ISCR Case No. 26-00468

________ ________ DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: Applicant for Security Clearance ) ) ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 26-00468 Appearances For Government: William H. Miller, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se 10/01/2026 Decision HARVEY, Mark, Administrative Judge: Security concerns arising under Guidelines E (personal conduct) and J (criminal conduct) are not mitigated. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA) on August 20, 2023. (Government Exhibit (GE 1)) On May 1, 2026, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under Guidelines E and J. (Hearing Exhibit (HE) 1) The DCSA acted under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated in Security Executive Agent Directive 4, National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (December 10, 2016), which became effective on June 8, 2017. On May 6, 2026, Applicant answered the SOR. (HE 2) On June 29, 2026, Department Counsel requested a hearing. (Tr. 14) On July 14, 2026, Department Counsel was ready to proceed, and on July 22, 2026, the case was assigned to me.

On August 4, 2026, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) notified Applicant that his hearing was scheduled to be conducted by video teleconference on September 3, 2026. (HE 3) The hearing was convened as scheduled. Department Counsel offered four exhibits; Applicant offered one exhibit; and all proffered exhibits were admitted into evidence without objection. (Tr. 12, 17-19; GE 1-GE 4; Applicant Exhibit (AE) A (11 pages)) On September 21, 2026, DOHA received the transcript of the hearing. The record did not remain open after the hearing. Statement of Facts In Applicant’s answer to the SOR, he admitted the allegation in SOR ¶ 1.a. He denied the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.b, 2.a, and 2.b. His admission is accepted as a finding of fact. He also provided extenuating and mitigating information. (HE 2) Applicant is a 70-year-old engineer, who has worked for his current employer since September 2024. (Tr. 6, 10; AE A at 2-4) In 1974, he graduated from high school, and in 1981, he was awarded a bachelor’s degree. (Tr. 7; AE A at 4) In 1980, he was married, and in 1989, he was divorced. (Tr. 7) In 2000, he married, and his son is 49 years old. (Tr. 8) He served in the Army from 1974 through 1976, and he left the Army as a private (E-1). (Tr. 8) At his hearing, he stated: I was a bit of a discipline problem back in those days. All I can say is just a rebel without a cause, a young man with very little self-discipline. I had no problems at all telling somebody when I thought they were wrong, even if they were my superior officer. Not a good choice. (Tr. 9) Applicant received some nonjudicial punishment while he was in the Army, and he was administratively discharged because of his involvement with illegal drugs. (Tr. 9) He received an honorable discharge. (GE 1 at 12) Personal Conduct SOR ¶ 1.a alleges, and Applicant admitted that in about December 2019, he was terminated from his employment for bringing a handgun to work and leaving it in an employee bathroom. (HE 2) Applicant said about 10 or 12 years ago, he and his spouse went to a gun store, and she purchased a .45 caliber pistol. (Tr. 49-50) In December 2019, he did not ask her permission to take her firearm. (Tr. 51) He described his possession of this firearm as follows: I kept it in the car, started in early December of that year. And I would [normally not] carry it with me. I kept it in the car. I only took it out of the car 2

to bring it into the house when I got home. And then from the house back out to the car whenever I left. (Tr. 25 (emphasis added)) At his hearing, Applicant said in mid December 2019, he put a loaded .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol in his coat pocket, and he drove to work, through his employer’s gate, and he parked inside the fence outside of his workplace. (Tr. 22-24) A round was probably not chambered because typically he does not carry a firearm with a round chambered. (Tr. 23) He forgot the firearm was in his pocket when he went into his workplace building. (Tr. 25) When he went into the bathroom at work, he took out the firearm and set it down in a stall. (Tr. 24, 27) He accidentally left it in the restroom, and he went home without retrieving his firearm from the restroom. On December 12, 2019, a security officer reported that Applicant was at the gate and needed to report the loss of his firearm. (GE 3 at 1) The security report states: Applicant informed me he had brought the weapon in by accident in [the] morning while half asleep. When he went to the restroom the weapon either fell out or was removed and forgotten by [Applicant]. When he realized he had misplaced it, he immediately returned to the restroom to remove the weapon to his vehicle. By the time he arrived back at the restroom the weapon had already been found and removed to the custody of the security team. . . . While discussing this [Applicant] mentioned the weapon belonged to his wife and was still registered to her. He also told me he had been thinking of coming forward since he first lost the weapon. He said he knew this would be a negative impact on his job. [He] also stated multiple times he had meant no harm nor had any ill intent with the weapon and that the incident was due to carelessness on his part. (GE 3 at 1) SOR ¶ 1.b alleges that information described in SOR ¶¶ 2.a. and 2.b., infra. In his SOR response, Applicant stated: I genuinely believed [I had] legitimate concerns for my safety at work due to significant security failures. So in June of 2019 I started carrying a firearm in my car. I decided a lawyer could get me out of jail faster than a priest could get me out of a graveyard. At home I took the gun i nside the house so if the car was broken into it couldn’t be stolen. But I did not like the situation at all and that same month of 2019 I turned in my notice to resign. My carrying the gun onto company property was unintentional and I fully attempted to r etrieve it solely for the purposes of returning it to my car. That same day I returned to [my employer’s workplace] and announced to Security the gun was mine. I did not try to hide or deny it or lie about it. I stood up and took personal responsibility for my actions. I think that alone says a lot about my general character as well as lack of criminal intent. And 3

I have not carried a gun since then. I regret how things turned out but no one around me was ever in any danger – family, neighbors, co-workers, etc. My motivation was strictly self defense. And, no legal action was taken against me over it by the state. I like to think it’s because they realized there was no real threat to anyone. Actually I don’t know for a fact that [my employer] even informed the investigating agent(s) why my employment was terminated. I volunteered that myself just so everyone would know I’m not trying to lie about or hide anything. Potentially I could have just said nothing about it and hoped no one found out but I didn’t. . . . By voluntarily stepping forward and admitting my actions I submit this shows a willingness on my part to protect [classified] information by reporting any actual or potential breeches even if I was the cause of it. I’m not the kind of person who would stay quiet and hope it all just blows over. (HE 2 (emphasis added)) At his hearing, Applicant said that from June 2019 to December 2019, he frequently traveled with a firearm in the glovebox of his vehicle from home to work and then back to his home. (Tr. 26-27) The glovebox of his vehicle does not have a lock. (Tr. 27) In 2019, he was violating state law because he did not have a concealed-carry permit to have a firearm in his vehicle. (Tr. 27) Applicant’s January 16, 2024 Office of Personnel Management (OPM) summary of interview states: Subject frequently carried a handgun for personal protection while he was not working. Subject advised that security at [his employer] was subpar at best and due to terrorist activities that had been in the news he feared that someone would target his workplace. He had two felony convictions in the 1970s, he was aware that he was not supposed to be carrying a weapon. The handgun that he carried was registered to his spouse. Subject never took the weapon into his workplace. He always locked it in his glovebox before he got out of his vehicle. In 12/2019, subject went to work as normal. After settling in his office subject went to the restroom. At that time subject realized that he had forgotten to take the gun from the waistband of his pants and the 45 caliber handgun was still in his possession. Subject planned to immediately take the gun to his car when he was done in the bathroom. He placed the gun on the toilet paper dispenser and [when he] left he forgot to pick it up. (GE 4 at 5-6 (emphasis added)) At his hearing, Applicant said the summary of interview incorrectly states the firearm was in his waistband, and it was in his coat pocket not his waistband. (Tr. 28-30) The summary also states that “Subject frequently carried a handgun for personal protection while he was not working,” GE 4 at 5, and what he meant was that he carries 4

a firearm while walking behind the house in a forest because of dangerous reptiles living behind his house. (Tr. 38) He said the firearm he carries is a black-powder flintlock, which is a cap-and-ball antique. (Tr. 39) He occasionally put his .45 caliber pistol in his glovebox of his vehicle for personal protection during the June 2019 into December 2019 timeframe. (Tr. 39-41) He occasionally had it in his vehicle when he went shopping in addition to taking it on drives to work. (Tr. 39) Applicant believed he was permitted to possess a firearm inside his employer’s fenced-in area in a locked vehicle. (Tr. 34-36) However, he did not provide a copy of his employer’s policy authorizing employee firearms in this area. He acknowledged that employees in 2019 were prohibited from possession of privately-owned firearms in his employer’s building. (Tr. 35-36) On December 14, 2019, security advised Applicant that his employment was terminated. (Tr. 37) His employer did not return his .45 caliber pistol to him. (Tr. 49) Applicant’s spouse keeps several unloaded firearms, such as shotguns and a Draco (similar to a mini-AK-47), in her closet. (Tr. 52-53) Applicant showed her how to load and shoot them. (Tr. 52) He did not describe how he showed her to load and shoot them without personally possessing the firearms during her training. He denied that he ever had “possession” of those weapons. (Tr. 53) Criminal Conduct SOR ¶ 2.a alleges that until at least December 2019, and in violation of state law, Applicant possessed a handgun as a convicted violent felon. SOR ¶ 2.b alleges until at least January 2024, and in violation of state law, Applicant possessed firearms as a convicted violent felon. In his SOR response for ¶¶ 2.a and 2.b, Applicant stated: Yes I was in possession of a handgun for a very short period of time in 2019, but my original conviction was in 1978 – 41 years earlier during which I did NOT possess a firearm I was prohibited from possessing. The way the statement in the reasons page is worded makes it sound as though I owned and carried guns since 1978 until 2019 and I did not. A few months in 2019 only (after 41 years) and then I kept it in the car except for that one unintentional event. I believe the situation needs to be considered in context. . . . I have not owned or possessed firearms since 1978 – with the single exception in 2019 noted in Guideline E. My wife owns several modern firearms but they are in her possession, not mine. My wife is not prohibited from owning guns. [The law in my state] allows convicted felons to possess antique muzzle loaders and replicas whose original design dates before 1898 which is all I possessed from 1978 until 2019 and from 2019 to the present. So the statement: “Until at least January 2024, and in violation of 5

state law, you possessed firearms as a convicted violent felon”. Is entirely incorrect. All my firearms are antique muzzle loaders and I do not carry them in public. In fact I only take them off my personal property to practice at a local free public shooting range. With the exception stated in Guideline E, I have possessed no firearms prohibited by state law in the past 47 years. (HE 2) 1978 burglary offenses Applicant’s January 16, 2024 OPM summary of interview states: Subject believes he went to court in about 01/1979. He was found guilty of two felony counts of burglary. He does not recall any type of larceny being included in his charges. He does not know why his record would reflect larceny rather than burglary. The value of all items stolen was approximated to be about $10,000. Subject was sentenced to three years in prison, suspended. For 90 days, subject worked during the day and spent evenings and nights in the County jail. Subject was also ordered to be on probation for three years starting after his 90 day release. Subject also had to pay about $2,000 or $3,000 in restitution. About one year after subject began his probation, his restitution was fully paid. Once the restitution was completely resolved, it was recommended that subject be released from his ordered three years' probation. The court approved the request and subject was released from probation approximately two years early. After his 90 days spending every night in the county jail, subject returned to college where he finished his degree. This is the only time anything like this has ever happened. Subject admits that he was young and immature and made a very bad decision. Subject hung out with the wrong people and agreed to participate in activities that have had a lifelong impact. Subject learned his lesson and has not repeated this type of activity again. Subject accepted responsibility for his choices and showed remorse for his bad decisions. Subject has not had any other issues since this time. This incident took place a very long time ago with no repeated offenses. (GE 4 at 8-9) At his hearing, Applicant said in August of 1978, he was arrested for two first- degree burglary offenses. (Tr. 44-45) He pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree burglary. Applicant provided the 2017 version of Chapter 569 Section 569.160, Burglary in the first degree. This statute states: 6

A person commits the offense of burglary in the first degree if he or she knowingly enters unlawfully or knowingly remains unlawfully in a building or inhabitable structure for the purpose of committing an offense therein, and when in effecting entry or while in the building or inhabitable structure or in immediate flight therefrom, the person or another participant in the offense: (1) Is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon; or (2) Causes or threatens immediate physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or (3) There is present in the structure another person who is not a participant in the crime. The offense of burglary in the first degree is a class B felony. (AE A at 10) This statute was passed in 1977; however, it might not have been in effect at time of Applicant’s burglaries. Applicant did not provide the predecessor version of this statute, which was probably in effect when the burglaries occurred. Under the predecessor statute to Section 569.160, the presence of another person other than the perpetrators during a burglary is necessary for first degree burglary under Rev. Stat. § 560.040 (1969). See State v. Darris, 587 S.W.2d 89, 91 (E.D. Mo. 1979); State v. Murphy, 508 S.W.2d 269, 275 (Mo. App. 1974). Section 569.160 likely replaced Section 560.040. The record evidence does not clearly indicate the statute he violated in about 1978, or the elements of that burglary offense. Applicant’s admission that he pleaded guilty to two first-degree burglary offenses makes additional inquiry about the statute in effect unnecessary. Applicant said, “none of the 3 conditions” in Section 569.160 (1977) applied to his conduct. (Tr. 45) “There was no violence involved. There were no weapons involved.” (Tr. 45; AE A at 10) He denied that any “third parties were present at any time.” (AE A at 10) He said at the time of the adjudication of the burglary offense, he did not understand that first-degree burglary included the elements (1) through (3). (Tr. 45) 2019 possession of a firearm by a person with a felony conviction Applicant was aware that when he possessed a firearm in 2019, he was in violation of state and federal law because of his two felony convictions. (Tr. 43, 47, 57) Notwithstanding this awareness, he said, “Well, sir, obeying the letter of the law wouldn’t do me any good if I was dead.” (Tr. 47) He said: [M]y justification at the time for that was I had no criminal intent in my mind at all. It was purely for self-defense if absolutely needed. It just, it made me feel personally safer. But it’s not like I had a grudge against anybody, or I was, you know, feelings of anger or anything. I had no intentions of using that thing to harm anybody unless they tried to harm me first. It was, I was prohibited. I’m not denying that. That is correct. I’m just pointing out that my motivation was not criminal. The act itself was, but the motivation was not. (Tr. 44) 7

Applicant has not applied for a pardon for his two felonies. (Tr. 47) He said under federal law he is permitted to and does “hunt with black powder, antiques, flintlocks,” and muzzle loaders. (Tr. 48) He also uses them for target shooting. (Tr. 48) Convicted felons are permitted to possess replicas of such firearms. (Tr. 48-49) To qualify for the exception, the replica must be of a firearm that was made prior to 1898. (Tr. 60) Applicant said he might not have violated state law in 2019 when he was possessing a firearm because “[M]y understanding of [state law in his state of residence] is that a person could carry a handgun concealed without a permit if they felt their life was in immediate danger”; however, he acknowledged that the prohibition from possession of a firearm for a person with a felony conviction might apply. (Tr. 57) Title 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) states, “(g) It shall be unlawful for any person—(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. . . . to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” Violations are subject to fines and imprisonment up to 10 years. Exceptions to the prohibitions against possession of firearms by felons include antiques and replicas as described by Applicant. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(3), (16). Character Evidence Applicant received an excellent performance evaluation for 2025 to 2026. (AE A at 6-8) His manager from 2016 to 2018 stated: [Applicant] was an excellent employee, and he was generally my go to person for complex tasks that required an exceptionally high level of technical expertise and organization. His [skills] were utilized by our company to streamline operations in support of continuous improvement and business needs, and he routinely mentored less-experienced engineers to increase their engineering skillset and awareness of our internal processes. [He] possesses excellent [programming] skills and was our subject matter expert for programming, statistics, adhesive and foam technologies. [He] was always willing to take on unique task assignments, small or large; short duration or long. This made him an extremely vital asset to my team, and he significantly contributed to its success. I highly recommend [him] for employment consideration with any team. (AE A at 5) Applicant’s current manager stated: During his time with our organization, [Applicant] has demonstrated consistent reliability and dependability. He reports to work as scheduled, performs his assigned duties as expected, though the lack of a final 8

clearance has reduced his effectiveness. He can be relied upon to carry out his responsibilities without requiring undue supervision. [Applicant] conducts himself in a professional and respectful manner and maintains appropriate working relationships with coworkers and supervisors. To my knowledge, he has not been a source of workplace conflict or disruption and has contributed to a stable and professional work environment. Based on my experience supervising him, I consider [Applicant] to be a dependable and responsible employee. I am pleased to provide this statement in support of his background investigation and security clearance review. (AE A at 9) Policies The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion of the Executive Branch in regulating access to information pertaining to national security emphasizing, “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to “control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy” to have access to such information. Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended. Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, this decision should not be construed to suggest that it is based, in whole or in part, on any express or implied determination about applicant’s allegiance, loyalty, or 9

patriotism. It is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President, Secretary of Defense, and Director of National Intelligence have established for issuing a clearance. Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996). Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his [or her] security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). The burden of disproving a mitigating condition never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02- 31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b). Analysis Criminal Conduct AG ¶ 30 provides the security concern arising from criminal conduct stating, “Criminal activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its very nature, it calls into question a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations.” AG ¶ 31 lists conditions that could raise a criminal conduct security concern and may be disqualifying in this case: (a) a pattern of minor offenses, any one of which on its own would be unlikely to affect a national security eligibility decision, but which in combination cast doubt on the individual's judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness; and (b) evidence (including, but not limited to, a credible allegation, an admission, and matters of official record) of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the individual was formally charged, prosecuted, or convicted. 10

SOR ¶ 2.a alleges that until at least December 2019, and in violation of state law, Applicant possessed a handgun as a convicted violent felon. AG ¶ 31(a) is not established because his violations of state law in 2019 are not minor offenses. AG ¶ 31(b) is established by his admissions. SOR ¶ 2.b alleges until at least January 2024, and in violation of state law, Applicant possessed firearms as a convicted violent felon. Applicant denied SOR ¶ 2.b because he limited his firearm possessions after December 2019 to black-powder antique replicas, which are excepted from the restrictions against felons possessing firearms. There is no evidence contradicting Applicant’s statement. Applicant has refuted SOR ¶ 2.b, and SOR ¶ 2.b is mitigated. Additional discussion of the disqualifying conditions is in the mitigating section infra. AG ¶ 32 lists conditions that could mitigate criminal conduct security concerns: (a) so much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior happened, or it happened under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; (b) the individual was pressured or coerced into committing the act and those pressures are no longer present in the person’s life; (c) no reliable evidence to support that the individual committed the offense; and (d) there is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including, but not limited to, the passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, restitution, compliance with the terms of parole or probation, job training or higher education, good employment record, or constructive community involvement. In ISCR Case No. 22-00761 at 7 (App. Bd. May 27, 2025) the Appeal Board discussed the evidentiary standard for proving the allegations in the SOR as follows: It is well-established that DOHA security clearance adjudications are administrative proceedings, and the “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof associated with criminal proceedings is not applicable. Similarly, the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in civil proceedings such as a [temporary restraining order] is not applicable. Instead, the Government must prove any controverted facts by substantial evidence — that is, more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance of the evidence. 11

In ISCR Case No. 10-04641 at 4 (App. Bd. Sept. 24, 2013), the DOHA Appeal Board concisely explained Applicant’s responsibility for proving the applicability of mitigating conditions as follows: Once a concern arises regarding an applicant’s security clearance eligibility, there is a strong presumption against the grant or maintenance of a security clearance. See Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F. 2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991). After the Government presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut or mitigate those concerns. See Directive ¶ E3.1.15. The standard applicable in security clearance decisions is that articulated in Egan, supra. “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” Directive, Enclosure 2, [App. A] ¶ 2(b). For SOR ¶ 2.a, Applicant suggested that he could possibly carry a firearm under state law despite being a convicted felon because of the issue of self-defense due to concerns about possible terrorist or other criminal attacks on his person. He did not provide any case law or other legal support under his state’s laws supporting this concern as a potential defense. Applicant has the burden of showing self-defense under the facts of this case. The evidence does not establish that there was a credible and significant bona fide concern about self-protection. Any such concern does not override the state- law prohibition against Applicant’s possession of a .45 caliber pistol. His possession of a .45 caliber pistol as a convicted felon is established as a criminal offense under state law. Credibility. Applicant made conflicting statements during the security clearance process. The SOR does not allege that Applicant made conflicting statements during the security clearance process and that he committed two burglaries in 1978. These issues will not be considered for disqualification purposes. However, the conflicting statements, and the 1978 crimes, were considered in the credibility, mitigation, and whole person assessments. In his SOR response, Applicant stated, “I genuinely believed [I had] legitimate concerns for my safety at work due to significant security failures. So in June of 2019 I started carrying a firearm in my car.” (HE 2 (emphasis added)) At his hearing, he stated: I kept [my pistol] in the car, start[ing] in early December of that year. And I would [normally not] carry it with me. I kept it in the car. I only took it out of the car to bring it into the house when I got home. And then from the house back out to the car whenever I left. (Tr. 25 (emphasis added)) Applicant’s January 16, 2024 OPM summary of interview states: 12

Subject frequently carried a handgun for personal protection while he was not working. . . . Subject never took the weapon into his workplace. He always locked it in his glovebox before he got out of his vehicle. In 12/2019, subject went to work as normal. After settling in his office subject went to the restroom. At that time subject realized that he had forgotten to take the gun from the waistband of his pants and the 45 caliber handgun was still in his possession. (GE 4 at 5-6 (emphasis added)) At his hearing, Applicant said his vehicle’s glovebox did not lock. He had his firearm in a coat pocket when he went into his employer’s building. Theoretically, he would be more likely to be more c ognizant of a firearm placed and retained in his waistband than in a coat pocket when he entered his workplace or building. Having a firearm in one’s waistband makes it unlikely that a person would inadvertently bring the firearm into their workplace building. I do not believe his claim that he inadvertently brought a firearm into his workplace building. Applicant said he was not really guilty of the two counts of first-degree burglary in 1978 because he denied the following elements of first-degree burglary: the accused “(1) Is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon; or (2) Causes or threatens immediate physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or (3) There is present in the structure another person who is not a participant in the crime.” In 2026, the DOHA Appeal Board stated: An applicant’s acceptance of responsibility for concerning conduct carries significant weight in national security eligibility determinations, and it is well settled that the failure to do so impacts upon the individual’s case in mitigation, such as through the passage of time without incident and other evidence of rehabilitation.1 Applicant’s minimization of the extent of his [violations of his employer’s policy] and the employer’s thorough investigative findings – avoids full responsibility and undercuts his evidence of reform and rehabilitation under the Adjudicative Guidelines and the Whole-Person Concept. ISCR Case No. 25-00238 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Sept. 23, 2026). Applicant did not provide relevant records from the two burglaries, such as records from court proceedings, transcripts, police reports, or witness statements, and he failed to convincingly undercut his guilty plea to two counts of first-degree burglary. His claim that he did commit burglary in the first degree does not constitute full acceptance of responsibility. 1 See ISCR Case No. 96-0360, 1997 WL 1882602 at *3 (App. Bd. Sep. 25, 1997) (“Where an applicant is unwilling or unable to accept responsibility for his or her own actions, such a failure is evidence that detracts from a finding of reform and rehabilitation.”); ISCR Case No. 97-0625 at 3 (App. Bd. Aug. 17, 1998) (“Whatever mitigating value attaches to the passage of time since the [alleged misconduct], it is seriously diminished by Applicant's failure to acknowledge his misconduct or accept responsibility for it.). 13

Applicant’s multiple possessions of a .45 caliber pistol as a convicted felon in 2019 are violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which are federal felonies. The SOR does not allege that he violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). These violations were not considered for disqualification purposes; however, they were considered in the mitigation and whole- person analysis. AG ¶ 32(d) partially applies because there is no evidence of criminal conduct after his December 2019 offense. He was not arrested, charged, or convicted of violating state or federal laws except for his two burglary convictions in 1978 or 1979. He provided two character reference statements from managers who lauded his excellent employment record, and he provided a good employment performance evaluation. None of the mitigating conditions fully apply because Applicant made conflicting statements, which damaged his credibility. He did not accept full responsibility for his conduct. He has not established a sufficient period of abstinence from criminal conduct. His multiple decisions to commit criminal conduct from June to December of 2019 when he illegally possessed a .45 caliber pistol are an indication he lacks the qualities expected of those with access to national secrets and continue to cast doubt on his current reliability, trustworthiness, and judgment. Criminal conduct security concerns are not mitigated. Personal Conduct AG ¶ 15 provides the security concern arising from personal conduct: Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure to cooperate or provide truthful and candid answers during national security investigative or adjudicative processes. The following will normally result in an unfavorable national security eligibility determination, security clearance action, or cancellation of further processing for national security eligibility: AG ¶ 16 provides conditions that could raise a personal conduct security concern and may be disqualifying in this case: (d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available information, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the individual may not properly safeguard classified or sensitive information. This includes, but is not limited to, consideration of: 14

(1) untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of client confidentiality, release of proprietary information, unauthorized release of sensitive corporate or government protected information; (2) any disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior; (3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations; and (4) evidence of significant misuse of Government or other employer's time or resources; and (e) personal conduct, or concealment of information about one’s conduct, that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress by a foreign intelligence entity or other individual or group. SOR ¶ 1.a alleges, and Applicant admitted that in about December 2019, he was terminated from his employment for bringing a handgun to work and leaving it in an employee bathroom. AG ¶ 16(d) applies. When he brought a firearm into the workplace, he engaged in inappropriate behavior, and he violated his employer’s policy against employees bringing firearms into the workplace building. AG ¶ 16(e) does not apply because Applicant has been open about bringing a firearm into the workplace. He is not vulnerable to exploitation, manipulation, or duress. SOR ¶ 1.b alleges that information described in SOR ¶¶ 2.a. and 2.b which is discussed under the criminal conduct guideline, supra. SOR ¶ 1.b is refuted because there is sufficient evidence to revoke his security clearance based on the information under the criminal conduct guideline, as discussed infra. SOR ¶ 1.b is mitigated as a duplication. AG ¶ 17 lists conditions that could mitigate personal conduct security concerns in this case: (c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; (d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that contributed to untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur; (e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress; and 15

(f) the information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable reliability. None of the mitigating conditions fully apply for the reasons stated under the criminal conduct guideline, supra. I do not believe Applicant’s claim that he inadvertently brought a .45 caliber handgun into his workplace building. He knew his handgun was in his waistband when he went into the building. His termination from employment was warranted. Personal conduct security concerns alleged in SOR ¶ 1.a are not mitigated. Whole-Person Concept Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of his or her conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. Under AG ¶ 2(c), “[t]he ultimate determination” of whether to grant a security clearance “must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration” of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. My comments under Guidelines J and E are incorporated in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(d) were addressed under those guidelines but some warrant additional comment. Applicant is a 70-year-old engineer, who has worked for his current employer since September 2024. In 1974, he graduated from high school, and in 1981, he was awarded a bachelor’s degree. He served in the Army from 1974 through 1976, and he received an honorable discharge. He received an excellent performance evaluation for 2025 to 2026. Two of his managers lauded his dependability, professionalism, and diligence. The disqualifying and mitigating information is discussed in the analysis section, supra. The reasons for denying Applicant’s security clearance are more persuasive than the reasons for granting him a security clearance. It is well settled that once a concern arises regarding an applicant’s security clearance eligibility, there is a strong presumption against granting a security clearance. See Dorfmont, 913 F. 2d at 1401. “[A] favorable clearance decision means that the record discloses no basis for doubt about an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified 16

___________________ information.” ISCR Case No. 18-02085 at 7 (App. Bd. Jan. 3, 2020) (citing ISCR Case No. 12-00270 at 3 (App. Bd. Jan. 17, 2014)). I have carefully applied the law, as set forth in Egan, Exec. Or. 10865, the Directive, the AGs, and the Appeal Board’s jurisprudence, to the facts and circumstances in the context of the whole person. Personal conduct and criminal conduct security concerns are not mitigated. This decision should not be construed as a determination that Applicant cannot or will not attain the state of reform necessary for award of a security clearance in the future. With continued effort to comply with rules and laws, and full acceptance of responsibility for his conduct, he may well be able to demonstrate persuasive evidence of his security clearance worthiness. Formal Findings Formal findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline E: Subparagraph 1.a: Subparagraph 1.b: AGAINST APPLICANT Against Applicant For Applicant Paragraph 2, Guideline J: Subparagraph 2.a:

Subparagraph 2.b: AGAINST APPLICANT

Against Applicant For Applicant Conclusion Considering all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant Applicant eligibility for access to classified information. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Mark Harvey Administrative Judge 17