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A decided public DOHA case, shown for research, not advice or a prediction.

ISCR Case No. 25-01169

Denied

Decided Oct 20, 2026 · Administrative Judge Jennifer I. Goldstein · Hearing

Case headnote

Summary

The applicant, a 35-year-old U.S. citizen originally from Pakistan, faced security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) due to her familial ties to individuals residing in Pakistan, including her husband’s brother who serves in the Pakistan Air Force. Despite her substantial ties to the U.S., the judge found that these connections created a heightened risk of foreign influence, leading to the denial of her security clearance application.

Why the applicant was denied

  • The applicant maintained significant familial ties to Pakistan, including a brother-in-law in the Pakistan Air Force.
  • The applicant expressed an interest in sponsoring her parents-in-law for immigration to the U.S.
  • The judge found that the applicant's connections created a heightened risk of foreign exploitation or coercion.

Conditions referenced

Disqualifying

  • AG ¶ 7(a) Contact with foreign family membersapplied
  • AG ¶ 7(b) Connections to foreign personsapplied
  • AG ¶ 7(e) Shared living quarters with a foreign nationalapplied

Mitigating

  • AG ¶ 8(b) Substantial ties to the U.S.applied

Key rule quoted

Procedural posture

SOR issued
04/16/2026
Answer filed
06/12/2026
Hearing held
09/29/2026
Decision date
10/20/2026

Cite for

  • Heightened Risk of Foreign Influence Due to Familial Ties Under Guideline B
  • Impact of Foreign Military Connections on Security Clearance Eligibility
  • Importance of U.S. Ties in Mitigating Foreign Influence Concerns

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

From the decision

Facts this decision states, each with the sentence it comes from. Descriptive of the record, not an assessment.

Applicant Age
35

Allegations under Guideline B

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Full decision

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Decision text, by section

Appearances

NGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: Applicant for Security Clearance ) ) ) ) ) ISCR Cas

Decision

No. 25-01169 Appearances For Government: Karen Moreno-Sayles, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se 10/20/2026 Decision GOLD

Statement of Case

TEIN, J., Administrative Judge: This case involves security concerns raised under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). Clearance is denied. Statement of the Case On April 16, 2026, the Defense Counterintelligence and S ecurity Agency (DCSA) sent Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under Guideline B. The DCSA acted under Executive Order (Exec. Order) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated in Security Executive Agent Directive 4, National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (December 10, 2016), which became effective on June 8, 2017. In Applicant’s June 12, 2026, response to the SOR (Answer), she provided explanations in response to the allegations and requested a hearing before a Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) administrative judge. On August 10, 2026, Department Counsel amended the SOR, pursuant to Paragraph 17 of the Additional Procedural Guidance of the Directive, to amend SOR ¶ 1(b) to read: “Your father-in-law and mother

Findings of Fact

in-law are citizens and residents of Pakistan.” Applicant responded to the Amended SOR on August 28, 2026. Applicant admitted both allegations.

On August 21, 2026, the Government was ready to proceed to a hearing. I was assigned this case on August 27, 2026. On September 2, 2026, DOHA issued a notice scheduling the hearing for September 29, 2026. The hearing proceeded as scheduled. The Government proffered two evidentiary exhibits, which I admitted as Government Exhibits (GE) 1 and 2, without objection. The Government also offered information about the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Pakistan) and asked that I take administrative notice of it and the 18 sources it summarized. I marked it Hearing Exhibit (HE) I and notice was taken. Applicant testified, called one witness, and submitted Applicant Exhibits (AE) A through J, which were admitted without objection. DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on October 14, 2026. Findings of Fact Applicant is 35 years old. She was born in Karachi, Pakistan, and moved with her family to the United States as an infant. She obtained U.S. citizenship in 1999. She earned a bachelor's degree from a U.S. university in 2016. Her mother, brother, and paternal extended family all reside in the United States. (AE H; Answer; Tr. 50) Applicant married her husband in Pakistan in 2016. They were introduced by a maternal family member. However, he was unable to immigrate to the United States until 2018. After moving to the United States in 2018, he became a U.S. citizen in 2023. Applicant visited Pakistan in 2016 for her wedding. She returned in 2017 to visit her husband. In 2020, 2021, and 2024, she traveled with her husband to visit his family in Pakistan. (AE A-AE C; GE 1; Tr. 34-35, 44-45) SOR ¶ 1.a alleged that Applicant’s brother-in-law, a citizen and resident of Pakistan, currently serves in the Pakistan Air Force. Applicant clarified that he is actually her husband’s half-brother (brother-in-law). He has served in the Pakistani Air Force for at least 11 years. He works as a pilot instructor. Applicant did not know his rank. He is married and has two minor children. His wife is a homemaker. Applicant communicates with her brother-in-law on special occasions. She indicated their contacts generally occur “one to three times per year during holidays, family gatherings, or group communications involving other family members. Most communication occurs through larger family group chats, group video calls, or family discussions involving multiple relatives.” (Answer) She also has indirect communication with his wife through the group chat. Applicant’s husband and his brother communicate approximately monthly. Her trips to Pakistan in 2020 and 2021 were to attend her brother-in-law’s engagement party and subsequent wedding. (Answer; AE J; Tr. 39-47) SOR ¶ 1.b alleged that Applicant’s father-in-law and mother-in-law (parents-in-law) are citizens and residents of Pakistan. She clarified at hearing that the mother of her husband is deceased and her father-in-law is married to her stepmother-in-law. Her father-in-law is a retired travel agent. Applicant’s husband calls them weekly. Applicant communicates with her parents-in-law through group chat messages. Since her marriage, she stays with her parents-in-law when she travels to Pakistan. She acknowledged an

interes

Policies

in sponsoring them for immigration to the United States. (Answer; AE J; Tr. 34- 39) Applicant’s parents-in-law know that she is employed, but do not know the specifics of what she does for a living. She has never been in a situation where she felt someone was trying to exploit her contractor position, nor has she received unsolicited emails or correspondence from anyone from a foreign country or entity. (Tr. 46) Applicant documented assets in the United States. She noted, “[m]y spouse and I maintain our residence, employment, financial accounts, assets, obligations, and future plans in the United States.” (Answer) She purchased a home two years ago for about $455,000. She made a $20,000 downpayment. She and her husband also have retirement savings plans. Her balance is close to $25,000. (Answer; AE D; Tr. 49) She does not have any foreign bank accounts, foreign real estate, or foreign investments. She again noted her financial obligations, assets, employment, residence, and future plans are rooted in the United States. (AE G, AE J) Applicant’s manager testified on her behalf and presented a letter of recommendation. He noted she is a person of strong moral character, and her performance evaluations were always positive. She has been recognized by the employer’s executive leadership for outstanding work. (Tr. 27-29) Administrative Notice I take administrative notice of the facts cited in HE I regarding Pakistan, including the following: Pakistan has a poor human rights record. Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary

Analysis

killings; disappearances; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; transnational repression against individuals in another country; serious abuses in a conflict; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence against journalists, unjustified arrests and disappearances of journalists, and censorship; restrictions of religious freedom; threats of violence motivated by antisemitism; and significant or systematic restrictions on workers’ freedom of association. Additionally, terrorist and cross-border militant attacks against civilians, soldiers, and police caused hundreds of casualties in Pakistan. There were also widespread reports of enforced disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities across the country. Some officials from the intelligence agencies, police, and security forces reportedly held prisoners incommunicado and refused to disclose their location. The U.S. Department of State recommends reconsideration of travel to Pakistan due to the risk of violence there, with advisements of “do not travel” for specific provinces in Pakistan. (HE I)

Policies When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(a), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel.” The applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision. A person who seeks access to sensitive information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to sensitive information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard sensitive information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of sensitive information. Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information). Analysis Guideline B, Foreign Influence

The security concern for foreign influence is set out in Adjudicative Guideline (AG) ¶ 6: Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with US interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is known to target US citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. AG ¶ 7 provides conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying. In this case, the following disqualifying conditions are potentially applicable: (a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; (b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign p

Analysis

s; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; transnational repression against individuals in another country; serious abuses in a conflict; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence against journalists, unjustified arrests and disappearances of journalists, and censorship; restrictions of religious freedom; threats of violence motivated by antisemitism; and significant or systematic restrictions on workers’ freedom of association. Additionally, terrorist and cross-border militant attacks against civilians, soldiers, and police caused hundreds of casualties in Pakistan. There were also widespread reports of enforced disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities across the country. Some officials from the intelligence agencies, police, and security forces reportedly held prisoners incommunicado and refused to disclose their location. The U.S. Department of State recommends reconsideration of travel to Pakistan due to the risk of violence there, with advisements of “do not travel” for specific provinces in Pakistan. (HE I)

Policies When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(a), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel.” The applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision. A person who seeks access to sensitive information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to sensitive information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard sensitive information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of sensitive information. Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information). Analysis Guideline B, Foreign Influence

The security concern for foreign influence is set out in Adjudicative Guideline (AG) ¶ 6: Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with US interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is known to target US citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. AG ¶ 7 provides conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying. In this case, the following disqualifying conditions are potentially applicable: (a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; (b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign p

Whole Person Concept

rson, group, or country by providing that information or technology; and (e) shared living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. Applicant maintains continuing contact with her parents-in-law and more limited direct contact with her brother-in-law, generally through family group communications and special occasions. Additionally, she lives with her husband, and he maintains close ties to his family in Pakistan. His close ties to his family in Pakistan create a heightened risk tied to his brother’s military career. To establish AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(e), the Government must also demonstrate a “heightened risk” of exploitation or coercion. The United States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding sensitive information from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those of the United States. The administrative notice materials for Pakistan establish a heightened risk through details of the prevalence of terrorist activities over the past several years and significant human rights abuses by Pakistani authorities and third parties in Pakistan. These conditions are relevant to Applicant’s parents-in-law because they reside in

Pakistan and to the brother-in-law because he is an active-duty member of the Pakistani Air Force. Collectively, the facts that she is related to her in-laws through marriage; she maintains group-based communications with them; she has traveled to Pakistan to visit her in-laws; her stated interests in sponsoring her parents-in-law for immigration to the United States; her brother-in-law’s role as an active duty Pakistani Air Force pilot instructor; and the risks raised in HE I raise concerns under AG ¶ 7(a). Similarly, her husband, while a U.S. citizen, has close ties of affection with his parents and brother. His continuing, close contact with his family is relevant because the Appeal Board recognizes a rebuttable presumption of affection or obligation toward the immediate family members of one’s spouse. See ISCR Case No. 11-12659 (App. Bd. May 30, 2013). AG ¶ 7(b) applies because Applicant has connections to her Pakistani parents-in­ law and brother-in-law. That connection could create a potential conflict of interest between her obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and her desire to help her parents-in-law or brother-in-law. Her brother-in-law’s service in the Pakistani Air Force weighs heavily in this risk assessment. Applicant and her husband share a household, and he maintains weekly contact with his parents and monthly contact with his brother in Pakistan. Applicant also participates in group communications, has traveled with him to Pakistan, and stays with his parents during those visits. In these circumstances, their shared-living relationship contributes to additional concerns concerning the potential for exploitation and c

Formal Findings

ercion. Accordingly, AG ¶ 7(e) applies. AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I have considered all the mitigating conditions, and specifically the following: (a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States; (b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance t

Conclusion

the group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the US interest; and (c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation. Applicant’s direct communications with her brothe