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A decided public DOHA case, shown for research, not advice or a prediction.

ISCR Case No. 26-00168

Appeal Board

Decided Oct 27, 2026 · Administrative Judge Moira D. Modzelewski · Appeal

Appeal at a glance

The appeal concerned the denial of a security clearance based on financial considerations under Guideline F. The Applicant argued that the Judge improperly assessed her resolution efforts regarding tax filings and debts. The Board affirmed the Judge's decision, finding no harmful error in the analysis of the evidence.

Descriptive structured reading of this decided, public Appeal Board decision: what the case says, not a prediction or advice.

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Appearances

FOR GOVERNMENT Andrea M. Corrales, Deputy Chief Department Counsel

Appearances

Samir Nakhleh, Esq. The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance. On April 22, 2026, DoD issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis of that decision – security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) in Appendix A of Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (effective June 8, 2017) and DoD Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive). On August 14, 2026, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Administrative Judge Mark Harvey denied Applicant national security eligibility. Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30. Judge’s Findings and Analysis Applicant, in her mid-30s, graduated from high school and has taken college courses, but she has not attained a degree. She married in 2009, divorced in 2016, and does not have any children. With the exception of a three-month period of unemployment over four years ago, Applicant has worked full time as a truck driver since April 2019. Applicant seeks national security eligibility for her employment as an over-the-road truck driver with a government contractor, for whom she has worked since February 2023. In June 2023, she transitioned from being a direct

employee of a government contractor to self-employment as an owner-operator driver under contract with the same employer. The SOR alleged security concerns arising from Applicant’s failure to timely file her federal and state income tax returns for tax years 2022, 2023, and 2024 and from her two delinquent consumer accounts totaling $5,370. In her response to the SOR, Applicant admitted both tax allegations and both delinquent debts. The Judge found adversely as to all allegations. Turning first to the tax allegations, prior to submitting her August 2025 security clearance application (SCA), in which she disclosed her failure to timely file the alleged returns, Applicant recognized her failure to file her tax returns would be a security issue. In November 2025, she engaged a new tax preparer, who assisted her in filing her 2024 federal tax return in July 2026. As of the close of the evidentiary record, Applicant had not filed her federal or state returns for 2022 and 2023 or her 2024 state return. Applicant explained that her failure to timely file her returns resulted from a combination of factors – forgetting to file, insufficient funds to pay a tax preparer, lacking supporting documentation to file, and the busyness of Applicant and her previous tax preparer. Transcript (Tr.) at 21-28; Government Exhibit (GE) 2 at 11. In her response to the SOR, Applicant admitted both delinquent debts. Regarding the allegations about delinquent debts, Applicant claimed to have initiated a payment plan for the debt alleged at SOR ¶ 1.c, but there is no evidence of any completed payments. Applicant testified that she believed she did not owe this debt because it had been removed from her credit report. Tr. at 34-35. As to SOR ¶ 1.d, Applicant and the creditor agreed to a settlement in May 2026; however, no payments were made. Applicant’s April 2026 credit report included both debts, and she admitted both debts in her appeal brief. Appeal Brief at 1. In addition to her period of unemployment, Applicant attributed her financial delinquencies and tax issues to the financial and tax-filing complexities of her employment as an owner-operator driver and to her financial support of family and friends. She estimated that she provided approximately $660 monthly to family and friends. Applicant acknowledged having approximately $600 remaining after expenses each week and mismanaging her finances in the past. The Judge concluded that none of the mitigating conditions applied.1 Noting Applicant’s period of unemployment and her financial support of family and friends, the Judge determined that these circumstances were not established to be beyond Applicant’s control such that she was prevented from timely filing her tax returns or initiating debt resolution efforts on the delinquent accounts, i.e., the first prong of AG ¶ 20(b). Decision at 7. The Judge concluded that Applicant did not demonstrate a “good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts” under AG ¶ 20(d), given the aforementioned unfiled returns and the absence of payment plans or completed payments. Id. He further concluded that, despite Applicant filing her federal tax returns 1 AG ¶¶ 20(b): the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person’s control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, a death, divorce or separation, clear victimization by predatory lending practices, or identity theft), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances; 20(d): the individual initiated and is adhering to a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts; and 20(g): the individual has made arrangements with the appropriate tax authority to file or pay the amount owed and is in compliance with those arrangements. 2

for 2024 and 2025 (not alleged), the remaining alleged returns were unfiled, and there is no evidence of payment plans with either the federal or state tax authorities (AG ¶ 20(g)). Id. at 9. Discussion Applicant’s several arguments on appeal can be addressed as two issues: (1) whether the Judge’s AG ¶¶ 20(d) and 20(g) analyses improperly measured the timing and sufficiency of Applicant’s resolution efforts; and (2) whether the Judge’s AG ¶ 20(b) and Whole-Person analyses failed to address and reconcile specific evidence in mitigation. For the following reasons, Applicant’s arguments are not persuasive, and we affirm the Judge’s decision. Turning first to Applicant’s contention that the Judge improperly assessed the timing of her resolution efforts within the AG ¶¶ 20(d) and 20(g) analyses, Applicant highlights her engagement of the tax preparer in November 2025, prior to the April 2026 SOR. Neither the Directive nor the Board has defined “recency” or “good-faith efforts” in relation to the date of the SOR, and we decline to do so here. Applicant’s engagement of the new tax preparer was not motivated by her fulfilment of her legal obligations but rather was prompted by her SCA and the potential derogatory impact of her tax issues on her clearance eligibility. The Judge also properly considered that the 2024 return was filed in July 2026, the other returns remained unfiled, and no payments had been completed on the delinquent accounts. Applicant has not established any error as to the Judge’s assessment and analysis of the timing of Applicant’s resolution efforts. Applicant next challenges the Judge’s conclusion as to the sufficiency of her resolution efforts within the AG ¶¶ 20(d) and 20(g) analyses. Applicant asserts that the initiation of these resolution efforts, without completed payments or tax agreements, warrants application of the two mitigation conditions. While these arguments largely attack the weight afforded by the Judge in mitigation, they also affront the plain language of these mitigating conditions. AG ¶ 20(d) requires both the initiation of and adherence to efforts to repay, as illustrated by a meaningful track record of payments. See ISCR Case No. 05-01920, 2007 WL 1107190 at *4 (App. Bd. Mar. 1, 2007). Similarly, the plain language of AG ¶ 20(g) requires filing of delinquent returns and compliance with tax repayment agreements, and Applicant has not yet filed all of the alleged returns nor established any tax agreements. See ISCR Case No. 22-01236, 2023 WL 11945258 at *2 (App. Bd. Sep. 13, 2023). Applicant’s remaining arguments – targeting the Judge’s AG ¶ 20(b) and Whole-Person analyses – highlight and argue for an alternative framing or weighing of evidence in mitigation. For example, Applicant cites her inability to afford a tax preparer for an unspecified but limited time around December 2023 as a circumstance beyond her control warranting consideration under the first prong of AG ¶ 20(b). The Judge is not required to address and reconcile his conclusions in light of every piece of favorable evidence. See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 12-01500, 2015 WL 5784607 at *2 (App. Bd. Aug. 25, 2015). Applicant has not established that the Judge failed to consider significant record evidence that would upend his conclusions under AG ¶ 20(b). Additionally, Applicant’s challenge to the Judge’s Whole-Person analysis reflects a recitation of favorable evidence in mitigation and a mere disagreement as to the Judge’s weighing of such evidence under Guideline F and incorporated within the Whole-Person analysis. Applicant’s disagreement with the Judge’s characterizations and weighing of the evidence is not sufficient to 3

demonstrate that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. See ISCR Case No. 04­ 08975, 2006 WL 2725032 at *1 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2006). Conclusion Applicant has not established that the Judge’s conclusions were arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The Judge examined the relevant evidence, weighed the disqualifying and mitigating conditions, and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision. The record is sufficient to support that the Judge’s findings and conclusions are sustainable. “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’” Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” AG ¶ 2(b). Order The decision in ISCR Case No. 26-00168 is AFFIRMED. Signed: Moira Modzelewski Moira Modzelewski Administrative Judge Chair, Appeal Board Signed: Allison Marie Allison Marie Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board Signed: Eric H. Borgstrom Eric H. Borgstrom Administrative Judge Member, Appeal Board 4