¶ 2(c), “[t]he ultimate determination” of whether to grant a security clearance “must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines” and the whole-person concept. My comments under Guideline E are incorporated in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(d) were addressed under that guideline but some warrant additional comment. Applicant is a 46-year-old staff development operations engineer, who is an employee of a government contractor. He has worked for his current employer off and on for 10 years. In 2004, he received a bachelor’s degree with a major in computer science and a minor in military science, and in 2010, he received a master’s degree in business in administration and management information systems. He served in the ARNG from 1998 to 2006, and he received an honorable discharge. He has held a security clearance for 25 years. His resume provides additional information about his professional background and experiences. Applicant received multiple cash awards for his excellent work performance and contributions to company B. He received outstanding performance evaluations from his current employer. The general sense of five character statements from coworkers is that Applicant is professional, diligent, responsible, loyal, respectful, trustworthy, and mission focused. The evidence supporting denial of Applicant’s security clearance is detailed in the personal conduct section, supra, and this evidence is more persuasive than the evidence of mitigation. It is well settled that once a concern arises regarding an applicant’s security clearance eligibility, there is a strong presumption against granting a security clearance. See Dorfmont, 913 F.2d at 1401. “[A] favorable clearance decision means that the record discloses no basis for doubt about an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified 15

______________________ information.” ISCR Case No. 18-02085 at 7 (App. Bd. Jan. 3, 2020) (citing ISCR Case No.12-00270 at 3 (App. Bd. Jan. 17, 2014)). I have carefully applied the law, as set forth in Egan, Dorfmont, Exec. Or. 10865, the Directive, the AGs, and the Appeal Board’s jurisprudence to the facts and circumstances in the context of the whole person. Applicant failed to mitigate personal conduct security concerns. Formal Findings Formal findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraphs 1.a and 1.b: Against Applicant Subparagraph 1.c:

For Applicant Conclusion I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the interests of national security of the United States to grant or continue Applicant’s national security eligibility for access to classified information. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Mark Harvey Administrative Judge 16