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A decided public DOHA case, shown for research, not advice or a prediction.

ADP Case No. 26-00012

Granted

Decided Sep 30, 2026 · Administrative Judge Jeff A. Nagel · Hearing

Case headnote

Summary

The applicant, a 59-year-old defense contractor, sought a public trust position while facing security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline C (Foreign Preference) due to familial ties in Pakistan and the acquisition of a National Identity Card for Overseas Pakistanis (NICOP). The judge found that the applicant's relationships were casual and infrequent, with no evidence of divided allegiance or intent to conceal foreign preferences, ultimately granting eligibility for access to classified information.

Why the applicant prevailed

  • Applicant's interactions with family in Pakistan are infrequent and casual, reducing the risk of foreign influence.
  • The applicant has deep and longstanding ties to the United States, mitigating concerns of divided allegiance.
  • The applicant clarified that he did not apply for Pakistani citizenship, and his use of the NICOP was solely for travel purposes.

Conditions referenced

Disqualifying

  • AG ¶ 7(a) Contact with foreign family membersraised
  • AG ¶ 7(b) Connections to foreign persons creating potential conflict of interestraised
  • AG ¶ 10(a) Applying for and/or acquiring citizenship in another countryraised
  • AG ¶ 10(c) Failure to use a U.S. passport when entering or exiting the U.S.raised

Mitigating

  • AG ¶ 8(a) Nature of relationships with foreign persons unlikely to create conflictapplied
  • AG ¶ 8(b) Minimal conflict of interest due to strong ties to the U.S.applied
  • AG ¶ 8(c) Casual and infrequent contact with foreign citizensapplied
  • AG ¶ 11(a) Foreign citizenship not in conflict with U.S. national security interestsapplied
  • AG ¶ 11(b) Dual citizenship based solely on parental citizenship or birthapplied
  • AG ¶ 11(e) Exercise of foreign citizenship entitlements does not present a national security concernapplied

Key rule quoted

Procedural posture

SOR issued
April 2, 2025
Answer filed
May 19, 2026 Requested decision on written record
Hearing held
No hearing; decided on written record
Decision date
September 30, 2026

Cite for

  • Mitigation of Foreign Influence Concerns Under Guideline B
  • Clarification of Foreign Citizenship Status and Its Implications Under Guideline C
  • Consideration of Familial Relationships in Security Clearance Determinations

Editorial summary generated for research. Not legal advice; not a prediction. Verify against the full decision before relying on any quoted language.

From the decision

Facts this decision states, each with the sentence it comes from. Descriptive of the record, not an assessment.

Years in Industry
2

Allegations under Guideline B

Reading the 3 per allegation rows needs a free account.

3 rows in this decision.

It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.

Allegations under Guideline C

Reading the 2 per allegation rows needs a free account.

2 rows in this decision.

It opens the per allegation record on every guideline: the amounts, the findings, and the sentence behind each row.

Descriptive standardized rendering of a decided public case. The verbatim source decision is below.

Full decision

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Decision text, by section

Appearances

_____ DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS __________________________

Decision

__________

In the matter of: )

)

) ADP Case No. 26-00012

)

) Applicant for Public Trust Position ) _____________________________________ ) Appearances For Government:

Statement of Case

George A. Hawkins, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se 09/30/2026 Decision NAGEL, Jeff A., Administrative Judge: Applicant mitigated the security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline C (Foreign Preference). Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. Statement of the Case Applicant submitted a Questionnaire for National Security Positions on March 27, 2024 (Questionnaire). On April 2, 2025, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline C (Foreign Preference). The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within DoD after June 8, 2017.

On May 19, 2026, Applicant responded to the SOR in writing (Answer) and requested that this case be decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing. In his Answer, he admitted to the Guideline B allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.a and 1.b (with explanations). He denied the Guideline C allegation in SOR ¶ 2.a but admitted the allegation in SOR ¶ 2.b (with explanations). On June 29, 2026, Department Counsel submitted the Government’s written case in a File of Relevant Material (FORM). A complete copy of the FORM, consisting of Government’s Exhibits (GE) 1 to 6, and the Government

Findings of Fact

s arguments in support of the SOR, was received by the Applicant on July 30, 2026. Applicant was afforded an opportunity to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the security concerns, and he timely submitted an undated, supplemental statement (Response). The case was assigned to me on September 15, 2026, and all exhibits were admitted without objection. In the FORM, Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts about the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and provided a summary, supported by Government documents pertaining to the country. Without objection, I have taken administrative notice of the facts contained in the request. The facts are summarized in the written request and will not be repeated verbatim here. However, I take particular note of Pakistan’s continuing proliferation threat of long-range missile development and the designation by the United States of four entities in Pakistan for sanctions for their efforts in this matter. I also note the rapidly expanding tactics of foreign intelligence entities (FIEs) attempting to steal national secrets, sensitive data, intellectual property, and technical and military capabilities that undermine and disrupt U.S. foreign policy and intelligence operations in Pakistan. (GE 6) I have additionally taken administrative notice the official Pakistan National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) websites discussing the eligibility criteria for both a National Identity Card for Overseas Pakistanis (NICOP) and a Pakistan Origin Card (POC). The NICOP “serves as official proof of identity and nationality for Pakistanis living overseas and allows visa-free entry into Pakistan.” I noted in particular the NICOP eligibility option for “children of Pakistani citizens born abroad who are eligible to be registered as Pakistani citizens.” (https://www.nadra.gov.pk/identitydocument/nicop and https://www.nadra.gov.pk/identitydocument/poc). Hearing Exhibits (HE) IV and V pertain. There are two additional administrative matters of note. First, the original SOR in this case mischaracterized Applicant as applying for a security clearance vice a public trust position. On September 22, 2026, Department Counsel remedied this error by amending the SOR. Applicant was apprised of the change and was advised it had no bearing on any substantive issues. Second, also on September 22, 2026, I reopened the record until close of business October 2, 2026, to advise both parties that I was taking administrative notice of the official NADRA website discussed above and the NICOP requirements discussed therein. Department Counsel replied on September 22, 2026, and Applicant responded on September 28, 2026. HE I, II, and III pertain. In Applicant’s response he also referred to the POC, about which I also took administrative notice. Department Counsel had no objection. HE 6 and 7 pertain. 2

Findings of Fact Applicant, age 59, was born in 1967, in Scotland, to parents who were originally from Pakistan. A younger brother was born in Pakistan in 1971 – the same year the family ultimately relocated to the United States. His youngest brother was born in the United States in 1976 – the same year

Whole Person Concept

the family was naturalized. Applicant was raised in the United States and earned a bachelor’s degree in 2020. He married a native-born American citizen in 2004, with whom he has two children and two step-children. Applicant has been employed by a defense contractor since February 2024 as a senior cybersecurity compliance analyst and applied for a public trust position in connection with this employment. In May 2023, Applicant obtained a National Identity Card for Overseas Pakistanis (NICOP) issued by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, for a family trip to Pakistan, so as to avoid visa fees. He holds no property or other assets in Pakistan and is not aware of having any particular rights, privileges, benefits, or obligations there. (Answer; Response; GE 3 at 5-6, 9, 11

Policies

12, 23-28; GE 4 at 5, 9-10) SOR Paragraph 1 (Guideline B: Foreign Influence) The Government alleged that Applicant is ineligible for a security clearance due to foreign influence given his contacts with friends and relatives in Pakistan. The following facts pertain: 1.a. Applicant participation in social media group chat with Pakistani friends and paternal cousins: Applicant admitted the allegation and explained that since early 2024, he has been a member of a group chat comprised of approximately twelve individuals in Pakistan. Most of the group are extended family members, including nine paternal cousins. Posts to the group tend to be approximately weekly, and Applicant’s direct communications with one member or another tends to be “a few times per year.” The purpose of the group is limited to “routine personal, social, and cultural communication” that is informal in nature and does “not involve political, government, business, financial, military, or other sensitive matter.” Two of the chat group members are doctors in the Pakistan military, each holding the rank of brigadier general (see SOR ¶ 1.c below). (Answer; Response; GE 4 at 12-13, 19-21) 1.b. Applicant participation in social media group chat with Pakistani friends and maternal cousins: Applicant admitted the allegation and explained that since early 2020, he has been a member of a group chat comprised of approximately 27 individuals in Pakistan. Some members of the group are extended family, including four maternal cousins. Posts to the group tend to be approximately weekly, and Applicant’s direct communications with one member or another tends to be “a few times per year.” The purpose of the group is limited to “routine personal, social, and cultural communication” that is informal in nature and does “not involve political, government, business, financial, military, or other sensitive matter.” (Answer; Response; GE 4 at 12-13, 19-21) 3

1.c. Applicant has two first cousins who are Brigadier Generals in the Pakistani military: Applicant admitted the alle

Analysis

ation and ex

plained both cousins are affiliated with the military medical corps. One cousin, AN, is a retired surgeon. The other, ZN, works with medical supply and logistics. Applicant does not maintain a close personal relationship with either and his interactions with them occur primarily in a group chat setting with no discussions of military, political, or governmental topics. (see SOR ¶ 1.a above). (Answer; Response) SOR Paragraph 2 (Guideline C: Foreign Preference) The Government alleged that Applicant is ineligible for a security clearance due to foreign preference given his acquisition of a NICOP card and his admitted use of a United Kingdom passport for travel to and from Pakistan. The following facts pertain: 2.a. Applying for Pakistani citizenship in May 2023: Applicant initially characterized Pakistan as a country of citizenship in his Questionnaire, which he affirmed to a defense investigator in June 2024. Elsewhere in t he Questionnaire, however, he explained he had obtained an identity card and not a passport. During the interview with a defense investigator, which he certified as accurate on January 21, 2026, he confirmed obtaining the citizenship to avoid paying visa fees. In his Answer, however, he clarified that he only obtained a NICOP and in fact did not “apply for Pakistani citizenship, seek naturalization in Pakistan, or obtain a Pakistani passport.” He further clarified his actions in his Response and denied telling the defense investigator he had actually applied for Pakistani citizenship. He reiterated having obtained the NICOP solely to facilitate travel to Pakistan. Lastly, after additional investigation, Applicant now believes it is possible he should have applied for a Pakistan Origin Card (POC) vice a NICOP. He recently made inquiries with NADRA about the appropriate card for visa issues without encroaching on matters of citizenship. (Answer; Response; GE 3 at 8; GE 4 at 7-9; HE III) 2.b. Use of U.K. passport at the U.S. border for travel to and from Pakistan in December 2023 and January 2024: Applicant admitted the allegation, explaining in both his Questionnaire and subsequent defense interview that during this trip, he used his U.K. passport because his U.S. passport had expired. In his Answer, he elaborated that the trip was hurriedly put together by his father in the wake of his mother’s recent passing. He denied any intent to evade U.S. law or conceal his travel and in fact used hi

s Global Entry credentials in conjunction with his U.K. passport at the U.S. border. This resulted in his having to later reapply for Global Entry. Applicant accepted full responsibility for “poor judgment and a misunderstanding of the applicable legal requirements.” He indicated he knows “better now after [his] experience” and has “taken deliberate steps to ensure full compliance with all applicable U.S. travel laws and regulations.” (Answer; Response; GE 3 at 8; GE 4 at 13) 4

Whole Person and Mitigating Evidence The comments and explanations Applicant included in his Questionnaire, discussions with the defense investigator, interrogatories, Answer to the SOR, Response, and HE III statement were reviewed in their entirety. In his Response, Applicant explained how since coming to the United States in 1971 as a child, America has been his home. He discussed how he built his life here, raised his family here, and contributed to his community as an American citizen. He reiterated that his allegiance is solely to the United States and any foreign contacts or activities referenced in the SOR are “limited to familial relationships and routine administrative or travel-related matters” and do not reflect any competing allegiance, preference, or obligation. (Answer; Response) Policies When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for national security eligibility, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the AG list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant’s national security eligibility. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. The entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. The protection of national security is of paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires, “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for

Whole Person Concept

ational security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. I have not drawn inferences based on mere speculation or conjecture. Directive ¶ E3.1.14, requires the Government to present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “The applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants national security eligibility. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified or sensitive information. 5

Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “Any determination under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also Executive

Formal Findings

Order 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information.) Analysis SOR Paragraph 1 (Guideline B: Foreign Influence) The security concern for foreign influence is set out in AG ¶ 6: Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a nat

Conclusion

onal security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign c