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A decided public DOHA case, shown for research, not advice or a prediction.

ISCR Case No. 26-00112

Appeal Board

Decided Oct 15, 2026 · Administrative Judge Moira D. Modzelewski · Appeal

Appeal at a glance

The appeal involved a denial of security clearance based on financial considerations under Guideline F. The Applicant challenged findings related to financial delinquencies and the Judge's application of mitigating conditions. The Board affirmed the Judge's decision, finding no harmful error in the analysis or conclusions reached.

Descriptive structured reading of this decided, public Appeal Board decision: what the case says, not a prediction or advice.

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Appearances

FOR GOVERNMENT Andrea M. Corrales, Deputy Chief Department Counsel

Appearances

Grant Couch, Esq. The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance. On February 25, 2026, DoD issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis of that decision – security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) in Appendix A of Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (effective June 8, 2017) and DoD Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive). On September 10, 2026, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Administrative Judge Jennifer Goldstein denied Applicant national security eligibility. Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30. Judge’s Findings of Fact and Analysis Applicant, in his early 60s, attended some college courses but did not attain a degree. He served on active duty in the U.S. military from 1982 to 1984 and received an honorable discharge. He has been married to his second wife since 2009, and he has two adult children and two adult stepchildren. Applicant has maintained a security clearance since 2018, and he seeks continued national security eligibility for his employment with a government contractor, for whom he has worked since January 2026.

The SOR alleged security concerns arising from Applicant’s bankruptcy, two defaulted personal loans, defaulted student loans, and five delinquent credit card accounts, all of which he admitted. The Judge found for Applicant concerning his student loans and four of the credit card accounts (SOR ¶¶ 1.e-1.i), and the facts and analysis surrounding those allegations will not be discussed further. Applicant reported one formerly delinquent medical account, but no other financial problems, on his November 2024 security clearance application. On January 6, 2025, he filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, wherein he certified that he had “received a briefing from an approved credit counseling agency within the 180 days before [he] filed [the] bankruptcy petition,” but averred that he did not have the corresponding certificate of completion. Government Exhibit (GE) 3 at 10. Adjacent to the query is the instruction: The law requires that you receive a briefing about credit counseling before you file for bankruptcy. You must truthfully check one of the following choices. If you cannot do so, you are not eligible to file. If you file anyway, the court can dismiss your case, you will lose whatever filing fee you paid, and your creditors can begin collection activities again. Id. Applicant, however, had not completed a credit counseling course as of his certification, but he subsequently did so on January 10, 2025. Id. at 16. In March 2025, the bankruptcy case was dismissed because Applicant had failed to complete credit counseling prior to filing his petition. During his October 2025 security interview, Applicant explained that he withheld his mortgage payments from September 2023 to at least December 2024 and disputed his mortgage account. After the creditor initiated foreclosure in December 2024, Applicant filed bankruptcy for the sole purpose of retaining his home. No other accounts were listed in the bankruptcy filing. At hearing, Applicant reiterated his explanation that he filed bankruptcy to halt a foreclosure sale of his home and to seek a loan modification. As to his certification of credit counseling, he claimed that he did not understand, at the time of the filing, that the counseling was required to be completion prior to filing. Transcript (Tr.) at 92. He further testified, “It was never my intention to complete the bankruptcy proceeding anyway.” Id. As of the hearing, Applicant remained at an “impasse” with his mortgage lender, despite a mid-2025 loan modification, and he had again been withholding payment for several months while disputing the account. Decision at 3. Applicant also discussed several delinquent accounts during his October 2025 interview, including the two personal loans and a credit card account. At the time of his interview, he expressed his intent not to pay these and other debts and to dispute the accounts with the creditors, relying on information he had reviewed on a website. The delinquent accounts included a $25,000 personal loan (SOR ¶ 1.b) incurred in December 2021 to consolidate his debts, but he deliberately ceased payments on the account in April 2023, and it was charged off in the amount of $20,408. Applicant presented no evidence of debt resolution efforts as to this debt. Applicant also intentionally stopped payment on a credit card account (SOR ¶ 1.c), disputed the amount owed, and requested the creditor to cancel the $10,469 debt. At hearing, applicant presented an IRS Form 1099-C, Cancellation of Debt, in the amount of $10,469 2

cancelling the debt but potentially imputing tax liability for tax year 2025. There is no record evidence of Applicant’s 2025 tax return or any associated tax payment. Finally, in about May 2025, Applicant received a check from a creditor in the mail in conjunction with a personal loan offer. Applicant signed and deposited the check, which he considered a “gift” and not a debt (SOR ¶ 1.d). Id. at 4. At hearing, Applicant submitted a payment plan to resolve SOR ¶ 1.d beginning in June 2026 and a receipt for a $900 payment. The receipt, dated July 22, 2026, does not identify the creditor, the account number to which the payment is applied, or the account holder from which the funds would be withdrawn. Applicant Exhibit (AE) L. After discussion of Applicant’s bankruptcy, debts, and resolution efforts, the Judge noted Applicant’s net monthly remainder of $405 after paying his monthly expenses, his emergency fund balance of $2,500, and approximately $1,800 in a retirement savings account. In addition, she noted that Applicant had “taken international vacations each year since 2017” and was planning another trip in 2026. Decision at 5. The Judge found that the record evidence established Applicant’s Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and eight delinquent accounts totaling approximately $44,000. The Judge determined that AG ¶ 19(a)1 did not fully apply because Applicant’s financial delinquencies were “not due to an objective lack of funds.” Id. at 7. Rather, citing that “Applicant stopped paying debts based on faulty advice, ‘gift’ claims for cash loans, and a belief that he is ‘the credit for the country,’” the Judge applied AG ¶¶ 19(b) and 19(e)2 in light of Applicant’s deliberate choices to withhold payments based on frivolous legal theories. Id. Similarly, Applicant’s bankruptcy filing was not triggered by an inability to pay, but to avoid foreclosure due to deliberately withheld payments. Id. The Judge concluded that none of the mitigating conditions were fully established concerning four allegations (SOR ¶¶ 1.a-1.d). AG ¶ 20(a)3 was not applicable because Applicant’s financial delinquencies were “very recent and frequent” and repayment efforts only began after his security interview. Id. at 8. AG ¶ 20(b)4 did not apply because Applicant demonstrated “a lack of responsible conduct” when he “made a deliberate choice to stop making payments” on his debts and his mortgage based on “frivolous online theories.” Id. Notwithstanding credit counseling and 1 AG ¶ 19(a): inability to satisfy debts. 2 AG ¶¶ 19(b): unwillingness to satisfy debts regardless of the ability to do so; 19(e): consistent spending beyond one’s means or frivolous or irresponsible spending, which may be indicated by excessive indebtedness, significant negative cash flow, a history of late payments or of non-payment, or other negative financial indicators. 3 AG ¶ 20(a): the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment. 4 AG ¶ 20(b): the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person’s control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, a death, divorce or separation, clear victimization by predatory lending practices, or identity theft), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances. 3

a $400 net monthly remainder, AG ¶ 20(c)5 was not established because SOR ¶ 1.b remained “entirely unresolved,” Applicant’s mortgage dispute was at an “impasse,” and Applicant’s continued international travel despite carrying financial delinquencies did not reflect financial responsibility and sound judgment. Id. at 8-9. With no evidence of good-faith debt resolution efforts as to SOR ¶ 1.b or the cancelled debt (SOR ¶ 1.c), the insufficient evidence of payment of SOR ¶ 1.d, and Applicant’s pattern of withholding payments and avoiding financial obligations, the Judge determined that AG ¶ 20(d) 6 did not apply. The Judge’s Whole-Person analysis incorporated the Guideline F analysis and highlighted Applicant’s “deliberate choice to withhold payments based on questionable legal theories,” his previous unwillingness to resolve his debts, his bankruptcy filing to forestall foreclosure proceedings, and his “falsely checking the box” in his bankruptcy filing certifying prior completion of credit counseling. Id. at 10. The Judge did not find Applicant’s testimony credible that he no longer espoused the beliefs that prompted him to withhold payments, and she reasoned that Applicant had not acted with the judgment of one entrusted to safeguard classified information. Discussion On appeal, Applicant challenges two of the Judge’s findings of fact and the weight afforded those findings in mitigation; contends that the Judge misapplied AG ¶ 19(e); and argues that, within the Whole-Person analysis, the Judge improperly relied upon matters not alleged – i.e., Applicant “falsely” certifying that he had completed credit counseling in his bankruptcy filing. For the following reasons, Applicant’s arguments are not persuasive, and we affirm the Judge’s decision. Turning first to the two challenged findings of fact, the Judge found that Applicant entered into a payment agreement with the creditor for SOR ¶ 1.d but assessed Applicant’s testimony and proffered receipt unreliable, noting the absence of an account number or identifiable creditor or payment recipient. The Judge was not compelled to accept Applicant’s unrebutted testimony or his insufficient documentary evidence as establishing payment. See DISCR Case No. 90-2069 at 10 (App. Bd. Mar. 25, 1992). Applicant’s quibble – that the Judge found Applicant vacationed internationally “every year since 2017” despite no travel in 2020 and only prospective travel in 2026 – does not upend the Judge’s finding and is, at most, harmless error. See ISCR Case No. 95­ 0495, 1996 WL 481030 at *3 (App. Bd. Mar. 22, 1996). The Judge’s findings are supported by substantial record evidence. Applicant also takes issue with the weight afforded these two findings and Applicant’s continued “impasse” with his mortgage lender within the mitigation analysis. The Judge articulated a rational explanation for her consideration of these factors, and Applicant’s disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence is not sufficient to demonstrate that the decision was 5 AG ¶ 20(c): the individual has received or is receiving financial counseling for the problem from a legitimate and credible source, such as a non-profit credit counseling service, and there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control. 6 AG ¶ 20(d): the individual initiated and is adhering to a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts. 4

arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. See ISCR Case No. 04-08975, 2006 WL 2725032 at *1 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2006). Next, Applicant contends that the Judge’s application of AG ¶ 19(e) was improper because she did not identify any frivolous spending as the plain language of the disqualifying condition directs. While the Judge’s cumulative discussion about the application of AG ¶¶ 19(b) and 19(e) referred to Applicant’s frivolous reasoning as opposed to frivolous spending, the disqualification analysis in general centers on Applicant’s excessive consumer and student loan indebtedness of over $44,000, accumulated through late and non-payments, as contemplated by AG ¶ 19(e), and his unwillingness to pay his financial obligations, which is clearly within the scope of AG ¶ 19(b). Finally, Applicant contests the Judge’s conclusion that he “falsely” certified that he had completed credit counseling prior to filing a bankruptcy petition and the Judge’s reliance upon this conclusion within the Whole-Person analysis. Applicant argues that the Judge failed to distinguish whether Applicant’s certification response was inaccurate or intentionally false and that any reliance on an intentional falsification, absent an SOR allegation, was improper. Appeal Brief at 6. We disagree. Read in the context of the Judge’s Whole-Person analysis, the Judge’s use of “falsely” reflects an intentional misrepresentation by Applicant, permissible within the Judge’s assessment of Applicant’s judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness and not an independent ground for denial. See ISCR Case No. 03-20327, 2006 WL 3545166 at *3 (App. Bd. Oct. 26, 2006). Conclusion Applicant has not established that the Judge’s conclusions were arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The Judge examined the relevant evidence, weighed the disqualifying and mitigating conditions, and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision. The record is sufficient to support that the Judge’s findings and conclusions are sustainable. “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’” Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” AG ¶ 2(b). 5

Order The decision in ISCR Case No. 26-00112 is AFFIRMED. Signed: Moira Modzelewski Moira Modzelewski Administrative Judge Chair, Appeal Board Signed: Allison Marie Allison Marie Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board Signed: Eric H. Borgstrom Eric H. Borgstrom Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board 6