A decided public DOHA case, shown for research, not advice or a prediction.
ISCR Case No. 25-01229
GrantedDecided Oct 6, 2026 · Administrative Judge LeRoy F. Foreman · Hearing
Case headnote
Summary
The applicant, a 60-year-old U.S. citizen and site manager for a construction company in Qatar, sought a security clearance under Guideline B due to foreign influence concerns stemming from family ties and property interests in Gaza and Jordan. The judge granted the clearance, finding that the applicant's connections did not create a heightened risk of foreign exploitation or conflict of interest, particularly given his strong ties to the U.S. and the nature of his work on U.S. government projects.
Why the applicant prevailed
- The applicant demonstrated strong ties to the U.S. through his citizenship, family, and employment.
- The applicant's foreign properties were deemed insignificant and not a source of foreign influence.
- The applicant's professional reputation and performance on U.S. government projects were highly regarded.
Conditions referenced
Disqualifying
- AG ¶ 7(a) Contact with foreign family membersraised
- AG ¶ 7(b) Potential conflict of interestrejected
- AG ¶ 7(f) Substantial foreign financial interestsraised
Mitigating
- AG ¶ 8(a) The nature of the applicant's employmentapplied
- AG ¶ 8(b) The applicant's ties to the U.S.applied
Key rule quoted
“Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines.”
Procedural posture
- SOR issued
- 01/21/2026
- Answer filed
- 02/06/2026
- Hearing held
- 08/27/2026 conducted by video teleconference
- Decision date
- 10/06/2026
Cite for
- Mitigating Factors Related to Foreign Influence Under Guideline B
- Significance of U.S. Citizenship and Employment in Mitigating Foreign Influence Concerns
- Evaluation of Foreign Property Interests in Security Clearance Determinations
Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.
From the decision
Facts this decision states, each with the sentence it comes from. Descriptive of the record, not an assessment.
- Applicant Age
- 60
- Years in Industry
- 22
- Prior Clearance
- never_held
- Bankruptcy
- none
Allegations under Guideline B
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8 rows in this decision.
It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.
Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case. The verbatim source decision is below.
Full decision
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Decision text, by section
______________ ______________ DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: )
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ISCR Case No. 25-01229
) Applicant for Security Clearance ) Appearances For Government: Carroll J.P. Connelley, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Andrew P. Bakaj, Esq. 10/06/2026 Decision FOREMAN, LeRoy F., Administrative Judge: This case involves security concerns raised under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). Clearance is granted. Statement of the Case Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA) on October 20, 2021. On January 21, 2026, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) sent him a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under Guideline B. The DCSA acted under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated in Security Executive Agent Directive 4, National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (December 10, 2016), which became effective on June 8, 2017. Applicant answered the SOR on February 6, 2026. and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was ready to proceed on April 16, 2026, and the case was assigned to me on June 2, 2026. On June 22, 2026, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) notified Applicant that the hearing was scheduled to be conducted by video teleconference on August 27, 2026. I convened the hearing as scheduled. Government Exhibits (GX) 1 through 4 were admitted in evidence without 1
objection. Applicant testified, submitted the t estimony of four witnesses, and submitted Applicant’s Exhibits (AX) A through W, which were admitted in evidence without objection. Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of U.S. Government information pertaining to Qatar (Hearing Exhibits (HX) I, V, and VI), Jordan (HX II), Egypt (HX III), and Israel and the Palestine Territories (HX IV). I took administrative notice as requested. I kept the record open until September 11, 2026, to enable Applicant to submit a written closing statement and comments on the administrative notice documents submitted by the Government. They were timely submitted. Applicant’s closing statement is included in the record as HX V. Applicant’s response to the Government’s request for administrative notice is included as HX VI, and the Government’s reply to HX VI is included as HX VII. The Government’s Closing Argument Rebuttal is HX VIII. DOHA received the hearing transcript on September 8, 2026, and the record closed on September 11, 2026. Findings of Fact In Applicant’s answer to the SOR, he admitted all the allegations, with explanations. His admissions are incorporated in my findings of fact. Applicant is a 60-year-old site manager for a U.S. construction company doing business in Qatar. He has worked for this company since January 2004. He was born in Gaza in October 1965. He came to the United States in December 1983, attended college and received a bachelor’s degree in the United States, and became a U.S. citizen in November 1990. He is a registered professional engineer. He received a doctorate in construction safety from a European university in November 2020. (GX 1 at 15; Tr. 105) All of his work in Qatar has been on U.S. government projects. (Tr. 121) He intends to retire in two or three years, and he is looking for a home in the United States where he can live after retirement. (Tr. 127) Applicant has never held a security clearance. He is seeking a security clearance because he has been invited to work on the classified sections of a new U.S. Embassy, which he regards as a “landmark project,” being constructed in Qatar. (Tr. 126) Applicant married a U.S. citizen in October 1984, and they divorced in January 1985. He married another U.S. citizen in January 1989, and they divorced in January 1997. Both marriages occurred in the United States. He married a citizen of Jordan in September 1997 in Jordan, and they divorced in January 2011. He married a citizen of Syria in September 2011 in Gaza, and they divorced in October 2014. He attributed his divorces to his frequent travel and separation in connection with his employment. He has amicable relationships with his former spouses. He has worked and resided in Qatar since May 2018. 2
Applicant has seven children and one grandchild, who are all U.S. citizens. (Tr. 105-07) Six of his children reside in Qatar. One is a medical doctor living in the United States. One of his daughters was educated in the United States, has a master’s degree in occupational health and safety, is working on her doctorate, and is employed as an occupational health and safety manager for her father’s employer. She holds a security clearance. (Tr. 85) Another daughter works for Applicant’s employer in Qatar as a security manager. Both daughters reside with Applicant in Qatar. (Tr. 88) The SOR alleges that Applicant has financial interests and family members in Gaza, Jordan, Qatar, and Egypt that raise security concerns under Guideline B. Applicant admitted all the allegations in the SOR, with explanations. The evidence concerning the allegations in the SOR is summarized below. SOR ¶ 1.a: home in Gaza with approximate value of $500,000. Applicant was born in this home and inherited it from his parents. It has been abandoned and unoccupied since his mother’s death in 2012. He last visited it in 2015, and it had deteriorated badly. He is no longer able to visit the property without a Palestinian passport. He has no family or contacts in Gaza. (Tr. 127-31) When he responded to DCSA interrogatories about foreign financial interests in May 2025, he disclosed this property in Gaza and two apartments in Jordan, but he did not list any value for these assets. (GX 3 at 15.) In November 2025, Department Counsel sent Applicant a list of his financial assets and asked him to provide any changes or updates to the list of his assets in Qatar, including the Gaza residence with an approximate value of $500,000. He responded, “No change.” (GX 4) Applicant was not represented by an attorney at this time. Although Applicant admitted this allegation in his response to the SOR, he had no previous experience with the s
ecurity-clearance process and a
ppears to have not appreciated the significance of his admission r egarding the Gaza property. The evidence submitted at the hearing does not reflect the basis for alleging that the v alue of the residence i s $500,000. There is no evidence, other than Applicant’s response to Department Counsel’s email, that Applicant suggested it or agreed with it. At the h earing, he testified that he does not know the current condition of the home or if it still exists. (Tr. 130) He believes that, under present conditions, no one is interested in buying property in Gaza. When asked at the hearing how financially significant this property to him, he responded, “Insignificant.” (Tr. 135)
SOR ¶ 1.b: apartment in Jordan with approximate value of $90,000. Applicant purchased this property in 2015 or 2016 to provide housing for his four children after he and their Jordanian mother divorced. (Tr. 132) Applicant’s ex-wife and his son still live in the apartment while his son, a U.S. citizen, attends a university in Jordan. Culturally, Applicant may not stay in the apartment, because Jordanian culture 3
prohibits him from staying in a home occupied by his ex-wife. He expects that eventually his son will inherit and keep the pr
operty. (Tr. 133-34) SOR ¶ 1.c: apartment in Jordan with approximate value of $75,000. Applicant purchased this apartment for his use while visiting his children after he divorced his Jordanian wife. He testified that the apartment is now “abandoned” and in need of maintenance, and he prefers to stay in a hotel when he travels to Jordan on business. (Tr. 178-79). He believes that the property could be sold easily, but he has not sold it because he believes that one of his children might want to use it. (Tr. 178-79) SOR ¶ 1.d: bank account in Qatar with previously reported value of $364,000 and current reported value of $260,000. Applicant has resided in Qatar and worked for his current employer since 2010. He lives in a home provided by his employer. (GX 1 at 11) He is required by Qatar law to have a bank account in Qatar for his salary and benefits. (Tr. 122-23) He reports his foreign assets to the U.S. Treasury Department annually on a FinCEN Form 114 (FBAR). (AX V) In addition to his Qatar account, he also has an account with a U.S.- based credit union, with a balance of $728,000 at the time of the hearing. (Tr. 124; AX S) SOR ¶ 1.e: sister who is a citizen and resident of Jordan. Applicant’s older sister is married, a retired teacher, and resides in Jordan. Her husband is also a retired teacher. She is financially independent and receives no income from Applicant. Applicant and his sister have casual conversations about once every three months. (Tr. 140-41) SOR ¶ 1.f: sister who is a citizen of Canada and resident of Egypt. Applicant’s younger sister, a citizen of Canada, lives with her daughter in Egypt. This sister has family members in Canada and travels frequently between Egypt and Canda. Applicant has less contact with her than with his older sister. He does not visit her in person, because he dislikes traveling to Egypt. He last visited this sister about three years ago. (Tr. 143) SOR ¶ 1.g: son who is a U.S. citizen and a resident of Jordan. One of Applicant’s sons lives with his mother in Jordan while attending a university in Jordan. (Tr. 107-08) Applicant testified that his son was persuaded by his brother to attend a university in Jordan so that their mother would not live alone. Once his son graduates, he intends to return to the United States, live near his sister, and continue his education. Applicant pays his son’s tuition and living expenses. (Tr. 143-45) SOR ¶ 1.h: son who is a U.S. citizen and resident of Qatar. 4
One of Applicant’s sons lives with him in Qatar. He has a security clearance and was working on the U.S. Embassy project until all projects were suspended due to the war with Iran. He is currently unemployed. (Tr. 106, 145) Whole Person Evidence The president of the company for whom Applicant has worked for the past 13 years retired from the Army after 29 years as an Army engineer. He described the company as an international construction company that works on overseas projects for the U.S. Government in the Middle East and Africa. It has about 2,000 employees, of which only about 30 are in the United States. The president of the company has known Applicant since he joined the company. Under Applicant’s leadership, all projects were completed on time and on budget. He is skilled at forming working relationships with local officials, vendors, and suppliers, and U.S. military leaders. He knows how to motivate workers. He is regarded as a role model for company employees who aspired to become project managers. (Tr.15-49) The former president of Applicant’s employer, also a retired Army officer, described the U.S. Embassy project structure, which is divided into secured and unsecured projects. He was Applicant’s direct supervisor from June 2022 to June 2024. He described Applicant as the best project manager he h ad ever seen. He described Applicant as honest, exceptionally capable, dependable under pressure, and a person of great integrity. He would trust Applicant with classified information without hesitation. (Tr. 58- 66) The manager for the U.S. Embassy project has known Applicant since April 2022. They have daily contact. He describes Applicant as “very trusted” among his colleagues and very professional in his dealings with military personnel and government representatives on the embassy project. (Tr. 69-78) Applicant’s outstanding performance is documented in his annual performance evaluations as well as numerous letters and certificates from contractors and U.S. Government officials. (AX B through J) Numerous managers and officials working for Applicant’s employer submitted testimonials supporting his application for a security clearance. (AX L through Q) Applicant’s daughter is the security manager for Applicant’s employer. She has a master’s degree and a doctorate from U.S. universities. She holds a security clearance. She was recruited by Applicant to be employed as the occupational health manager. She lives with Applicant, her two brothers, and her sister. She is aware of the two apartments Applicant purchased in Jordan. She testified that her brother lives in one apartment and that Applicant prefers a hotel to staying in the second apartment. She testified that Applicant has virtually no contact and no financial relationships with her aunts in Jordan and Egypt. She is very close to Applicant, describing him as a “lovely dad” and “the best dad ever.” (Tr. 84-98) 5
Administrative Notice-Qatar The United States established diplomatic relations with Qatar in 1972. Bilateral relations between the United States and Qatar are strong. The two countries cooperate on security in the Persian Gulf region, with Qatar hosting an Air Force base and a major command headquarters in support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and U.S. military operations in the region. Qatar is a major staging ground for air operations against Iraq and Syria. The two countries also have extensive economic ties, and they both belong to the same international organizations, including the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade organization. The President of the United States has described Qatar as a “steadfast ally” and has stated that an armed attack on it will be regarded as a “threat to the peace and security of the United States.” (HX I and VI) Administrative Notice-Jordan, Egypt, and Gaza The government of Jordan is relatively stable, but the security environment is complex and can change quickly. The U.S. Department of State travel advisory for Jordan is Level 3 (reconsider travel due to terrorism and armed conflict). The travel advisory for certain areas in Jordan, including the borders with Syria and Iraq, is Level 4 (do not travel). (HX II) The current travel advisory for Egypt as a whole is Level 2, except for the Northern and Middle Sinai Peninsula, the Westen Desert, and Egyptian border areas, which are Level 3. (HX III; HX VI) The current travel advisory for Gaza is Level 4 (do not travel) due to terrorism and armed conflict. (HX IV) Policies “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to “control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 2. Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. 6
The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance. Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan at 531. Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion in light of all the contrary evidence in the same record.” See ISCR Case No. 17-04166 at 3 (App. Bd. Mar. 21, 2019). It is “less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [a Judge’s] finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. ISCR Case No. 15-01253 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 20, 2016). Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02- 31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).
An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01- 20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan at 531. Analysis Guideline B, Foreign Influence The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 6: 7
Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual maybe manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. The following disqualifying conditions are potentially relevant: AG ¶ 7(a): contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; AG ¶ 7(b): connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information or technology; and AG ¶ 7(f): substantial business, financial, or property interests in a foreign country, or in any foreign owned or foreign-operated business that could subject the individual to a heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation or personal conflict of interest. AG ¶ 7(a) is established. This disqualifying condition requires substantial evidence of a “heightened risk.” “Heightened risk” denotes a risk greater than the normal risk inherent in having a family member living under a foreign government. See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 12-05839 at 4 (App. Bd. Jul. 11, 2013). It is not a high standard. See, e.g., ISCR Case No.17-03026 at 5 (App. Bd. Jan. 16, 2019). It is a level of risk equivalent to the Level 2 advisory (“exercise increased caution”). Jordan and Egypt are regarded by the State Department as Level 2. Applicant’s son and two sisters reside in Level 2 countries, thus establishing the “heightened risk.” AG ¶ 7(b) is not established. Applicant has no connections with his two ex-wives, local government officials, or local vendors that create a potential conflict of interest. AG ¶ 7(f) is established. Applicant has substantial funds in a bank on Qatar, partly because local law requires it, but they are significantly outweighed by his funds in U.S. financial institutions. He owns two apartments in Jordan. He also owns property in Gaza, 8
but there is little evidence of its actual value. The two apartments owned by Applicant are not important to him. One is unused and the other is occupied by his son. Neither is expensive. He plans to give them to his sons. There is no evidence that the former family residence in Gaza has any significant value. The $500,000 figure was proposed by someone in the security-clearance chain, but not by Applicant. There is no evidence that the residence still exists or that has any significant market value. The following mitigating conditions are potentially applicable: AG ¶ 8(a): the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States; AG ¶ 8(b): there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and AG ¶ 8(f): the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual. AG ¶ 8(a) is not established. Applicant is close to his sons, but more distant from his sisters. Because these family members live in Level 2 countries, a conflict of interest cannot be excluded as unlikely. AG ¶ 8(b) is established. Although Applicant has resided in Qatar for many years, he has devoted his professional life to providing support for U.S. military and diplomatic activities overseas. AG ¶ 8(f) is established. Applicant’s two apartments in Jordan are not financially important to him. He has abandoned one apartment, and he expects to give both properties to his sons. There is no evidence that the Gaza property has any significant market value. In addition to his overseas financial and property interests, he has about $728,000 in a credit union in the United States. 9
Whole-Person Analysis Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. An administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s security eligibility by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all the relevant circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. I have incorporated my comments under Guideline B in my whole-person analysis and applied the adjudicative factors in AG ¶ 2(d). Applicant was candid, sincere, and credible at the hearing. His supervisors were visibly enthusiastic in their descriptions of his accomplishments, and they strongly support his application for a security clearance. After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guideline B and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has mitigated the security concerns raised by his foreign family connections and foreign financial interests. Formal Findings I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR: Paragraph 1, Guideline B (Foreign Influence): FOR APPLICANT Subparagraphs 1.a-1.h: For Applicant Conclusion I conclude that it is clearly consistent with the national security interests of the United States to grant Applicant eligibility for access to classified information. Clearance is granted. LeRoy F. Foreman Administrative Judge 10